

# PROCLUS



## COMMENTARY ON PLATO'S *TIMAEUS*

VOLUME II

Book 2: Proclus on the  
Causes of the Cosmos and its Creation



EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY  
DAVID T. RUNIA AND MICHAEL SHARE

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## PROCLUS

### *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*

This volume of Proclus' commentary on Plato's *Timaeus* records Proclus' exegesis of *Timaeus* 27c–31b, in which Plato first discusses preliminary matters that precede his account of the creation of the universe and then moves to the account of the creation of the universe as a totality. For Proclus this text is a grand opportunity to reflect on the nature of causation as it relates to the physical reality of our cosmos. The commentary deals with many subjects that have been of central interest to philosophers from Plato's time onwards, such as the question of whether the cosmos was created in time, and the nature of evil as it relates to physical reality and its ontological imperfection.

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PROCLUS

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VOLUME II

Book 2: Proclus on the Causes of the  
Cosmos and its Creation

TRANSLATED WITH AN  
INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY

DAVID T. RUNIA

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and

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## *Acknowledgements*

The present volume is the third in the series resulting from a project initiated by Harold Tarrant, Dirk Baltzly and David Runia in 1997 and was the recipient of an Australian Research Council Discovery grant for the years 1999–2004. At the time David Runia was teaching at Leiden University in the Netherlands and the intention was that the project would be an Australian–European joint venture. In 2001 he spent a most profitable month enjoying the hospitality of Harold Tarrant’s Classics Department at the University of Newcastle. But all these arrangements changed when he returned to Australia to become Master of Queen’s College at the University of Melbourne in 2002. From then it became an all-Australian project. By 2003 it became clear that it was going to be difficult for him to complete the translation of the entirety of Book 2 of Proclus’ commentary (pages 205–458 in volume I of Diehl’s text). So it was decided to ask the Tasmanian classicist Michael Share (Hobart) to join in the project and translate that part of Book 2 that deals with *Tim.* 29d6–31b3. The present volume is the result of a very successful collaboration.

David Runia would like to thank first of all his collaborators in the project for their great support throughout the period of nearly a decade during which this translation was being produced. Harold Tarrant’s unsurpassed knowledge of the Platonist tradition was a continual source of information and inspiration. He was kind enough to read through the Introduction and Translation and make valuable comments, which I was able to include in the final draft. I have greatly enjoyed the periodic breakfasts with Dirk Baltzly on the South Bank of Melbourne’s Yarra River during the past six years, as we discussed various aspects of the project. It has been a delight to work together with Michael Share on this volume. Through the years of our collaboration I have developed an ever-increasing admiration for the extent and the accuracy of his knowledge of philosophical Greek. My last doctoral student at Leiden University, Marije Martijn, assisted me at various points as we tackled the difficulties of Proclus’ commentary together. Tim Buckley responded to my call to help me with the arduous task of compiling the Greek–English indices and English–Greek glossary. I also extend my thanks to Queen’s College, and in particular the President of its Council,

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Michael Share would like to thank the members of the project for the opportunity to join it mid-stream and for their friendly support during the years of his involvement. Both David Runia and Harold Tarrant read my contribution to the translation and made comments that greatly improved the final product. My special thanks go to David for making our collaboration so easy and so rewarding. Indeed, so pleasurable has it been that I almost regret the completion of this volume! Finally, I would like to thank my partner Wendy Pearson for her support and patience over the last four years.

## *Note on the translation*

The text used for this translation is that of E. Diehl (1903–6, three volumes), the only critical text available for this work.<sup>1</sup> References to pages and lines of Diehl's text are given in the margin. We have obtained a great deal of assistance from the French translation by the great scholar of late ancient pagan and Christian thought, André-Jean Festugière (1966–8, five volumes). Festugière's notes contain many important suggestions, based on Diehl's critical apparatus, for improving the text.<sup>2</sup> We have taken these into consideration, as well as other emendations recorded by Diehl in his critical apparatus.<sup>3</sup> Whenever we translate a text that deviates from Diehl, we record the details in our notes. On the other hand, we have not made extensive reference to the only previous English translation by Thomas Taylor (1810, two volumes). Taylor's version is based on a defective text and does not meet with modern scholarly standards.

As translators we are all too aware of the difficulty of rendering the complex yet precise structure of Proclus' Greek syntax into readable English. Our aim has been in the first place to produce an accurate translation that is faithful to the intent and content of the text, in the knowledge that many readers will not be in a position to check our translation against the Greek original. We have tried very hard to maintain terminological consistency, aiming to render crucial terms with the same English word where possible. So, for example, we consistently render *kosmos* with 'cosmos', *dêmiourgos* with 'demiurge', *paradeigma* with 'paradigm', and *eikôn* with 'image'.<sup>4</sup> In the case of some terms, of course, it is impossible to achieve this consistency, because they have multiple meanings depending on the context, as is notoriously the case for the term *logos* but also applies to common terms such as *archê*, *genesis*, *dunamis*, *ousia*, *teleios*, and so on. In the notes we make comments on our choice of translation for certain terms and on difficulties faced in

<sup>1</sup> Book 2 is located in volume I, pp. 205–458.

<sup>2</sup> Festugière made extensive use of comments and suggestions made by Praechter in his thorough review of the edition (1905).

<sup>3</sup> This is the source of the conjectures by Kroll, Praechter, Radermacher, Schneider and Taylor discussed in our notes.

<sup>4</sup> Capital letters are used when the Demiurge and the Paradigm are meant. It is not, however, always easy to follow this practice when Plato talks theoretically about generated paradigms and multiple demiurges.

rendering certain key Greek terms (especially those denoting being and becoming). In the translation we often add the transliterated Greek term in parentheses when it is important for understanding the meaning of the passage. The method of transliteration used follows the example of earlier volumes in the series.<sup>5</sup> A fuller listing of terms is found in the indices. Where the translation contains words that are not present in the Greek but are required to render the meaning in English, we place them in square brackets.

In general the translation attempts to stay reasonably close to Proclus' syntax. In this regard our translation differs slightly from earlier volumes in the series. On many occasions, however, this proves impossible to achieve and his long sentences have to be divided up into more manageable units. The translation of the Platonic text poses particular challenges because, if possible, it should correspond to the interpretation given it by Proclus. It has sometimes proved necessary to give a more literal translation of Plato's words than will be found in modern versions such as those of Cornford and Zeyl.<sup>6</sup>

The original text of the commentary has no chapter headings and forms a continuous body of text punctuated by the cited lemmata of the original Platonic text. In order to make reading of the commentary easier we have included our own divisions of the text. These are in many cases similar to the divisions included by Festugière in his translation, but they may sometimes differ. In the case of the Platonic lemmata we consistently indicate in the notes differences between Proclus' text and the modern critical edition of Burnet.

The purpose of the notes is limited and varied. We use them to comment on problems in the Greek text when they affect our translation. They also give background information – both topical and philosophical – which may be required in order to understand Proclus' meaning. To a limited degree comments are made which may help the reader follow his arguments. Whenever Proclus cites or makes allusions to other authors and texts we attempt to give a reference to a modern edition or collection of fragments. For the editions used see further below. We also cite modern discussions of Proclus' text when these are known to us. What the notes cannot do, however, is replace a full commentary on the text. It is to be hoped that this will be produced by others in the future.

<sup>5</sup> It is based on the practice of the *Ancient Commentators on Aristotle* series. See the Note on the translation in vol. I, p. x and vol. III, p. xi. One small difference is that we have decided to uniformly render the Greek *upsilon* with *u* in English.

<sup>6</sup> Cornford (1937), Zeyl (2000). As was the case for other volumes in the series, Zeyl's translation has been the starting-point, but it is often not literal enough for the purposes of understanding Proclus' commentary.

The following abbreviations to other works of Proclus have been used:

- in Tim.* = *Procli in Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, ed. E. Diehl, Bibliotheca Teubneriana, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1903–6 (references to volume I are given without volume number).
- in Remp.* = *Procli in Platonis Rem publicam commentarii*, ed. W. Kroll, Bibliotheca Teubneriana, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1899–1901.
- in Parm.* = *Procli commentarius in Platonis Parmenidem (Procli philosophi Platonici opera inedita pt. III)*, ed. V. Cousin, Paris, 1864; repr. Hildesheim, 1961.
- in Alc.* = *Proclus: Sur le premier Alcibiade de Platon*, ed. A. Segonds, Collection Budé, 2 vols., Paris, 1985–6.
- in Crat.* = *Procli Diadochi in Platonis Cratylum commentaria*, ed. G. Pasquali, Bibliotheca Teubneriana, Leipzig, 1908.
- ET* = *The Elements of Theology*, ed. E. R. Dodds, 2nd edition, Oxford, 1963 (references by page and line, not by chapter numbers unless the whole chapter is cited).
- PT* = *Proclus: Théologie Platonicienne*, ed. H. D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink, Collection Budé, 6 vols., Paris, 1968–97 (chapter numbers are used only when citing a whole chapter).
- in Eucl.* = *Procli Diadochi in primum Euclidis elementorum librum commentarii*, ed. G. Friedlein, Bibliotheca Teubneriana, Leipzig, 1873; repr. Hildesheim, 1967.
- De dec. dub.* = *Proclus: Trois études sur la providence*, vol. I: *Dix problèmes concernant la providence*, ed. D. Isaac, Collection Budé, Paris, 1977.
- De mal. subs.* = *Proclus: Trois études sur la providence*, vol. III: *De l'existence du mal*, ed. D. Isaac, Collection Budé, Paris, 1982.

Editions and fragment collections of writings referred to by Proclus are:<sup>7</sup>

- Epicurus: H. Usener, *Epicurea*, Leipzig, 1887.
- Hermarchus: F. Longo Auricchio, *Ermarcho: Frammenti*, La Scuola di Epicuro 6, Naples, 1988.
- Stoa: J. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, 4 vols., Leipzig, 1903–24, repr. Stuttgart, 1978 (abbreviated as *SVF*).
- Numenius: E. des Places, *Numénius Fragments*, Collection Budé, Paris, 1973.
- Gaius, Albinus, Taurus, Harpocration: A. Gioè, *Filosofi medioplatonici del II secolo d.C. Testimonianze e frammenti: Gaio, Albino, Lucio, Nicosttrato, Tauro, Severo, Arpocrazione*, Elenchos 36, Naples, 2003.
- Atticus: E. des Places, *Atticus: Fragments*, Collection Budé, Paris, 1977.

<sup>7</sup> For works not listed here see the bibliography.

- Alcinous: J. Whittaker and P. Louis, *Alcinoos Enseignement des doctrines de Platon*, Budé, Paris, 1990.  
 Plotinus: P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer, *Plotini opera editio minor*, 3 vols., Oxford Classical Texts, Oxford, 1964–82.  
 Porphyry: A. R. Sodano, *Porphyrii In Platonis Timaeum Commentariorum fragmenta*, Naples, 1964.  
 Longinus: M. Patillon and L. Brisson, *Longin: Fragments, Art rhétorique*, Collection Budé, Paris, 2001.  
 Iamblichus: J. M. Dillon, *Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis dialogos commentariorum fragmenta*, Philosophia Antiqua 23, Leiden, 1973.  
 Theodore of Asine: W. Deuse, *Theodorus von Asine. Sammlung der Testimonien und Kommentar*, Palingenesia 6, Wiesbaden, 1973.

As is noted in the Introduction, Proclus also refers frequently to two theological sources, the writings in the Orphic tradition and the Chaldean Oracles. The editions and translation that we use for these works are:<sup>8</sup>

- O. Kern, *Orphicorum fragmenta* (Berlin 1922).  
 E. des Places, *Oracles Chaldaïques*, Collection Budé, Paris, 1971; 3rd edition 1996.  
 R. Majercik, *The Chaldean Oracles. Text, Translation and Commentary*, Studies in Greek and Roman Religion 5, Leiden, 1989 (= *Or. Chald.*, numbering the same as in Des Places).

Other abbreviations that are used in the notes are:

- DK = H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 6th edition, Berlin, 1952.  
 Dörrie-Baltes, PA = H. Dörrie and M. Baltes, *Der Platonismus in der Antike*, Stuttgart, 1983–; § refers to ‘Baustein’.  
 Long–Sedley = A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1987.  
 LSJ = H. Liddell and R. Scott, *A Greek–English Lexicon*; rev. H. Jones (and others), with a rev. suppl., Oxford, 1996.  
 OCT = Oxford Classical Texts.  
 PW = Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 1894–1972.  
 TLG = *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*.  
 Tr-GF = B. Snell, R. Kannicht, S. Radt (eds.), *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, 4 vols., Göttingen, 1971–85.

For the English–Greek glossary, the Greek word index and the General index we closely follow the practice established in earlier volumes of the series. See further the introductory remarks for each list.

<sup>8</sup> We have not been able to use the new edition of A. Bernabé; see n. 30 in the Introduction.

# Introduction to Book 2

## STRUCTURE OF BOOK 2 OF PROCLUS' COMMENTARY

Book 2 of Proclus' *Commentary on the Timaeus* comments on 27c1–31b4 of the original text, amounting to 106 lines of Greek in Burnet's OCT edition. After two introductory sections, the former recapitulating the role of the prologue in 17a1–27b8, the latter giving a brief exposition on the nature and role of prayer, Proclus divides the text into fifty-one brief lemmata and treats them sequentially in the remainder of the book. The longest lemma is four and a half lines, the shortest are a number of lemmata of about a single line of text.<sup>1</sup> Each lemma is cited in full.<sup>2</sup> Proclus' text, which antedates that of the earliest manuscripts by at least half a millennium, is remarkably similar to Burnet's text, but there are a few significant differences, such as the omission of ἀεί at 28a1. All variations between Proclus' text and Burnet's are noted in the translation in footnotes to the translated lemma.

The commentary on the fifty-one lemmata takes up 240 pages of Diehl's Teubner text, so averages just under five pages per lemma. The length of the individual sections, however, is quite varied, depending on the subject dealt with. The longest sections are in each case provoked by an important theme, as can be seen in the following table, which lists the seven longest:

Lemma	Location	Length	Main subject
27d6–28a1	227.4–240.12 <sup>3</sup>	13	being and becoming I
28a1–4	240.13–258.8	18	being and becoming II
28c3–5	299.10–319.21	20	who is the Demiurge?
28c5–29a2	319.22–328.11	8	what is the Paradigm?
30a1–2	370.11–381.21	11	creation and the nature of evil
30a2–6	381.22–396.26	15	the temporality of the cosmos
31a3–4	438.19–447.32	10	unicity of Paradigm and cosmos

<sup>1</sup> Longest 28a5–b2 cited at 264.4; shortest 27d5 at 223.3, 29b2–3 at 337.8, 30b3–4 at 402.13, 31a3–4 at 438.18, 31b3–4 at 457.12.

<sup>2</sup> This is not the case in Book 1, where some lemmata are abbreviated, but corresponds to Proclus' practice in the rest of the work.

<sup>3</sup> All references to *in Tim.* without book numbers refer to volume I of Diehl's edition (i.e. Books 1 and 2).

Some sections, in contrast, are as short as a single page.<sup>4</sup> It cannot, in fact, be said that the commentary itself has any kind of structure beyond the sequence of cited lemmata and the comments made on them, which are in turn determined by both the method used by Proclus and the subjects raised by the text and its commentator. We shall return to Proclus' method in the next section.

A different, though not wholly unrelated, question is how Proclus the commentator views the structure of the Platonic text. This is in fact what determines the length of the book. The question is not hugely important for him, and what he says on the matter is not always fully consistent, but he makes enough remarks to enable us to reconstruct his views.<sup>5</sup> In the general introduction at the beginning of Book 1 he divides the work into three: at the beginning the order of the All is indicated through images, in the middle sections the creation as an entirety is recounted, and towards the end the particular parts and the final stages of the creative process are interwoven with the universal parts (see 4.8–11). The first part, as he goes on to explain, covers the section 17a–27b, which presents the continuation of the constitution of the *Republic* and the story of Atlantis, the subject of Book 1.<sup>6</sup> He then continues (4.26–29): 'Following upon this he teaches the demiurgic cause of the universe, and the paradigmatic, and the final. With these pre-existing, the universe is fashioned both as a whole and in its parts.' This statement can be easily related to the macro-structure of Book 2: the first part (205.1–355.15) introduces the three causes, the second part (355.16–458.11) the creation of the universe as a whole. This division is confirmed at the beginning of Book 3, where he distinguishes (II. 2.9–15) between 'the first foundation of the universe with reference to the wholeness that it receives from its creation', namely what is discussed in the second part of Book 2, and 'the second foundation which divides the cosmos by wholes and brings about the creation of whole parts', namely body and soul as discussed in the two parts of Book 3.<sup>7</sup>

But there is more to be said about the main division of the book into two parts. Early on, when interpreting the words 'in my opinion at least' (27d5), Proclus points out that Timaeus, as a Pythagorean, does not follow the dialectical method of Socrates but puts forward his own doctrine (223.5–14). This takes place by means of an account (*logos*) in

<sup>4</sup> E.g. on 27d1–4 at 222.7, 28b4–5 at 275.1, 31b3–4 at 457.12 (final section of the book).

<sup>5</sup> See the monograph of Lernould (2001), esp. 39–112, to which we are indebted for basic insights.

<sup>6</sup> See the Introduction to the translation of Book 1 by Harold Tarrant.

<sup>7</sup> See the Introduction to the translation of Book 3, part 1 by Dirk Baltzly.

which its subjects are sequentially introduced (227.1). As a Pythagorean, Timaeus is a natural philosopher (*phusilogos*), but not in the manner of other natural philosophers (236.3–9). His chief subject is the natural realm of physical reality, but he recognizes that the first principles of that realm need to be studied in so far as they are relevant for natural philosophy.<sup>8</sup> So the first part of Book 2 is concerned with preliminary matters relating to natural science, including some metaphysical or, as Proclus would prefer, theological themes. As he writes at 355.18, when making the transition to the second part, these are preparations for the science of nature in its entirety. The second part then commences the commentary on that part of Timaeus' account which is natural science proper, namely when it is concerned with its own object of inquiry, the universe. We shall return to this division when we discuss Proclus' treatment of Plato's *proemium* (27c–29d).<sup>9</sup>

By the time that Proclus was writing his commentary in about 440 CE<sup>10</sup> book production had moved from the scroll to the codex. His books are thus much longer than those produced by earlier writers such as Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus. The first part of Book 2 on 27c–29d (150 pages) is only marginally shorter than Book 4 on 37c–40e (161 pages) and not that much shorter than Book 1 on 17a–27b (205 pages). It may be surmised that Proclus decided that, although Plato clearly meant the section of the text 27c–29d to stand on its own, the links that it has with the following section on the creation of the cosmos as a whole (29d–31b) were so strong – especially in its discussion of the role of the Demiurge and the Paradigm – that it was advantageous to join the commentary on them in a single book. Even so, its length of 254 pages is shorter than Book 3, which discusses the creation of both the cosmos's body and its soul, and runs to no fewer than 317 pages in Diehl's text.

<sup>8</sup> In fact, as Proclus notes at 237.6, Timaeus will engage in metaphysics proper (called the 'highest science') in 47e–52d, where he proves the existence of (intelligible) Being. The commentary on this section is lost. Note that he is described as using all the methods of dialectics at 276.10, but this only applies to the preliminary topics required for his main theme, i.e. the fundamental principles and the demonstrations based on them.

<sup>9</sup> See below, pp. 16–17.

<sup>10</sup> According to his biographer Marinus, *Vita Procli* 13, Proclus completed his *Timaeus* commentary in his twenty-eighth year, i.e. by 440 CE. In modern terms it can be compared to a 'doctoral dissertation', showing what he could do, and very soon after he was chosen as his teacher Syrianus' successor. It is a prodigious work to have been completed in less than three years. It has been speculated that we may not have the original version, but one that has later been reworked; see Saffrey and Segonds (2001) 112, n. 12.

## METHOD OF PROCLUS' COMMENTARY

As we noted in the previous section, Proclus follows a fixed procedure in writing his commentary. He divides the Platonic text into brief lemmata and then proceeds to write explanatory comments of varying lengths on them. No use is made of headings of any kind. All the headings incorporated in the translation are the work of the translators, not of Proclus himself.<sup>11</sup> The sections of commentary themselves follow no fixed procedure. In a valuable article Festugière argued on the basis of the *Commentary on the Alcibiades* and the present work that the main structural tool used by Proclus was the distinction between general presentation (*theôria*) and detailed lexical reading (*lexis*) of the text, which goes back to oral teaching methods.<sup>12</sup> One of the main texts that he appeals to is found in Book 2, where Proclus begins his treatment of the famous text introducing the Demiurge at 28c3–5. After citing with approval the observation of his predecessors that Plato introduces a divine cause immediately after demonstrating that the cosmos has come into being from a cause, Proclus writes (299.19–21): ‘As for us, we should first examine the wording (*lexis*) of the text on its own and then proceed to the examination of the theme in its entirety (*hê holê theôria*) . . .’ The next four pages are then devoted to an analysis of virtually every word in the lemma (299.13–303.23). This is followed by sixteen pages on the subject of who the Demiurge is and in which order of reality he is to be located (303.24–319.21). Clearly the French scholar’s suggestion has merit and gives insight into some of the basic patterns of the commentary. In fact, however, Proclus’ method is much more varied and complex than this simple opposition indicates.<sup>13</sup> Without wishing to be exhaustive, we suggest that the methods used by Proclus in his commentary can be illuminated by the following nine features.

1. *Analysis of argument.* As we noted above, Timaeus is a philosopher of nature or natural scientist (*phusiologos*) who presents a reasoned, structured account (*logos*) of the origin and order of the physical world. Proclus therefore regards it as one of his chief tasks to explain the train of thought of Plato’s argument. The commentator assumes its underlying method, logic and structure and proceeds to explain it as he goes along. These assumptions come to the fore mainly at nodal points in his commentary, when he introduces the comments he is going to make.

<sup>11</sup> The use of headings does occur in some ancient texts, but to our knowledge they are not used in ancient commentaries.

<sup>12</sup> Festugière (1963). For the earlier history of this distinction, which goes back to the beginning of our era, see Dörrie–Baltes, PA §77.

<sup>13</sup> Lamberz (1987) 17 argues that it does not belong to the formal characteristics of the commentary (*bupomnêma*) as such.

Plato's account has an order (*taxis*), logical procedure (*logikê ephodos*), proper sequence (*akolouthia*) and continuity of thought (*sunecheia*); see 227.1, 328.16, 365.6, 371.9, 416.12. Plato proceeds in this way because there needs to be a strict correspondence between realities, thoughts and linguistically formulated accounts (339.5), as the text itself makes clear in 29b3–c3. For this reason the interpreter has to explain and defend the 'logographic' sequence of the text (436.6). Timaeus uses the proper methods of dialectic in presenting his account (276.10), asking the what-question when starting a particular inquiry in accordance with (Aristotelian) scientific method (227.13, 321.1, 357.3) and the example of Socrates in the *Phaedrus* (275.15). The statements that Plato gives in his argument have to be explained and their truth demonstrated (452.3). At various points Proclus explains or makes intelligent comments on the underlying syllogistic structure of Plato's argument; see 258.23, 328.20, 424.6, 438.20, 439.2. There is much that present-day interpreters of Plato's text can learn from his remarks.<sup>14</sup>

2. *Detailed reading of the text.* Much of the commentary is spent on detailed examination of terms and phrases used by Plato. As noted above, this is generally called the *lexis* (wording, text, formulation) of the text. How can we resolve a dispute between two interpretations, Proclus writes at 227.9, 'if we did not examine each of the *lexeis* involved one for one'? see also 243.26, 299.20, 387.6, 390.27, 420.20. The aim is to show the accuracy of the words (*onomata*) used by Plato to express his thought and argument (327.10). This can lead to some very interesting terminological analyses of crucial terms in Plato's philosophy, for example when he explains the epistemological terminology of 28a1–3 in 243.26–252.9. In such passages copious references are made to Platonic texts outside the *Timaeus* (see further under no. 8 below). Interpretation of the *lexis* also leads to differences among the interpreters, for example in the case of the words 'singly' and 'in their families' at 30c6 (425.11). Of course Proclus finds it as difficult to make a clear demarcation between terminological and systematic questions as any modern commentator would do. He is certainly flexible in his understanding of terms and consistently interprets them against the background of the context, even if he sometimes reads more into them than we would be inclined to do (e.g. his interpretation of 'in my opinion' in 27d5 at 223.14).

3. *Explanation of main philosophical themes.* Proclus recognizes, as any reader of the *Timaeus* must, that it contains a number of central themes. On a number of occasions he describes these as *problēmata*, literally 'things thrown up (by the text)', points of discussion or problems. The

<sup>14</sup> See for example the discussion on Timaeus' logic in the *proemium* by Ebert (1991), Runia (2000).

question of whether the cosmos is generated or not is ‘the very first of the problems concerning the universe’ (236.3), which in turn leads to other problems such as its causation, unicity, knowability, and so on (236.12, 416.9, 436.6, etc.). Other main themes are the nature of Being and becoming, the nature and role of the Demiurge and the Paradigm, the origin and role of matter, and so on. These themes are furnished by the philosophical problematics and systematics of the text itself but can in turn give rise to significant issues of interpretation, on which commentators can differ (see no. 5 below) and which highlight the differences between Platonist thought and that of other schools (see no. 6 below).

4. *Difficulties raised by the text.* More specifically Proclus often draws attention to *aporiai* (difficulties, puzzles). They can be raised directly by the text, but usually they arise from the work of previous interpreters and readers. For example the word *ti* (what) at 27d6 ‘furnishes both us (i.e. Proclus) and his predecessors with this *aporia*’ (227.18): why does Plato immediately proceed to the question ‘what it is’ and not follow the standard (Aristotelian) scientific procedure of asking ‘whether it is’? Such difficulties are often introduced by vague formulas using third-person plurals, such as ‘some raise the difficulty’ (266.21, see also 217.28), and ‘one might ask’ (422.5). But sometimes they are raised by previous interpreters, who are explicitly named, for example Atticus at 431.14 followed by Porphyry, Iamblichus and Amelius. Proclus naturally takes on the challenge of resolving the difficulty, as at 325.12–28 where, after raising the question why Plato should speak of a generated paradigm at 29a2, he says a little patronizingly that ‘we shall solve this difficulty if we recall to mind what has often been said before . . .’ (325.22). But this immediately gives rise to another difficulty (325.25), which is resolved at 327.9, and so on. Often he is at first quite tentative in answering these puzzles, beginning his explanations with words such as ‘perhaps’ (218.13), and ‘one might say’ (225.4). But this modesty does not usually last long. The task of the commentator is to point out the difficulties and then to solve them.

5. *Differences of interpretation.* Proclus records frequent differences of opinion (*antilegousi* 227.6, cf. 439.22) among prior exegetes and commentators in the Platonist tradition. Sometimes the reference is very general, as at 227.6. This is often the case when his criticism of their approach is harsh, such as when those who identify the Demiurge with the highest god are described as ‘altogether ridiculous’ (359.23). He is also quite critical of predecessors such as Plutarch and Atticus or Amelius (see 381.26–383.22, 398.16), whose views diverge from what had become standard Neoplatonist interpretation. Usually his tone, however, is more neutral. Analysis of previous positions helps him to clarify his own. On a number of occasions we are presented with the views of a list of interpreters.

The longest list is given on the question of the identity and role of the Demiurge, introduced by the statement, ‘the ancient interpreters have come to different opinions (*doxai*)’ (303.27). Other quite long lists are found on the question of the generation of the cosmos (276.31), the Paradigm and its relation to the cosmos (321.24), the temporality of the cosmos (381.26), the contents of the Paradigm (425.11), and on the relation between the Paradigm and the Demiurge (431.14). On Proclus’ use of source material from his exegetical predecessors see further in the next section. Consistently after giving these lists Proclus will state his own opinion or that of his teacher Syrianus with which he identified. He is convinced that these views come closest to Plato’s own thinking (310.6). Many of these passages can be called doxographical in the loose sense of the word. It is standard practice to state the views of others, criticize them and finish with one’s own considered opinion. Two passages show more resemblance to the doxographical method of the *Placita*, one on whether there is or is not an efficient cause of the cosmos (i.e. the Demiurge) at 265.21–266.4, the other at the end of Book 2, where views on unicity, plurality or infinite number of worlds are opposed to each other (453.14–456.31, following Plato’s cue at 31b2–3; see also 31a2–3).<sup>15</sup>

6. *Objections raised against the text.* But not all readers of the *Timaeus* were as sympathetic to its doctrine as Proclus and his Platonist predecessors. Throughout the commentary he also refers to those who actually oppose Plato’s viewpoint rather than just question its interpretation. A clear case is found at 266.21, where Proclus lists the objections of other philosophical schools to the conception of a Demiurge who uses a paradigm to create a cosmos. As is usually the case, their views are stated rather superficially. Proclus is not really interested in their views and engages in easy polemics. The case is different for Aristotle and his school. He gets some things wrong (e.g. the true nature of the cosmos’s eternity 286.21, the nature of the first principle 267.4),<sup>16</sup> but he also gets a lot of things right and can be used as a valuable source for doctrine (e.g. the argument that a limited body cannot have unlimited power 253.11, the doctrine of the various kinds of causes 261.2, etc.). See further the next section on Proclus’ references to other philosophical schools.

7. *Praise and defence of Plato.* As a Platonist, Proclus is fully committed to the value of Plato’s philosophy. The commentary is filled with

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Aëtius at Ps.Plut. 2.1, Stob. *Ecl.* 1.21–2, which in fact does not include the possibility of a plurality of worlds illustrated in Proclus by the example of Petron of Himera. On the method of the *Placita* and the concept of doxography in general see Runia (1999).

<sup>16</sup> See also 252.11–254.18 for a good example of how Proclus deals with Aristotle’s objections to Platonic doctrine, using his own views to refute his position.

remarks praising him and expressing admiration for his doctrine and the way he formulates it. See, for example, 270.9, 292.9, 403.31, 404.21. The principles of Plato's philosophy are true and Proclus is eager to demonstrate their truth in his commentary (265.9–266.21). He is not a detached observer who sees it as his task to explain what a great philosopher thought and wrote. Plato has expounded the truth and in doing so stands in a long tradition which starts with the first theologians.

8. *Plato's writings form a unity.* A hidden assumption, which Proclus does not make explicit in the text, is that the corpus of Plato's writings form a coherent unity. A number of classic texts in other dialogues shed light on the account of the cosmos's creation in the *Timaeus*, so are referred to at regular intervals; see especially references to *Philebus* 23–31 (259.27, 262.30, 315.15, 384.24, 403.18, 423.22) and *Politicus* 268–273 (253.19, 260.14, 312.18, 315.23). Proclus is aware that the context is a determinant factor in the terminology used. It allows him to explain, for example, why soul is called ungenerated in the *Phaedrus*, but generated in the *Timaeus* (287.20). Reference to other dialogues can also be used as proof for a particular interpretation of Plato's philosophy. A fine example is found at 393.14–31, where Proclus takes over a passage from Porphyry in which texts from other dialogues are invoked to demonstrate against the Middle Platonist Atticus that there is but one ultimate principle. It is striking how often he names other dialogues explicitly when referring to their texts rather than simply making an erudite allusion as we might find in an author such as Plotinus; see the index for a full list of such references. This practice stems from the didactic background and purpose of the commentary.

9. *Plato and the tradition of wisdom.* Finally we should note that Proclus does not only use philosophical sources to explain Plato's text. As a pupil of Syrianus ('our teacher', as he usually calls him) Proclus stands in a tradition, beginning with Iamblichus, which recognizes a single tradition of wisdom that can be expressed in both philosophical and theological modes. It should be recognized, he says at 390.27–391.4, that when Plato introduces the pre-cosmic chaos he was imitating the 'theologians' when they opposed the Titans to the Olympians, but they were speaking 'theologically' whereas he operates 'philosophically'. Basically there is complete agreement between Plato and both the 'theologians' in the Orphic tradition and the much later Chaldean Oracles. Indeed they can be used to shed light on each other, as he argues at 407.21. On these traditions and references to Homer and the poets see further the following section. It is noteworthy that these discussions often occur towards the end of the commentary on a particular lemma. This is because Proclus tends to regard the agreement between the inspired poets and Plato as he interprets him as a confirmation of his exegesis. Undoubtedly this is

the aspect of Proclus' work that deviates most from what we would now expect of a commentary on a strictly philosophical text.

Summing up, we can say that the only fixed procedure that Proclus follows in his commentary is the alternation of text and exposition. His methods, for which he is greatly indebted to his exegetical predecessors, are highly varied and primarily adapted to the needs of his exegesis. He is a tidy author and the reader is generally left in no doubt about the direction that he wishes his comments to take. There is a fair amount of repetition, but this is hard to avoid when using the method of the line-by-line commentary. To some degree Proclus is aware of the problem and does include a considerable number of cross-references in his text. Without doubt the commentary is long-winded,<sup>17</sup> but it is worth remembering that, if it had been shorter, we would have been deprived of much of the extremely valuable information on the commentary tradition of the *Timaeus* which it contains.

#### THE SOURCES FOR PROCLUS' COMMENTARY

The importance of Proclus' commentary for our knowledge of the tradition of interpretation of Plato's *Timaeus* can hardly be overestimated. Indeed it has been suggested that it may well be the most important text for our knowledge of Middle Platonism.<sup>18</sup> But it contains much more material than just on that period. We are presented with this cornucopia because, for reasons that we do not fully understand,<sup>19</sup> Proclus is much more generous with references to and discussions of his exegetical predecessors than in his later commentaries. The following is an overview of the source material which Proclus uses in Book 2. The list is only exhaustive as far as the names are concerned. For a complete list of references, see the Index of names.

#### The Platonist tradition<sup>20</sup>

1. *Old Academy*.<sup>21</sup> The only member of the Old Academy whom Proclus mentions by name is Crantor (277.8), whom he had earlier (76.1) called

<sup>17</sup> It is, for example, much longer than the equivalent modern commentaries of A. E. Taylor and F. M. Cornford.

<sup>18</sup> Tarrant (2004) 175.

<sup>19</sup> For various speculations see Tarrant (2004) 176. I suspect that chronology may have something to do with it. The commentary is a youthful work and, just like modern dissertations, is better documented than usual.

<sup>20</sup> For a fine overview of Platonist commentators and commentaries on the *Timaeus* see Dörrie-Baltes, PA §81.

<sup>21</sup> On Proclus and the Old Academy see Tárán (1987).

‘Plato’s first exegete’.<sup>22</sup> Plato’s successors in the Academy, Speusippus and Xenocrates, are not named although we know that the view that the cosmos is created ‘for purposes of instruction’, cited at 290.9, is theirs. Proclus will have derived it from Aristotle’s critique in *De caelo* 1.10, 279b32–280a11.<sup>23</sup>

2. *Middle Platonists*.<sup>24</sup> The earliest ‘Platonist’<sup>25</sup> to be mentioned is Plutarch. Most often he is coupled with the second-century Platonist Atticus as the key representatives of an interpretation of the *Timaeus* with which Proclus very strongly disagrees, namely that the creation is a process that takes place in time (276.31, 326.1, 381.26, 384.4). Plutarch is cited on his own on the doctrine of providence (415.19) and the question of the unicity of the cosmos (454.13). Others to be mentioned are Harpocration (304.22), Albinus on his own (219.2) and with his teacher Gaius (340.24), Severus (227.15, 255.6, 289.7), Atticus on his own (272.1, 366.9, 391.7 etc.) and Numenius (only once at 303.27).

3. *Third-century Neoplatonists*. Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonism, is called ‘the most divine’ at 427.14 and is cited about ten times in passages which shed interesting light on early interpretation of the *Enneads* (esp. 3.9). His friend and fellow-philosopher, the ‘noble’ Amelius (309.21), is mentioned a little less often. Proclus argues against the way he makes the Demiurge triple: it is possible to let the three demiurges stand, but who is the single Demiurge prior to them (306.21)? Plotinus’ rival, the ‘philologist’ Longinus, is named only once at 322.24, the only other mention in the commentary apart from the copious references in Book 1. But it is Plotinus’ pupil and editor, Porphyry of Tyre, who as exegete has the greatest impact on Book 2. By means of his commentary Porphyry placed the interpretation of the *Timaeus* on a new footing and it is only a slight exaggeration to say that Proclus is indebted to it on almost every page. In Sodano’s collection of fragments Proclus supplies the bulk of the fragments on this part of the text.<sup>26</sup> At 391.4 he makes it quite clear that he is paraphrasing an extensive section of Porphyry’s commentary amounting to nearly six pages in length (391.4–396.26), where he attacks the Middle Platonist Atticus for interpreting Plato in

<sup>22</sup> Although Proclus is not explicit, both Tarán (1987) 270 and Dörrie–Baltes, PA §81.1 interpret this statement to mean that Crantor was the first to write a commentary on the *Timaeus* (though not necessarily a line-by-line treatment).

<sup>23</sup> It is possible that the description ‘those who explain in a more dialectical fashion’ (290.3) is at least partly an oblique reference to these philosophers.

<sup>24</sup> I make no distinction between Platonists and Neopythagoreans here. On Proclus and the Middle Platonists see Whittaker (1987).

<sup>25</sup> The term Platonist (Πλατωνικός) did not come into use until the first century CE.

<sup>26</sup> Frs. 28–33, 40–6, 51–6 (the rest are from Philoponus’ *De aeternitate mundi*). Sodano’s collection should be superseded by a more thorough study.

terms of a multiplicity of principles. It is fair to assume that many of the exegetical techniques and a considerable amount of exegetical material used by Proclus are derived from Porphyry's great work without attribution. But his indebtedness goes a step further. Porphyry was most probably the first commentator to try to interpret the dialogue in terms of a unified interpretation of Plato's philosophy, a task which modern historians of philosophy are reluctant to do, but which Proclus attempts to take to a new level.

4. *Fourth-century Neoplatonists.* Proclus also makes copious reference to the commentary of Iamblichus of Chalcis, which takes the second place in the list of pre-Proclan *Timaeus* commentaries. It appears that the second book of Iamblichus' commentary covered exactly the same length of text as Proclus' Book 2.<sup>27</sup> Dillon's collection of fragments contains twenty-one extracts from our book.<sup>28</sup> Proclus has a high respect for his predecessor, usually calling him the 'divine' Iamblichus. Once again he takes over many exegetical details, but his greatest debt is in the area of theology. Iamblichus had developed the method whereby the contents of Plato's dialogues and their metaphysical and physical doctrines were directly linked to or even identified with the pantheon of Greek gods.<sup>29</sup> Proclus often mentions the two great commentators Porphyry and Iamblichus in one breath (e.g. 219.20, 275.23). He clearly sees them as standing in the same tradition as that which goes back to the great Plotinus. He himself has greater sympathy, however, for the more 'hieratic' style of Iamblichus which was further developed by his own teacher Syrianus. The only other fourth-century Platonist to whom he refers is Theodore of Asine, who is called 'admirable' (332.7, 427.13) and cited four times (also 309.14, 425.19).

5. *Fifth-century Neoplatonists.* Proclus does not name any more recent commentators than Theodore, who died no later than 360 CE. But he does make frequent oblique references to his teacher Syrianus under the title 'our teacher' (218.13, 241.3, etc.). Proclus never enters into discussion with his teacher and we can assume that Syrianus' views correspond to his own. After he has given a long doxography of views of Platonist predecessors on the nature of the Demiurge, he introduces Syrianus' views by saying that he believes that 'they have come closest of all to reaching Plato's thought on the matter . . .' (310.6). Syrianus will have given lectures on the *Timaeus*, but as far as we know he did not write a commentary himself. His most important and creative work, which sadly

<sup>27</sup> As argued by Dillon (1973) 54.

<sup>28</sup> Frs. 26–46. We are much indebted to his translation and commentary.

<sup>29</sup> Valuable remarks on the convergence of religion and philosophy in Iamblichus by Wallis (1972) 129–34. But there are prefigurations of this approach in Plotinus and Porphyry.

has not been preserved, was entitled *Agreement of Orpheus Pythagoras Plato with the [Chaldean] Oracles*. It is safe to assume that Proclus' frequent references to the Orphic poems and Chaldean Oracles, which we shall discuss next, were inspired by his teacher.

### The inspired tradition of wisdom

1. *The Orphic tradition*. Throughout Book 2 Proclus makes numerous references to and quotes a large number of lines of poetry from the Orphic writings attributed to the inspired mythical singer Orpheus, named in 306.12, 307.28, 427.21, but more often called the 'Theologian' (207.2, 313.8, etc.) or referred to as 'the theologians' (280.20, 333.2 and many more examples). In his collection of the fragments Kern attributed almost all this material to the 'Sacred accounts in 24 rhapsodies'.<sup>30</sup> As noted above, it was the innovation of Iamblichus and Syrianus to give an interpretation of the mythological account of the origins of the cosmos in terms of Neoplatonist philosophy, in which the various gods and eponymous divine figures such as Chronos, Gaia and Phanes are identified with key philosophical concepts such as the One, the Demiurge, Being, and Eternity.<sup>31</sup> Proclus sees these poems as part of a tradition of ancient wisdom. Elsewhere he refers to these poets as 'those who are wise in divine things' (133.9), 'the wise among the Greeks' (II. 82.13), the 'ancient theologians' (183.13), and so on. On one occasion he also cites Iamblichean material on ancient Egyptian lore and Hermes Trismegistus which is used to illustrate and confirm Plato's doctrine of the derivation of matter (386.10).

2. *Homer and the poets*. Homer is cited much less often than the Orphics. But he is the 'divine poet' (316.4) and part of the tradition that celebrates the Demiurge with fine names (316.10). Plato's epithet 'father' for the god (28c3) is in direct imitation of Homer (316.11). His famous verse on the golden chain (*Iliad* 8.9) is cited at 314.17. Other unspecified poets are mentioned at 338.12.

3. *The Pythagorean tradition*. Book 2 contains only a limited number of references to the Pythagoreans, who privilege the role of number (276.16) and especially the monad (308.24 in a report on Iamblichus) in their philosophy. Proclus assumes that Plato follows the Pythagoreans in his doctrine (262.10, 267.2), and of course Timaeus himself is a Pythagorean (223.5, 237.5).

<sup>30</sup> Kern (1922), see index at 371–2. The exception is fr. 315, cited at 316.19. But at III. 107.14 he calls it a 'Pythagorean hymn'. We have not yet been able to make use of the new edition of Orphic writings by A. Bernabé (2004–5), because it is not yet indexed.

<sup>31</sup> On this practice see Brisson (1987b).

4. *Other early philosophers.* Greek philosophers before Plato apart from the Pythagoreans are also cited on a few occasions, not always positively. Parmenides is regarded as belonging to the Pythagorean tradition. The title that he gives the second part of his poem (*Pros doxan*, 'In relation to opinion') agrees with Plato's views on the epistemological status of what is generated (252.1).<sup>32</sup> But those early thinkers who have a negative view of the cosmos are criticized at 334.1–4 (only Heraclitus is named). And compared with Plato, Heraclitus and Empedocles are far too brash in their assertions about the status of their knowledge (351.6–11).<sup>33</sup>

5. *The Chaldean Oracles.* A quite different source, historically speaking, is the collection of verses known as the Chaldean Oracles. Proclus refers to their authors, the second-century CE figures Julian father and son, as the 'Theurgists' at 274.16 (singular at 317.23). Even though, as he knows, these texts were not written until much later than Plato's time, he regards them as divinely inspired and on a par with much more ancient traditions. Twice they are called 'the divinely transmitted Theology' (318.22, 408.12). Most often, however, Proclus refers to them simply as 'the Oracles' (*ta logia*). The divine names for the cosmos, both ineffable and expressed, have been handed down to them (274.17). In Majercik's edition our book yields ten texts, but there are considerably more allusions to their doctrines and phraseology.<sup>34</sup> For the historian of philosophy Proclus' exegetical practice is intriguing, since he uses the Oracles to explain the *Timaeus*, whereas it is abundantly clear that their authors were influenced by Middle Platonist philosophy, which itself was strongly dependent on the *Timaeus* for the systematics of its doctrine.<sup>35</sup>

### Other philosophical schools

It was noted above that Proclus from time to time enters into conversation with other schools which follow a different philosophical line from that of Plato and his tradition. But the references are fairly scanty and superficial. Proclus is supremely confident that he is in possession of the true philosophy and he has the support of the *Zeitgeist* in the case of a number of his fundamental convictions (no one at this time would seriously entertain views that were anti-teleological in physics, materialist in

<sup>32</sup> The reference to the Protagoreans on sense-perception and Xenophanes on opinion as the criterion (254.21–3) are purely doxographical. Here Plato's views are superior.

<sup>33</sup> On Proclus and the Presocratics see Westerink (1987).

<sup>34</sup> See Majercik (1989), index on p. 246. Des Places' collection (1996 [1971]) is fuller, because it also takes single terms and allusions into account; see his index at p. 246 (*sic*).

<sup>35</sup> See discussions at Dillon (1996) 392–6, Majercik (1989) 3. There is a particularly close affinity between the Oracles and Numenius, but it is difficult to determine who has influenced whom.

metaphysics or sceptical in epistemology). The exception to this superficial treatment is his use of Aristotle, which is extensive.

1. *Aristotle*. Proclus refers to Aristotle far more than any other philosopher except Plato (and his exegetes). The epithet that he generally uses for him, 'splendid' (*daimonios*, see 294.13, 295.28), indicates admiration tinged with irony. There is much that can be learnt from him in the area of method (e.g. use of hypotheses 237.17, specifying the kind of account 339.20, in both cases imitating Plato), philosophical analysis (e.g. analysis of terms 280.1) and doctrine (e.g. analysis of causes 261.2, arguments on the nature of the corporeal 279.8). But there are also many issues where Aristotle does not follow Plato's teaching and reaches conclusions opposed to the *Timaeus* and therefore wrong. The main points of contention are the interpretation of what it means to be generated (252.11, 253.29), the concept of time and eternity in relation to the cosmos (286.21, 295.11), the roles of the efficient and the final cause in the cosmos's generation (267.5), the role of Intellect (404.7), and the neglect of the Paradigm (456.10–13). Especially noteworthy is the extensive passage 294.28–296.12, where Proclus resists the Neoplatonic tendency to try to harmonize the thought of the two thinkers completely and gives a valuable summary of how he sees their main similarities and differences.<sup>36</sup> Aristotle's main works were read in the school of Syrianus, who regarded their study as a preliminary stage in the initiation into Platonic thought. We know that Proclus spent nearly two years studying them and he has a sound first-hand knowledge of their contents.<sup>37</sup> The works used most are the *Physics*, *On the Heaven* (esp. 1.10–11) and the *Metaphysics* (esp. book Lambda). But references can also be taken at second hand, as is the case at 395.1, which is part of a long section taken from Porphyry.

2. *The Peripatetics*. Apart from Aristotle there is almost no mention of the school. The only general reference is at 266.29, where, as part of a brief doxography of opposing views, Proclus attacks them for neglecting the efficient and the paradigmatic cause. The only other reference to a Peripatetic is the surprising report (425.22) of a detailed exegetical comment by Xenarchus (first century BCE),<sup>38</sup> unless we should also include the brief citation from Theophrastus at 456.17.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>36</sup> On the shortcomings of Aristotle's physics especially on the subject of divine causality see Steel (1987), (2003).

<sup>37</sup> Marinus, *V. Procl.* 13.

<sup>38</sup> On this text see Moraux (1973–84) I. 206, who does not think it points to a *Timaeus* commentary.

<sup>39</sup> Fr. 242 Fortenbaugh *et al.*, a brief doxographic report on the reasons that Plato gives for affirming that there is but a single cosmos. It is probably derived from the *Phusikai doxai*.

3. *The Epicureans*. Proclus refers to Epicurus and his school only when discussing the principle of efficient causation, which Epicurus undermines with his notion of multiple spontaneous causes (262.2, 266.26, 267.16). A clever attack on *Timaeus* 27c1–3 by Epicurus' successor Hermarchus is cited at 216.18.

4. *The Stoics*. Here too the references are rather thin. The school is mentioned as part of the doxography at 456.15 and is criticized for failure to distinguish between gods and humans in the domain of knowledge (351.14). The only individual Stoic to be cited is Chrysippus, whose concept of the cosmos is roundly criticized from a Neoplatonist point of view (414.1).

Finally we might wish to ask whether Proclus enters into discussion with opponents who do not share his Hellenic religious outlook. Certainly there are no overt discussions. It is possible, however, that his comments at 369.19–25 about people saying 'God is good' every day are a covert allusion to Christians.<sup>40</sup> Saffrey has identified a small number of such allusions, but they have even less depth than his references to other philosophical schools.<sup>41</sup> The commentary is written primarily for a circle of believers in the Hellenic and Platonic faith.

We may conclude, therefore, that Book 2, just like the rest of Proclus' commentary, is a treasure-trove of erudition and information. Without it our knowledge of the tradition of the interpretation of the *Timaeus* would be sadly diminished. Our gratitude need not be lessened by the realization that some of what he records may well be based on indirect acquaintance. This is especially the case for the earlier Platonist tradition before Plotinus. In some cases, for example the report on Petron of Himera, based, ultimately at least, on one of Plutarch's treatises (454.12), his information may come from his own reading.<sup>42</sup> But very often it is likely to have been taken from his two main sources, the commentaries of Porphyry and Iamblichus.<sup>43</sup> Even if it is for this reason perhaps a little less reliable, it still remains quite invaluable.

#### MAIN THEMES OF PROCLUS' COMMENTARY

Book 2, as was noted above, covers two central parts of *Timaeus*' discourse, the section in which he grounds his account in higher principles and discusses preliminary issues (27c1–29d6, dealt with in 205.4–355.15) and the section in which the creation of the cosmos is described in general terms (29d7–31b3, dealt with in 355.16–458.11). In his role as

<sup>40</sup> See the note to 369.25.

<sup>41</sup> Saffrey (1975). See esp. III. 153.6–15, also III. 44.2–6 and perhaps 122.12.

<sup>42</sup> Esp. if ἡκονσα is taken to mean 'I read'; see note ad loc.

<sup>43</sup> See the sagacious comments by Tarrant (2004) 177.

commentator Proclus follows the text wherever it goes. Numerous questions raised by the text are treated in great detail, and he is not averse to making digressions.<sup>44</sup> But as his commentary unfolds he also develops his thought on the great main themes of Plato's text. In this section of the introduction we shall briefly outline these themes, drawing attention to the main passages in which they are discussed. For a more detailed treatment of the book's contents the reader is referred to the recent monograph of Lernould.<sup>45</sup>

### The *proemium*

It has long been customary to call the first part of Timaeus' long monologue, before the brief interruption of Socrates at 29d4–6, the *proemium*, taking over the description used by Plato himself at 29d5 (προοίμιον, translated as 'prelude').<sup>46</sup> The opening words of Book 2 may, in this perspective, be a little misleading, since Proclus uses the same term to look back on the contents of Book 1 (205.4). It is made clear at 206.16–26, however, that the first part of the dialogue is quite different from what follows. It dealt with the subject 'by means of images'.<sup>47</sup> Now it is time to look at the 'paradigms' of those images, the 'knowledge of the whole' (206.17). At the outset of Book 2 Proclus tells us little about how he sees the role of the *proemium* in Timaeus' discourse as a whole. But he makes up for this oversight at the end when he specifically comments on the term at 29d5 (354.28–355.4) and also a few lines later when he links up the *proemium* with the next part of the work (355.18–25).<sup>48</sup>

This section of the work, Proclus declares, embraces all the preliminary questions that need to be discussed (355.1). Together they lay a foundation for the treatise as a whole. Four questions are mentioned.

- (1) It introduces the specific nature of the object being researched (355.2), namely the physical universe as subject matter of Timaeus' discourse. Earlier, when commenting on *Timaeus*

<sup>44</sup> E.g. the mini-treatise on prayer at 207.19–214.12, the section on evil at 373.22–381.21, Porphyry's arguments against Atticus at 391.4–396.26.

<sup>45</sup> Lernould (2001). Most of the monograph is devoted to an analysis of Book 2. A further study of the main philosophical themes of the book has just been completed in a Leiden dissertation by Dr Marije Martijn (2008). See also her article, Martijn (2006).

<sup>46</sup> See the discussion in Runia (1997).

<sup>47</sup> On this passage see the comments of H. Tarrant in volume I of this series: Tarrant (2007) 18.

<sup>48</sup> In this text he clearly distinguishes between the two *proemia*, the former in 17a–27c, the latter at 27c–29d. It would have been easier if he had not used the same term for both, e.g. reserving the term 'prologue' for the former (but in fact he almost never uses that term; in Book 2 it occurs only at 345.7).

28b4–5, he states that this task involves determining the ontological status of the object of inquiry by asking whether it belongs to the realm of Being or the realm of becoming, the question that will be answered in the following lines, 28b6–7 (275.1–20).

- (2) Next it states on what fundamental principles the object of inquiry depends, and on what prior propositions demonstrated on the basis of these principles (355.2–3). These are the fundamental principles which Proclus discerns in 27d5–28b4 and the further demonstrations which are presented on the basis of them in 28d6–29a6. Together they enable Timaeus to determine the conceptual framework required for the examination of the nature and structure of the universe that he is about to begin. We shall discuss these in greater detail in the next subsection.
- (3) It also indicates what kind of discourse Timaeus' account will be (355.3–4). This refers of course to the discussion at 29b3–c3, where a correlation is made between the ontological status of an object of inquiry and the kind of *logoi* that can be used to explain it. Proclus comments on this text at 339.3–348.7. In the case of the cosmos, being a physical and sense-perceptible copy of an intelligible paradigm, the form of discourse that can be devoted to it is verisimilitude (εἰκοτολογία), imaging the truth but not to be equated with the truth itself (338.28–339.2).
- (4) Finally it discusses 'what kind of listener there is' (355.4), referring to Plato's text at 29c4–d3. This passage is briefly treated at 348.8–353.28. According to Proclus, Plato prepares the listener as to how he should receive the intended *logoi* (348.17). It is necessary not only to take the nature of the *logoi* into account, but also the inevitable limitations of human nature (353.28).

It is perhaps disappointing that Proclus does not show greater interest in analysing this introductory section of Timaeus' discourse in the perspective of the kind of discourses written by Plato's predecessors. Only once does he draw attention to the contrast between the modesty shown by Plato and the posturing of the Presocratics Heraclitus and Empedocles (351.6–10). But it does emerge that he has a firm view of the *proemium's* role in the overall structure of Timaeus' account. The fact that he devotes so much attention to this crucial part of the work does him credit.<sup>49</sup> There is much in his approach from which we can learn.

<sup>49</sup> In contrast to modern commentators, who have generally given relatively little attention to it. This includes the latest study by Johansen (2004), who devotes a chapter to the status of Timaeus' account (i.e. on 29b–d) but says relatively little about the rest of the *proemium*.

## The first principles

The object of Timaeus' investigation, as we have seen, is the universe as physical and sense-perceptible object encompassing all other such objects.<sup>50</sup> Of course, numerous questions can be asked of this object, but the most fundamental, in Proclus' view, is the question: what is its origin, where does it come from? Following the interpretation of his predecessors Porphyry and Iamblicus, he interprets the difficult text at 27c5 to mean that Plato places this question at the forefront of the investigation, namely 'whether it has come into being or is ungenerated'. But how does the philosopher proceed on this question? Plato is not an empiricist. There is no question of starting out with our experience and drawing conclusions from what it tells us. Instead Plato uses the method of the hypothesis, setting out fundamental assumptions or principles – for which he uses the terms *axiômata* and *hupotheseis* – and drawing conclusions from them.<sup>51</sup> These first principles are set out, according to Proclus, in 27d5–28b4. A numbered list of them is presented in an important passage at 236.8–237.16. Starting with the most fundamental, they are the following:

- (1) There is always-existent true being, known by intuitive knowledge (*noêsis*) together with a reasoned account (*logos*).
- (2) There is what is generated, grasped by opinion with the help of sense-perception.
- (3) Whatever is generated comes into being through the agency of a cause. Conversely, what does not gain its existence through a cause is not generated.
- (4) In the case of a generated object, if it comes into being with eternal being as its paradigm, it will be beautiful, but if its paradigm is itself generated, the result will not be beautiful.
- (5) Let the whole of reality be named heaven or cosmos.

In a second passage, at 265.3–8, he presents the third and fourth as pairs of two hypotheses, which makes seven principles in total, but does not number them explicitly.<sup>52</sup> The difference between the two presentations is moot. On the other hand, it is important to observe the logical connections between the principles. Proclus argues firmly that the first two

<sup>50</sup> Since Kant it has been considered doubtful whether it is possible to make an investigation of the whole of physical reality.

<sup>51</sup> On the terms used by Proclus and his view of the relation between philosophy and mathematics see further Festugière (1966–8) II. 66, O'Meara (1989) 181–209, Lernould (2001) 115–25, Martijn (2008) chs. 3 and 4.

<sup>52</sup> Lernould (2001) 41 and n. 18 notes that one can also reduce the number to four. Like Festugière (1966–8) II. 67, I retain five because of Proclus' explicit numbering scheme.

do not represent a division but rather offer distinct definitions of the two classes of existents (224.17–227.3). The third principle then picks up on the second class and stipulates that it must come into existence through a cause (258.12), while the fourth principle adds the further stipulation that its nature depends on the kind of paradigm used by its maker (264.10). Only the fifth hypothesis is different and does no more than introduce and name the object which will be the subject of the further investigation (272.10).

When Proclus refers to the hypothetical method used by Plato, he does not in the first place have in mind Plato's own references to this method (e.g. at *Meno* 86e3, *Phd.* 110b3, *Rep.* 511b5) but explicitly refers to the method used by geometers, who first postulate, define and name their key principles before proceeding to their demonstrations based on them.<sup>53</sup> As an illustration of the method he cites an example from Euclid (272.13) and also claims that Aristotle uses the method in his *Physics* and *De caelo* (237.18). It is important to recognize, however, that geometers develop proofs elucidating the nature of what they postulate, but they do not prove its existence (236.30). It is not their task to reflect on the principles of their science. That is the role of the philosopher who advances to the first principles of reality. Timaeus as a natural philosopher does not embark on this task in the *proemium*, which precedes his account of the genesis of the physical universe. But as a Pythagorean he has advanced beyond natural philosophy and later in the treatise he will actually prove the existence of true being (228.29, 237.5, referring to 52a–b).

On the basis of the fundamental principles or hypotheses set out in 27d5–28b4 Timaeus then proceeds, in Proclus' reading of the text, to a number of 'demonstrations' (*apodeixeis*) based on them in 28b5–29b1 and required in order to solve the problems that the subject of the account, the origin and nature of the cosmos, raises (276.18). The first of these concerns the specific kind (*eidos*) of the cosmos. In which order should it be placed, that of always-existent being or that which is generated?<sup>54</sup> The demonstration is given at 28b7–c1. It belongs to the latter because it has a bodily nature, which determines its ontological status (276.27). The second demonstration shows that the cosmos comes into being through the agency of an efficient cause, which is to be identified with the Demiurge (28c2–5, see 296.15–29). The third demonstration then shows that the cosmos has been created in relation to an eternal paradigm, as proven by its beauty and the excellence of its maker (28c5–29b1, see 328.16–329.1). Whereas the first demonstration homes in on the specific

<sup>53</sup> See 226.26, 228.27, 236.15, 258.12, 272.10, 283.17.

<sup>54</sup> But see 276.25 for the subtlety that in virtue of its soul the cosmos can also be placed in the class of what is ungenerated.

nature of the cosmos, the second two elucidate the causation that is required for it, namely the efficient, paradigmatic and final.<sup>55</sup> Proclus already announces this in his introduction to the commentary at 4.26–29 (see 263.19–264.3). Later, when Timaeus turns to the actual creation of the cosmos in 29d7, his point of departure will be precisely the Good as final cause (355.28–357.23). There is thus a natural progression from the *proemium* as introductory section of the account to its main part.

### The generated and temporal nature of the cosmos

As we have already seen, Proclus regards the question of the generated or non-generated nature of the cosmos as the central theme of Timaeus' account. Plato's first move is to set out, in the first two fundamental principles, what is to be included under the ontological categories of Being and becoming (see 27d5–28a4). The former, more precisely called 'the always-existent' (τὸ ὄν ἄει), encompasses all that exists eternally, including both the 'Living-Thing-itself', namely the Paradigm, and the Demiurge, but not including the One Being and the One, which are both beyond Being (231.19–26).<sup>56</sup> It is in effect the entire realm of Being ontologically prior to Soul (232.6). Becoming, on the other hand, is interpreted by Proclus as denoting the entire corporeal realm (233.11). It is emphatically not to be equated with the cosmos itself, for it excludes the soul of the universe, since Soul as hypostasis in a certain sense belongs to eternal Being (233.13).<sup>57</sup>

It is not until 28b6–c2 that Timaeus discloses, with reference to the earlier distinction between Being and becoming, what the nature and status of the cosmos is. It belongs to the latter both because it is a composite and corporeal entity and because it is dependent on higher causes for its existence (276.8–16).<sup>58</sup> At the same time it can also be said to be ungenerated, because a little later in his account Timaeus will call it a 'blessed god' (34b8), a description which it could only receive because its corporeal nature is directed by Soul (cf. 276.25–30).

<sup>55</sup> On the doctrine of the six causes, which Proclus takes over from the Platonist tradition see 263.20, 357.12 and Dörrie-Baltes, PA §117.

<sup>56</sup> Proclus is arguing here against a broader interpretation on the part of Iamblichus.

<sup>57</sup> Inasmuch as it participates in and contemplates the intelligible realm. Note that in Proclus' interpretation the distinction that Plato makes in 27d–28a certainly does not embrace the whole of reality and in fact does not even cover all that exists between the One that is beyond Being and matter that is beyond the corporeal, since Soul escapes its polarity; cf. 235.26–32.

<sup>58</sup> Proclus tells us explicitly that he follows his Neoplatonist predecessors in this view. Earlier exegetes in emphasizing dependence on a cause only had given an incomplete view, since Being itself is dependent on a higher cause, but is not generated (see also 290.20).

There is, however, need for further investigation of what it means for the cosmos to be generated. Earlier interpreters, notably Plutarch and Atticus, had concluded that the cosmos was generated primarily because it was temporal in nature and that this temporality should be understood as ‘coming into being at a certain point in time’, that is to say, that time existed before the cosmos came into being (276.30–277.7, 283.27–30). Proclus is strongly opposed to this view and argues against it at considerable length (see also 381–96). It is in his view symptomatic of a wholly erroneous interpretation of Platonic philosophy, because it is based on the assumption of a plurality of first principles (God, forms, matter) as well as involving the absurdity of a pre-cosmic disordered soul. Proclus in fact takes a hard line on this question by arguing that the term ‘generated’ (γενητός) has multiple meanings, that the meaning ‘having come into being in time’ is only one of these, and that it is not relevant to Plato’s argument at 28b–c (279.30–280.19). Other meanings that do not involve time are no less important, especially the meaning ‘everything that proceeds from a (higher) cause’ and ‘whatever is composite in its essence’.<sup>59</sup> Proclus argues that the cosmos is ‘generated’ because it is an object that ‘both is always coming into being and has come into being’ (ὡς αἰεὶ γιγνόμενον ἅμα καὶ γεγενημένον, 290.24), where the word ‘always’ is ‘to be taken temporally in accordance with the infinity of time’ (290.29). Temporality is thus a central feature of the ontological realm to which the cosmos belongs.<sup>60</sup> Proclus is thus quite happy to speak of ‘temporal sempiternity’ in relation to the cosmos (χρονικὴ αἰδιότης 291.24, cf. 294.27). This may sound rather Aristotelian – and Proclus is at pains to emphasize that there is no essential conflict between the two philosophers on this point (294.29) – but there can be no doubt that Plato gives more accurate expression to the nature of the cosmos, precisely because he recognizes the efficient cause (295.15).<sup>61</sup> For Aristotle the cosmos always is the same, for Plato it is always becoming such (295.13).<sup>62</sup> But this should certainly not be taken to mean ‘that Plato destroys the everlasting nature (αἰδιότης) of the cosmos’, as Proclus demonstrates with a bevy of arguments, including reference to a number of other dialogues (286.20–290.17).

<sup>59</sup> On Proclus’ interpretation of *genētos* in the context of his reading of 27c–28c see the valuable article of Phillips (1997), esp. 175–80. He argues that Proclus does not just follow his Neoplatonist predecessors but adopts an independent approach (182).

<sup>60</sup> See 291.20, where it is even said that the universe ‘has participated in time’.

<sup>61</sup> See above n. 36.

<sup>62</sup> Proclus also wrote a separate work on the doctrine that the cosmos is without temporal beginning or end, directed as it seems more at Platonist interpreters than at Christian opponents, but preserved in Philoponus’ polemical reply; see Lang and Macro (2001).

There is no doubt, then, that Proclus stands on the side of those modern interpreters who defend the non-literal and non-temporal nature of the cosmogony in the *Timaeus*.<sup>63</sup> His argumentation is of particular interest because of the way in which he downplays the aspect of temporality in determining the specific nature of the cosmos. He is right to argue that it plays no role of any significance in the *proemium* and that its emergence in the account at 30a4 must be seen in that light.

### The Demiurge

At the outset of his commentary, when discussing the target (*skopos*) of the treatise, Proclus announces that Timaeus ‘investigates the primary causes [of generation], the one who creates, the paradigm and the goal, and it is for this reason that he sets over the universe a demiurgic Intellect, an intelligible cause in which the universe primarily resides, and the God, which stands before the creator in the rank of object of desire’.<sup>64</sup> The efficient, paradigmatic and final causes can easily be identified.

The Demiurge is first mentioned almost surreptitiously in the fourth<sup>65</sup> fundamental principle at 28a6 when Timaeus introduces the correlation between the nature of the paradigm used by ‘the Demiurge’ and the nature of the resultant product. But he is explicitly introduced with the famous words at 28c3–5, which in Proclus’ analysis represent the second of the three demonstrations based on the first principles (296.20–6). He is thus the primary efficient cause of the cosmos, the divine Creator who is responsible for the existence, order and structure of the universe as a whole, if not for all of its parts.<sup>66</sup> For modern readers the Demiurge is often seen as an enigmatic figure, almost like a *deus ex machina*, invoked by Plato to explain the world’s rational structure. But this is not the case for Proclus. He regards him as a divine figure who has a precise location in the hierarchy of being commensurate with his role as creator (or more accurately ‘orderer’) of the physical universe. The theme of the Demiurge’s ontological status is first broached when Proclus discusses the nature of eternal being, introduced in 27d6–28a. The Demiurge clearly belongs to this realm because he is a divine

<sup>63</sup> For a thorough exposition of this interpretation see Baltes (1996). The same scholar had given a thorough analysis of Proclus’ arguments in his commentary in (1976–8), vol. II.

<sup>64</sup> 3.3–7, translation Tarrant (slightly modified).

<sup>65</sup> According to the numbering set out above; see n. 52 and text thereto.

<sup>66</sup> There is in fact an entire hierarchy of creators, as set out in 310.15–26, the most important of which, inferior to the Demiurge, are the ‘young gods’ introduced by Plato at 42d6. On these subordinates and the fourfold schema at 310.18–24 see Opsomer (2003).

Intellect, who exists prior to Soul (229.26–230.4). Plato describes him as a *nous* at 39e7 (cf. 224.7, 323.24), as an eternally existent god at 34a8 (cf. 230.2), and he is to be identified with the ‘Royal intellect’ in *Philebus* 30d2 (cf. 224.1, 315.16, 406.29).

But it is when he is expounding Plato’s words at 28c3–5 that Proclus indicates most clearly his conception of the Demiurge’s status and role (299.13–319.21).<sup>67</sup> After first devoting some attention to the terms used by Plato in this text, Proclus focuses on the interpretations of eight of his Platonist predecessors (303.26–310.1). None of them have the right answer. The Middle Platonists Numenius and Atticus, for example, go badly astray by equating him with the highest principle when Plato explicitly says that ‘he was good’, not the Good (304.5, 305.8, cf. 359.29).<sup>68</sup> He is kinder to Plotinus (305.19) and Amelius (306.14), whom he sees as laying some groundwork for his own view, but Porphyry is harshly dealt with for placing the Demiurge on the level of Soul (307.4). Iamblichus is seen as introducing the necessary ontological divisions in his theology (308.8), but the correct answer is given (as always) by Proclus’ own teacher Syrianus, who is able to situate him within a precise and refined ontological hierarchy. Proclus explains his position at considerable length (310.3–317.20). As noted above, the Demiurge is an Intellect situated in the realm of eternal Being. More precisely he marks the border of the intellectual gods.<sup>69</sup> The transcendent realm of Being, situated at the level under that of the first Principle and connected to it by means of the henads, consists of three levels of gods, a triad of intelligible gods (to which the Paradigm belongs), a triad of intelligible-intellectual gods which are the cause of life, and thirdly seven intellectual gods, of which the Demiurge is the lowest of the first triad. This god only is called ‘Maker and Father’ by Plato (311.26). He is also called Zeus by Orpheus (313.5) and, in his footsteps, by Plato (e.g. at *Plt.* 273b6, *Phlb.* 30d1). He is filled with power from the triads above him, and from him all other demiurgic activity proceeds, though he himself remains undisturbed (310.7–14, cf. 42e5–6 cited at 282.28, 311.15). Below him there is a whole hierarchy of gods who engage in different kinds of creative activity.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>67</sup> On this entire section see the excellent articles of Opsomer (2001) and (2005), to which I am much indebted in the present discussion.

<sup>68</sup> Proclus is clearly mistaken in his interpretation of Numenius’ position here, as can be seen if we adduce the fragments cited by Eusebius; see Dillon (1996) 367, Opsomer (2005) 68.

<sup>69</sup> For what follows see Opsomer (2001) 53–7. Not all details can be covered in this summary.

<sup>70</sup> See the illuminating schema at Opsomer (2001) 69, also found in a slightly different form in Opsomer (2003) 131–2.

Book 2 contains numerous further discussions which shed light on Proclus' views on the nature and activity of the Demiurge, too many to enumerate in this introduction. He emphasizes, for example, the fact that the Demiurge creates eternally, which is the cause of the everlasting nature of the cosmos itself in a kind of paradigm-image relation that also provides the cause of the cosmos's goodness and order (366.20–368.11). On the other hand, the Demiurge does not create matter (384.18). Matter is present before the Demiurge commences his creative activity and participates in the (higher) cause of the Paradigm, but this absence on the part of the Demiurge must be taken 'hypothetically' (388.25–8). True to Plato's words in 30a2, Proclus recognizes that the Demiurge has a Will, which he interprets in terms of surplentitude and productivity and links with the life and power of the second level of the intelligible triad of substance, life and intellect (371.9–31). But the most important trait of the Demiurge for Proclus is without doubt his goodness (*Tim.* 29e1), which stems from his union with the One-Good, from which he never departs (364.5–7). This is why he is a god (363.19), and from him derives the divinity that the cosmos possesses.

Proclus' interpretation of the Demiurge is marred by the overelaborate schematics of his metaphysics. Nevertheless there is much that the modern reader can learn from it. There has, for example, been considerable controversy among modern interpreters as to whether the Demiurge is an intellect or a soul, whether he should be hypostasized, and what his relation is to the paradigm that he contemplates. Proclus' answer that he is a god who is pure intellect and contemplates an already existent noetic paradigm is worthy of serious consideration and may well come close to what Plato intended to convey with his enigmatic figure.<sup>71</sup>

### The Paradigm

One demonstration remains, the third, and it focuses on the Paradigm, the paternal and paradigmatic cause of the cosmos (226.28).<sup>72</sup> Its existence follows on from the existence and activity of the Demiurge, for like every other craftsman he must look to a paradigm when he engages in his creative activity (226.29, 320.5). The paradigm supplies him with a measure and a goal for his work, so that it will be produced in an orderly fashion and reach a proper state of completion (320.10–15).

<sup>71</sup> See the positive remarks about Neoplatonist and Proclean interpretation of the Demiurge made by Brisson (1998) 69, Opsomer (2001) 66.

<sup>72</sup> On the interpretation of the Paradigm see the extensive discussion in Brisson (1998) 107–73; Proclus' views are discussed at 161–4.

The role of the Paradigm in the *proemium* gives rise to a number of questions. Firstly, how does it relate to the cosmos? The answer to this question is easy: the Paradigm must be ontologically prior to the cosmos and the cosmos must be an image of both the Paradigm and the Demiurge who contemplates that paradigm (321.2–17). Secondly, what is its nature and ontological status (321.25)? This question is of course parallel to that posed about the Demiurge, and the same complex ontological issues are brought into play. Proclus in fact answers the question mainly by determining the relation of the Paradigm to the Demiurge. It is either prior to, or on the same level as, or posterior to the god, and all three positions had been defended by Proclus' predecessors (321.26–322.18). He himself states that he is presenting the views of his teacher Syrianus (322.18). The Paradigm is prior to the Demiurge and belongs to the ranks between him and the One (322.30). It is intelligible, not intellective as the Demiurge is (323.5). In fact it belongs to the third triad of intelligible Being, of which it is the third member.<sup>73</sup> The Demiurge thus contemplates the Paradigm but also interiorizes it. The result is a neat schema that is very typical of Proclus' method: the Paradigm is both prior to the Demiurge and within him, in the former case in the intelligible mode (νοητῶς), in the latter case in the intellective mode (νοεργῶς) (323.20–2). This is Plato's doctrine, Proclus claims, but it is also anticipated by Orpheus when he says that the intelligible god Phanes is swallowed up by Zeus (324.15). A corollary of the Paradigm's superior ontological status is that its power and influence extends further than the Demiurge's. For this reason it produces forms in the pre-existent chaotic matter, which the creator god then reduces to order (387.19–388.1).

Further discussion is devoted to the Paradigm when it is later introduced during the process of creation as the 'Living-Thing-itself'. See below.

### The account of the creation

The preliminaries completed, Timaeus launches upon his account of the creation at 29d6. Proclus divides the creation itself into a first or universal creation and a second or partial creation,<sup>74</sup> concerned largely with the creation of man. The first creation is further subdivided into the creation of: 1. the cosmos as a whole; 2. the 'whole parts' of the cosmos (i.e. body and soul); 3. time (involving the creation of the planets);

<sup>73</sup> This more precise determination is in fact not given in the discussion in 321.24–323.22, but it can be deduced from the earlier discussion on the Demiurge at 311.7 and 312.4–14; see further Opsomer (2001) 56.

<sup>74</sup> Or a 'creation of wholes' and a 'creation of parts'.

4. divine but partial beings (i.e. the stars and the sublunary gods). The description of the first of these four subdivisions of the first creation takes up the remainder of Book 2 of *in Timaeus* (and thus of this volume) and is itself subdivided into sections on: (a) the constitution of the cosmos (*Tim.* 29d7–30c1; *in Tim.* 355.16–416.5); (b) the resemblance of the cosmos to the Living-Thing-itself (*Tim.* 30c2–31a1; *in Tim.* 416.9–436.3); (c) the uniqueness of the cosmos (*Tim.* 31a2–b3; *in Tim.* 436.4–458.11).<sup>75</sup> As before, we shall comment briefly on selected topics.

### The final cause

Timaeus' account of the reason for the existence of the cosmos, of its final cause as Proclus puts it, occupies twenty lines (29d7–30c1) to which Proclus devotes sixty pages (355.18–416.5) of his commentary. Obviously we shall have to be very selective.

Timaeus, Proclus says, appropriately introduces the final cause, the last of the three principle causes of the cosmos, at the very beginning of his account of the creation (355.28–356.3).<sup>76</sup> It is in fact twofold (360.15–17). On the one hand, there is the Good, or One, the most sovereign and venerable of causes, the ultimate cause of all there is, including the paradigmatic and demiurgic causes and their operations (356.3–16); on the other, there is the goodness of the Demiurge, which is also the final cause of everything he produces (360.25).<sup>77</sup> As we read on, it becomes apparent that we are dealing with two complementary and equally valid perspectives. From the former, the three Primary Causes, the Good, the Paradigm and the Demiurge, exist on different ontological levels and must be clearly distinguished. From the latter, the Demiurge has internalized the Good and (as we have seen already) the Paradigm and so can be said to be responsible for everything in the cosmos. From either viewpoint the Good (more often referred to as the goodness of the Demiurge in the latter case) is ultimately responsible for everything

<sup>75</sup> The preceding analysis is based on that of Lernould (2001) 44–51. Festugière calls the first two sections of the first subdivision of the creation: 1. The Reason for the Creation of the World. The Final Cause; 2. The Nature of the Paradigm. The Living Being itself.

<sup>76</sup> Although it was in a sense introduced earlier when he deduced its existence from the three names of the cosmos at 274.27–30.

<sup>77</sup> This formulation enables Proclus to introduce the Good (albeit rather awkwardly; see the note at 356.16) with appropriate fanfare at the beginning of his comments on the creation and at the same time accommodate Plato's explanation of the activities of the Demiurge in terms of his own goodness. The challenge for Proclus is, as often, to reconcile the craftsman metaphor of the *Timaeus* with that of emanation in the Neoplatonic system.

(even matter, which the causalities of the paradigmatic and demiurgic causes do not reach (356.5–8)), the Paradigm for form and the demiurgic cause for order (cf. 361.19–26, 386.13–387.5, etc.).

The relationship between the Good and the goodness of the Demiurge needs further explanation. Clearly, we must not identify the Good and the Demiurge, as some have done. The former is absolute good, transcendent and imparticipable; the latter is good by participation, a particular good rather than the Good (359.22–360.4). However, it is important to understand that although the Demiurge is in his own right an intellect, he is also a god, and whereas *qua* intellect he participates in the things above him, *qua* god he exists, like all true gods, on the plane of what is essentially good in constant union with the Good, so that he too (though participated rather than imparticipable) is primally good and one can even say that goodness is his very essence.<sup>78</sup> It is this goodness, which derives from his union with the Good and can even be described as an internalization of the Good, that is the immediate cause of his creative activities and can therefore, along with the Good, be described as the final cause of the cosmos (cf. 361.5–18, 363.26–364.10).

If all gods are good, why is it the Demiurge who produces the cosmos? It is of the nature of goodness to be expansive and providential, and as a result all gods engage in providential activity of one kind or another. However, different gods are providential in different ways. Some, for example, are vivifying, some sustaining (360.1–3, 361.6–9); the Demiurge's specific role is 'to go forth to all things', making them, as far as their nature allows, good like himself (365.19–26); in other words, to produce an ordered cosmos.

In the *Timaeus* the Demiurge's goodness and his desire to make everything as far as possible good like himself lead to the production of an ordered universe which takes the form of a living creature endowed with intellect and soul (29d7–30c1). Proclus not only develops these themes but addresses a number of related issues, most if not all of which he found already present in the commentary tradition. Two of the more important examples will have to suffice. (1) The Demiurge's desire to make all things as good as possible gives rise to two different but related questions, 'Why in that case does procession proceed all the way to matter rather than halting at the perfection of the gods?' (372.19–373.21), and 'Can there in that case be evil in the world?' (373.22–381.21). (2) The statement that the Demiurge is responsible for order in the cosmos paves the way for a defence of the Neoplatonic positions that the production of an ordered cosmos does not take place at a point of time but is an eternal process (381.26–383.22) and that matter is not an independent

<sup>78</sup> This very much simplifies what Proclus actually says and passes over some difficulties.

principle but eternally produced by the higher causes, being ultimately dependent on the One (383.22–387.5). Throughout, he keeps in mind the structure, as he reads it, of this part of the *Timaeus* and firmly grounds his answers and explanations in the finality of the Good and the goodness of the Demiurge.

### Evil

Timaeus' statement that the Demiurge wished 'all things to be good and nothing to be bad as far as was possible' (30a2–3) raises, as we saw, the question of evil in the universe. Proclus begins by considering the proposition that if the Demiurge had really wanted all things to be good he would not have created the world and its contents at all but have halted creation 'at the gods and the immaculate essences' (372.21–2). Proclus' reply is that this would in fact result in a less good universe. It would mean that the divine would have the lowest position in the scale of being and thereby lose its goodness, for 'if there is no inferior there is no room for a better' (373.1–2). It would also deprive it of the power to procreate and share its goodness that is essential to anything good and render it sterile. In fact, the universe is a continuum of entities of gradually diminishing goodness from the One, or Good, all the way down to matter, and this (it is implied) is the best possible arrangement (372.19–373.21).

Proclus next propounds a dilemma. How is the existence of divine providence compatible with the existence of evil? If God, who is the Father of all things, does not wish evil to exist, how can it exist? If, on the other hand, he wants it to exist, how can he be good (373.28–374.2)?

The answer, which Proclus attributes to Syrianus and which is also allegedly Plato's, is that it is a matter of perspective. For the divine, or for the universe as a whole, nothing is evil, but for partial entities, which suffer from it, evil exists. This can be so because nothing can be absolutely evil. Absolute Good is prior to Being and Absolute Evil would have to be posterior to non-being, which would make it non-existent. This means that even an evil thing must have existence and therefore participate Being and ultimately the One, or the Good, and so have an admixture of good. This comes about thanks to the Demiurge. Wishing all things, even the lowest, to share in his own goodness, he unstintingly confers measure and order and limit on them. If some things nevertheless contain an admixture of evil it is because there is a limit to their capacity to participate that goodness. The Demiurge wishes nothing to be evil, and from his perspective nothing is evil (374.2–375.5).

There are those who nevertheless hold that the Demiurge is responsible for evil on the ground that he is responsible for the existence of

particulars. The truth is that, as Plato points out, he is only responsible for good in the universe. The 'contrary to nature', or physical evil, is an incidental consequence of generation and perishing in the world, and the 'contrary to reason', or moral evil, an incidental consequence of the exposure of souls to the 'deformity' of matter. And, thanks to the goodness of the Demiurge, even these are also goods. In contrast to goods, there is no single cause of evils. Their causes are particular, indeterminate and diffuse. We cannot even locate them in soul or body (375.6–376.15).

Proclus next embarks upon a lengthy division designed to reinforce and elaborate upon these points. Physical evil is again linked to generation and perishing, or the cycle of change in the world, and is said to be destructive and contrary to nature from the perspective of the parts of the universe but not for the universe as a whole. The treatment of moral evil is rather more complex. We are responsible for our own actions and therefore deserving of their consequences. Evil deeds, by making us evil, are their own punishment. Such punishment is just, and so a good from the point of view of the universe as a whole and even from that of the perpetrator, and to that extent the evil deed itself is a good. However, it is not an unqualified good even from the perspective of the perpetrator, whose life it can ruin. The situation is the same with evil thoughts or intentions (Proclus' term is 'choices') that do not actually lead to evil deeds. These too are their own punishment, since they deprave the soul. From the point of view of the soul such choices are an evil, but a soul's choices ultimately determine its place in the universe, and so, from a wider perspective, even the evil ones serve the purposes of justice and God and are good (376.15–378.22).

The causes of evil, then, are particular. But why should even these exist? The answer, once again, is that procession is continuous and there is no gap in the scale of being. This means that the existence of autonomous beings with freedom of choice is inevitable and this is the source of (moral) evil. This does not mean that evil is natural to such beings, but what is evil for a particular life may be good for life as a whole (378.22–379.26).

To return to the original question, we can say that there is a sense in which God wanted evil to exist and a sense in which he did not. To the extent that he is responsible for the existence of everything in the universe, he must have wanted it to exist, but to the extent that he makes everything, even evil things, good, he clearly does not want it to exist. One might say that *qua* evil (moral) evil comes *per se* from particular souls and only accidentally from God, but *qua* good (which it is, as we saw, to the extent that it serves the interests of justice) *per se* from God and only accidentally from souls (379.26–380.8).

In summary, evil exists only in particular souls and bodies, and not in their essences or powers, but only in their activities. But even this does not define its locus precisely enough. In the case of souls, it is not a feature of either their rational or their irrational activities but the result of their incommensurability, and in the case of bodies it results from the incommensurability of matter and form, each of which in isolation seeks to produce order. In short, it is a kind of side-effect of the occurrence of generation in the cosmos, albeit one that is necessary for the perfection of the whole (380.24–381.12).

### The Living-Thing-itself

Having explained that the cosmos the Demiurge produces is a living thing (30b8), Timaeus returns to the question of the paradigm he looks to when producing it. Earlier (29a2–6), because he was dealing with all aspects of generation,<sup>79</sup> he identified the whole of everlasting being, that is, the whole of the intelligible and intellective plane, as the Demiurge's paradigm (419.23–6). That will not do here. The paradigm for the cosmos *qua* living thing must itself be a living thing, because a paradigm must itself have the features it gives rise to in a copy and a copy takes its name from its paradigm (419.26–7; 416.20–3).

Since he is an intellect, the Demiurge looks to an intelligible paradigm, so his paradigm will be an intelligible living thing (416.15–18). There is in fact a multitude of these. They first appear with the third triad of the Intelligibles (the first triad is prior to life, the second life itself rather than something with life), and they proceed down through the Intelligibles and Intellectives and the Intellectives (418.6–16). Further, at each level some are more universal and more unified, others more particular and more divided (421.7–10). The cosmos is 'most beautiful' and 'all-complete' so the Demiurge cannot have taken one of the partial living things as his paradigm (421.24–7; cf. 422.28–31). In fact, he modelled the cosmos on the very first living thing, Living-Thing-itself, the monad of all living things, which is located in the third triad<sup>80</sup> of the Intelligibles; and just as it contains all other living things in unitary fashion (see 418.16–17), so does the cosmos embrace within itself all sensible living creatures (429.1–4).

Proclus sees the need to clarify two points. First, Living-Thing-itself is not alive in the sense that it is sentient or appetitive but as participating Eternity or Life, the immediately anterior triad in the Intelligibles (418.30–419.11). Second, to say that some intelligible living things are

<sup>79</sup> This has not been Proclus' position till now, but see the note at 419.26.

<sup>80</sup> For this see 419.16–17. Elsewhere we learn that it is the third member of this triad.

partial or incomplete is not to say that they are such in themselves; that would be impious. They are so described only in contrast to the universality of Living-Thing-itself. It is the same as saying that they are living things by participation in Living-Thing-itself, the primal Living Thing (421.13–19).

The relationship between the Living-Thing-itself and the Demiurge is complex. Since the former proceeds to the entire intellective order, it is at the same time prior to the Demiurge, in the Demiurge and posterior to the Demiurge, and the Demiurge looks to the first two of these manifestations in producing the cosmos – though not to the third because it would not be appropriate for him to attend to anything below him. On the other hand, since the Living-Thing-itself contains the intellective orders in the causal mode, we can also say that the Demiurge is in the Living-Thing-itself. However, the two modes of containment are quite different (431.14–433.10).

### The uniqueness of the cosmos

Timaeus has stated that the world the Demiurge produces as a copy of the Living-Thing-itself is ‘a single visible living thing’ (30b8), and he goes on to ask whether he is right to talk of a single world or whether he should be talking of more than one, or even an infinite number. His answer is that since the Paradigm is, for reasons he gives, single, the copy must also be single (31a2–b3). Proclus devotes twenty-two pages (436.6–458.11) to these lines.

Having told us that the cosmos is (a) a copy, (b) a living creature, (c) endowed with soul, (d) endowed with intellect, says Proclus, Plato adds that it is unique. This not only completes its description, or definition (see *ὁρίσαστο* at 436.7) but, since oneness or uniqueness is the property ‘which above all and primally belongs to divine beings’, tells us that it is a god (436.14–26). The immediate source of this oneness is the Paradigm (437.2–5, 456.18–25, etc.), its ultimate source the One or Good (437.17–18, 26–7, 457.22–3).<sup>81</sup>

Because some had posited a plurality, or even an infinity, of worlds, Plato, quite rightly, feels that he needs to prove that there is only one (436.7–12). Proclus formalizes his argument as follows: ‘If the cosmos has come into being after the Paradigm and the Paradigm is unique, then the cosmos is unique. The antecedent. Therefore the consequent’ (439.4–6). Although other arguments are available, notably that from

<sup>81</sup> At 437.17–24 Proclus explains that the ancestry of the oneness of the Paradigm includes the Good, Limit and One Being.

the nature of the Demiurge,<sup>82</sup> this is the best and quite adequate on its own (447.10–29, 456.18–28).

After analysing Plato's argument and buttressing it with various supporting arguments (438.20–439.22), Proclus goes on to consider an objection to it. If the Living-Thing-itself produces a unique copy, why do not Forms such as Man-itself, which are similarly unique, also produce a unique copy (439.22–9)? This question had obviously exercised the minds of generations of commentators and Proclus summarizes the replies of Porphyry, Iamblichus and his master Syrianus, who provided no fewer than five separate answers (439.29–447.32).

Although Proclus is, as we saw, aware of the existence of cosmologies which assume a plurality of worlds,<sup>83</sup> he only describes (or even identifies) one (454.10–455.2), a rather bizarre concoction from Plutarch of Chaeronea, who attributes it to a certain Petron of Himera, and then, one suspects, only for the sake of the 'Chaldean' interpretation he includes along with it. He does, however, think it worth including an argument against the possibility of an infinity of worlds, based on the natures of infinity and causation (453.14–454.10), and an Aristotelian argument against a plurality of worlds, based on the notion of natural place (455.15–29), although he goes on to say that Plato quite correctly rejected physical arguments of the kind used by Aristotle and the Stoics, which only make use of subsidiary causes, in favour of theological arguments such as that from the Paradigm (455.29–456.18).

<sup>82</sup> At 447.12–19 Proclus suggests that Plato himself hints at this argument.

<sup>83</sup> Although, as Westerink (1987) shows, his interest in, and perhaps his information about, Presocratic philosophy, was limited.

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### *I Preliminary remarks: 205.4–214.12*

### *Recapitulation of the role of the prologue: 205.4–206.26*

The prelude<sup>1</sup> of the *Timaeus* records two main subjects, a summary of Socrates' constitution<sup>2</sup> and a concise narration of the battle of the Athenians against the Atlantines and of the victory that occurred over them.<sup>3</sup> Each of these accounts makes a very large contribution to the entire investigation of the cosmos. The ideal form of the constitution, though object of knowledge in and for itself, has also harmonized at the primary level<sup>4</sup> with the ordering of the heaven, while the account of the war and the victory has symbolized for us the opposition that is fundamental to the cosmos. The former revealed the essence of the encosmic kinds, the latter revealed their powers from which the activities advance into the universe. The former gave a sketch of the first creation in images, the latter of the second creation,<sup>5</sup> or, if you wish, the former presented the formal cause, the latter the material cause. Indeed,<sup>6</sup> all the philosophers of nature put forward the opposites as principles and establish the cosmos as resulting from the harmonization of the opposites. But harmony and order derive from the ideal form, which, starting from the

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<sup>1</sup> Proclus here interprets the *proemium* of the *Timaeus* as covering the entire passage 17a1 to 27b9, the textual basis of Book 1 of his commentary. This differs from Plato's usage of the same term at 29d5. See further the Introduction, pp. 16–17.

<sup>2</sup> The summary is given at 17c1–19a1 and is commented on by Socrates in 19b3–e8. See Proclus' commentary in 28.14–67.28.

<sup>3</sup> As recounted by Critias in 21a7–26e1. See Proclus' commentary in 75.27–196.29, and further H. Tarrant's (2007) Introduction to vol. I.

<sup>4</sup> I.e. at the ideal level of the forms as represented by the Paradigm of the universe.

<sup>5</sup> It is to be agreed with Festugière that Proclus distinguishes between a first creation at the intelligible level and a second involving matter. See the exegesis of 19b7 at 60.17ff.

<sup>6</sup> Proclus explains here (using γάρ) the second part of the previous sentence, assuming the Aristotelian view in *Metaphysics* A that the philosophers of nature concentrated on the material cause at the expense of the formal cause introduced by the Pythagoreans and Plato.

constitution, [Socrates'] account has revealed as common to and extending to all multiplicity that proceeds in order. For that constitution is transmitted in different forms, whether in the soul, or in human beings, or at the cosmic level. Socrates' recapitulation, which gave a sketch of the actual ideal form of the constitution wholly separated from matter, reveals to us at the primary level the constitution in the universe, and it is to the same form<sup>7</sup> that it is eager to relate the parts absolutely as well.

In addition there is, if you wish, another way in which one should rank the constitution analogously to the heaven<sup>8</sup> and the war analogously to genesis. The constitution in fact<sup>9</sup> penetrates to the ultimate parts, since all things have been ranked in accordance with the appropriate series extending from the Demiurge<sup>10</sup> right down to the bottom level of the encosmic beings. In a way the opposition was already established in the heavens beforehand, whether through the double revolution – rightward and leftward – of the [heavenly] bodies, or through the double circles – of the same and of the different – of the souls, or through the kinds of being – rest and motion – or through the properties of the gods – male and female – or through any other such division. But the constitution is more akin to heaven, while the war is akin to genesis. For this reason the former belongs to the Jovian [rank], while it is fitting for the latter to be allotted to Poseidon.<sup>11</sup>

But after the investigation of the parts by means of images, one should reach out towards the knowledge of the whole, and, after observing the images, it remains to take hold of the paradigms themselves, starting from the things of little importance in order to recall to mind the larger realities. These [images] have in fact been established like preliminary rites and as lesser mysteries which summon the eye of the soul towards the understanding of the whole and the all and towards the investigation of the single cause and single procession of all encosmic beings. For everything has its being from the One<sup>12</sup> and [all things revert back] to

<sup>7</sup> My interpretation differs from that of Festugière, who relates the parts to the Universe.

<sup>8</sup> Proclus sometimes follows the Platonic practice of using the term *ouranos* to refer to the entire cosmos; see the exegesis of *Tim.* 28b3–5 at 272.14ff. As the next sentence shows, the term probably refers to the entire cosmos here. See also n. 470.

<sup>9</sup> I sometimes use 'in fact' or 'indeed' to render explanatory γάρ, which is notoriously difficult to render in English.

<sup>10</sup> In the translation the word 'demiurge' (δημιουργός) will be capitalized when it is clear that it refers to the creator god who forms and orders the cosmos.

<sup>11</sup> The link between the Atlantines and the god Poseidon is stated at *Crit.* 113c; see 71.9, 173.10. The Jovian rank (Δίος) is linked to the political life (148.2) and the intellect embracing the noetic world (305.26ff.).

<sup>12</sup> Or 'unity'. Proclus does not use the article with 'one'.

the One, [each] advancing according to a differing fate in the possession of partial and differing powers which preside over the universe.<sup>13</sup> 25

*Excursus on prayer and the gods: 206.26–214.12*<sup>14</sup>

But before dealing with the subject matter in its entirety, he [Timaeus] turns his attention to invocations of the gods and prayers, imitating in this way too the Maker of the universe, who before undertaking the entire creative task is said to enter the oracular shrine of Night to fill himself with divine thoughts from there, to receive the principles of the creative task and, if it is permissible to speak thus, to resolve all difficulties and above all to encourage his father [Kronos] to collaborate with him in the creative task. This is what he is recorded as saying by the Theologian in his poem:<sup>15</sup> 30 207

Mother, supreme among the gods, immortal Night, how, tell me, 5  
How should I establish a resolute beginning for the immortals?

And from her he hears:<sup>16</sup>

Surround all things with unutterable ether, and in the middle place the 10  
heaven,

and he is then instructed about the remainder of the creative work. As for Kronos, after putting him in chains, he all but prays to him and says:<sup>17</sup>

Raise up our race, glorious divine spirit, 15

and throughout what follows he keeps on invoking the goodwill of his father. For how else would he be in a position to fill all things with gods and make the sense-perceptible realm resemble the Living-Thing-itself (*autozôion*) unless he stretches out towards the invisible causes of the universe and, himself filled with these, is in a position to:<sup>18</sup> 20

Bring forth again from his heart wondrous deeds?

It is necessary, therefore, that before all else we obtain some clear knowledge about prayer, what its essence<sup>19</sup> is and its perfection, and from where it is instilled in souls.

<sup>13</sup> Following the textual supplements suggested by Diehl and Festugière.

<sup>14</sup> On this passage see Van den Berg (2001) 87–91.

<sup>15</sup> *Orph. fr.* 164 Kern. <sup>16</sup> *Orph. fr.* 165 Kern.

<sup>17</sup> *Orph. fr.* 155 Kern; note that ‘spirit’ translates *daimôn*.

<sup>18</sup> *Orph. fr.* 1.2 Kern. <sup>19</sup> Or ‘essential nature’ (οὐσία).

25 Now the philosopher Porphyry,<sup>20</sup> in distinguishing between those of the ancients who have accepted prayer and those who have not, has given us a guided tour to the various opinions on the subject which can be summarized as follows.<sup>21</sup> Those who have been afflicted with the primary form of atheism, that is who deny that the gods exist at all, reject the assistance that prayer gives, and so do those who are afflicted with the secondary form of atheism, that is those who admit that the gods exist but wholly reject providence, as well as those who concede that the gods exist and that they exercise providence but affirm that everything they cause occurs by necessity, for if there is nothing that can take place other than it does, the benefit of prayer is destroyed. Those thinkers, however, who state that the gods exist and exercise providence and that many of the things that happen could occur otherwise, quite plausibly also accept the [efficacy of] prayers and agree that they set our life aright.

Moreover he [Porphyry] adds a number of arguments.<sup>22</sup> (1) Prayer is especially appropriate for the virtuous, because it is a connection with the divine, because like loves being connected to like and the virtuous person is most like the gods, and also because those who lay claim to virtue, since they are 'in prison'<sup>23</sup> and have been apprehended by the body as if it was a jail, should pray to gods for their emigration from these parts. (2) Like children who have been separated from their parents, we should pray for the return to our true parents, the gods. (3) Those who decline to pray and to turn to their superiors are in fact like fatherless and motherless people. (4) Among the nations too those who are distinguished for their wisdom make prayers their particular concern, the Brahmins among the Indians, the Magi among the Persians, and in the case of the Greeks the best of the theologians, who have also established rites and mysteries. As for the Chaldeans, not only did they worship the divine in general, but they also named virtue 'goddess of the gods'<sup>24</sup> and honoured her by

<sup>20</sup> *Commentary on the Timaeus*, fr. 28 Sodano.

<sup>21</sup> Porphyry's discussion here shows some indebtedness to doxographical traditions on the subject of theology adapted to the topic of prayer. For the first two kinds of atheism see, for example, the division at Cicero, *Nat. Deor.* 1.2. See further Runia (1996) 551–4. The practice of first examining whether an entity exists also belongs to the doxographical method, as derived from Aristotle's philosophy of knowledge; see Mansfeld (1992) 70–6. See also on 227.19 below.

<sup>22</sup> It should be noted that all subdivisions of arguments etc. have been added by the translator, in many cases following the lead of Festugière.

<sup>23</sup> Quotation from *Phd.* 62b4, the *locus classicus* for the Platonist topos that the soul is imprisoned in earthly somatic reality. The same words are quoted by Plotinus, *Enn.* 4.8.1.32.

<sup>24</sup> The Greek is unclear here and could also be rendered 'named the virtue of the gods as a goddess', as preferred by Festugière.

ensuring that their virtue did not mean they neglected the holy cult. (5) In addition to all these [considerations], because we are part of the All, it is fitting that we pray to the All. For in the case of every being reversion to the Whole brings salvation with it. If, therefore, you possess virtue, you should invoke that [deity] which has already grasped the whole of virtue in advance, since that which is entirely good is for you too cause of the good that is suitable for you. If you seek some corporeal good, there is the power that holds together the whole of body in the cosmos. This is necessarily the source of perfection for the parts as well. This is a brief summary of what Porphyry has to say. 25 30 209

The divine Iamblichus,<sup>25</sup> however, considers such an account inappropriate for the subject [of the passage]. For Plato's text here is not concerned with godless men, but with those who are prudent (27c2) and able to converse with the gods, not with those who are hesitant about the acts that piety prescribes, but with those who can be saved by the saviours of the universe. He teaches us about both the power and the perfection of prayer, a doctrine that is marvellous and extraordinary and exceeding all expectation. 5

As for us, our approach will be to translate the passage to a level with which its readers<sup>26</sup> are more familiar and more cognizant, making its meaning plain and giving the account of prayer that concords with Plato's views. We should make our start, then, from the following. 10

All things that exist are offspring of the gods, are brought into existence without intermediation by them and have their foundation in them. For not only does the continuous procession of entities reach completion, as each of them successively obtains its subsistence from its proximate causes, but it is also from the very gods themselves that all things in a sense are generated, even if they are described as being at the furthest remove from the gods, [indeed] even if you were to speak of matter (*bulê*) itself. For the divine does not stand aloof from anything, but is present for all things alike.<sup>27</sup> For this reason, even if you take the lowest levels [of reality], there too you will find the divine present. The One is in fact everywhere present, inasmuch as each of the beings derives its existence from the gods, and even though they proceed forth from the gods, they have not gone out from them but rather are rooted in them. Where, indeed, could they 'go out', when the gods have embraced all things and taken hold of them in advance and still retain them in themselves? For what is beyond the gods is That which is in no way 15 20 25

<sup>25</sup> *Commentary on the Timaeus* fr. 26 Dillon.

<sup>26</sup> Or listeners; the verb can mean both, *pace* Festugière.

<sup>27</sup> For the Neoplatonist the effects remain present in the cause (cf. *ET* §18), here translated in theological terms.

existent,<sup>28</sup> but all beings have been embraced in a circle by the gods and exist in them. In a wonderful way, therefore, all things both have and have not proceeded forth. They have not been cut off from the gods. If they  
 30 had been cut off, they would not even exist, because all the offspring, once they were wrenched away from their fathers, would immediately  
 210 hasten towards the gaping void of non-being. In fact they are somehow established in them [the gods], and, to put the matter in a nutshell, they have proceeded of their own accord, but [at the same time] they remain in the gods.<sup>29</sup>

But those [beings] which proceed forth must also return, imitating the manifestation of the gods and their reversion to the cause, so that  
 5 they too are ordered in accordance with the perfective triad,<sup>30</sup> and are again embraced by the gods and the most primary henads. They receive a second kind of perfection from them, in accordance with which they are able to revert to the goodness of the gods, so that, being rooted at the outset in the gods, through their reversion they can be fixed in them  
 10 once again, making this kind of circle which both begins from the gods and ends with them. All things, therefore, both remain in and revert to the gods, receiving this ability from them and obtaining in their very being a double signature, the one in order to remain there, the other so that what proceeds forth can return. And it is possible to observe  
 15 these not only in souls, but also in the lifeless beings that follow them.<sup>31</sup> For what else is it that produces the sympathy that they have towards the diverse powers than the fact that they have obtained symbols from nature, which causes them to correspond to the various classes<sup>32</sup> of the  
 20 gods? Nature is in fact suspended from the world above and the gods themselves, and she is distributed through the ranks of the gods. She thus also instils in the bodies the signatures of affinity to their gods, in the one case solar signatures, in another lunar, in others those of other gods, and she causes these things to revert to the gods as well, some to  
 25 the gods in general, others to specific gods, bringing her products to completion in accordance with the various characteristics of the gods.<sup>33</sup>

These [signatures] the Demiurge too had much earlier effectuated in the case of the souls, giving them signatures so that they could both

<sup>28</sup> I.e. the One which is beyond (ἐπέκεινα) being; cf. *Rep.* 509b9.

<sup>29</sup> Or less literally 'it is to the gods that they owe their permanence'.

<sup>30</sup> I.e. the triad of procession, reversion and rest. It is 'perfective' (τελειουργός) because it returns beings to their final goal (τέλος) in the origin. This is the 'circle' that Proclus refers to a few lines later; cf. *ET* §33.

<sup>31</sup> I.e. in the hierarchy of being. It is this double signature (διττὰ συνθήματα) that forms the basis of the theory of theurgy. On Proclus' theory see Van den Berg (2001) 66–85.

<sup>32</sup> The term here is σείρα, which can also be translated as 'series'.

<sup>33</sup> On Proclus' conception of nature (φύσις) see now Martijn (2008) ch. 2.

remain and revert, on the one hand establishing them in accordance with the One, on the other hand graciously bestowing on them the [ability to] revert in accordance with Intellect. It is to this reversion that prayer offers an enormous contribution by means of the ineffable symbols of the gods, which the Father of the souls has sowed in them. Prayer attracts<sup>34</sup> the beneficence of the gods towards itself.<sup>35</sup> It unifies those who pray with the gods who are being prayed to. It also links the Intellect of the gods with the formulations of those who pray, inciting the will (*boulêsis*) of those who contain the goods in a perfect way within themselves to share them unstintingly. Prayer is the creator of divine persuasion and establishes all which is ours in the gods.

Perfect and true prayer is conducted as follows. (1) First there is the knowledge of all the divine ranks to which the person who prays draws near. For he [the person praying] would not approach them in the appropriate manner if he did not know the characteristics of each of them. For this reason the Oracle<sup>36</sup> too has commanded that the 'fire-heated conception' has the very first rank in the holy cult. (2) Second after this comes the process of familiarization which takes place through becoming like<sup>37</sup> the divine in respect of complete purity, chastity, education and ordered disposition. Through this we direct what is ours towards the gods, extracting their goodwill and submitting our souls to them. (3) Third comes touching, through which we make contact with the divine substance with the topmost part of our soul and incline towards it. (4) Next there is the 'approaching',<sup>38</sup> for this is what the Oracle calls it:<sup>39</sup>

For the mortal who approaches the fire directly will possess light from the gods, allowing us greater communion with the gods and a more transparent participation in their light. (5) Finally there is unification (*henôsis*), which establishes the unity of the soul in the unity of the gods, causing there to be a single activity of us and them, in accordance with which we no longer belong to ourselves but to the gods, remaining in the divine light and encircled in its embrace. This is the supreme limit of

<sup>34</sup> This is the first of no fewer than six participles describing the actions and features of prayer.

<sup>35</sup> I.e. the praying soul. <sup>36</sup> *Or. Chald.* fr. 139 Majercik and Des Places.

<sup>37</sup> The two terms here are *οἰκείωσις* and *ὁμοίωσις*, the former emphasizing that what the soul does is contained in its own being (as offspring of the gods), the second the process whereby the soul models itself on the gods. Although union can take place, as indicated below, identity is not possible, since, as Proclus has already emphasized, the relation is one of cause and effect.

<sup>38</sup> The term is the rare *ἐμπέλαισις*, inspired by the quotation from the Chaldean Oracles which follows.

<sup>39</sup> *Or. Chald.* fr. 121.

30 true prayer, enabling it to link together the reversion with the [initial]  
rest, to re-establish in the unity of the gods all that proceeded from it,  
212 and to enclose the light in us with the light of the gods.

It is no small contribution, then, that prayer makes to the entire ascent  
of the souls. Nor is it the case that the person who possesses virtue does  
not need the goods that come additionally through prayer, but rather  
5 the complete opposite. It is through prayer that the ascent is brought to  
completion and it is with prayer<sup>40</sup> that the crown of virtue is attained,  
namely piety towards the gods. In short, none other should pray but  
the person who is especially good, as the Athenian stranger says:<sup>41</sup> for  
10 this person the [practice of] conversing with the gods becomes highly  
effective for obtaining the life of well-being, whereas in the case of the  
wicked it is natural for the opposite to occur, ‘for it is not permissible  
that the impure come in contact with what is pure’.<sup>42</sup>

The person, therefore, who has nobly undertaken the [practice of]  
prayer should make the gods propitious and awaken within himself the  
conceptions concerning the gods – for [recollection of] the kindness of  
15 one’s superiors is the very first encouragement to sharing in their being.  
He should be unceasingly occupied with the cult of divinity,<sup>43</sup>

For in the case of the mortal who dithers [in prayer] the blessed ones are swift  
[to strike].

He should preserve unshaken the right order of his acts towards the  
20 gods and set before himself virtues that purify him from the realm of  
generation and cause him to ascend, and also trust and truth and love,  
that renowned triad,<sup>44</sup> as well as hope of good things and unchanging  
receptivity to the divine light and ecstasy separating him from all other  
preoccupations, so that he is united alone with God alone and does not  
25 attempt to join himself to unity while in the company of plurality. For  
such a person does the complete opposite and separates himself from the  
gods. Just as it is not permissible to converse with being in the company  
of non-being, so it is not permissible to be joined to unity in the company  
of plurality.

<sup>40</sup> Bracketing the second καί in 212.5.

<sup>41</sup> What follows is a paraphrase of *Laws* 716d6–e2; Proclus is quoting from memory, triggered by the mention of ‘prayers to the gods’ in 716b7 (which he does not cite).

<sup>42</sup> An almost exact quotation of the famous saying at *Phd.* 67b2.

<sup>43</sup> *Or. Chald.* fr. 140.

<sup>44</sup> On this triad and its background in the Chaldean Oracles see Wallis (1972) 153–5. The term for trust is πίστις, often also translated ‘faith’. Since hope is often associated with the triad (as here), the triad comes close to the Christian triad of faith, hope and love (Paul in 1 Cor. 13:13), though its application is quite different. In Proclus see further *PTI* 110.6, in *Alc.* 1.51.16–53.2.

What one needs to know about prayer in the first instance is approximately the following.<sup>45</sup> Its *essence* (*ousia*) is to bring together and bind together the souls to the gods, or rather, it unifies all the secondary beings with those that are prior. For, as the great Theodore says,<sup>46</sup> ‘all things pray except the First’. Its *perfection* consists in the fact that it commences from the more common goods and ends in divine unification and the gradual accustoming of the soul to the divine light. Its *activity* is efficacious, enabling fulfilment of the goods [that we obtain] and ensuring that our affairs are shared with the gods.

As for the *causes* of prayer, we reckon them to be as follows.<sup>47</sup> (1) Its *efficient* causes are the efficacious powers of the gods, which turn around and summon all things towards the gods themselves. (2) Its *final* causes are the undefiled goods which the souls enjoy when they are established in the gods. (3) Its *paradigmatic* causes are the primary creative principles of reality, which both have proceeded from the Good and have been unified with it in a single ineffable union. (4) Its *formal* causes are what cause the souls to resemble the gods and bring their entire life to completion. (5) Its *material* causes are the signatures<sup>48</sup> which the Demiurge has placed in the souls’ essences for the recollection of the gods who caused them to exist as well as all other things.

Moreover the *modes* of prayer are of various kinds and we distinguish them as follows.<sup>49</sup> (1) There are modes *in accordance with the genera and species of the gods*, prayer then being either creative or purificatory or vivificatory. (a) It is *creative*,<sup>50</sup> for example, [when it takes place] on behalf of rain and wind. The creative gods are in fact<sup>51</sup> the causes of the generation of these, and the prayers of the Eudanemoi<sup>52</sup> at Athens are directed towards these gods. (b) Prayers are *purificatory* when they avert pestilential diseases or all manner of pollution, such [prayers] as we find inscribed in temples.<sup>53</sup> (c) They can be *vivificatory*, as in the case of prayers on behalf of the growth of crops which worship the causes of the growth of life that are superior to us. (d) There are also *perfective* prayers, because it is towards these classes of [perfecting] gods that they lift us up.

<sup>45</sup> Proclus now carries out what he announced above at 207.21.

<sup>46</sup> Theodore of Asine, Neoplatonist and pupil of Porphyry (± 280–360). This quotation is Test. 7 Deuse.

<sup>47</sup> For this fivefold scheme of causation cf. the texts on the Platonist doctrine of principles at Dörrie–Baltes, PA §116.

<sup>48</sup> The same term, συνθήματα, used above at 210.13, 22.

<sup>49</sup> On the numbering of the divisions here see above n. 22.

<sup>50</sup> Or ‘demiurgic’ (δημιουργική). <sup>51</sup> See above n. 9 (on explanatory γάρ).

<sup>52</sup> Literally ‘wind-stillers’. They were a family of priests in charge of the Eleusinian hero Eudanemos; see PW 6.893.

<sup>53</sup> Proclus obviously is speaking about written prayers here.

The person who makes any changes to this separation (*krisis*) of prayers deviates from the correctness of [conducting] prayers.

(2) There are also modes *in accordance with the differences of those who pray*. For there is (a) philosophical prayer and (b) theurgic prayer, and, beside these, there is (c) institutional prayer according to the ancestral practices of communities.

(3) There are also modes *in accordance with the objects for which the prayers take place*, (a) in the first place on behalf of the salvation of soul, (b) secondly on behalf of the sound constitution of the body, and (c) thirdly those which are completed on behalf of external goods.

And (4) there are modes *in accordance with the division of the times* at which we perform our prayers, distinguishing the various kinds of prayer (a) according to the seasons of the year, or (b) according to the chief points of the solar revolution, or (c) according to other such [heavenly] connections.<sup>54</sup>

## ***II Introductory matters: 214.13–223.2***

### ***Invocation of the gods***

But indeed, Socrates, this is what all those who share in even a modicum of good sense do. When venturing on any matter, even if it is insignificant, they always in some way call on God.<sup>55</sup> (27c1–3)

### ***Exegesis of the text: 214.17–217.3***

You see what kind of subject (*hypothesis*) Plato has entrusted to Timaeus, what kind of listener he has furnished him in the person of Socrates, what kind of beginning of his discourse he has outlined. The subject matter extends to the whole work of creation. The listener is in a state of readiness to concur with him [Timaeus], being of one mind [together] and focused on the single investigation of the All. This is the reason he himself summons Timaeus to prayer (cf. 27b8). The beginning of the discourse, in taking its point of departure from the invocation of the gods, truly imitates the procession of beings, who first remained among the gods and only in this way<sup>56</sup> have obtained the process of birth from them.

<sup>54</sup> As Festugière points out ad loc., the term ἐπιπλοκαί is a quasi-technical term indicating linkage to the solar cycle; cf. III. 35.1.

<sup>55</sup> Divergences from Burnet's OCT text: (1) Proclus lacks καὶ μεγάλου in 27c3.

<sup>56</sup> I.e. in the process of creation.

But since it is commanded that **all those who share in even a modicum of good sense should always call on God when setting out on any venture, even if it is insignificant**, let us observe then from what mental conception in each case these [men] make this invocation of the gods. In fact, if they are people of good sense, it is surely improbable that they do not take their aim at Being and at the truth concerning the gods themselves. I declare, therefore, that all people grasp hold of the knowledge concerning the gods in the true manner, when they (a) apply a pure mind to the investigation, (b) build up their store of what is noble and good in the excellences of the soul, and not in human concerns or external contingencies, and when they (c) observe the power of providence penetrating the whole of reality and bringing all things into harmony with the universe, in order that both the whole and its parts be in the best possible state and nothing be without share in the concern that extends from the gods to each individual thing. Observing this, for every deed and every activity they suitably call on God as collaborator of their enterprise, placing their actions on board<sup>57</sup> the universe together with everything else, and establishing themselves in the goodness of the gods. For even matters that seem to be **insignificant** (cf. 27c3) enjoy providence and are important to the extent that they are dependent on the gods, whereas things that are important in terms of their own nature, when separated from the divine, appear as wholly insignificant and of no value.

This is what **good sense**<sup>58</sup> provides the souls with.<sup>59</sup> It is not a human disposition, approximating to what is called self-control, but rather an inspired activity of the soul,<sup>60</sup> which (a) has reverted both to itself and the divine<sup>61</sup> and (b) sees the cause of all things which is among the gods. It (c) observes how both the whole and the parts proceed from there and (d) attributes to them the signatures of the gods in us, which are instilled in us and serve as starting-points for the return to the gods.<sup>62</sup> It (e) finds the symbols of the gods in each thing, even the most insignificant, and through these it (f) appropriates each of them in relation to the gods.

Since the gods have not only been the cause of our entire existence but also granted us self-motion for the choice of goods, and since their

<sup>57</sup> The metaphor is one of embarking on a ship.

<sup>58</sup> The term here is *σωφροσύνη*, as in the text being given exegesis. Proclus gives it a religious and a mystical connotation rather than its usual ethical meaning. The rendering 'good sense' has to cover both the Platonic text and its Proclan interpretation.

<sup>59</sup> Retaining the reading of Diehl, *ταῖς ψυχαῖς*; Festugière opts for *τῆς ψυχῆς*.

<sup>60</sup> In giving a definition of *σωφροσύνη* Proclus unleashes a sequence of six participles describing the activities of the soul to which it corresponds.

<sup>61</sup> Because it both has descended and is also self-subsistent; cf. *ET* §§40ff.

<sup>62</sup> This recalls the explanation of prayer above at 210.11ff., 213.14ff.

creative work<sup>63</sup> is especially revealed in activities that are external to us, even though we need their providential concern also when we make decisions – as is shown by the fact that the Athenians have also honoured Zeus as the Counsellor – and when choosing we need their assistance, so that when making decisions we should discover what is profitable and in choosing we should not through passion incline to what is worse, but all the more when we act and venture upon any deed we should observe that self-movement has but the feeblest force, whereas the whole is dependent on divine providence – for all these reasons, therefore, Timaeus states that **when venturing out on any matter persons of good sense always in some way call on God**.<sup>64</sup> For in the case of our choices (*haireseis*) we are unable to separate out the role of providence from what is in our power,<sup>65</sup> but in the case of our impulses (*bormai*) we can do that better, since self-motion there plays a lesser role.<sup>66</sup> In fact, the influence of what is in our power does not extend as far as the providence of the gods does, but rather, as has been said [earlier],<sup>67</sup> the superior entities exert their influence both prior to the secondary [beings] and with them and after them, enfolding the activities of the subordinate [beings] on all sides.<sup>68</sup>

But does this not mean, the Epicurean Hermarchus<sup>69</sup> states, that we proceed to infinity, if **in venturing on any matter, even if it is insignificant**, we need a prayer? For in order to pray, we will again need another prayer and so will never come to a halt. We should resolve this puzzle as Porphyry does (fr. 29), namely [by arguing] that it has not been stated

<sup>63</sup> Or possibly ‘their good deeds’.

<sup>64</sup> This complex and difficult sentence weighs up the factors of general divine providence and human freedom of movement, as a result of which prayer is a necessary activity.

<sup>65</sup> The technical term is τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, indicating what is within the bounds of human freedom and for which one must take responsibility.

<sup>66</sup> Because impulses involve irrational factors, whereas choice and decision are the work of discursive reason. Note that the term for impulse (ὁρμή) is found in the Platonic text (translated as ‘when venturing’).

<sup>67</sup> Above at 209.15–210.2.

<sup>68</sup> The superior beings are the gods, the secondary or subordinate beings are human souls. On the extent of influence of both see *ET* §§56–7. Since Providence, as the workings of higher reality, extends to all lower levels, it in fact exerts influence on human beings beyond the level of rational behaviour, e.g. in the structuring of irrational impulses such as hunger and desire for sex. For this reason there is all the more reason for prayer to the gods. As Festugière notes, Proclus equivocates by interpreting ὁρμή first as ‘any action’, and then more specifically as ‘(irrational) impulse’. In actual fact Timaeus’ investigation is a good example of the use of discursive reasoning.

<sup>69</sup> Follower and close friend of Epicurus, who took over the Epicurean school on its founder’s death. This text is fr. 48 in the fragment collection of Longo Auricchio. Hermarchus will have discussed this passage in his work *Against Plato*. Proclus presumably took it over from Porphyry’s commentary.

that one should pray in the case of any matter,<sup>70</sup> but rather in the venturing of any matter. We have an impulse to matters [of action], but we do not have an impulse to impulses, so that there is no path to infinity. 25

Or is it the case that the puzzle still remains? In fact, we do have an impulse to prayer, so that for this too we will need prayer, and again for the impulse to this prayer, and so on to infinity. It is therefore finer to state that the person who prays for any matter whatsoever first will 30  
declare his thanks to the gods for this very fact, that he has obtained from them the ability to revert to them, and that for all other matters 217  
goodness comes to be present through prayer, but in the case of prayer it comes through [prayer] itself. It [the prayer] will in no way be in need of another prayer, because it has included the good in itself and provides communion with the divine.

### *Subject of Timaeus' investigation*

But for us who in some way are about to produce the accounts<sup>71</sup> concerning the universe, whether it has come into being or even if it is 5  
ungenerated, unless we go entirely astray . . .<sup>72</sup> (27c4–6)

### *General explanation: 217.7–28*

He has revealed how marvellous the subject matter is, but at the same time has decorously preserved his place in the rank of modesty, pursuing a middle course between irony<sup>73</sup> and effrontery. For when he earlier stated (27c1–3) that even those who share in a modicum of good sense when venturing on any matter, even if it is insignificant, invoke god, [now] as 10  
far as the proposed subject is concerned, he has very much exalted it, opposing **the accounts concerning the universe** to the 'small matter', but as for himself, he has cautiously not stated that he has reached the summit of good sense – for this would be quite opposite to 'sharing in 15  
even a modicum of good sense' – but rather that he does not entirely go astray, and this he has done quite deliberately, so that he will have his

<sup>70</sup> Proclus here uses the term *πρᾶγμα*, as in the Platonic text. What is meant is matters involving *action*, whether rational or irrational.

<sup>71</sup> Plato's term is *οἱ λόγοι*, which I have rendered 'the accounts', i.e. what Timaeus produces as a result of his investigation (*θεωρία*) into the nature of the universe. Zeyl translates 'speeches', which is also possible (but note that he leaves out the article).

<sup>72</sup> Divergence from Burnet's OCT text: (1) at 27c4 Proclus omits *τοῦ* before *παντός*; (2) at 27c5 he reads *ἢ* instead of *ἢ* (cf. below 218.28–219.31).

<sup>73</sup> I.e. false modesty.

ability and his knowledge demonstrated from the work itself, and not from his own statements.

20 The object of his [Timaeus'] investigation will thus be the universe, inasmuch as the universe derives its existence from the gods. Now it is possible for someone to examine the universe in many different ways, either as a bodily object, or inasmuch as it participates in souls, both partial and whole,<sup>74</sup> or inasmuch as it possesses intellect. But Timaeus for his part examines the nature of the universe not only along these  
25 lines, but especially in terms of the procession from the Demiurge. In this respect natural philosophy is seen as a kind of theology,<sup>75</sup> because entities that come into existence naturally, inasmuch as they are generated from the gods, also have a kind of divine existence. This is what we have to distinguish on this point.

### *First difficulty: 217.28–218.28*

218 They [the interpreters] are in the habit of raising the following difficulty: why ever did Plato add here the word **in some way** (*pêi*)? For he writes **those who in some way are about to produce the accounts concerning the universe**. The more ancient of the interpreters<sup>76</sup> state that the universe is in some way ungenerated, in some way generated, and  
5 for this reason it is quite suitable that the account deals with it in some way as ungenerated and in some way as generated. [They maintain this] even though Plato has not aligned up the [word] **in some way** with what is ungenerated and what is generated, but rather with **producing the accounts**.

10 The divine Iamblichus (fr. 27) states that the account will **in some way** be concerned with the universe and in some way not. It leaves matter undiscussed, because it is without limit and without form, whereas there is a thorough investigation of the entire formal variety [that exists] in the cosmos. Against this interpretation too we should affirm that the [word]

<sup>74</sup> The universe participates in the hypostasis of Soul, which is ontologically higher. But Festugière in his note ad loc. is wrong in postulating a part-whole relation between the World-soul and individual souls. They are more like 'soul-sisters', both participating in the Soul-hypostasis. Cf. Helleman (1980) on Plot. *Enn.* 4.3.1–8.

<sup>75</sup> Although the *Timaeus* discusses the nature of the material universe, the chief focus is the cosmos's derivation from higher causes (formal and efficient). See the Prologue, 1.4–4.5, and especially 2.3off.

<sup>76</sup> It has been suggested that this refers primarily to Albinus, a Middle Platonist active in the middle of the second century; see Baltes (1976–8) I. 99–100, Dörrie–Baltes, PA §139.3. Gioè includes it as (?) 13 T (*sic*) in his collection of Albinus' fragments. Proclus' source was no doubt Porphyry's commentary, which was his main source for early exegesis of the *Timaeus*. See also below n. 84.

**in some way** has been aligned with something else and not with ‘the universe’.

Perhaps, as our teacher has stated,<sup>77</sup> the [term] ‘accounts’ (*logoi*) belongs to those words with multiple meanings. (1) Some are demiurgic accounts proceeding from intellect, such as the Demiurge pronounces to the ‘young gods’<sup>78</sup> (41a–d, 42d), and indeed he says that the soul when moving speaks to itself (37a6).<sup>79</sup> (2) Others [accounts] are those which are [mentally] observed within science, and (3) yet others have been allotted a place at a third remove from the intellect, those which are brought forth externally for the purposes of instruction and social intercourse.<sup>80</sup> Now Timaeus, knowing that the demiurgic accounts would be produced by the Demiurge and that he would not now generate the scientific accounts but retain them within himself, but that he would produce only the externally uttered accounts for Socrates’ benefit, for this reason stated that **he would in some way produce the accounts concerning the universe**. For the three modes of speaking intuitively, scientifically and didactically differ from each other, and the [word] **in some way** indicates these differences in respect of the accounts.

### *Second difficulty: 218.29–219.31*<sup>81</sup>

Another problem has been raised by the words **ê it has come into being ê even is ungenerated**.<sup>82</sup> (1) Some have interpreted the phrase by giving the first ê a rough breathing and the second ê a smooth breathing.<sup>83</sup> They affirm that Timaeus will speak about the universe inasmuch as it has come into being from a cause, even if it is ungenerated, so that when we have observed it having come into being, we might see the nature

<sup>77</sup> This is the phrase that Proclus habitually uses for Syrianus.

<sup>78</sup> The standard way in the later tradition of referring to the planetary gods to whom the Demiurge entrusts the secondary creation, based on Plato’s phrase in 42d6.

<sup>79</sup> Reading λέγειν φησι with one of the MSS and Festugière.

<sup>80</sup> As Proclus’ further explanation makes clear, the distinction between (2) and (3) is based on the distinction first made by the Stoa between internal thought (*logos endiathetos*) and external speech (*logos prophorikos*).

<sup>81</sup> On this passage see the analysis by Baltes (1976–8) II. 1–3 and also Dörrie–Baltes, PA §81.7.

<sup>82</sup> This passage is very difficult to translate because the difficulty to which Proclus refers turns on the small Greek word which is basically a long e (η) with the possibility of different breathings, accents and the addition of an iota subscript. In the text here he simply writes the undifferentiated letter.

<sup>83</sup> This is the combination ἦ γέγονεν ἦ καὶ ἀγενὲς ἔστιν, the text read by Burnet in the OCT.

that it possesses. The Platonist Albinus<sup>84</sup> considers that in Plato's view the cosmos, though ungenerated, (also) has a principle of generation. For this interpreter it even exceeds true Being, true Being only having eternal existence, whereas the cosmos, in addition to being eternal, also has a principle of generation. As a result it is both always existent and generated. It is the latter not because it is generated in terms of time – for then it would not be eternal as well – but because it has a rationale (*logos*) for its generation through being compounded from multiple and dissimilar parts, a combination whose existence must necessarily be referred back to another more ancient cause. Because this cause is always existent at the primary level, the universe itself is also in some way always existent. It is not only generated, but also ungenerated. Plato, however, never states in what follows that the universe is in some sense generated and in some sense ungenerated.

(2) Other interpreters give a rough breathing to both,<sup>85</sup> which results in [Timaeus] saying that 'he will produce speeches about the universe insofar as it has coming into being and insofar as it is generated'. But they make the same mistake as their predecessors, unless indeed they use terms in such a way that the universe has come into being with regard to the form, but is ungenerated with regard to the nurse [of becoming] (52d5). Along these lines Timaeus will pronounce that the latter is ungenerated,<sup>86</sup> but that the universe is generated, because it has received its form from the god.

(3) Porphyry (fr. 30) and Iamblichus (fr. 28) give a smooth breathing to both, so that the text says 'whether the universe has come into being or is ungenerated'.<sup>87</sup> For this is the question which is being investigated before all others. And indeed whether this principle is established or not, namely if the cosmos is generated or ungenerated, makes a huge contribution to the whole of natural philosophy. For we shall be able to examine the nature of both its essence and its powers from this basic principle,<sup>88</sup> as will become clear to us a little later on.<sup>89</sup>

The accounts concerning the universe, therefore, will be advanced for the sake of instruction and have as their point of departure the question

<sup>84</sup> Fr. 12 T Giò. On this passage see Dörrie-Baltes, PA §139.3, Phillips (1997) 189–90.

<sup>85</sup> This is the combination ἢ γέγονεν ἢ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν.

<sup>86</sup> This is not said explicitly, but implied at 52a8.

<sup>87</sup> This is the combination ἢ γέγονεν ἢ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν.

<sup>88</sup> The term here is ὑπόθεσις, on which see further n. 150 below.

<sup>89</sup> A rather vague reference, but Proclus is probably thinking of 28b6–7, expounded below at 276–82.

whether the cosmos has come into being or is ungenerated, braiding<sup>90</sup> 30  
the remainder in sequence from this [beginning].

### *Praying to the two genera of divinities*

It is necessary to invoke the gods and goddesses and pray that everything 220  
we say will be in conformity with their intellect above all,<sup>91</sup> but also  
consequently with ours.<sup>92</sup> (27c6–d1)

### *General explanation: 220.4–221.8*

The division into male and female contains within itself the entire con- 5  
tents of the divine orders. For in the male is contained that which is the  
cause of the power of stability and sameness and that which furnishes  
being and attaches to all things the very first principle of their return,  
while the female embraces that which projects from itself all manner  
of processions and distinctions, together with their measures of life and  
generative powers. For this reason Timaeus too quite reasonably, in ele- 10  
vating himself towards the gods, has included their ranks in their entirety  
in accordance with the division into the genera. Such a division is also  
most appropriate for the investigation that is being undertaken. After  
all,<sup>93</sup> this universe is replete with these two genera of divinities. To start 15  
with the extremes, heaven has the same relation to earth as the male  
has to the female, because the movement of heaven instils structures<sup>94</sup>  
and powers in each thing, while the earth, receiving the effluences from  
there, conceives and gives birth to all kinds of animals and plants. As 20  
for the gods in heaven, they too are distinguished into two groups along  
the lines of the male and the female. Moreover the gods who super-  
vise the process of birth without themselves being subject to it, these  
too belong either to the one or to the other of the coupled series. In  
general there is in the universe a vast demiurgic choir and numerous  
channels of life, which [all] exhibit the form either of the male or of the 25

<sup>90</sup> The metaphor is one of ‘weaving’, often used for the process of constructing a literary work.

<sup>91</sup> Translating Plato’s κατὰ νοῦν rather literally. Cf. Zeyl (2000) 13: ‘and pray that they above all will approve of all we have to say, and that in consequence we will, too’.

<sup>92</sup> No divergences from Burnet’s OCT text.

<sup>93</sup> In order to avoid having too many sentences beginning with the conjunction ‘for’ (especially when the following words are an article and noun), I use ‘after all’ from time to time as an additional way to translate explanatory γάρ.

<sup>94</sup> The term is *logoi*; Festugière translates ‘creative principles’.

female. Why should we extend our discussion? From the hexadic gods who are detached<sup>95</sup> variegated orders of the masculine and the feminine descend into the universe. It is quite suitable, therefore, that ‘the person who is about to produce accounts concerning the universe’ (27c4) invokes gods and goddesses from each of whom the universe’s plenitude derives, and that what is about to be said will be said especially **in conformity with the intellect** (27c7) of the gods themselves. For this is the supreme end of philosophical speculation,<sup>96</sup> to ascend to the divine intellect and to organize one’s account of the realities in a manner comparable to the unified way in which all things have been grasped in advance in that mind. Secondarily and consequent upon this (cf. 27c6), the entire investigation should be conducted in conformity with the human intellect and the light of scientific knowledge. For that which is whole and perfect and unique pre-exists in the divine mind, whereas what is partial and falls short of the divine simplicity<sup>97</sup> relates to the human intellect.

### *A difficulty: 221.9–222.6*

But how can it be, they say, that Timaeus has announced with a grand flourish that one should pray and call on the gods and goddesses, but that he fails to do this himself and immediately turns to the proposed accounts without praying? To this we shall reply that what belongs to the decision<sup>98</sup> includes its accomplishment in itself, while what follows on from the decision inclines to another [form of] activity and through action completes what had been decided. The philosophical life is dependent on our decision, and what is deficient in it results from the deficiency in our decision-making. But the acquisition of external things also needs a second form of activity after the decision has been made, for their completion does not lie in our power. We would be justified, therefore,

<sup>95</sup> ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπολύτων ἐξάδων. Proclus refers with this expression to the lowest level of the hypercosmic-encosmic gods; cf. *PT* I. 18.3 and Saffrey and Westerink (1968) lxvii. There are twelve gods, six male and six female. Hence the two hexads. The Platonic source is the twelve ranks of gods in *Phdr.* 247a.

<sup>96</sup> The term here is θεωρία, which Proclus uses both for the ‘investigation’ of the physical universe being undertaken by Timaeus (as below in 221.6), and also in a more general sense for intellectual activity culminating in a vision of intelligible reality. My translation here follows Festugière.

<sup>97</sup> The text can be accepted here without the lacuna suggested by Diehl.

<sup>98</sup> It is very difficult to translate the term βούλησις here. The usual translation is ‘will’, but in the present context this rendering may obscure the fact that it is a rational process involving discursive reasoning. One might also in some contexts translate ‘intention’ when the emphasis is on future action.

in claiming that the activity of prayer belongs to that which has its full completion in the decision itself. The decision to pray is a desire for reversion to the gods. This desire guides the desirous soul and unites it to the divine, which in our view was the very first task of prayer.<sup>99</sup> One should not, therefore, decide first and pray later, but rather the decision and the practice of prayer should go together in accordance with the measure of the intention, now more and now less.<sup>100</sup> And this is the task of true prayer, that the things for which we pray are held in common with the gods, in accordance with our capacities and our activities, and that we complete them in cooperation with the gods. An example would be if someone should pray to the gods, who excise [the effect of] matter and cause the stains that come from the [process of] birth to vanish, while he himself with the help of the purificatory virtues is especially engaged in this [activity]. Such a person would certainly, together with the [help of the] gods, achieve liberation from the shackles of matter. This, then, is what Timaeus does here. The things which he prays to the gods to accomplish, these he too fulfils in accordance with the human intellect<sup>101</sup> by ordering his entire account in conformity with the intellect of the gods. 20  
25  
222  
5

### *Exhortation of the listeners*

So let the gods have been called upon in this manner. But we should also call upon ourselves,<sup>102</sup> so that you may learn as easily as you can, and I may demonstrate as best I can how I think about the proposed subjects.<sup>103</sup> (27d1–4) 10

### *Exegesis of the text: 222.11–223.2*

The exhortation of the listeners takes place following upon the prayers. For that which fills,<sup>104</sup> after securing dependence on its own causes,

<sup>99</sup> Proclus has in mind his earlier theoretical discussion on prayer at 209.9–212.10.

<sup>100</sup> I take this to mean that the βούλησις may vary according to context, depending on what kind of endeavour one wishes to undertake.

<sup>101</sup> The phrase κατὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον νοῦν is placed in between the verb πληροῖ and the participle διατιθεῖς and may well go with both.

<sup>102</sup> Plato writes τὸ ἡμέτερον, so one could also translate ‘our own contribution’.

<sup>103</sup> Divergence from Burnet’s OCT text: Proclus reads μάλιστα instead of μάλιστ’ ἔν.

<sup>104</sup> Retaining Proclus’ neutral formulation. In typical fashion he translates a human situation (exhortation of speaker and listener) into the exposition of a metaphysical process.

15 should first arouse its recipients and revert them towards it before the  
process of filling, so that they will become more receptive and tenaciously  
grasp the thoughts instilled in them. For them this makes the sharing  
more complete, while for the giver it makes the giving easier. Moreover,  
this very aspect of easiness is fitting for those who are to imitate the  
20 entire creative process, from which everything proceeds while it remains  
in itself (cf. 42e5) and rejoices in the products which it has set in motion  
(cf. 37c7).

Furthermore, the completion of a single series by connecting what is  
prior to what has the second rank imitates the demiurgic series which  
extends right down to the final entities. For if the listeners will receive  
the account in accordance with Timaeus' intellect, and Timaeus will  
organize his entire exposition in accordance with the gods' intellect,  
25 then it simply must be the case that the entire conversation will relate  
to one and the same intellect and intellectual process. In addition to  
all this, the self-movement of the souls is amply demonstrated through  
these words, because they [the souls], after being set in motion by  
the gods, both move themselves and project the sciences (*epistêmai*)  
223 from themselves.<sup>105</sup> In fact, [the words] **how I think** indicate the  
activity that receives its impulse from the life that possesses its own  
autonomy.<sup>106</sup>

### *III Five basic principles of natural philosophy: 223.3–274.32*

#### *First distinction and delimitation of two crucial genera*

First, then, in my opinion at least, one should make the following  
division.<sup>107</sup> (27d5)

#### *First explanation of the text: 223.5–224.17*

5 Timaeus is a Pythagorean and right from his opening words he  
reveals himself as preserving the characteristic manner of Pythagorean  
accounts.<sup>108</sup> Socrates did not expound his own opinions to others in an

<sup>105</sup> For this triad cf. *ET* §17, §20.

<sup>106</sup> Literally 'from the life that is αὐτεξουσίου', i.e. has the principle of movement within  
itself, although at the same time having received it from a higher cause. This is the  
level of soul.

<sup>107</sup> Divergence from Burnet's OCT text: Proclus adds γέ, 'at least', in the phrase κατ'ἐμὴν  
δόξαν.

<sup>108</sup> Proclus emphasizes the Pythagorean nature of the dialogue at the outset of his  
commentary; see 7.17–8.29, 15.23–18.28, and the comments of Lernould (2001) 40–1.

affirmative fashion but rather purified the conceptions of those others and so brought the truth to light in a dialectical fashion. Indeed he said to them that he knew nothing except how to offer and receive an account.<sup>109</sup> 10  
 Timaeus, however, because he is producing his accounts for knowledgeable men, says he is expounding his own doctrine, not bothering with the opinions of others, but pursuing the single path of knowledge. Moreover the use of [the term] **opinion** (27d5) is very much to the point here and consistent with what was said before. For of the rational soul in its entirety one part is intellect (*nous*), another is discursive reason (*dianoia*) and another is opinion (*doxa*), and of these the first is connected to the gods, the second projects the sciences,<sup>110</sup> while the third provides these to others. This man, then, shows his awareness of these matters by harmonizing his own intellect with that of the gods through his prayers. 15  
 This was in fact made clear by the [words] **everything in conformity above all with the intellect** of the gods, **but also consequently with ours** (27c7–d1). Through his invocations he has roused the discursive part of the soul. This is in fact shown by the [words] **how I think** (27d3).<sup>111</sup> 20  
 What remains is the opinative part [of the soul],<sup>112</sup> 25  
 which receives the scientific distinction (cf. 27d5) from the understanding and channels it towards others. This part (*doxa*) is neither ambiguous nor parcelled out over the sense-perceptible objects, nor is its form of cognition limited to mere assumptions only, but it has been filled [with information] from the intellect and the understanding, examines the demiurgic plan (*logos*), and distinguishes the nature of the realities.<sup>113</sup> 30  
 Moreover these three aspects adequately resemble the paradigm that the speaker [Timaeus] has before him. For in that realm [too] the royal intellect, in virtue of which the speaker is united with the objects of intuitive knowledge, leads the way, followed by discursive reason, which holds together within itself the full contents of the forms, and then there 224

<sup>109</sup> Diehl refers to *Prot.* 336c, but Proclus also has in mind the general way in which Socrates is presented in the *Apology*, the Socratic dialogues, and especially the *Theaetetus*. Modern interpreters too are struck by the difference between Timaeus' subsequent monologue (the longest in the Platonic corpus) and the usual practice of the Platonic dialogue.

<sup>110</sup> Cf. 222.28.

<sup>111</sup> Because Timaeus uses the verb διανοοῦμαι linked with the term διάνοια (discursive reason).

<sup>112</sup> The term 'opinative' (δοξαστικόν) is derived from δοξάζω (I opine), which is directly linked to δόξα (opinion).

<sup>113</sup> Proclus is keen to separate *doxa* here from any connection with the lower half of the Divided line (cf. *Rep.* 510a) because Timaeus uses it here in relation to the foundational principles of his discourse.

is the very first and unifying cause of opinion. For this reason he [the Demiurge]:

On the one hand holds the objects of intuitive knowledge in his mind,  
and on the other introduces sense-perception to the cosmic realm,

as the Oracle states,<sup>114</sup> or as Plato affirms,<sup>115</sup> ‘the extent to which the intellect observes the ideas inherent in the Living-Thing-itself, such a number it reasoned that this universe should have’ (39e7–9).

Moreover, the division of beings that exist and those that come into being also follows on from what has been said previously. For after the gods and goddesses and the ineffable specific character of the two genera belonging to them, the division of being and becoming<sup>116</sup> has its [rightful] place. Being, with its eternal and unchanging stable nature and as object of intuitive knowledge, is properly aligned with the superior rank of the gods, whereas becoming is aligned with the inferior rank, from which the infinite procession [of creatures] and their manifold variability obtain their existence.

*Further detailed explanation: what is the division?*

**224.17–227.3**

What, then, is this division, and in what way has it taken place? Has he<sup>117</sup> made the divide (a) as of a whole into its parts, or did he divide it (b) as a genus into its species, or (c) as a single word into several meanings, or (d) as a substance into its accidental categories, or conversely (e) as an accidental composite into its substances? These are in fact the types of division that people commonly talk about. Well, to make a division into being and becoming as an accidental composite into its substances (e) or as a substance into its accidental categories (d) is ridiculous. For what is accidental bears no relation whatsoever to that which exists eternally. But **one should** also not **make the division** as a word into its meanings (c). For what single common<sup>118</sup> word did Plato take and divide into what exists eternally and what comes into being? There is no such word,

<sup>114</sup> *Or. Chald.* fr. 8, quoted more fully at *in Crat.* 51.26–30.

<sup>115</sup> Proclus’ quotation is a simplified version of Plato’s fuller text. Note that the final verb in the quotation is διανοήθη, which Proclus links to τὸ διανοητικόν, the faculty of discursive reason.

<sup>116</sup> The division into τὸ ὄν and γένεσις introduced in 27d6. I use the terms ‘becoming’, ‘generation’ and ‘coming into being’ to render γένεσις depending on the context.

<sup>117</sup> Either *Timaeus* or Plato could be meant here. As Festugière points out, at 224.27 Plato is explicitly mentioned, so one should not distinguish sharply between the two.

<sup>118</sup> ‘Common’ (κοινός) in the sense of ‘joint’.

unless indeed one should mention the [word] *ti*.<sup>119</sup> This, however, is not a Platonic approach, but has been dragged in from the Stoic way of doing things.<sup>120</sup> What then? Did he make the division as a whole into parts (a)? But what would that entity be which is composed of the always-existent and that which becomes? How could paradigm and image be constituents of a single formation? How could the always-existent itself be part of anything, when it is undivided and unified and simple? After all, what is without parts is not part of anything, unless that consists of nothing but indivisibles. That which is generated, however, is divisible. Therefore it and the always-existent will never be parts of a single entity. But is it then divided as a single genus into species (b)? How can there be a common genus of these [two categories] when that which is anterior and that which is posterior is involved? For the always-existent precedes that which comes into being in the manner of a cause, and even if the latter is non-existent, the former continues to exist, whereas if the always-existent is non-existent – a statement which is not even permissible – then becoming too disappears. And how can there be a single genus containing the very first things and the very last? In fact the division of genera into species is only found in accounts given at the intermediate level of soul. The entities prior to soul exist in superior genera, while those below soul have their substance in the subordinate realm. How, then, could one line up being itself and becoming under a single genus? And what will this genus be? It will not be Being, for otherwise becoming, which is never Being (cf. 28a1), would be ranked in the realm of being. And it will also not be One,<sup>121</sup> because every genus is divided with appropriate differentia and it already contains these differentia either potentially or actually. But it is not permissible for the One to have these differentia potentially, lest it be less complete than what is secondary to it, and also not actually, lest it contain plurality. Since it has been declared wholly superior to potency and actuality, it could in no way contain these differentia, so that there can be no question of a division of the One.

<sup>119</sup> Used twice in 27d6 in the interrogative sense ('what'), but here it would be indefinite ('anything').

<sup>120</sup> *τι* (something) is the most fundamental category of Stoic metaphysics; see Long–Sedley §27–8 (I. 162–76). Cf. the discussion of the interpretation of 27e6 by Severus below at 227.13ff.

<sup>121</sup> Bracketing with Diehl (αὐ)τὸ τὸ ὅν. If Festugière's tentative conjecture τοῦτο ὅν is accepted, the translation would read 'but this [the genus] will also not be a being that is one'. But it seems that Proclus is thinking of the One as the first hypostasis which would have the genus of being and becoming below it, which of course is out of the question in his hierarchy of being.

What then shall we say? Possibly<sup>122</sup> that Plato in the present case has not made a division at all,<sup>123</sup> but rather a delimiting distinction between the always-existent and that which comes into being, [indicating] what each of them is. The [words] **one should make the division** seem to me to mean the same as 'one should carefully distinguish'. Since in fact the discussion will be concerned with the cosmos and the Demiurge of the cosmos and the Paradigm, he wishes to define the always-existent separately and that which comes into being separately, so that by means of the given definitions, we would be in a position to say where the cosmos, where the Demiurge and where the Paradigm are to be ranked, and we would not confuse the various orders of reality,<sup>124</sup> but distinguish them from each other in accordance with their respective natures. Plato follows the same procedure in the *Philebus*.<sup>125</sup> In investigating intellect and pleasure and the mixed life and inquiring as to which is better, he dealt with their genera – limit, the unlimited and the mixed. By this means the rank of each would become plain and, starting from the genera, he elucidated their individual features. But in that case limit and the unlimited took their starting-points from the gods and penetrated through the whole of reality in whatever manner it exists. They are in fact found in the intelligible realm in virtue of the stable and generative cause of the intelligible beings; they are also found in the intellectual realm in virtue of the paternal and the maternal principle of the intellectual gods; they are also found in the hypercosmic realm in virtue of the demiurgic monad and the zoogonic dyad, and lastly also in virtue of the creative and fructifying potencies. Here [in the present text], however, being and becoming do not receive their starting-point from the gods. The henads of the gods are superior to being, and prior to them is the One itself, which transcends all beings and is not participated by them, just as the henads which come after it and from it are described and are in fact participated by being. And they also do not penetrate through to the lowest level.<sup>126</sup> For neither is it possible to call matter the always-existent (we usually call it non-being), nor can we call it that which comes into being, since it cannot even be acted upon, lest it be destroyed and disappear entirely. This, then, we shall also discuss at a

<sup>122</sup> Proclus frequently uses the particle ἤ to introduce a tentative answer to an interpretative question. But his tentativeness usually does not last very long.

<sup>123</sup> Since all of the possible kinds of division have been shown not to apply to the distinction between being and becoming.

<sup>124</sup> As Proclus thinks is done by many of his predecessors, including Porphyry; cf. his analysis of their views on the ontological status of the Demiurge in 303.26–310.2.

<sup>125</sup> A general reference to the discussion in 16c–17a, 23c–31a.

<sup>126</sup> On the symmetry of highest and lowest (indicated by the double οὐτε) and the exclusion of being from both, see *ET* §59.

later opportunity,<sup>127</sup> namely that there is no division [here] of a single entity, and that the present investigation requires a delimitation of these two genera before all other considerations, so that, just as in the case of geometrical hypotheses, the account will advance to the examination of the consequents and will discover the nature of the universe and its paternal and paradigmatic cause.<sup>128</sup> For if the universe is generated (cf. 28b7), it has come into being through a cause (cf. 28c1–2). There is, therefore, a demiurgic cause of the universe (cf. 28c3–5). If there is a Demiurge, there is also a Paradigm of the cosmos (cf. 28c6–29a6), to which the constructor<sup>129</sup> referred when he fashioned the universe. In this way the account concerning these subjects is sequentially introduced. The investigation of nature truly culminates in theology and for us that is a fine development!

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### *Detailed examination of description of the two genera*

What is that which always is and has no becoming,<sup>130</sup> and what is that which came into being but never is being?<sup>131</sup> (27d6–28a1)

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### *Introducing the examination of the literal text: 227.6–13*

Some interpreters have affirmed that all existents whatsoever are included in this distinction in the manner of either a paradigm or an image, while others have said this is not the case. The disputes between the exegetes on this issue have been quite considerable. As for us, we would not know which of the two views we should state if we did not

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<sup>127</sup> This is the most natural way to translate the sentence. Proclus may be referring to his discussion of the following lemma at 227.6ff. It is also possible to translate ‘this, then, shall be stated once again . . .’ But the use of the uncommon word εἰσαϋθίς suggests the translation given.

<sup>128</sup> Proclus here gives a very compact summary of how he interprets the *proemium* as first setting out five basic principles followed by three propositions that follow on from them. The former are explained in 227.4–274.32, the latter in 275.1–348.7. See the summary in 348.13–15, 355.18–28.

<sup>129</sup> For ὁ ξυνοιστάς cf. 29e1, 30c3, 32c7.

<sup>130</sup> The verb γίγνομαι presents the translator with considerable practical problems. The best English equivalents are undoubtedly ‘come into being’ and ‘come to be’, which we prefer, but it must be recognized that they can easily lead to cumbersome renderings, so sometimes ‘become’ is to be used instead. For γένησις ‘becoming’ is preferred, but ‘coming into being’ and ‘genesis’ are also used. The corresponding adjective γενητός is usually translated ‘generated’. See further the remarks of Share (2005a) 8–9.

<sup>131</sup> Divergence from Burnet’s OCT text: Proclus reads γενόμενον instead of γιγνόμενον. He also does not include αἰεί, which Burnet has included in his text on dubious grounds, as shown by Whittaker (1969).

examine each of the terms involved one for one. Let us therefore start by examining each of these words on its own and determine what meaning it has.<sup>132</sup>

### *Explanation of ti: 227.13–229.11*

15 First, then, the word *ti* (**what**) is intended to be definitory, for in definitions we are in the habit of giving precedence to the question ‘what it is’.<sup>133</sup> It does not indicate the genus, as Severus the Platonist<sup>134</sup> thought, who affirmed that this term *ti* was the genus of being and becoming, and that by it the All [i.e. universe] was signified. In fact, if taken in this way, both that which comes into being and that which always is would be ‘all’.<sup>135</sup>

20 The word furnishes us, as it did our predecessors, with this difficulty: why did Plato, before instructing us on the question ‘what it is’, not deal with the question ‘whether it is’?<sup>136</sup> On what basis could he assume that that which always exists does [in fact] exist? It is the rule of demonstrative expositions that, in cases where one does not know whether something exists, this question must be examined before the question of ‘what it is’.

25 To this we should reply<sup>137</sup> that (A) perhaps Timaeus thought there was no need for him to establish this, for on the previous day<sup>138</sup> he had had it quite satisfactorily explained by Socrates in the discussions on the soul. He demonstrated that the soul is ungenerated and indestructible

<sup>132</sup> Because the first basic principle is crucial, Proclus examines every single term that it contains, before looking at the deeper meaning of what Plato intends. Cf. 299.19–21, where he distinguishes between the λέξις (wording) and θεωρία (doctrine). On the method see Festugière (1963) and our remarks in the Introduction, pp. 4–5.

<sup>133</sup> Cf. Aristotle *An post.* 2.1 89b34, 2.3 90b4: definition concerns the essence, which is asked in the ‘what’ question.

<sup>134</sup> Fr. 4 T Giøe. Little is known about this Platonist. See Dillon (1996) 262–4, who places him in the late second century. On this text see Dörrie–Baltes, PA §104.8.

<sup>135</sup> In the *Timaeus* τὸ πᾶν generally means the universe (cf. 27c4, 28c4, 29d7, etc.). If Severus was followed there would be another πᾶν which embraced both the intelligible and the sense-perceptible worlds.

<sup>136</sup> This is the sequence of questions prescribed in Aristotle’s philosophy of science; cf. *An post.* 2.1.

<sup>137</sup> I have followed Festugière in separating four responses to the question. This is a typical example of Neoplatonist multiple exegesis, in which the final answer is usually regarded as the strongest and best.

<sup>138</sup> Proclus argues in his introductory remarks at 8.30–9.11 that the discussion of the *Republic* was repeated on the next day, which was the day before the present discussion took place (but by 26.15 he has forgotten this refinement and assumes that the conversation in the *Republic* took place on the previous day). Modern scholars are sceptical about the link between the two dialogues, but it is taken with complete seriousness by Proclus.

because of its kinship with being,<sup>139</sup> with which it has contact when it is philosophizing. In these discussions he also demonstrated the difference between (a) that which is being in the complete sense and is truly object of scientific knowledge, (b) that which is being in one sense but not in another and for this reason is object of opinion, and (c) that which is in no way being and is completely unknowable.<sup>140</sup> In the same discussions he divided the line into four: the realm of knowledge, of discursive reasoning, of sense-perception, and of guesswork.<sup>141</sup> He also held a discussion about the Good and stated that it rules as king in the noetic realm, just as the sun does in the visible realm.<sup>142</sup>

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But (B) perhaps the preceding account on prayer too is a demonstration that the always-existent<sup>143</sup> does exist, for if there are gods, it follows necessarily that true being exists.<sup>144</sup> This in fact is what is unified with the gods, and not 'that which comes into being and passes away, but never truly is' (28a3–4).

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But (C) prior to these answers we should rather say that in our common conceptions<sup>145</sup> [the notion] is laid down that there exists a form of being that always exists. After all, where would coming into being come into being from, if not from that which exists always? For if that [always-existent] were to come into being, this would happen through the agency of something else (cf. 28a4), and that would either exist always or have come into being, with the result that (a) we would progress to infinity or (b) generation<sup>146</sup> would take place in a circle, or (c) that which always

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<sup>139</sup> Proclus is no doubt thinking of the well-known passage at *Rep.* 611b–e, in which the soul is compared to the shell-encrusted sea god Glaucón, although it is certainly not a demonstration of the soul's ungenerated and indestructible nature. For the theme of kinship (συγγένεια) with the divine and eternal realm see 611e2–3.

<sup>140</sup> See *Rep.* 476e6–478e6. The tenor of this passage is epistemological, but Proclus presents his summary in primarily ontological terms. This allows him to include the third category which for him refers to 'matter', a concept that is not present in the *Republic*.

<sup>141</sup> A very bald summary of the image of the Divided line, 509d6–511e5. Proclus makes a number of references to this passage in our text; see 246.32, 255.2ff., 343.23, 350.15.

<sup>142</sup> *Rep.* 508e1–509d5, especially 509d2–3; cf. further below 246.32, 350.15.

<sup>143</sup> This is my preferred way of rendering τὸ ὄν αἰεί, which is Proclus' preferred way of referring to the subject of the first hypothesis. Note, however, that the word αἰεί was apparently not found in his Platonic text; see n. 131 above.

<sup>144</sup> Since the gods as henads are the cause of being; cf. *ET* §115.

<sup>145</sup> The so-called κοινὰ ἔννοια first introduced by the Stoa to explain the empirical basis of conceptual knowledge. Proclus also refers to them at 258.14, 265.7, 275.28. Proclus regards them as equivalent to the 'basic principles' (ὑποθέσεις) introduced by Timaeus as the basis of his account into the nature of the universe; see the discussion at Lernould (2001) 116.

<sup>146</sup> I.e. γένεσις as the process of becoming.

exists does [in fact] exist.<sup>147</sup> But (a) it is not permissible to advance to infinity, for all things come from the One as single principle. Nor (b) does generation take place in a circle, lest the same things become superior and inferior, and become both causes and products. What remains, therefore, is (c) that the always-existent exists.

Why, then, one might object, does becoming not come [directly] from the One? Because, our assertion shall be, to derive multiplicity directly from what is absolutely One is absurd. It is necessary, therefore, for true Being to exist, which proceeds from it [the One] primarily, so that the Very First<sup>148</sup> is not cause only of the things that are last, but also, prior to these, of Being, from which [in turn] becoming derives.<sup>149</sup>

(D) Nevertheless, in addition to what has been said, the truest explanation is that he now has taken the existence of the always-existent as a basic principle<sup>150</sup> and has defined it, just as a geometer has posited the existence of a point and given it a definition. After the accounts of the cosmos's creation (29e–47e), however, he takes up this very subject again and demonstrates that the always-existent exists (cf. 52a–b). [Here], carefully observing the requirements of the study of nature, he proceeds from this basic principle and shows what follows from it. In fact the study of nature too is a science that starts from a basic principle and needs first to grasp its basic principles before turning to the demonstrations. In the discussions on matter (47e–52d), therefore, he will demonstrate not only the existence of matter, but also of Being. But [in this earlier part of the account], after showing a little later on the basis of one of the basic principles, namely the third, that the Demiurge of the cosmos exists (cf. 28a4–6), he holds by means of this too,<sup>151</sup> that the always-existent exists prior to that which is generated.<sup>152</sup> And again, on the basis of the fourth [basic principle] he declares that the Demiurge has fashioned the universe by looking to the eternal Paradigm (28a6–b2). But, as for this

<sup>147</sup> This is an example of the method of argument frequently used in *ET*. Proclus gives the various theoretical alternatives and eliminates all but the one he wishes to establish.

<sup>148</sup> τὸ πρῶτιστον, often used as an epithet of the One.

<sup>149</sup> Proclus' formulation here is somewhat awkward. He means to say that between the One and τὰ ἔσχστα (i.e. physical reality) there has to be an intermediate realm, i.e. that of true Being.

<sup>150</sup> The term ὑπόθεσις, which Proclus uses here, plays an important role in his understanding of the role of the *proemium*. Although it can be translated 'hypothesis' and this is actually encouraged by the comparison with the procedure of the geometer, we have preferred on most occasions to render it with 'basic principle', since Proclus emphasizes that, in contrast to the geometer, the philosopher actually proves his basic principles. See further the Introduction, pp. 18–20.

<sup>151</sup> Reading with Praechter and Festugière ἔχει καὶ διὰ τοῦτο.

<sup>152</sup> It is hard to see how Proclus can derive proof of the existence of being from 28a4–6 unless he takes αἴτιον to refer to Being and not to the Demiurge, as is obviously meant.

subject taken on its own, namely that the always-existent exists prior to what has come into being, this he will demonstrate in those accounts which we have [already] mentioned.<sup>153</sup> So much for this topic.

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### *Explanation of to on aei: 229.11–232.22*

But the actual phrase **that which always is**, does it refer to (a) the entire intelligible cosmos or (b) the Demiurge or (c) the Paradigm of the universe? Interpreters have understood it in different ways. If (a) the intelligible realm is meant, where does the full extent of the intelligible world<sup>154</sup> have its origin and how far does it proceed? If it is (c) the Paradigm, how can it be that the Demiurge is not the always-existent, if the Paradigm and the Demiurge are different [entities]? And if it is (b) the Demiurge, how can it be that the Paradigm is not such [i.e. the always-existent]?

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Well, (3) that the paradigmatic cause is to be placed in the realm of eternal Being Plato states quite plainly (28c6–29a2):<sup>155</sup> ‘in relation to which of the two paradigms did the builder [of the universe] construct it, the one that is unchanging and remains the same, or the one that has come into being?’ And he immediately determined his answer (29a2–4): ‘if indeed the cosmos is beautiful and the Demiurge good, it is plain that he looked to the everlasting<sup>156</sup> [Paradigm]; but if what is not even permissible to say is the case, then he looked to that which has come into being [as paradigm]’. Well, if it is not even permissible to say this, [then] the Paradigm of the universe is the always-existent.

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That (2) the Demiurge belongs to the same order as well, is evident from the same quarter.<sup>157</sup> He himself [Plato] explicitly calls the soul, which the Demiurge brings into existence, the first of the things that have come into being (cf. 34c4–5) and expounds the doctrine of its generation. But the Demiurge exists prior to the soul, so as a result he belongs to the beings which always exist.<sup>158</sup> For this reason he will also say about him

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<sup>153</sup> Above at 228.28–229.5.

<sup>154</sup> Proclus quite often uses the phrase νοητὸν πλάτος to indicate the full extent of the intelligible realm as objects of intuitive knowledge; cf. 233.2, II. 131.27, 289.17, *PTI*. 52.15, etc.

<sup>155</sup> Text same as in Plato, except that Proclus omits πότερον in 29a1.

<sup>156</sup> For αἰδιος, as here, I use ‘everlasting’, whereas ‘eternal’ translates αἰώνιος or sometimes αἰεῖ. This is not to say that Plato or Proclus cannot mean the same with all three terms, i.e. αἰδιος can mean ‘supra-temporal existence’. See also Share (2005a) 2 and the note at 366.21.

<sup>157</sup> The usage of ἐκεῖθεν is odd here. Proclus may mean from the text of the *Timaeus* itself. It cannot refer, as it often does, to the intelligible realm.

<sup>158</sup> Probably an allusion to the text at 37a1 where the Demiurge is called ‘best of the intelligibles that always exist’.

(34a8): ‘this, then, was the reasoning of the god who always exists’. And how, as a divine intellect, would he not belong to this order?

Is it, then, (3) the intelligible cosmos in its entirety that is the always-existent? The divine Iamblichus (fr. 30), however, vehemently opposes this doctrine,<sup>159</sup> declaring the always-existent to be superior to both the genera of being and the ideas, and establishing it at the summit of the intelligible essence as that which primarily participates in the One. Evidence for these assertions is both what has been written in the *Parmenides* about the One-existent<sup>160</sup> and what is stated in the *Sophist*,<sup>161</sup> for there he ranks the One-existent ahead of the whole and ahead of all that is intelligible, even though the whole and the all are intelligible. But [it may be objected] in this work at any rate Plato clearly has denoted the Paradigm as always-existent and whole and complete. This comes from his own pen, for he calls it a complete and whole living thing when he states (30c5–6): ‘that [living thing] of which the other living things are parts, individually and generically’. As a result, if the Paradigm is whole and complete, but primal Being is beyond the whole and the all, [then] the Paradigm and that Being could not be the same.

Perhaps, therefore, it would be better to state that a rank of being such as the divine [interpreter] has taught and such as Plato has investigated elsewhere does indeed exist, but that in the present work he has named the entire eternal cosmos in this way [i.e. as the always-existent]. This is in no way surprising. Sometimes, in fact, his texts use the [term] intelligible (a) for the entire nature that is unseen and invisible, as when it is said that the soul too is intelligible, for example by Socrates in the *Phaedo*,<sup>162</sup> sometimes (b) for all the existents that are superior to the soul’s substance, as the division in the *Republic* makes clear,<sup>163</sup> and sometimes at least (c) for the very first triads of Being, as a little later Timaeus will call them.<sup>164</sup> In the same way, then, in the *Sophist* he makes plain that Being is the rank of the One Being, and here that it is the entire eternal cosmos.<sup>165</sup> It is, of course, obvious that Being as primary Being occupies the topmost place

<sup>159</sup> On this passage see Dillon (1973) 299, who argues that the Platonic evidence was probably cited by Iamblichus in defence of his interpretation.

<sup>160</sup> I.e. the second hypothesis, *Parm.* 142b–155e, on the *ἐν ὄν*.

<sup>161</sup> Proclus has in mind the passage at *Soph.* 244d–245e.

<sup>162</sup> The closest Plato comes to saying this in the *Phaedo* is at 80b4, where the soul is described as ‘most like’ (ὁμοιότατον) the intelligible; see also 83b4 where the soul contemplates the intelligible and unseen. From Plotinus onwards it becomes standard that the intelligible realm extends down as far as the hypostasis of the Soul.

<sup>163</sup> See the reference to νοητόν at 509d5, 510b2.

<sup>164</sup> Diehl and Festugière refer here to 28a1–2, but there is no reference to νοητόν there. It is quite possible that Proclus has 48e6 in mind. He is very conscious of the later section on matter and Being at 48–52, and he has just referred to it at 229.3.

<sup>165</sup> Proclus here uses the term δῶνιος as equivalent to νοητός.

of the noetic realm in its full extent<sup>166</sup> and is the monad of all existents.<sup>167</sup> In all cases, in fact, it is primary Being that occupies the topmost rank in its own series. If it is secondary, and not the Form in itself, then it is no longer that which exists primarily. So just as Virtue-itself occupies the topmost place in the series of the virtues, Equality-itself among the equal things and the Living-Thing-itself among the living things, in the same way Being-itself, which exists as primary Being, is the peak of all existents, and from it proceeds the entire intelligible realm and the intellectual realm and everything whatsoever that receives the predication of being. But there is no identity of the One Being and the always-existent, for the One Being transcends eternity.<sup>168</sup> In fact eternity participates in Being, so everything that participates in eternity also has a part in Being, but not everything that participates in Being has also participated in eternity.<sup>169</sup> Indeed there are also time-bound entities which participate in Being. As a result primary Being transcends the rank of eternity. The always-existent is eternal. As a result the argument has demonstrated the very opposite [to what has been argued by Iamblichus], namely that by the [term] always-existent one should comprehend everything except the One Being. That [entity] is in fact superior to that which exists always, because it is situated in between the One and eternity and is called 'One Being prior to eternity'.

If, then, I should say how the question appears to me, Plato in the present passage took the always-existent to be primarily all that exists eternally, beginning from the nature of the Living-Thing-itself<sup>170</sup> – for this is that which is primarily eternal – and ending at the particular intellects. As for the One Being, however, he has perhaps left it out of consideration as monad<sup>171</sup> of these beings and as ineffable and unified with the One. So this could be taken as Plato's account of the entire intelligible realm, provided you do not include the intelligible [entity] which is at the summit and hidden and inseparable from the One.<sup>172</sup> Advancing a little further he will call the Living-Thing-itself 'the most

<sup>166</sup> On Proclus' use of *πλάτος* for the Intelligible realm see above n. 154.

<sup>167</sup> Dillon (1973) 299 argues that this passage reflects Iamblichus' ontological theories.

<sup>168</sup> Because it is regarded as a *henad*, the ontological level just below the One; cf. *ET* §§113–15.

<sup>169</sup> Proclus uses an argumentative technique which is well suited to his hierarchical ontology: B and C are in A, but C is not in B, so A must be ontologically superior to B.

<sup>170</sup> The MSS are divided between *αὐτοενός* and *αὐτοζώου*. It is to be agreed with Praechter and Festugière against Diehl that the latter must be read, since the former is precisely the Iamblichan position that Proclus is arguing against. But see also below n. 174.

<sup>171</sup> I.e. as first term of the series; cf. *ET* §21.

<sup>172</sup> I.e. the One Being as *henad* again; cf. above n. 170.

beautiful of the objects of thought' (30d1–2), in the conviction that what is prior to it is also, through the transcendence of the One, at a higher level than what can be the object of thought. Unless, perhaps, he called the Living-Thing-itself the most beautiful living thing among all the objects of thought, with both Eternity and One Being being 'objects of thought' that are anterior to the Living Thing, the first (i.e. One Being) as being 'always' causally, the second, Eternity, existentially, the third the eternal, by participation.<sup>173</sup>

If these [views] should prevail, then Eternity and the Living-Thing-itself and the Demiurge would be included in that which exists, as well as the One Being itself as containing the hidden cause of Eternity. As a result it would be clear from these considerations that the always-existent has embraced the entire realm of being prior to the souls, both intelligible and intellective, beginning from Being-itself and ending at the particular intellect,<sup>174</sup> but not just the summit of all beings, as Iamblichus stated,<sup>175</sup> namely the One Being, through which all existents are called 'existents',<sup>176</sup> to which only the One itself and the principles of being<sup>177</sup> are superior.

Now (a) the One is superior even to being self-constituted,<sup>178</sup> for it must transcend every form of plurality.<sup>179</sup> (b) The always existent *is* self-constituted, but it has this power in virtue of the One. (c) That which follows it is both self-constituted and at the same time comes to exist from another productive cause, as no doubt is the case for us.<sup>180</sup>

<sup>173</sup> The sentence is difficult. Proclus appears to have the same three levels in mind as at 231.10–14 (cf. n. 169 above): (A) the One Being as closest to the One operates κατ' αἰτίαν, i.e. emulating the causation of the wholly transcendent One; (B) Eternity operates καθ' ὕπαρξιν, i.e. as the always-existent; (C) the eternal heavenly beings operate καθ' μέθεξιν, i.e. participate in Eternity. This triple division recurs at 234.23. See the note to that passage.

<sup>174</sup> Proclus repeats here his position stated above at 231.19–23. Note that here the hierarchy begins with the αὐτόν, which makes one wonder whether perhaps at 231.21 Proclus wrote αὐτοόντος rather than the αὐτοενός and αὐτοζώου of the MSS.

<sup>175</sup> Here too Dillon (1973) 299f. sees Iamblichan terminology being used.

<sup>176</sup> It is to be agreed with Festugière that the received text poses no problems here, despite Diehl's doubts.

<sup>177</sup> I.e. the henads again.

<sup>178</sup> The term is αὐθυπόστατος, i.e. being self-sufficient and deriving one substance from oneself and not from another cause. I follow Dodds in my rendering of the term. Festugière prefers a more literal rendering, 'lui-même son principe d'existence'. On the term see Steel (2006) 243–50.

<sup>179</sup> Cf. *ET* §40, 42.27 Dodds. We have here the same three levels of substance, with a fourth added.

<sup>180</sup> This is the level of soul, which is eternal, but also created. The final level is that of bodies.

(d) Those things that come last derive their existence from a superior cause; they are not self-constituted but rather are non-constituted. But the always-existent should not be conceived<sup>181</sup> as in some respect being and in some respect non-being. This could only be the case if it were composite and composed of elements which have the same dissimilarity. It should also not be conceived as at one time being and at another time non-being. After all this is the very reason that it has been called always-existent. Rather, its existence is absolute and eternal, unmixed with anything that is in any manner whatsoever opposite [to it].

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### *Explanation of genesin ouk echon: 232.23–233.7*

This, I believe, is what the addition of the [words] **and has no becoming** shows, namely the unmixed and unsullied purity of the always-existent, in virtue of which it transcends every form of existence that is carried along in phantoms of being and is involved in temporal change. I do not agree with the view of some that the words **and has no becoming** are used to explain **that which always is** for the sake of clarity, nor with what others say, [namely] that Plato wanted to say the same thing both positively and negatively.<sup>182</sup> No, the point is that the always-existent should be understood as being on its own<sup>183</sup> and far removed from temporal change. It is in fact the case that soul participates in time and that heaven has obtained a life that unfolds temporally. Only the intelligible realm is fully eternal in virtue of itself. For this reason some of the ancients describe (a) the noetic realm in its full extent as ‘truly existent’ (cf. 28a3–4), (b) the psychic realm as ‘not truly existent’, (c) the sense-perceptible realm as ‘not truly non-existent’ and (d) matter as ‘truly non-existent’. How these interpreters arrange these matters we shall discuss elsewhere.<sup>184</sup> But for now I believe I have made clear through my exposition that the addition of the phrase ‘not having becoming’ shows the separate<sup>185</sup> essence of the always-existent.

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<sup>181</sup> The verb ὑποθετέον may allude to the fact that Proclus is explaining what he regards as the ὑποθέσεις or ‘basic principles’ of Timaeus’ account.

<sup>182</sup> This statement makes it hard to accept the analysis of Lernould (2001) 158 that according to Proclus Plato gives a positive followed by a negative definition of τὸ ὄν αἰεί. But see below 243.4.

<sup>183</sup> The expression ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ no doubt refers to the fact that being is ‘self-constituted’; cf. above 232.11–17.

<sup>184</sup> Festugière refers to the discussion of a similar division at II. 128.1–129.2, but the cross-reference is vague.

<sup>185</sup> Proclus uses here the originally Aristotelian term χωριστός in the sense of transcendent.

***Explanation of to gignomenon: 233.8–29***

10 Next we come to the [words] **that which comes into being**.<sup>186</sup> Do they mean the entire cosmos or the material composite which is in every way changing? This question, in fact, has been interpreted in different ways by the ancients. As for us, we read the term as referring to the entire corporeal realm, inasmuch as it is unordered of itself, but is ordered by another, whether eternally or at a point in time. It is not the soul of the universe, for it is in a certain respect always existent.<sup>187</sup> The same applies  
15 all the more for the Intellect, for it is eternal being in its own right. Only body is ‘that which comes into being and never truly is’ (cf. 28a2–3). For this is what is always in need of the cosmos-making cause and always carries the appearance of being that it receives from it.

Why then, interpreters ask, did he [Plato] not add the [word] ‘always’ (*aei*) to ‘that which comes into being’,<sup>188</sup> just as he did to ‘being’, or  
20 add the [word] ‘at a point in time’ (*pote*), so that it would be completely antithetical to ‘that which always is’? We might suggest that Plato had in mind the variegated nature of the realm of becoming when he engineered the removal of the [qualifications] ‘always’ and ‘at a point in time’, for the wholes are always in a state of becoming, while the parts come into being at a certain point in time.<sup>189</sup> Besides, some of the [immanent] forms are  
25 inseparable from matter and always come into existence from eternal being, whereas others come into being and pass out of being in time. For corporeality is always coming into being and is always attached to matter. But the form of fire or of air passes in and out of matter, and it is separated [from it] and destroyed through the domination of the  
30 opposite nature.

***Explanation of on de oudepote: 233.30–234.3***

234 So if that which is always holding fast to matter is always coming into being, it **never is being**. For that which is becoming, inasmuch as it is coming into being, *is* not, but is always becoming, and therefore **never is**. And if what comes into being at a point in time, when it comes into being, *is* not, and if when it does not come into being it *is* not as well, then what comes into being at a point in time never is being. But everything that

<sup>186</sup> Note that Proclus here reverts to γιγνόμενον, as in the transmitted Plato text at 27d6, unlike in his quotation of the lemma above, which has γενόμενον.

<sup>187</sup> Cf. above, from a different perspective, 230.24, 233.3.

<sup>188</sup> This is clear proof that Proclus did not have αἰεί in his Platonic text.

<sup>189</sup> I.e. the two qualifications cannot be applied to the entire somatic realm. ‘Wholes’ here refers to the celestial bodies and the earth as mother of genesis, ‘parts’ to the sub-lunary realm.

comes into being either does so always or at a point in time. Therefore everything that comes into being never is being.

*Return to a more systematic treatment: 234.4–235.32*

After these explanations,<sup>190</sup> we return to our point of departure (cf. 227.6) and ask whether all existents are embraced in these [phrases] or not. For it was in seeking an answer to this question that we decided we should examine each of the terms used here, namely whether we would say that it was used of all or not of all of them.<sup>191</sup>

If we should posit that **that which always exists** only designates the eternal nature which contains eternity fully of itself, then the answer is not of all of them. For neither (a) that which is prior to eternity nor (b) the rank (*taxis*) of eternity nor (c) whatever has substance that is eternal but activities that are temporal will be ranked under being as postulated. But if we should take the always-existent<sup>192</sup> as everything that is eternal in whatever way, whether properly or not, and whether wholly or partially, then both soul will belong to the eternal entities and the One Being will be described as eternal being, inasmuch as it holds the cause of all that is eternal in a unified way and, as they say,<sup>193</sup> hidden within itself.<sup>194</sup>

In fact we have this situation: there is (a) that which is beyond eternity; there is (b) eternity; there is (c1) that which is absolutely eternal; and there is (c2) that which is eternal in a certain way. Each of these is **always existent**, the first (a) as power and source of the ‘always’, the second (b) as being always primarily and always-in-itself<sup>195</sup> and not through participation, the next (c1) as participating in what is always and as primarily eternal as a whole, and lastly (c2) what shares in such a particularity in a certain way. Each entity in fact exists in a triple manner, either causally (*kat’ aitian*) or existentially (*kath’ huparxin*) or by

<sup>190</sup> Basically Proclus moves to the θεωρία after the λέξις, although the former term is not used and it was introduced by the *aporia* at 227.13, to which he now returns.

<sup>191</sup> A good example of Proclus’ rather didactic literalism that surfaces from time to time.

<sup>192</sup> This is, as noted above at n. 143 our preferred rendering of τὸ ὄν ἄει (that which always exists).

<sup>193</sup> Diehl and Festugière see here a reference to the Chaldean Oracles; see fr. 198 Majercik. There is a similar reference above at 232.4.

<sup>194</sup> The One Being and Soul are at the top and bottom reaches of the always-existent and do not belong to it primarily. Proclus adopts a slightly different approach here from that above in 231.19–232.11, where he does include One Being but excludes the souls.

<sup>195</sup> The term αὔτοαί, i.e. being always in virtue of itself, is found only here in extant Greek literature.

25 participation (*kata methexin*).<sup>196</sup> The One Being, then, existentially is Being only, whereas causally it is eternal Being. Eternity (*ho aiôn*) existentially is eternal being, but by participation it is Being. The eternal (*to aiônion*) is by participation Being and eternal Being, but existentially it is something else, (1a) the intelligible or (1b) the intelligible and intellective or (1c) the intellective, and if it is the last-named, it is either (2a) universal or (2b) partial, and if it is the latter, it is either (3a) hypercosmic or (3b) encosmic, and if it the latter, it is either (4a) divine or (4b) posterior to the divine, and in each of these cases it is such either in (5a) its existence only, or in (5b) its power and its activity.<sup>197</sup> The always-existent extends down to these [reaches] of that which is in some way eternal [and no further].

Turning now to **that which comes into being**, if we are to take it in the proper sense [of the term], it will mean the becoming that involves change of all kinds. But if we take it to be everything that is in some way or other generated, then we shall declare the heaven as coming into being as well, inasmuch as it is involved in movement and change, and the soul too, as the first of all that comes into being, inasmuch as it lives a life in time and time is connatural (*sumphuês*) with its activities. And so, ascending upwards we shall stop at soul as first of the existents that have been generated, and descending from above we shall once again halt at soul as the last of the eternal beings.<sup>198</sup> For, although it is correct to say that the heaven always exists, its being is always coming into being from another source, but soul has its own [principle of] existence from itself as well.<sup>199</sup> For this reason the Socrates who appears in the *Phaedrus* stated<sup>200</sup> that it is both ungenerated and self-moving, as principle of all becoming, but generating itself and giving itself life. It is correct, therefore, if we affirm that it is both ungenerated and generated, and both eternal and not eternal. For this reason the Athenian stranger too stipulated that the soul be called<sup>201</sup> ‘indestructible but not eternal’ – these are the very words

<sup>196</sup> The same tripartition as 231.32. It is common in *ET*, e.g. at §65: πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν ὑφεστὸς ἢ κατ’ αἰτίαν ἔστιν ἀρχοειδῶς ἢ καθ’ ὑπαρξιν ἢ κατὰ μέθεξιν εἰκονικῶς. Cf. also §§103, 118, 173. See Dodds (1932) 235 on how it relates to a triadic view of reality, with the highest level being that of seminal possibility, the second level as that of actualization, the third of individualization.

<sup>197</sup> See Festugière’s note ad loc. for the scholiast’s diagram of the diaeresis implicit here.

<sup>198</sup> Cf. 233.14.

<sup>199</sup> Soul is the final member of the ontological hierarchy that is ‘self-constituted’ (cf. 232.12–15) and thus is capable of reversion upon itself and its own good; cf. *ET* §42.

<sup>200</sup> Proclus refers not very accurately to the discussion on the soul’s immortality at *Phdr.* 245c–246a. Soul is ἀγέννητον at 245d1 and τὸ αὐτὸ κινεῖν at 245c7, but at 245c5 Plato reads ἀεὶκίνητον rather than αὐτοκίνητον as in Proclus. There is no discussion of its life-giving powers except the fleeting allusion at 245c7.

<sup>201</sup> *Laws* 904a8–9.

he uses – because it is eternal in a sense, but not fully of its own accord, as is the case for true Being.<sup>202</sup> ‘Being always’ and ‘becoming always’<sup>203</sup> differed from each other [as we saw in our earlier discussion].<sup>204</sup> The heaven is always becoming – for it does not have being from itself – while soul [not only becomes] but also exists eternally – for it does have being from itself – while all which precedes it does not become from a cause but *is* from a cause. Becoming in fact only pertains to those entities that gain their being through [the activity of] others.

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Let then the manner in which the divisions we have discussed both embrace all that there is and do not do so be apparent from these observations. They do not, on the one hand, embrace the whole of reality because they have [only] comprehended that which is solely eternal and that which is solely generated, which are in fact that which is prior to soul and that which is posterior to it. But they do embrace it, on the other, because when the extreme terms have been comprehended it is also possible on the basis of these to discover what is in between, namely that which is both being and becoming at the same time.

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### *The definitions as basic principles: 235.32–238.5*

That it was necessary for Plato to have made the definitions of that which always is and that which is becoming before all the other fundamental propositions<sup>205</sup> can easily be ascertained if we consider that the very first of the problems concerning the universe is ‘whether it has come into being or is ungenerated’,<sup>206</sup> as was stated a little earlier (27c5), and that he himself will state further on: ‘we should therefore first examine concerning it what is laid down that we must examine for every subject at the outset, whether it has always existed, having no beginning of its becoming, or has come into being’ (28b3–6).<sup>207</sup> If this is the very first of the subjects to be investigated, it is suitable for it to have the first position among the fundamental propositions (*axiōmata*), namely what

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<sup>202</sup> Cf. 234.9.

<sup>203</sup> Proclus writes τὸ εἶναι ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι, but the sequel shows that ἀεὶ is also understood with the second verb (even if it is missing in Plato’s text).

<sup>204</sup> I follow Festugière in my interpretation of the imperfect ἦν here.

<sup>205</sup> This is the first time that Proclus uses the term ἀξιώματα in his commentary. He appears to use it interchangeably with the term ὑπόθεσις, on which see above n. 150. We follow Festugière in translating the term with ‘fundamental proposition’; see further his note ad loc.

<sup>206</sup> Proclus leaves out the καὶ in the Platonic text as quoted above at 217.5.

<sup>207</sup> Proclus omits to cite the final phrase in 28b7, ‘beginning from a beginning’. Otherwise the text here is as he will cite it at 275.1–2, 276.8–9.

is that which is generated and what is that which is eternal.<sup>208</sup> The other principles follow these,<sup>209</sup> just as the other problems follow on the problem concerning the coming into being [of the universe]. And if I should take up the argument about basic principles again<sup>210</sup> and state my views in more detail, it seems to me that Plato, just like the geometers, precedes his demonstrations by first assuming definitions (*horoi*) and basic principles (*hupotheseis*), which he uses to make the demonstrations, establishing them in advance as principles (*archai*) of the whole of natural philosophy. For just as there are principles for music and different ones for medicine, and the same goes for arithmetic and mechanics, so too indeed there are certain principles for natural philosophy in its entirety, which Plato now teaches [us]. They are:<sup>211</sup>

- (1) There is true being, which is comprehended by intuitive knowledge (*noêsis*) together with a reasoned account (*logos*).
- (2) There is that which is generated, which is grasped by opinion together with unreasoning sense-perception.
- (3) All that is generated comes into being from a cause. What has not obtained existence from a cause is not generated.
- (4) That of which the paradigm is eternal being, is necessarily beautiful. That of which the paradigm is generated, is not beautiful.
- (5) Let the whole [of physical reality] be called heaven or cosmos.

These are in fact the principles from which the entire sequel (of the account) proceeds. It is also for this reason, I think, that he states *what* eternal being is and *what* is generated, but does not state that each of them exists.<sup>212</sup> This is the case for the geometer too, who recalls to mind what the point is and what the line is but does not teach that each of them exist. For how could he remain a geometer if he entered in a discussion on the principles of his own science?<sup>213</sup> In the same way, then, the student of nature (*phusikos*) will also state what the always-existent is for the sake of the demonstrations that are about to be made, but he will at no stage demonstrate that it exists, for he would be passing beyond the limits of natural philosophy.

<sup>208</sup> Proclus here substitutes the terms τὸ γενητόν and τὸ αἰώνιον for Plato's descriptions in 27d6–28a1.

<sup>209</sup> Note that Proclus regards the present passage as yielding *two* fundamental propositions.

<sup>210</sup> Proclus alludes here to his previous discussion at 228.25–7. On this passage see further the Introduction, pp. 18–20.

<sup>211</sup> The five principles here amount to a paraphrase of 27d6–28a3.

<sup>212</sup> Proclus repeats what he has discussed above at 228.25–229.11.

<sup>213</sup> It is the task of the metaphysician (or theologian) to reflect on the principles of the sciences.

But since, as we said previously,<sup>214</sup> Timaeus as a Pythagorean natural philosopher (*phusiologos*) is not a natural philosopher in the same way as others, and since Plato too does not demonstrate the highest level of science in this passage but later on<sup>215</sup> he will prove in a manner quite divine that true being exists, for the present he regards the what-question as sufficient and stays within the boundaries of natural philosophy.<sup>216</sup> It would seem that he seeks to give the definitions of the always-existent and that which comes into being in order that he may find the causes that go to make up the universe, form and matter. These [causes] in fact are the ones required for that which comes into being. The third basic principle he employs, it would seem, in order to find the efficient cause, the fourth in order to construe that the universe came into being in conformity with the eternal Paradigm, while the fifth, which relates to the name, is used so that he can go in pursuit of the bestowal of the good and the ineffable, as will be shown in what follows.<sup>217</sup>

I believe that Aristotle also imitates him in the *Physics* when he assumes the [following] single basic principle and states: 'Let it be posited by us that of natural objects either all or some are in motion',<sup>218</sup> for if the reasonings of physical science are going to advance at all, there will certainly be need for motion, assuming of course that nature is a principle of motion. Similarly in the treatise *On the Heaven* he assumes, before all other arguments, those basic principles of which Plotinus has said:<sup>219</sup> 'For Aristotle this is no trouble at all, provided one assumes the basic principles concerning the fifth body', by which he means the following five:<sup>220</sup> (1) Simple motion<sup>221</sup> is motion of a simple body. (2) The simple body has a certain natural motion. (3) Two motions are simple. (4) A contrary only has a single opposite. (5) That which does not have a contrary does not have anything that could destroy it. On the basis of these basic principles he demonstrates the essential nature of the fifth body.

<sup>214</sup> See above at 223.5–14 (Diehl's reference to 204.3 is mistaken).

<sup>215</sup> In *Tim.* 47e–52d, as argued above at 229.3ff.

<sup>216</sup> Here natural philosophy as a science is separated from metaphysics (or theology).

<sup>217</sup> This idea is repeated below at 274.27–30. <sup>218</sup> *Phys.* 1.2, 185a12–13.

<sup>219</sup> *Enn.* 2.1.2.12–13. Proclus inexactly quotes Plotinus and then adds the five hypotheses himself. The problem that is being discussed is how the heaven and the heavenly bodies can be individually everlasting, in contrast to the sublunary world which is only everlasting in terms of the species. This text is a good example of how Proclus reads an earlier non-Platonist author such as Aristotle via the tradition.

<sup>220</sup> In a long note Festugière identifies the Aristotelian texts that Proclus had in mind: for (1) see *Cael.* 3.3, 302b7; for (2) 3.3, 302b5; for (3) 1.3, 270b29; for (4) cf. *Metaph.* 1.5, 1055b30; for (5) *Cael.* 1.3, 270a12ff.

<sup>221</sup> 'Simple' in the sense that it cannot be reduced to any other motion.

The difference is that, on the basis of basic principles Aristotle proves the cosmos's indestructibility, whereas Plato proves its destructibility. As to whether they are actually in disagreement, we will make this quite plain a little later.<sup>222</sup> This is a subject for a later occasion.

***Why does Plato prefer to use 'always' for being? 238.6–240.1***

Why, then, does Plato, who is in the habit of using the terms 'in itself' (*auto*) and 'what it is' (*hoper*, sc. *on*) for the intelligibles, take neither of them [in this text] but prefers the term 'always' and judges it to be connatural with being? And there is also this difficulty to consider: what is the reason that, out of the three terms, Plato assumed that the term 'always' was the most appropriate for signifying the nature of true being? Possibly we might suggest<sup>223</sup> that (1) the term 'in itself' indicates the simplicity of the intelligibles, their existential being<sup>224</sup> and their primary nature. It is used in virtue of the particularity which ensures that they are primarily (*prôtôs*) what they are and they then fill secondary beings with participation in themselves. (2) The term 'what it is' indicates the purity and unmixed nature [of being], as well as that it is not infected by what is contrary to it. (3) The term 'always' indicates that it is eternal and immutable and substantially not subject to change. For example, (1) when we say 'beauty in itself' and 'justice in itself', we do not envisage what is beautiful (*to kalon*) through participation in beauty or what is just (*to dikaion*) through participation in justice, but what is primarily beautiful in itself and what is primarily just in itself. And (2) when we say 'what is beautiful', we envisage what is not mixed with any ugliness and is not defiled by its contrary, as is the case for enmattered beauty, which in fact is situated in ugliness and is itself infected by the nature that forms its substrate. But (3) when we say the 'always beautiful', we envisage not what is sometimes beautiful and sometimes not, but what is eternally beautiful.

It may be concluded that (1) the first term indicates the simplicity of the intelligibles and the munificence that proceeds from them to all other things. This applies to beauty in itself, by which beautiful things are all beautiful, and equality in itself, by which equal things are all equal, and similarly in other cases. (2) The second term indicates 'aloneness' (*monôsis*) and purity and freedom from mixture and defilement. This is the

<sup>222</sup> See below 286.20ff, where he gives a sequence of arguments to show that Plato rejects the Aristotelian position; see also 297.27ff.

<sup>223</sup> Proclus here again uses  $\eta$  to introduce a tentative answer; see n. 122 above on 225.24.

<sup>224</sup> Literally their being in virtue of their existence ( $\kappa\alpha\theta' \upsilon\pi\alpha\rho\epsilon\iota\nu$ ).

purport of 'what it is', not being of a different kind than it is nor attracting anything that is alien to it. (3) The third term indicates immutability. This is the purport of the 'always', and not just immutability in an absolute sense, but eternal permanence. For there is a difference between 'always' in the temporal sense and in the eternal sense. In the one case being is wholly all together (*athroôs pan*), in the other it is stretched forth by the entire continuity of time and so is unlimited.<sup>225</sup> In the one case it is located in the 'now', in the other case in extension, which is unceasing and always in a state of becoming.

Now the [characteristic of being] 'in itself' (cf. (1) above) devolves on what exists from the Paradigm. That is the cause of simplicity for what exists and of the bestowal on others of what it possesses primarily. The [characteristic of being] 'what it is' (2) devolves from the One Being. That is what is primarily elevated above non-being and privation, because it is that which is primarily Being and in it all things secretly and indivisibly subsist. But the [characteristic of being] 'always' (3) devolves from Eternity (*aiôn*). Just as the One Being is the bestower of being, so Eternity is the bestower of eternity to the intelligibles. (1) If, therefore, Plato focused his discourse on what participates and what is participated and he needs [to describe] being to this end, he would speak of 'what Being is in itself'. And (2) if he focused on what is unmixed and mixed, he would speak of 'what Being is'. But (3) when the discussion is focused on generation and freedom from generation<sup>226</sup> and he needs these definitions for this end, he quite suitably asks **what is that which always is** (27d6). It is by this [characteristic] [i.e. always existing] that the eternal is distinguished from that which subsists temporally. That which is generated is coupled with time, just as that which is ungenerated is coupled with eternity. For this reason 'the nature of the Living Thing' which embraces within itself all the intelligible living things is 'eternal' (37d3), but 'time came into existence with the heaven', as he himself states later on (38b6).<sup>227</sup> In fact the always-existent, even if it is said to proceed from a cause, must itself in relation to all these causes be said not to be generated, but rather to be. For in its case the instrumental cause, the final cause and the efficient cause amount to

<sup>225</sup> This is the classic distinction between non-temporal eternity and temporal sempiternity as gradually developed in ancient and patristic philosophy; cf. Sorabji (1983) 98–130, on Proclus 115. See also further below 278.3–11.

<sup>226</sup> Proclus uses the neologism *ἀγενεσία*, found only here in his works (and elsewhere in extant Greek literature only in Ps. Justin, *Refutation of Some Aristotelian Doctrines* where it is used eleven times), unless the MS reading with the slightly less uncommon *ἀγενήσια* is correct.

<sup>227</sup> Proclus will cite the former text again at 279.5, the latter at 281.24, 286.23.

the same.<sup>228</sup> The always-existent is self-constituted.<sup>229</sup> It does not come into being by itself (i.e. efficient cause), lest it ever were not existent and came into being – for that which comes into being, whenever this happens, does not [yet] exist. It also does not come into being in conformity with itself (i.e. final cause), lest it be composite, or through itself (i.e. instrumental cause), lest it be incomplete. That which comes into being, however, is dependent on something else and obtains its path [to being] from other causes, as is for example the case for the entire bodily realm.

### *Final question about non-being: 240.1–12*

But how can it be that that which comes into being is **never existent**,<sup>230</sup> when he has explicitly stated in the *Sophist* that even this [non-being] is in some manner being?<sup>231</sup> We might suggest<sup>232</sup> that Plato will himself address this question a little later on when he says not that it is non-being, but that it is what is ‘never really existent’ (28a2–3).<sup>233</sup> But at this point it is said to be **never existent**, because Being has already been aligned with the eternal nature, whereas that which comes into being is never [the same as] the always-existent. Therefore if Being, inasmuch as it is existent,<sup>234</sup> is unreceptive of non-being, it is plain that that which comes into being (*to gignomenon*), since it has whatever existence is present in it intertwined with non-being, is **never existent** (*on*) in this way – by which I mean Being (*on*) that is purely existent and existent by itself, to which only Being is apposite, but not having in addition to Being also [the characteristic of] somehow not being – and also non-being (*ouk on*) at the same time.<sup>235</sup>

<sup>228</sup> Proclus here makes use of the formulations of the so-called prepositional metaphysics, in which prepositional phrases are used to indicate the various kinds of causes: he uses δι’ ὃ for the instrumental cause, πρὸς ὃ for the final cause, ὑφ’ ὃ for the efficient cause. On this kind of scheme see Dörrie–Baltes, PA §115.2. See further the didactic exposition of the technique (with examples) at 357.12–23.

<sup>229</sup> Cf. above 232.11–17.

<sup>230</sup> I.e. ‘never being’ in Plato’s text as translated above at 227.5. For the sake of the English syntax here I have translated ὄν as ‘existent’.

<sup>231</sup> Festugière refers to *Soph.* 250a–b, but Proclus seems to make a more general allusion to the argument that there is no such thing as true non-being; cf. *Soph.* 237–56.

<sup>232</sup> The particle ἤ again; see notes 122 and 233.

<sup>233</sup> I.e. when Plato gives his answer to the question posed at 27d6–28a, he adds ὁντως to the phrase ὄν δὲ οὐδέποτε. This word can be translated by ‘really’ or ‘truly’. I have preferred the former here because it is closer to the Greek.

<sup>234</sup> Proclus uses here the Aristotelian phrase ἡ ὄν (*qua* being) of τὸ εἶναι.

<sup>235</sup> The syntax of the sentence is very awkward, because Proclus interposes quite a long parenthesis on Being in the middle of his description of becoming.

*Further analysis and critique of being and becoming*

Indeed that which is grasped by intuitive thought together with reason is that which always exists identically to itself, while on the other hand that which is opinable<sup>236</sup> by opinion together with irrational perception is that which comes into being and passes away but is never really existent.<sup>237</sup> 15  
(28a1–4)

*How to read the lemma: 240.17–241.31*

Some interpreters have made each of these clauses a single statement. They take [the words] **that which is grasped by intuitive thought together with reason, always existing identically to itself** as a definition of the always-existent, and [the words] **that which is opinable by opinion together with irrational perception, comes into being and passes away but is never really existent** as a definition of that which comes into being. Among the many mistakes that these people in fact make is the attempt to include what needs to be defined in the definitions themselves. In fact what was being investigated was [the question] ‘what is that which always is?’ (27d5). This is taken up by the former of the two definitions which says **that which always exists identically to itself** 25 (28a2). And in the case of [the question] ‘what is that which comes into being?’ (27d6), it is taken up by the latter which says **that which comes into being and passes away but is never really existent** (28a3–4). This is the manner of proceeding of those who betray ignorance of dialectic and attribute it to Plato as well.

Other interpreters make a distinction and affirm that in each of the clauses there is [first] a definition and [then] that which is to be defined. In the former they say the definition is **that which is grasped by intuitive thought together with reason** (28a1–2), while the subject to be defined is that which **always exists identically to itself** (28a2), while in the second **that which is opinable by opinion together with irrational perception** (28a2–3) is presented as definition, while the remainder is taken as the subject to be defined. 241

These men certainly spoke well and our teacher<sup>238</sup> was in agreement with them. Indeed, if we were to transpose the text just a little, the entire passage will immediately become perfectly clear: ‘that which always exists 5

<sup>236</sup> ‘Opinable’ is required as the rendering for δοξαστόν in order to preserve the parallelism with ‘intelligible’ (νοητός).

<sup>237</sup> Divergence from Burnet’s OCT text: the only difference is very minor, Proclus reads δέ in 28a2, whereas Burnet has δ’.

<sup>238</sup> I.e. Syrianus.

identically to itself is grasped by intuitive knowledge together with reason, while that which comes into being and passes away is opinable by opinion with irrational perception'.<sup>239</sup> This interpretation is consistent with previous text: 'what is that which always is and has no becoming, and what is that which comes into being but never is?' (27d5–6). The words **what always exists identically to itself** (28a2) indicate 'that which always is and has no becoming', for 'identically to itself' is equivalent to 'having no becoming', while the words 'that which comes into being but never is' (27d6–28a1) signify the same as **that which comes into being and passes away but is never really existent** (28a3–4), except that the formulation has been made clearer. Through the addition of the word **really** (*ontôs*) Plato demonstrates that, inasmuch as it is coming into being, it is not being, and inasmuch as it bears an image of being, to that extent it is being and not becoming.<sup>240</sup>

In fact in the definitions he has also further clarified what is to be defined through the additions [he has made]. What he earlier described as 'that which always exists' (27d6), he has added to and called **that which always exists identically to itself** (28a2), in case we should understand **always** as temporal and not as eternal. For this [the eternal] is what is all together<sup>241</sup> and identical to itself, whereas the temporal [realm] has been extended in alignment with the infinite [extension] of time. And what he described as 'coming into being' (27d6), he now states together with **that which passes away** (28a3), in case we should understand generations (*geneiseis*) as processions in absolute terms, something which also applies to the gods who are beyond being, and not as those [processions] which have destruction coupled with them.

Therefore the definitions that have been presented here are something like this: what **exists always is that which is grasped by intuitive thought together with reason** and what **comes into being is that which is opinable by opinion together with irrational perception**.

### *Criticisms of Plato's definitions: 241.31–243.2*

Now in relation to these definitions the following accusations are customarily made against Plato, (1) firstly that he has not established a genus, as the rules of definition stipulate, and (2) secondly that he has not made

<sup>239</sup> Proclus here rewrites Plato's text so that what he takes to be the subject of the two clauses comes first.

<sup>240</sup> This comment shows that *ὄντως* is best translated as 'really'. Proclus wants the phrase to say two things at once, both that becoming is never really being and that becoming never really is non-being.

<sup>241</sup> *ὁμοῦ πᾶν*, the standard Neoplatonic description for non-temporal eternity.

clear the nature of the objects to be defined [as they are in] themselves, but has determined them on the basis of knowledge that we have already, whereas one should examine the objects as they are in themselves before considering their relation to us. 242

But (1) we must demonstrate the very opposite, namely that those who customarily raise these difficulties are totally beside the mark. What genus is apposite in the case of Being (*to on*), which embraces the noetic essence in its entirety?<sup>242</sup> If essence (*ousia*) has no genus anterior to itself and admits no definition because it is the thing that is most generic (*genikôtaton*), what would you say about Being itself, which embraces not only the whole of essence but also all powers and all activities as well? Thus neither is Being (*on*) the genus of Being, for in this case Being would not be Being absolutely but a particular being (*ti on*), nor is it not-being, in case we should inadvertently make the always-existent a form of non-being, for in all cases the genera are predicated for their own species. There is, therefore, no genus for Being. 10

But (2) how can it be that the procedure of determining on the basis of knowledge is not suitable for the entire investigation and the definitions that are being undertaken? If, as we stated previously,<sup>243</sup> it was his intention to make use of these as fundamental propositions (*axiômata*) and basic principles (*hupotheseis*) for the demonstrations to be pronounced, these presentations have to be known and evident to us. If he had commanded us to track down the nature of the realities as it is on its own, he would have inadvertently filled his entire teaching with obscurity. Since he wishes to make known what being and becoming are by means of definitions, so that he may advance the demonstrations from basic principles that are known and evident to his readers, it is quite suitable to introduce their particularity from knowledge that is present in us. If we summon up this knowledge and make it complete, we shall contemplate the nature of the objects in question more clearly. Since the entire cognitive realm is either itself the object of knowledge or sees or possesses the object of knowledge – for intellect is the object of knowledge itself, while sense-perception sees the object of sense-perception and discursive reasoning has the object of discursive reasoning in itself – and since we are by nature incapable of becoming the object of intellect ourselves<sup>244</sup> but gain knowledge of it by means of the faculty in us that 15 20 25 30

<sup>242</sup> Cf. the earlier discussion above at 227.15 on whether the  $\tau\iota$  in 27d6 is the genus of both being and becoming, as argued by Severus.

<sup>243</sup> Cf. above 228.25, 236.1ff. Note that this is the only passage in our text in which the terms ἀξιώματα and ὑποθέσεις are used in conjunction.

<sup>244</sup> For Proclus, differently than in the case of Plotinus, we do not exist at the level of Intellect but of Soul.

243 is coupled with that object, it is this faculty, therefore, that we need and through it the nature of being becomes known to us. With these remarks, then, we shall respond to the difficulties raised.

*Why the definition of becoming also has a negative component:*

243.2–25

We should also carefully observe how he proposed for himself the basic problems and clarified each of them both positively and negatively,<sup>245</sup>  
 5 but in his reply to each of them in the case of **that which always exists** (28a2) he took up the positive aspect only, but in the case of **that which comes into existence** (28a3) he took up the negative aspect as well, adding to it the words **that which passes away** and interpreting the words **but never is** by rephrasing it as **but is never really existent**.  
 10 Since that which exists is characterized in terms of being only, but that which comes into existence in terms of non-being as well, in the one case when defining he took up the positive aspect only, affirming that it **exists identically to itself**, but in the other he combined it with the negative aspect. He did not, however, use the negative aspect only, since definitions belong to [the class of] affirmative statements which indicate what belongs to the object in question.

15 It is moreover not surprising that he not only described it as **that which comes into being**, but also added **that which passes away**. Just as in the case of **that which exists** he added the [characteristic of] self-identity to that of eternity, so for **that which comes into being** he added the [characteristic of] passing away. In fact, just as coming into being differs from existing always, so passing away differs from existing  
 20 identically to oneself. That which comes into being, in virtue of the fact that it comes into being and passes away, is not capable of maintaining itself. If that were the case, it would also be capable of supplying itself with its own existence. He [Plato] therefore took each on their own, **that which exists** and **that which comes into being**, and perceived that the one was beyond becoming, while the other was not indestructible, with  
 25 the proviso that when an image of Being was added to that which comes into being,<sup>246</sup> it is possible for it to have a kind of permanence as that which is always coming into being.<sup>247</sup>

<sup>245</sup> I.e. at 27d6–28a1; cf. above 232.29.      <sup>246</sup> Cf. 241.18.

<sup>247</sup> This recalls the *ἀεί* added in Burnet's text at 28a1. It is part of Proclus' interpretation and not present in his text, but it shows how the word could have easily been added to the Platonic text.

### *Detailed explanation of noêsis: 243.26–246.9*

Let us now examine individually each of the terms (*lexeis*) which Plato uses to put together his presentation. First of all let us look at the [term] **intuitive knowledge** (cf. 28a1)<sup>248</sup> and see in how many ways it is used, giving a complete account of the procedure of its usage.<sup>249</sup>

(1) In the first placed, then, there is intelligible intuitive knowledge (*noêsis hê noêtê*). [This occurs] when it arrives at identity with the object of intuitive knowledge and is not different to it. This is also ‘essential’ intuitive knowledge and ‘essence in itself’ (*autoousia*), because everything that is in the intelligible realm subsists in this manner, essentially and intelligibly.

30

244

(2) The second kind of intuitive knowledge is that which connects the Intellect to the intelligible object. Its particular function is connective and so as to link up the extremes. As Life and Power, it fills up the Intellect from the intelligible (source) and establishes the Intellect in the intelligible realm.

5

(3) The third kind is the intuitive knowledge coupled with the divine Intellect itself. It is the Activity of the Intellect, through which it has comprehended the intelligible realm within itself and in virtue of which it intelligizes itself and recognizes its own status.<sup>250</sup> In fact it is Activity and ‘intuitive knowledge in itself’ (*autonoêsis*), but not intelligible intuitive knowledge (i.e. (1)). Nor does it function as Power (i.e. (2)), but as Activity, as has just been said, and as intellectual intuitive knowledge (*noera noêsis*).

10

(4) The fourth rank is held by the intuitive knowledge of the particular intellects, since each of these too possesses both a certain intelligible object which is coupled with it above all and also an intuitive knowledge, or rather each of them possesses all these things partially – intellect, intuitive knowledge, intelligible object – by means of which each of them is not only connected with the wholes but also intelligizes the entire intelligible cosmos.

15

(5) The fifth kind is the intuitive knowledge of the rational soul. For just as the rational soul is said to be intellect, so its knowledge (*gnôsis*)

<sup>248</sup> This is the somewhat clumsy but nevertheless most suitable English rendering of νόσις, a direct form of knowledge of the object (knowledge by acquaintance) such as Platonism envisages of the ideas. It is opposed to discursive reasoning (διάνοια, λογισμός) involving propositional thought.

<sup>249</sup> Proclus first distinguishes six possible meanings of the term νόσις. He then finally indicates how they are related to each other and determines which meaning should be applied to the text at 28a1.

<sup>250</sup> Literally ‘how it itself is [as Intellect]’.

is a form of intuitive knowledge, namely discursive intuitive knowledge involving a temporal aspect connatural to itself.

20 (6) In the sixth place, if you wish to count this one as well, imaginative knowledge (*phantastikê gnôsis*) is named intuitive knowledge and imagination is named ‘passive intellect’ (*nous pathêtikos*) by some, because, even though it knows what it knows with the help of marks and shapes, it does take place within.<sup>251</sup>

The common element for all forms of intuitive knowledge is this very fact of having the object of knowledge within. It is through this, I presume, that intuitive knowledge differs from sense-perception. But sometimes (1) intuitive knowledge *is* the object of knowledge itself; sometimes (2) it *is* the second form (of intuitive knowledge) but *possesses* the first (i.e. the object of knowledge); sometimes (3) it *is* the third form (of intuitive knowledge), but *possesses* the second form and *sees* the first in a holistic way; sometimes (4) it *is* the object of knowledge in a particular way, but it also *sees* the wholes by means of the particular; sometimes (5) it sees the wholes, but only in parts together<sup>252</sup> and not all at the one time; and sometimes (6) this sight involves a passive element. Such, then, are the various kinds of intuitive knowledge.

245 Now in the present context we should not take him to mean (6) imaginative intuitive knowledge, for it is not in its nature to obtain knowledge of what really exists. The object of imagination is indeterminate<sup>253</sup> because knowledge of it is obtained by means of shape and form, whereas the always-existent is without shape. In general no  
5 irrational form of knowledge is capable of contemplating Being itself, since it is not even in its nature to grasp what is universal. We should also not adopt the intuitive knowledge in the rational soul (5), for it does not possess the ability to know all at the one time<sup>254</sup> and is not coupled with the eternal realm, but proceeds temporally. Neither should we adopt the holistic [forms of] intuitive knowledge (1, 2, 3). They have been elevated beyond the forms of knowledge that we have,

<sup>251</sup> I follow Festugière’s interpretation of ὅτι καί.

<sup>252</sup> I.e. as a collection of parts and not as a single undifferentiated whole (ἁπλώς). This refers to the processes of discursive reasoning.

<sup>253</sup> The text is difficult here. I have translated the transmitted text as found in Diehl, who rightly points out that at 247.11 Proclus again mentions ἀόριστος γνώσις (indeterminate knowledge) in a similar context. Another possibility is to emend ἀόριστον to ἀλόγιστον, i.e. ‘the object of imagination is irrational’. Festugière adopts a more radical solution, emending to ἀόρατον and taking the phrase to refer back to τὸ ὄντως ὄν.

<sup>254</sup> Proclus returns to the distinction introduced at 244.29–30.

whereas Timaeus has aligned intuitive knowledge with the *logos* (i.e. at 28a1).<sup>255</sup>

In the present context it is the intuitive knowledge of the particular intellect (4) that we should adopt, for this is the mode of cognition with which we too sometimes see Being. Just as in the second pairing [in the text] sense-perception is placed below the rational soul, so [in the first] intuitive knowledge is placed higher in relation to it. In fact, the partial intellect is established directly above our essential nature, guiding it and perfecting it. This is what we turn to when we have been purified through philosophy and have linked our own intelligent power to the intuitive knowledge of that intellect. What this particular intellect is and how it is not unique for a single particular soul and how it is not participated in directly by particular souls, but through the intermediation of angelic and demonic souls who are always active in accordance with that intellect and through whom particular souls too sometimes share in the intellective light, these questions have been thoroughly examined at considerable length elsewhere.<sup>256</sup> For the present let it be understood to this extent, namely that the particular intellect is entirely participated by other proximate demonic souls, but it also turns its light towards our souls, whenever we turn towards it and we make the reason (*logos*) in us completely intellective (*noeros*). Just as in the *Phaedrus* (247c8) he called this intellect the ‘pilot of the soul’ and declared that it alone knew ‘Being’ (*to on*, 247d3), while the soul did this together with it when it was ‘nourished with intellect and science’ (247d1–2), in the same way here too he states that intuitive knowledge is prior to the soul and that that is what intuitive knowledge really is, but that the soul participates in it whenever its reason is intellectively active.

For this reason in what follows he will say that intellect resides among the gods, but that ‘the race of humans participates in it to a small extent’ (51e5–6). It would seem that the present account, because it discloses every kind of knowledge of the always-existent, states that it is intuitive knowledge first, but in case you should assume it is this alone, it then adds the [term] *logos* to intuitive knowledge, distinguishing it by its discursive character, so that whenever reason (*logos*) knows the always-existent, as reason it is active discursively, but as intellect it is active with

<sup>255</sup> Note that Proclus uses the definite article with *logos* here, contrary to Plato’s text. This is because, as will emerge at 247.2–10, he interprets it as a form of cognition close to intellect but differing from it.

<sup>256</sup> Proclus’ reference is vague here and does not appear to refer to any specific treatment in his extant works. In a long note Festugière refers to various passages in *ET* which can illuminate his thought here: §§108–9, 166, 181, 183–5. As Harold Tarrant reminds me, it could be a reference to treatment by others in the school, e.g. Syrianus.

[the] simplicity [of intuitive knowledge]. It knows each thing at once and as something simple, but does not know all things at once. Rather, it moves from the one to the other, even though in the process it knows each object of its knowledge as a single and simple thing.

### *Detailed explanation of meta logos: 246.10–248.6*

Now that we have determined what the term ‘intuitive knowledge’ means, let us examine the term ‘*logos*’ both as to what it is and in what way it is naturally connected with intuitive knowledge.<sup>257</sup>

The [term] *logos* is also found in the *Theaetetus*, and there it is used in three ways, (a) as the expression [of thought], (b) as the traversal [of the object] through its elements, and (c) as that which supplies the differentiation of each object in relation to others.<sup>258</sup> But all these interpretations of the term have to do with [processes of] composition and distinction and so are unsuitable for the comprehension of the always existent. It is their nature to grasp the similar by means of the similar, whereas the always-existent is simple and undivided, raised above everything that is opposed to these [two characteristics].

Again, the [term] *logos* is used in another way as [in the distinction between] (a) opinative (*doxastikos*) *logos*, (b) scientific (*epistêmonikos*) *logos* and (c) intellective (*noeros*) *logos*. Since opinion (*doxa*) and discursive reasoning (*dianoia*) and intellect (*nous*) are found within us – I mean in this context intellect as the summit of discursive reasoning – and since our entire essential nature is *logos*, we must observe the *logos* differently in each of these [forms of cognition]. But (a) opinion is unable to be linked to the intuitive knowledge of the active Intellect. In fact quite the opposite is the case: it has been yoked together with the irrational form of cognition (28a2–3).<sup>259</sup> Nor (b) does discursive reason, to the extent that it advances to multiplicity and division, have the ability to proceed to Intellect, but quite the opposite is the case: it shies away from intellectual indivisibility through the variegated nature of its reasonings. The option that remains (c), therefore, is that what is highest in the soul and

<sup>257</sup> The term λόγος is an even greater challenge for the translator than its predecessor νόησις. On some occasions I have had to follow the lead of Festugière in leaving it transliterated.

<sup>258</sup> At *Tht.* 206c6–7 Plato says that the word λόγος has three meanings. This forms the basis for the passage here. For (a) see 206d1–2, i.e. the outward expression of language through words (cf. the λόγος προφορικός in later Stoic thought). For (b) see 206e7, 207c3–6, etc.; this refers to discursive analysis. For (c) see 208c7, 208d6, 209a5; this refers to the process of distinguishing a concept from others so that it is distinctive.

<sup>259</sup> I use ‘form of cognition’ as a way of translating γνώσις, used here as the generic term for any kind of knowledge.

most resembling unity in [the exercise of] discursive reason is established in the intuitive knowledge of the particular intellect and is linked to it through affinity (*syngeneia*). This, then, is the *logos* [in our passage], the faculty in us that knows the intelligibles, of which Socrates in the *Republic* stated that it was the activity of intuitive knowledge (511d8), just as he called discursive reason the form of cognition of the intermediates between intelligibles and objects of opinion (511d4–5).<sup>260</sup> Now if the activity of this [highest part of the soul] is intuitive knowledge, the *logos* [spoken about here] would be an intellect, of which he subsequently says that it comes to exist in the soul when it is cognitively concerned with the intelligible realm (37a6, c2),<sup>261</sup> just as is the case with knowledge (37c2), except that knowledge is a more variegated activity, which presses a diversity of objects hard by means of other objects,<sup>262</sup> whereas intellect is a simpler activity, contemplating the existents with its own direct vision.

This highest and most undivided part of ours Plato has in the present context called *logos* because it shines light<sup>263</sup> on our intellect and the intelligible nature.<sup>264</sup> Indeed, whenever the soul distances itself from imagination and opinion and cognition that is variegated and indeterminate and ascends to its own partlessness, in virtue of which it has been rooted in the particular Intellect, and in its ascent it connects its own activity with the intuitive knowledge of that Intellect, it is then that, together with that Intellect, it knows the always-existent. This activity, however, is both single and double, involving both sameness and differentiation in its [acts of] intuitive knowledge.<sup>265</sup> In fact it is precisely then that the intuitive knowledge of the soul is better able to see all [things] at the same time,<sup>266</sup> and comes closer to the eternal realities, so that it too grasps the intelligible together with the Intellect and becomes active like a lesser light acting together with a greater one. In fact the *logos* in us insinuates itself in the intuitive knowledge of the Intellect, and so the intelligible becomes **grasped by intuitive knowledge together with**

<sup>260</sup> Proclus here refers again to the Divided line, as he did above at 228.4.

<sup>261</sup> Literally ‘when it moves itself around the intelligible’.

<sup>262</sup> I.e. in the discursive process. The verb here, *πιέζω*, literally means to ‘squeeze’.

<sup>263</sup> Or, if *ἐκφαίνων* is read with some of the manuscripts, ‘because he [Plato] wishes to cast light on our intellect and the intelligible nature’.

<sup>264</sup> From this conclusion it is clear that we have to translate *logos* in 28a1 as Proclus understands it by means of a term indicating an active cognitive faculty close to intellect but not to be identified with it. I have opted for ‘reason’ when the text is cited above in 240.13, but it is just an approximation.

<sup>265</sup> Proclus unusually uses the plural of *νόησις* here.

<sup>266</sup> Cf. the similar formulation above at 245.6 using the term *ἁθρόως*, ‘all at the same time’ or ‘all together’.

*logos*. Our *logos* grasps hold of the intelligible together with intuitive knowledge, whereas the intuitive knowledge of the Intellect is always both [identical to] and sees the intelligible, but connects the *logos* to itself, whenever this [faculty] becomes ‘intellect-like’ (*nooeidês*).

But how is the really existent grasped by the particular Intellect or by the *logos*? For this is something that is even more remarkable. In answer we might suggest that, even if the Intelligible realm in itself cannot be grasped by the intellect and the *logos*,<sup>267</sup> because it is superior to all comprehension and has grasped all things at a transcendent level, nevertheless the intellect, in having its own intelligible object, by means of this grasps the whole as well, while the *logos*, by means of the intellect with which it is coupled, obtains conceptions of the existents and thus by means of these is said to grasp that which exists. Perhaps he also wishes to indicate that the *logos* contemplates the intelligible object by circling around it and focusing its activity and movement as it were on a central point.<sup>268</sup> Intuitive knowledge would thus know its object non-discursively and indivisibly, whereas the *logos* dances around the essence of the intelligible in a circle and unwinds the substantial unity of all things that it possesses.

### *Detailed explanation of doxêi met’ aisthêsêôs: 248.7–252.10*

Let us next consider what **opinion** (*doxa*, 28a2) is. That it is the [lower] limit of all rational life, and that it is connected to the highest [part] of the irrational life is the view that is commonly bandied about. Our present concern is to state what is special to the Platonic tradition, namely that the opinative faculty<sup>269</sup> embraces the accounts of sense-perceptible objects and that it is this faculty that knows their essential natures and examines the ‘what it is’ question, but remains ignorant of the cause. Since it is the role of the discursive reasoning to know both the essential natures and the causes of the perceived objects, but of sense-perception to know neither – for it has been clearly demonstrated in the *Theaetetus* that sense-perception is ignorant of essential nature and completely uninformed about the cause of what it knows<sup>270</sup> – it is necessary that

<sup>267</sup> I.e. at the human level, as in the text being given exegesis.

<sup>268</sup> Proclus’ metaphor here of the circle and its focal point recall the common use of this metaphor by Plotinus, e.g. to explain the relation between the soul, the Intellect and the One; cf. for example *Enn.* 6.8.18.4ff.

<sup>269</sup> The term here is τὸ δοξαστικόν, i.e. based on the adjective parallel to δοξαστός (opinable, see above n. 236), but with an active force.

<sup>270</sup> Proclus has in mind the passage *Thet.* 186b–d, where Socrates argues that sense-perception is unable to attain to the essence and truth of an object, in contrast to knowledge (ἐπιστήμη).

opinion be ranked in between [these two] and that it know the essential natures of the objects of perception by means of the accounts (*logoi*) in it, but remains ignorant of the causes. In this way right opinion (*orthê doxa*) would differ from knowledge (*epistêmê*), namely that it would only know the ‘what it is’,<sup>271</sup> whereas the latter is able also to examine the cause.<sup>272</sup>

Now, sense-perception is positioned next to opinion and occupies the middle position between the sense organ and opinion. In fact, the sense organ grasps hold of the objects of sense-perception together with an affection (*pathos*), and for this reason it is damaged by their excessive force. Opinion, on the other hand, has a mode of cognition which is free from affection. Sense-perception participates in a certain way in the affection, but also has a cognitive element, inasmuch as it is established in the opinative faculty and is illuminated by it and becomes ‘*logos*-like’ (*logoeidês*),<sup>273</sup> even though in itself it is irrational.

Sense-perception in fact represents the final point where the series of the cognitive faculties ends. This series commences with intuitive knowledge, which is beyond *logos* and non-discursive. The second rank is held by *logos*, which is the [form of] intuitive knowledge possessed by the soul and has contact with the existents discursively. The third place is held by opinion, which is cognition of the objects of sense-perception in conformity with *logos*,<sup>274</sup> while sense-perception has the fourth rank as irrational cognition of the same objects. Discursive reasoning (*dianoia*) [has so far not been mentioned, but it]<sup>275</sup> is intermediate between intuitive knowledge and opinion in that it obtains cognition of the intermediate forms, which require a direct apprehension (*epibolê*) less clear than the intellective mode, but clearer than the opinative mode, as Socrates stated on the previous day when he distinguished the modes of cognition in relation to their objects.<sup>276</sup> We must therefore describe opinion as occurring ‘in conformity with *logos*’, because it possesses accounts (*logoi*) that have knowledge of the essential natures [of sense-perceptible objects], but from another perspective we must describe it as irrational, because it

<sup>271</sup> Reading with Festugière γινώσκοι instead of Diehl’s γινώσκει.

<sup>272</sup> This is standard Platonic doctrine; cf. *Meno* 98a, *Symp.* 202a.

<sup>273</sup> I.e. parallel to νοεிடής (intellect-like) used of the *logos* at 247.25.

<sup>274</sup> I differ from Festugière who translates κατὰ λόγον as ‘proportionally’. But *logos* should refer to the faculty here, since each form of cognition has something of the higher level. The phrase returns at 249.8. See also the phrase κατὰ νόησιν used for διάνοια in 249.6.

<sup>275</sup> Something like this ellipse is suggested by γάρ here. Festugière translated ‘Je ne compte pas la raison discursive . . .’

<sup>276</sup> *Rep.* 533d5–7, part of the discussion which is regarded as having preceded the *Timaeus*. Proclus contrasts here cognition κατὰ νόησιν and κατὰ λόγον, and places διάνοια in between. Επιβολή is a non-Platonic word with a background in Hellenistic philosophy. Proclus uses it here as a generic term for a direct form of knowledge.

is ignorant of the causes [of these objects]. For how could an irrational reality be knowledge, as the Socrates in the *Symposium* says about it [opinion]?<sup>277</sup> But as for sense-perception, it must be posited as wholly irrational. In general each of the senses is acquainted with the affection that occurs in the living thing from the object of sense-perception. For example, when an apple presents itself, sight knows that it is red from the affection that occurs in the eye, smell knows that it is fragrant from the affection that occurs in the nostrils, taste knows that it is sweet and touch knows that it is smooth. But what is it that tells us that this thing that is presented [to us] is an apple? None of the particular senses do this, for each of them is acquainted with a single one of its features and not with the whole. It is also not the common sense that does this,<sup>278</sup> for it only discriminates the differences between the affections but does not know that the whole object has an essential nature of a particular kind. It is clear, then, that there must be a faculty superior to the senses which knows the whole before the parts, as it were, and partlessly contemplates its form, which connects together these various [partial] qualities [that we have described].<sup>279</sup> This faculty, therefore, Plato has called opinion and for this reason the sense-perceptible object is called **opinable**.

Moreover, since the senses often report other kinds of affections and not those as their producers wish [them to be], what is the faculty in us which states that deception occurs when the [sense of] sight tells us that the sun is one foot across and the sense of taste tells sick people that honey appears bitter?<sup>280</sup> Certainly it is clear, I would think, that in all such cases the senses report the affection that they have and do not tell what is completely false, for they state the affection obtained by the organs of sense and that it is of a particular kind. But the faculty which states the cause of the affection and judges it is different. There is, therefore, a faculty of the soul which is superior to sense-perception. It knows the objects of sense not by means of an instrument but by its own means and corrects the crassness of sense-perception. This faculty

<sup>277</sup> *Symp.* 202a6–7, where Plato is speaking about right opinion. I have kept the literal rendering of ‘the Socrates in the *Symposium*’ because it beautifully illustrates Proclus’ sensitivity to the differing statements of various characters in Plato’s dialogues, even if ultimately he believes that they represent one coherent system.

<sup>278</sup> Reference to the Aristotelian theory of the κοινὴ αἴσθησις as a common aspect of the sense-faculty shared out over the various senses; cf. *De an.* 3.1, *De mem.* 1, 450a10ff. The theory is assumed in Neoplatonism; cf. Plot. *Enn.* 1.1.9.12.

<sup>279</sup> Here we have Proclus’ considered opinion of what *doxa* is. It is striking that he interprets it as a faculty rather than as a form of cognitive activity, e.g. a conjectural form of judgement.

<sup>280</sup> The first example is well-known from its use in Epicurean philosophy (e.g. Cleomedes, *Cael.* 2.1), the second from Neopyrrhonian scepticism (e.g. Sext. Emp. *PH.* 1.101). Note that the first example involves normal perception, the second a pathology.

is reason (*logos*) with regard to sense-perception but is irrational (*alogos*) with regard to knowledge of the really existent realities, whereas sense-perception is irrational absolutely. For this reason, in the *Republic* too (478d9),<sup>281</sup> he declares that this faculty, opinion I mean, is intermediate between knowledge and ignorance. Knowledge is rational (*logikê*), but is completely mixed with irrationality because it obtains cognition of the objects of sense by means of sense-perception. **Sense-perception**, on the other hand, is solely **irrational**, as indeed Timaeus describes it (28a2–3), firstly because it occurs in the irrational living things as well and is the hallmark of all irrational life. This is the way that the argument in the *Theaetetus* (186b11–d5) distinguishes it from knowledge. Secondly, because it is, more than any other part of the irrational soul, deaf to the persuasions of reason. The spirited and the desirous parts do listen to reason and its commands, and they receive admonition from it, but sense-perception, even if it has heard reason state a thousand times that the sun is larger than the earth, it still sees it as a foot in width and it reports no other message to us. Thirdly, because it does not even know what the object is that it knows. It is by nature unable to grasp its essential nature. It does not know what the object is that is white but has come to know that it is white by means of the affection [that it has undergone]. It is in fact the organ of sense-perception that has made the discrimination. In this way, then, sense-perception is irrational. This is how in the *Gorgias* (464c6) he [Plato] determined what irrational cognition is, namely as the mode of cognition which does not know but conjectures. Fourthly, because it is the limit of the entire series of modes of cognition. Its essential nature stands at furthest remove from reason and intellect. The objects of its cognition are external, and it achieves its comprehension by means of the body. All these reasons demonstrate its irrationality.

Thus the entire realm of generation is grasped by **opinion together with irrational perception**, the one reporting the affections, the other projecting the accounts (*logoi*) of the objects and knowing their essential natures.<sup>282</sup> Just as reason (*logos*), linked together with intuitive knowledge, grasps the intelligible object, so opinion too has been ranked together with sense-perception and knows the object which is generated. In fact, since the soul belongs in the intermediate realm of being (cf. 35a–c), it too accomplishes what is intermediate between intellect and irrationality. With its highest faculty it communes with intellect, with its lowest it inclines towards sense-perception. This is the reason why Timaeus in the first pairing<sup>283</sup> ranked intuitive knowledge before reason,

<sup>281</sup> Note that Plato's ἐπιστήμη is replaced by γνώσις.

<sup>282</sup> I.e. within the limits indicated above.

<sup>283</sup> I.e. the two pairs of cognitive faculties contrasted in the text; cf. above 245.12.

15 because it is superior, while in the second he ranked opinion ahead of sense-perception. In the former reason came after intuitive knowledge as a lesser intellect, in the latter opinion came before sense-perception as a sense-perception infused by reason (*logikê*).

The entire expanse of the realm of rational existence is delimited by opinion and reason – Intellect is our king, sense-perception our messenger, as the great Plotinus says.<sup>284</sup> Reason grasps the intelligible object together with the Intellect, while on its own it contemplates the intermediate accounts, whereas opinion with the help of sense-perception grasps that which is generated, while on its own it examines all the forms within itself (these have been described elsewhere, both how they subsist and how the opinative part of the soul is their location). The intelligible realm is **grasped** by the former [i.e. reason], whereas the realm of becoming is **opinionable** by the latter [i.e. opinion]. In fact the object of cognition is outside it [opinion] and not within, as is the case for the intelligible object of the former [i.e. reason]. This is the reason why its object is not **grasped**, but is **opinionable**. But the object is not described as perceptible (*aisthêton*), because opinion does know the essential natures of the things, whereas sense-perception does not. Opinion therefore obtains the title of the clearer form of cognition<sup>285</sup> because it comes to know the ‘what it is’ and not just the ‘what kind it is’, which we said was the task of sense-perception.<sup>286</sup>

252 It is quite suitable, therefore, that Timaeus should also call that which is generated **opinionable**. And this is also a Pythagorean way of speaking, for it is on this account that Parmenides in [his poem] gives his treatment of the objects of sense-perception the title ‘In relation to opinion’ (*Pros doxan*), because the objects of sense-perception are opinionable in their own nature.<sup>287</sup> Therefore the realm of generation should not be called ‘perceptible’ only, because sense-perception does not obtain knowledge of the essential nature of any object, nor should it be called ‘opinionable without sense-perception’, because opinion knows the accounts within itself and in general knows itself, neither of which belongs to the realm of generated objects in an absolute sense. It is quite plausible,

<sup>284</sup> *Enn.* 5.3.3.44–5. But Proclus has reversed Plotinus’ order, placing Intellect first. This is because he thinks hierarchically, with Intellect at the top and sense-perception at the bottom.

<sup>285</sup> I.e. in being placed first before sense-perception. <sup>286</sup> Cf. above 249.12–22.

<sup>287</sup> Parmenides is regarded as belonging to the Pythagorean tradition because he is a member of the Italian succession which commences with Pythagoras; cf. Diog. Laert. 1.16 and (less clearly) 9.21. In a parallel passage in his *Commentary on the Parmenides*, 1024.10 Cousin, Proclus describes the two parts of Parmenides’ poem as Πρὸς ἀλήθειαν and Πρὸς δόξαν respectively. As Festugière notes, this is clearly based on fr. B1.28–30.

therefore, that he has described it as **opinable with (the help of) sense-perception** (28a2). This is what we are able to say about the terms used by Plato.

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*Arguments against an Aristotelian objection: 252.11–253.28*

It is in this context especially, it seems to me, that Aristotle criticizes the second statement. For where, [he argued,] is the truth [of the statement] that **that which is opinable by opinion with sense-perception** is (identifiable with) **that which comes into being and passes away?** The heaven is at any rate ungenerated and indestructible, even though it is opinable by opinion with sense-perception. Now Timaeus too, [we may reply,] will investigate later on whether the entire heaven has come into being. But let it be said by us for the moment that the [processes of] coming into being and passing away occur analogously in the heaven as well, not only through their motions and changes of shape, but also because the body of the heaven does not generate itself but has derived its existence from another cause.<sup>288</sup> For this reason it is generated, as an object that has the cause of its existence dependent on another being. And since it not only has derived its subsistence from others but also is unable to hold itself together but is held together by another, it also passes away in accordance with his own [Aristotle's] argument, namely that passing away must be taken as coupled with generation.<sup>289</sup> For those beings that really exist and always exist both generate themselves and are held together by themselves, whence they are said to be ungenerated and indestructible in their very nature. But if real Being subsists of itself as ungenerated, that which does not subsist of itself would not be really ungenerated, and if that which is really indestructible is by nature able to hold itself together, [then] that which is unable by nature to hold itself together is not really indestructible.<sup>290</sup> But it is the case that the heaven – by heaven I mean only that part which is bodily in form – is by nature unable to bring itself forth or hold itself together. After all, every such entity that brings itself forth or holds itself together is without parts.<sup>291</sup> It is therefore neither really ungenerated nor really indestructible, but at least as far as its part that is bodily in form is concerned, it is both generated and subject to dissolution.

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<sup>288</sup> I.e., against Aristotle, generation is not just temporal but also involves causation. See the analysis of the term γενετός below at 279.30–280.6.

<sup>289</sup> Cf. *Cael.* 1.10, 279b17–32, where Aristotle has Plato's argument in the *Timaeus* in mind.

<sup>290</sup> The reversibility of premises is legitimate here because they are contradictories (A and -A).

<sup>291</sup> This is obviously not the case for the heaven.

10 Moreover, as Aristotle himself says and demonstrates in a clear and noble fashion, no body that is limited has unlimited power.<sup>292</sup> Now the body of the heaven is limited. Therefore it does not have unlimited power. That which is indestructible in so far as it is indestructible has unlimited power. Body therefore, in so far as it is body, is not indestructible. We may conclude, therefore, that such a thesis is demonstrated in  
15 accordance with Aristotle's [own] argumentation as well.

The manner in which the heaven is ungenerated and everlasting will be made clear by us a little later on.<sup>293</sup> For the present this much is clear from what has been said, namely that of its own accord the entire  
20 bodily realm **is that which comes into being and passes away but is never really existent** (28a3–4), as indeed he [Plato] himself says in the *Politicus*:<sup>294</sup> 'To remain steadfastly in the same state and always the same is reserved for the most divine of all [beings] only. Corporeal nature does not allow admittance to this rank. What we have named the heaven or the cosmos has certainly received many blessings from the one who  
25 engendered it, but he did cause it to partake of body and this means that it is completely impossible for it not to partake of some change.' It has been stated, then, how the heaven too falls under the above-mentioned definitions.<sup>295</sup>

### *Another Aristotelian objection: 253.29–254.18*

But if, to mention another point, the splendid<sup>296</sup> Aristotle should raise questions about the definition of **the always-existent** (27d6), when he  
30 persists in saying that not everything that always exists is **grasped by intuitive knowledge together with reason** (28a1–2) – for he claims that 'the most divine of visible beings' also exist always<sup>297</sup> – we shall  
254 require him not to confuse what is eternal with what exists for the whole of time. In fact he too distinguishes between eternity (*aiôn*) and time, and apportions the one to Intellect and the other to the heaven and

<sup>292</sup> Proclus refers to the argument at *Phys.* 7.10, especially 266b25–7, leading up to the postulation of the Unmoved mover.

<sup>293</sup> See the detailed discussions below at 276.30–281.5, 294.28–296.12. But Proclus may have in mind the discussion of the second objection just a few lines further down at 253.30ff.

<sup>294</sup> *Plt.* 269d5–e2. Proclus' quotation is fairly exact with only four minor changes.

<sup>295</sup> I.e. in the determination of what opinable is, cited at 252.12.

<sup>296</sup> The adjective here is δαιμόνιος, reserved in this work by Proclus exclusively for the Stagirite; see also 268.17, 294.13, 295.28. Its usage is, one suspects, both complimentary and mildly ironical. Aristotle had an admirable intellect but he misused it in not staying true to all the doctrines of his teacher.

<sup>297</sup> Proclus cites some words from *Phys.* 2.4, 196a33, though, as Festugière points out, the context is different.

the motion of the heaven. That [Being], then, the always-existent, the eternal, is such as Timaeus has defined [it to be]. ‘The most divine of visible beings’ are everlasting (*aidia*) in another manner and not in terms of eternal duration. Rather they are brought forth for the whole duration of time from their own causes, and their entire being is [concentrated] in their coming into being.

Moreover he [Aristotle] also makes the following statement, namely that eternity is of a cognate nature with the intelligibles, since it contains and surrounds the infinity of time, and it is the eternal (*to aiônion*) that is really intelligible.<sup>298</sup> If this is the case and if the always-existent signifies the eternal, why should one refer the nature of heaven to this being that always exists, and not state that it is always in a state of becoming, inasmuch as it is coextensive with the everlasting nature of time?

The result is that we have solved, on the basis of his own arguments, both objections which Aristotle brought against the definitions under discussion. But since we have replied to this inquiry as well,<sup>299</sup> let us indeed desist from these matters. They will be discussed again on another occasion.

### *On the faculties of judgement: 254.19–255.26*

In general terms, the views that Plato has on the faculties of judgement (*kritêria*) should be taken from these [definitions].<sup>300</sup> There is a divergence of opinion on what the faculty of judgement is.<sup>301</sup> Some thinkers affirm that it is sense-perception, as the Protagoreans state,<sup>302</sup> others that it is opinion (*doxa*), such as the [philosopher] who says that ‘it is seeming (*dokos*) which has succeeded in all cases’,<sup>303</sup> others that it is reason (*logos*), yet others that it is intellect. Plato, however, divides up the field of the criteria<sup>304</sup> in a manner appropriate to the realities (*pragmata*), assigning intellect to the intelligibles, discursive reasoning to the objects

<sup>298</sup> This is based on *Cael.* 1.9, 279a23–25, but reformulated by Proclus in his own terms.

<sup>299</sup> Proclus is probably referring here to the question of the nature of the heaven, to which he will indeed return when he gives exegesis of 28b6–c1 at 276–297.

<sup>300</sup> The question as to what the faculty of judgement is which allows human beings to gain access to the true nature of things is implicit in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle (and also in a less developed form in Democritus), but it first becomes a fixed part of philosophical systematics in Hellenistic philosophy; see Long–Sedley §§17, 40, 70A, 71A. Against this background it is significant that Alcinous begins his presentation of Plato’s doctrines with a section *περί κριτηρίων*, *Did.* 154.9–156.23.

<sup>301</sup> The brief doxographical survey follows the hierarchy of four cognitive states already mentioned at 251.12ff.

<sup>302</sup> Based on Plato’s account at *Tht.* 151d–164d. <sup>303</sup> Xenophanes 21B34.4 DK.

<sup>304</sup> Using ‘criteria’ in what follows to translate *κρίτηρια* as faculties of knowledge or cognition.

of understanding, opinion to the objects of opinion, sense-perception to the objects of perception. And you should not think that because of this the criteria are found in a state of dislocation in his thought. In fact the soul is both a unity and a multiplicity. If, therefore, the activity of making judgement belongs to the soul – for it would not be, I suppose, our body that has this faculty – and if the soul is a unity and a multiplicity, then the critical faculty too is a unity as well as a plurality, and the judgemental faculty is both single and plural in form.

What, then, is this single faculty, one might ask. Our reply is: the reason (*logos*).<sup>305</sup> This is the faculty which when it directs itself to the contemplation of the intelligibles, makes use both of itself and of intuitive knowledge, not because intuitive knowledge is its instrument and it itself is the employer [of that instrument], as Severus the Platonist thinks<sup>306</sup> and so makes intuitive knowledge inferior to *logos*, but rather because intuitive knowledge is the light of the reason, bringing it to completion and leading it upwards and illuminating the cognitive power which it possesses. When it enters into the adjudication of intermediate accounts (*logoi*),<sup>307</sup> it makes use not just of itself but also of discursive reasoning and through the latter's agency it has become turned in towards itself. In judging the objects of opinion it also sets opinion in motion, and the same applies for imagination (*phantasia*) in the case of the objects of imagination and for sense-perception in the case of the objects of perception. Whenever it engages in the examination of the specific forms of the sense-perceptible realm, such as in the case of each of the objects of perception, it makes use of opinion as its collaborator in the investigation. For it is in this faculty that the accounts of the objects of perception reside. Whenever it [the reason] is investigating a certain position or shape, for example how the earth is positioned with its pole at the top, and what kind of relation it has to the heaven, it summons up the imagination as well, so that it can examine the object of inquiry in an extended and plastic manner, and when it is concerned with an eclipse, it also takes sense-perception along as an assistant in its observations. Sometimes it accepts the judgements of the secondary faculties, but sometimes it has refuted the errors that on many occasions they tend to make on account of the instruments [that they have to use]. These remarks, then, will suffice on the subject of the faculties of judgement. We have

<sup>305</sup> In what follows Proclus applies his thesis that the criterion is *logos* to the four cognitive states of the Divided line in the *Republic*.

<sup>306</sup> Fr. 13 T Gioè. On this philosopher see above n. 134.

<sup>307</sup> Proclus is probably thinking of the objects covered by the second section of the Divided line; cf. *Rep.* 511c4.

treated them at greater length in a clear fashion in our *Commentary on the Theaetetus*.<sup>308</sup>

***Another approach through the hierarchy of beings:***  
**255.27–258.8**

The precision of the definitions discussed above is clear from what has been said so far. But if you wish, let us examine the subject by another method.<sup>309</sup> I affirm that always existent in the primary sense is<sup>310</sup> that which is eternal in all respects, as essential nature (*ousia*), power, activity, whereas the generated in absolute terms is that which receives the essential nature in time as well as power in its entirety and activity. For there must be a whole that is eternal and a whole that is temporal, the one existing self-constitutedly as ‘all together’,<sup>311</sup> the other having an existence derived from elsewhere which is [rooted] in the extension [of time]. These being the extremes, I state that there are also intermediates, which on the one hand somehow have partaken in the portion (*moira*) of being, yet on the other somehow have communion with becoming. And I state that there are also entities which partake of neither of these, in the one case through superiority, in the other through inferiority. In fact matter (*hylē*) is neither being nor becoming – for it is neither grasped by intuitive knowledge nor the object of perception – and the same applies to the One, as the *Parmenides* demonstrates in both instances, the one case in the first hypothesis, the other in the fifth.<sup>312</sup>

Always-existent, then, is the entire intelligible genus, the entire intellective realm, the entire supra-cosmic intellect, the entire intellect participated by the divine souls, the entire so-called particular intellect participated by angels and demons and particular souls, [these last-mentioned] through the intermediation, as we said,<sup>313</sup> of those [other ranks, i.e. angels and demons]. This is as far as the always-existent extends. In fact, the entirety of intellect is eternally active and is measured along its whole extent by eternity. But coming into being (*gignomenon*) is all that is ‘in disharmonious and disordered motion’ (304a–5), which is observed conceptually before the creation of the cosmos, together with all that is generated and destructible in the proper sense and also the heaven. All

<sup>308</sup> No longer extant.

<sup>309</sup> This is a good example of how Proclus’ writing can be quite sloppy at times. Note the double use of εἰρημέντοι and the unspecified use of αὐτό.

<sup>310</sup> As the same phrase in 257.4 below confirms, πρώτως goes directly with αἰεὶ ὄν here.

<sup>311</sup> On this phrase see above n. 241; on αὐθυποστάτως see n. 178.

<sup>312</sup> In the Neoplatonic interpretation the nature of the One is dialectically investigated in the first hypothesis at *Parm.* 137c–142a; the nature of matter in the fifth at 160b–163b.

<sup>313</sup> Above at 245.18. Proclus’ language here is very compressed.

of these are sense-perceptible and visible (cf. 28b7–8). These are what Timaeus defines as generated and always-existent in the absolute sense.

25 In between them are the realms which have communion with both and on each side of them are the realms which participate in neither. It is for this reason that he introduces both [of the extremes] both positively and negatively, that is, as **always-existent** and **having no becoming** on the one hand and again as **generated** and **never being** on the other (27d6–28a1), so that through the negative formulation he divides off those [realms] which have communion with neither of them and through  
30 the positive formulation he separates those that somehow participate in them both. These thus being the extremes of the entire intelligible and intellective realm and of the sense-perceptible realm, we should also look at the nature in between. Timaeus in fact calls both time and the soul  
257 generated, and it is clear that, since they are not objects of perception, in a certain sense they are beings (*onta*) and in a certain sense they are generated (*genêta*), and do not belong completely to either portion.

Porphyry (fr. 31) was thus quite correct in asserting that in the present context Plato defines the extremes, namely the always-existent in a primary sense and that which is generated only, but he passes over the intermediates, such as that which is being and at the same time becoming and that which is becoming and also being. Of these the former, that which is being and becoming, is appropriate for the level of the souls, whereas the latter, becoming and being, is appropriate for what is highest in the realm of the generated.<sup>314</sup> Of such a kind is also the nature that gives life to the universe.<sup>315</sup> Indeed, because she is divisible throughout the  
10 bodies, she is certainly generated, yet because she is completely incorporeal, she is ungenerated. To say, however, that matter too is generated, as well as being, is absurd. For in this way it would be [ontologically] superior to the objects of sense-perception which have been generated, on the grounds that they are generated only, whereas it participates in  
15 being as well. If, after setting aside that which is always-existent only and that which is generated only, you should wish to define what is intermediate as well, namely what is in a certain sense being and in a certain sense generated, by stripping intellect away from one of the two definitions and sense-perception from the other of the two, you will produce the definition of the intermediate. This, in fact, is what is knowable  
20 by reason (*logos*) and opinion. Reason knows itself and opinion, while

<sup>314</sup> I.e. the heaven as highest physical entity.

<sup>315</sup> I.e. the World-soul. As hypostasis Soul is closer to the Intelligible realm, i.e. being-becoming. As individual (but of course highest) soul, the World-soul is intimately entwined with body, and thus closer to the realm of physical reality, i.e. becoming-being.

opinion knows itself and reason, the former knowing both together with the cause, the latter knowing both without the cause, for this is the difference between reason and opinion. So opinion is known by reason and reason is known by opinion, while it is by means of both of them as intermediates that soul in her entirety is known.

Similarly<sup>316</sup> if you take the inferior of the two higher faculties, reason, and make it a bastard reason (*nothos logos*, cf. 52b2), and of the two lower you take sense-perception and make it an imperceptible sense-perception (*aisthêsis anaisthêtos*, cf. 52b2), you will be able to see how Plato thinks matter is known, [namely] by a bastard reason and an imperceptible sense-perception. And analogously, if in each case you take the superior of the two and make it bastard at the superior level, you will be able to see how the One is knowable. It is knowable by a bastard intellect and a bastard opinion. For this reason it is not properly knowable as a simple object and also not from a cause. It is known, therefore, by bastard means, because it happens in a way that is superior in both cases. Opinion does not know through a cause and that [object] [i.e. the One] is not knowable from a cause. Intellect knows its object as something simple, so it is a bastard intellect which knows that [object] [the One], because this happens in a manner superior to [intellective] knowing. The superior [form of knowing], therefore, is bastard in relation to the Intellect, just as that [object] [the One] is superior to being simple, such as the intelligible realm is for the intellect<sup>317</sup> and for that to which the intellect is cognate and not bastard. That [object] [the One] the Intellect thus knows by its own [bastard knowledge] which is not intellect, whereas this [object], the unity in itself, it knows insofar as it is god as well.<sup>318</sup>

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### *Coming into being and causation*

**Again, all that which comes into being necessarily comes into being by [the agency of] some cause, for it is impossible for anything to have becoming without a cause.**<sup>319</sup> (28a4–5)

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<sup>316</sup> This is an excellent example of Proclus' extremely systematic mind. In between the two 'extremes', being and becoming, there are the two intermediate levels, as already noted. But the extremes are only such in terms of true knowledge. Beyond them there are still the One and matter, and for these there is a kind of surrogate knowledge, for which he uses the Platonic term *vôthos* (bastard). So there are six levels: beyond being, being, being-becoming, becoming-being, becoming, beyond becoming. For each there is a corresponding cognitive state, whether real or bastard.

<sup>317</sup> I.e. having the simplicity which admits true intuitive knowledge (*vôhêsis*); cf. 246.7–9.

<sup>318</sup> This last sentence is rather compressed and can be read in a number of different ways depending on what words are understood.

<sup>319</sup> Divergence from Burnet's OCT text: Proclus reads *ἐξείν* instead of Plato's *σχεῖν*, but below in lines 21 and 29 he does use the form of the word preferred by Plato.

*General explanation of the text: 258.12–260.19*

In full agreement with the geometrical method,<sup>320</sup> after [treating] the definitions [just discussed], he [now] takes up these fundamental propositions (*axiōmata*).<sup>321</sup> Now that he has stated what being and what becoming are, he adds these other common conceptions, namely that that which comes into being certainly does so through the agency of a cause, and that it is not possible for that which does not come into being through the agency of a cause to have becoming. From these [propositions] it is also plain that the words ‘one should make the division’ (27d5) did not signify the path of division, but rather that one should define the basic principles. In fact the statements that **all that which comes into being necessarily comes into being by [the agency of] some cause** and it is impossible for anything to have becoming without a cause and [also] the next in sequence, ‘that which comes into being in relation to an eternal Paradigm is completed as something beautiful’ (cf. 28a6–8), all these have been presented for the purposes of making a definition. They are fundamental propositions and not parts of a division.<sup>322</sup>

But, since of the two statements made now the one is more evident while the other is less familiar and clear, he posits the one as middle term and the other as conclusion. The statement **all that which comes into being necessarily comes into being by [the agency of] some cause** is a conclusion, whereas the statement **it is impossible for anything to have becoming without a cause** is a middle term, so that the following categorical syllogism in the first figure is [obtained]:

- (1) It is impossible for that which comes into being to come into being without a cause.
- (2) But everything for which it is impossible to come into being without a cause necessarily comes into being by the agency of some cause.
- (3) Therefore everything that comes into being necessarily comes into being by the agency of a cause.

It is better to draw the conclusion in this way, as the divine Iamblichus also determined (fr. 30), than to follow others and make a hypothetical syllogism [out of it].

<sup>320</sup> On the relevance of this method see above 228.27, 236.15.

<sup>321</sup> Once again it is impossible to tell whether the subject of the sentence is Timaeus or Plato. Note also that Proclus here describes Timaeus as introducing two new basic principles, but elsewhere he assumes that just a single principle is involved.

<sup>322</sup> Proclus has argued above at 224.17–226.2 that διαπετέον at 27d5 does not refer to a division but a delimitating distinction.

But (the question may be raised as to) how the middle term is more familiar than the conclusion. For ‘impossible not to be’ plainly amounts to the same as ‘necessarily is’ and ‘necessarily is’ equates with ‘impossible not to be’. We might suggest that each of these is more or less the same, but in many cases ‘necessarily is’ is not familiar, whereas ‘impossible not to be’ *is* familiar. For example, when the doctor states that it is necessary to be nourished, he might be less effective in persuading the patient. But if he should say that it was impossible to live without being nourished, this statement has a constraining effect on the listener. And conversely we say that it is necessary that death take place through a cause for it is impossible not to die, and it is necessary that the debtor repay the money to the tyrant for it is impossible not to give it back, and similarly in a large number of other cases you would see that the one statement is less clear and the other more familiar, even though they both signify the same fact. How, then, in the present case is the one clearer than the other? After all, what is the use if what I have just said is true in other cases, but it is not true here? We might suggest that here too it is easy to understand how that which comes into being, when separated from the cause, is powerless<sup>323</sup> and weak. For, since it is unable to preserve itself and is not maintained by itself, but both the preservation and maintenance are obtained from the cause and are removed if it is deprived of the cause, it is plain that on its own it becomes powerless and is dispersed into non-existence, which is indicative of the fact that that which comes into being is unable to come into being without a cause. In fact, if it is coming into being, it does so by [the activity of] some producer (cf. 28c3). Rightly, therefore, it is also stated in the *Philebus* (26e2–7) that that which comes into being is something that has been produced and that the producer serves as cause for that which comes into being. Now if this is the case, then either (a) it comes into being by its own [agency], or (b) it does so by [the agency of] another. If (a) it occurs by its own [agency], it will advance to the same rank as eternal being, that which becomes and that which is always-existent will amount to the same, and it will belong to those existents which have been established eternally (*quod non*). But if (b) it does not come into being by its own [agency], then this will certainly happen by [the agency of] another. For that which comes into being must do so by the agency of something, if it is something that comes into being and is not Being. In fact, if it does not maintain and actively produce itself, then it will undergo this by [the agency of] another and, as it is weak on its own, it obtains its power by [the agency of] another.

Moreover, even if the same [entity] acts and is acted upon, in the one case inasmuch as it is a passive recipient it is acted upon by another, while

<sup>323</sup> ὁδύνατον, the same term which in the propositions we have translated as ‘impossible’.

in the other case inasmuch as it is an active agent it acts on another. That which comes into being, inasmuch as it is coming into being, is something that is acted upon, and as a passive object (*paschon*) it is acted upon by another. By nature it is unable to generate itself, for [in that case] it would exist before it came into being, and it would exist in actuality before it did so potentially. [This cannot be the case], for that which acts  
 10 on the potentially existent must first exist in actuality.

Quite suitably, therefore, Plato, when connecting up ‘that which comes into being’ with ‘the cause’, which he does in the conclusion, uses the expression **necessarily** (*ex anankês*, 28a4–5). For permanence and stability only come to be present in that which comes into being from the cause, together with what it undergoes, just as when he says in  
 15 the *Politicus* (270a4) that the ‘reconditioned immortality’ is instilled in the cosmos from the Father.<sup>324</sup> However, when separating it from the cause, which he does in the middle term, dividing off that which comes into being ‘without the cause’ (cf. 28a5), he [no less suitably] uses the expression **it is impossible** (28a5). After all, viewed on its own, it is impotent and incomplete.

### *Explanation of ‘cause’: 260.19–262.1*

A further point to be made is that, in speaking of **cause** (*aition*, 28a4, 5),  
 20 Plato reveals the unique<sup>325</sup> power of the demiurgic principle, calling the cause demiurgic (*dêmiourgikon*) and not simply what makes something else exist (*hupostatikon*). It is true that Socrates has said that the Good is cause of the intelligibles (see *Rep.* 508e–509b).<sup>326</sup> But it [the Good] is not a demiurgic agent, because every demiurgic agent is presented [as such] in relation to becoming, as when he said in the *Philebus* (cf. 27a11–  
 25 b2) that the demiurgic agent is spoken about in relation to that which comes into being.<sup>327</sup> From this [it emerges that], even if there are many different causes of things prior to the cosmos, they are nevertheless not demiurgic causes of generated beings. And even if there are multiple demiurgic causes, the cause is nevertheless single as well.<sup>328</sup> In general terms, if unicity (*henôsis*) comes to be present in that which comes to

<sup>324</sup> In the *Politicus* Plato says it is obtained from the Demiurge. The adjective ἐπισκευαστός, which we have translated ‘reconditioned’, is somewhat unusual.

<sup>325</sup> The term here is ἐνοσιδής, literally ‘single of its kind’.

<sup>326</sup> This is deduced from *Rep.* 508a–509b; note especially 508b9–c2.

<sup>327</sup> Cf. *Phlb.* 27a11–b2; γιγνόμενον at a1, γιγνόμενα at a11, τὸ δημιουργοῦν at b2.

<sup>328</sup> Proclus’ language is rather obscure here. For the interpretation of the sentence Fesugièrè rightly cross-refers to 262.12.

being from the cause,<sup>329</sup> it is all the more necessary that the prior [cause] is single in its kind (*monoeidês*) and holding the multiplicity together, so that in accordance with the unicity that has a prior existence in the cause, that which comes into being is single as well.<sup>330</sup> Let this suffice on these matters. 30  
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Now in this context<sup>331</sup> they [the interpreters] usually enumerate all the causes and the differences between them as explained by Aristotle,<sup>332</sup> but they do this in an unsystematic manner. In fact what they should say is that every cause is (1) either intrinsic (*kath' heauto*) or incidental (*kata sumbebêkos*), and that these are presented in two ways, (2) either contiguously or at a distance, and that these are again presented in two ways, (3) either as simple or as complex, and that these too are again presented in two ways, (4) either potentially or in act. In this way their multiplicity would come into view. For (1) through the intrinsic and the incidental [kind], there are two ways of presenting the causes; (2) through these being presented in two ways, either contiguously or at a distance, there are four; (3) through these again being presented in two ways, either as simple or as complex, there are eight; and (4) through these too being presented in two ways, either potentially or in act, there are sixteen. But when, as may happen, the causes are expounded in a fourfold manner according to Aristotle,<sup>333</sup> or according to Plato in a threefold manner, with the accessory causes expounded in a threefold manner as well,<sup>334</sup> according to Aristotle there would be sixty-four ways, while according to Plato they would be forty-eight in number, with another forty-eight for the accessory causes. In this way the treatment of the subject would be fully systematic. But even if those interpreters failed to use [this] [systematic] method of treatment,<sup>335</sup> they did enumerate these [causes] before examining how the statement is to be understood that all that which comes to be does so by [the agency of] a cause. We in contrast reject all this idle curiosity<sup>336</sup> of theirs and would affirm that the account in this context has to do with the efficient cause. This is the 5  
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<sup>329</sup> Same formulation as at 260.13.

<sup>330</sup> Both at 31b3 and 92c9 Plato calls the cosmos *μονογενής*.

<sup>331</sup> For the passage 261.1–25 see Dörrie–Baltes, PA §118.2.

<sup>332</sup> At *Phys.* 2.3, 195a25–b26.

<sup>333</sup> The standard four causes as set out at *Phys.* 2.3, 194b16–195a3.

<sup>334</sup> Plato's three causes are the efficient, the paradigmatic and the final; the three accessory causes are the material, the formal and the instrumental. Cf. the enumeration at 263.19ff.

<sup>335</sup> I follow Festugière's improvements on Diehl's text. Dörrie–Baltes, PA §118.2 suspects that these interpreters would have included Porphyry and Iamblichus.

<sup>336</sup> The term is *πολυπραγμοσύνη*, famously used by the Church fathers for useless knowledge.

25 reason why he has said **by [the agency of] some cause**, for the [phrase]  
 ‘by the agency of’ (*buph’ bou*) properly belongs to the efficient cause. But  
 he added the word **some** because ‘efficient’ is also said of [causes such  
 as] the Intellect of the universe and the Soul and Nature,<sup>337</sup> and prior  
 to them other causes possess this dignity as well. Since, however, there  
 are many things that come into being and also many causes, but these  
 262 causes are not appropriate for each effect, it is suitable to add the word  
**some**, for each single [object] comes into being by the agency of some  
 [cause], and not by all of them.

*The need to have a single efficient principle: 262.1–29*

These matters, then, are clear.<sup>338</sup> This fundamental proposition (*axiōma*),  
 however, has been completely trampled in the mud by the Epicureans,<sup>339</sup>  
 5 who create ‘the heaven and the most divine of visible beings from spon-  
 taneity (*to automaton*)’.<sup>340</sup> But as for the Aristotelians, they only nomi-  
 nally treat it with respect. They state that that which comes into being  
 certainly does so by the agency of a certain cause, but they fail to notice  
 that they make the cause a non-cause whenever they include spontaneity  
 on the list of causes. For this is precisely what spontaneity is, the non-  
 10 cause. Only Plato, following the lead of the Pythagoreans, correctly says  
 that all that comes into being does so by [the agency of] a cause, since he  
 has set fate in command over the existents that have come into being<sup>341</sup>  
 as well as God. Even if such existents are many and scattered, and for this  
 reason come into being from a variety of causes with differing kinds of  
 activity, nevertheless there is also a single cause which gathers together  
 15 and collects the agents, so that nothing occurs in the universe ‘at ran-  
 dom’ or ‘disjointedly’.<sup>342</sup> For ‘reality’ should ‘not be administered badly’,  
 but rather let there be ‘a single chief’<sup>343</sup> and a single cause of all things  
 and a single providence (*pronoia*) and a single concatenation (*beirmos*).  
 Let there also be, together with the monad, the appropriate multiplicity,

<sup>337</sup> On the demiurgic role of nature mentioned here see Martijn (2008) ch. 2.

<sup>338</sup> On this section see the comments of Opsomer and Steel (1999) 255–6.

<sup>339</sup> Fr. 383 Usener. The imagery is obviously inspired by the frequent depiction of Epicureans as pigs grovelling in the mud in pursuit of pleasure.

<sup>340</sup> The quote against the Epicureans is actually from Aristotle, *Phys.* 2.4, 196a33–4. It is better not to translate ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου with chance (τύχη), since what is meant is the spontaneous appearance of order from an activity that does not have this result as its primary goal.

<sup>341</sup> For the role of εἰμαρμένη see especially 41e2.

<sup>342</sup> Terms used by Aristotle against non-teleological views; cf. for μάτην *Phys.* 2.5, 197b22ff., *Cael.* 1.5, 271a33, for ἐπεισοδιώδες cf. *Metaph.* Λ 10, 1076a1, N 3, 1090b19.

<sup>343</sup> Two more Aristotelian phrases from *Metaph.* Λ 10, 1076a3–4.

namely many kings and a variety of causes and a multiform providence 20  
and a diversified rank. But let it everywhere be the case that multiplicity  
has its ordering centred on the monad and diversity centred on the simple  
and multiformity centred on what has a single form and diversity centred  
on what is common [to all], so that a chain that is truly golden<sup>344</sup> rules 25  
over all things and all things are ordered as they ought to be. For if,  
as Aristotle says,<sup>345</sup> all things have been organized for the good, there  
must also be a cause of the organization and there must be no place for  
randomness (*matên*) in the universe, but what seems to be of no purpose  
for the part must be of benefit for the entirety. But these matters have  
already been dealt with elsewhere.

### *Comparison with the Philebus: 262.29–263.19*

It seems that this fundamental principle is less universal than the 30  
statement in the *Philebus* (23d7, 27b9) that the entire realm of the mixed 263  
(*pan to mikton*) has come into existence as the result of some cause of the  
mixing. For unless the mixed elements were to be mixed quite haphaz-  
ardly,<sup>346</sup> there must be a single cause which brings together and unifies  
what has been separated and supplies what is mixed with form. This cause  
is sometimes God, sometimes Intellect, sometimes Soul, sometimes 5  
nature, sometimes some art which imitates nature. Now, everything that  
has come into being is mixed, but not everything that is mixed has come  
into being. In fact, even the most primary of realities, the limited and the  
unlimited, have [only] come into existence mixed with each other. From  
these at any rate, he says, the other entities and the bodies have come into 10  
existence. There is an analogy between all [the key-elements] here (i.e.  
in the *Timaeus*) and all those there (i.e. in the *Philebus*):<sup>347</sup> (1) between  
the creative principle<sup>348</sup> and the One, (2) between form and limit, (3)  
between matter and the unlimited, and (4) between that which comes  
into being and the mixed. But those [key elements] are more universal  
than the ones here, because they are examined in application to the  
whole of reality, whereas here they are only concerned with the cosmic  
realm. Indeed Intellect too is a mixed entity, both as knowledge and as 15

<sup>344</sup> The famous ‘golden chain’ derived from Homer, *Il.* 8.19 and symbolizing the dependence of the whole of reality on a single supreme cause. Note that the term for chain, σείρα, is usually translated ‘series’ and has a prominent place in Proclus’ metaphysics; cf. *ET* §21 and above 206.6, 222.21, etc.

<sup>345</sup> Proclus has in mind here *Metaph* Λ 10, 1075a11–25; cf. especially 18–19 πρὸς ἕν ἅπαντα συντέτακται, in which he substitutes τὸ εὔ used by Aristotle in line 14 for ἕν.

<sup>346</sup> Literally ὡς ἔτυχε, ‘as it happened’. <sup>347</sup> See especially *Phlb.* 26c–e.

<sup>348</sup> Proclus uses the participial phrase τὸ δημιουργοῦν instead of ὁ δημιουργός here.

endowed with infinite potency,<sup>349</sup> and the same is the case for Soul, as both undivided and divisible at the same time. Therefore the cause of that which comes into being is *some* cause, just as that which comes into being is *some* mixed [entity], but not the entire realm of the mixed.<sup>350</sup> This also makes clear how the Demiurge is second [in rank] to the One, because he does make a mixed [product], but one that is generated.

### *Summary of the six causes: 263.19–264.3*

20 The causes of the cosmos are thus the following: the final cause, the paradigmatic cause, the efficient cause, the instrumental cause, the formal cause, the material cause. The final cause he himself will reveal to us later when it appears from the account and its demonstrations.<sup>351</sup> The instrumental and the material and the formal cause he will teach us on  
25 the basis of the first principles enunciated earlier. For if the universe is not being, but rather that which has come into being, there is a form which is participated in by matter, and there is also the direct source of movement for these [two].<sup>352</sup> As for the efficient cause, it is disclosed in the present passage. For if the universe is [something] that has come into being, there is a cause which brings about its existence (cf. 28a4–5, c2–3). The paradigmatic cause will emerge from the passage that follows the  
30 present one. For if the cosmos is beautiful, it comes into being modelled on eternal being (cf. 28c5–29a4). The result is that by means of these  
264 first principles he has tracked down<sup>353</sup> for us the causes of the universe and taught them all in proper order. This too is a useful service that the basic principles provide him with.

### *The role of the paradigmatic cause*

5 Whenever the Demiurge looks to that which remains in the same state always and, using a paradigm of some such kind, produces the form and the power, everything completed in this way will necessarily be beautiful.

<sup>349</sup> The term here is ἀπειροδύναμος, i.e. having infinite potency. At *ET* §§84–5 he indicates that it can be used of both being, as here, or of becoming, as at 295.7 with respect to the cosmos.

<sup>350</sup> Proclus may be thinking here of *Phlb.* 23d1, ἐν τι συμμισγόμενον, literally ‘some mixed single entity’.

<sup>351</sup> Proclus probably refers here to 47cff. This part of the commentary is no longer extant.

<sup>352</sup> I.e. the instrumental cause.

<sup>353</sup> Same metaphor of hunting already used at 237.16, 242.20, on both occasions in relation to first principles.

**But whenever he looks to that which has come into being, using a generated paradigm, it will not be beautiful.**<sup>354</sup> (28a5–b2)

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*General explanation of the text: 264.10–265.9*

This statement too connects up with what has been said so far. After the efficient cause the investigation focuses on the paradigmatic cause, with the difference that the fundamental propositions which have already been stated achieve for us a discovery that there is a demiurgic cause of the cosmos, whereas in this case they contribute a discovery, not that there is a paradigm of the cosmos, but rather of what kind the paradigm is, namely whether it is everlasting or generated. For from the existence of an efficient cause follows that the Paradigm exists as well, whether it is pre-existent in the maker himself or external to him, and whether it is superior to the maker or inferior or of the same rank. After all, the formative principle<sup>355</sup> certainly does its making by referring to some form (*ti eidos*) which it wishes to impose on its product. This, therefore, clearly follows. But it is also necessary to discover the next [point at issue], whether the cosmic paradigm is eternal or whether it is generated. The fundamental propositions already laid out make a contribution towards this [task] for us. The entire argument (*logos*) would be consistent with itself as follows:

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If there is an object that has come into existence, there is a maker for it.<sup>356</sup>

If there is a maker of the universe, there is also a paradigm.

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And if that which comes into being is beautiful, it has come into being in relation to the always-existent Paradigm, but if it is not beautiful, then [this has taken place] in relation to the paradigm that has come into being.

The result is that we obtain a syllogism connected to the above as follows:<sup>357</sup>

<sup>354</sup> Divergences from Burnet's OCT text: (1) Proclus deletes οὖν in b6 ὅτου μὲν οὖν ἄν; (2) he adds the definite article τήν το δύναιμι in a8 and leaves out αὐτοῦ after it (I have also done this in my translation); (3) in b1 he reads γενητῶ (generated) rather than γεννητῶ (begotten).

<sup>355</sup> In a manner parallel to 263.11 (see the note ad loc.) Proclus uses τὸ ποιοῦν rather than ὁ ποιητής here.

<sup>356</sup> Note the assumption shared by Plato and Proclus that something that comes into existence has to have an efficient cause, i.e. cannot come into existence spontaneously.

<sup>357</sup> This is but a partial analysis of 28b7–29a6, because it does not include the conclusion that the Demiurge looked to the eternal Paradigm.

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The cosmos 'has come into being' (28b7).  
 All that has come into being has a demiurgic cause.  
 All that has a demiurgic cause also has a paradigmatic cause.  
 Therefore the cosmos has a demiurgic and a paradigmatic cause.

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And just as in the case of the first set of fundamental propositions (*axiômata*) there were two basic principles (*hupotheseis*), 'there is that which is always existent' and 'there is that which comes into being',<sup>358</sup> and in the case of the second set there are two others, 'all that which comes into being as a cause' and 'that which does not have a cause is not a generated object', so too in the case of these [first principles] there are two common notions, 'that which comes into being in relation to an intelligible [paradigm] is beautiful' and 'that which comes into being in relation to a generated [paradigm] is not beautiful'.

***Demonstration of the truth of these fundamental propositions:***

**265.9–266.21**

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Now, each of these too is absolutely true. For (1) the person who makes an object with regard<sup>359</sup> to the intelligible [paradigm] copies it either (a) with or (b) without resemblance. If he does so (a) with resemblance, then he will make the copied object beautiful, for it is in that realm<sup>360</sup> that the primarily beautiful is located. If he does so (b) without resemblance, he does not make it with regard to the intelligible. On the contrary he in fact fails to achieve resemblance. But (b) the person who makes an object with regard to a paradigm that has come into being, if he really looks to that [paradigm], he will clearly make a product that is not beautiful. For that paradigm itself is full of dissimilarity and is not what is primarily beautiful. The result is that that which comes into being with regard to it will be at a much greater remove from beauty [itself]. For example Phidias,<sup>361</sup> when he made the [image of] Zeus, did not look to that which had come into being, but he managed to reach the conception of Zeus as found in Homer. But if he had been able to extend his thought to

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<sup>358</sup> Proclus quotes the two phrases from 27d6 including the initial τί, because he treats them as propositions; cf. above 236.21–3.

<sup>359</sup> This is my preferred way to translate πρὸς when used to describe a craftsman working with a paradigm which he looks at, usually mentally rather than physically. Cf. Plato's use of ἐβλεπεν πρὸς (he looked towards) in relation to the Paradigm at 29a3.

<sup>360</sup> Literally 'there' (ἐκεῖ), i.e. the intelligible realm.

<sup>361</sup> This example of Phidias making the great statue of Zeus at Olympia is found in a large number of later ancient texts. Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* 5.8.1.38–41: 'For Phidias too did not make his Zeus from any paradigm perceived by the senses, but understood what Zeus would look like if he wanted to make himself visible' (translation Armstrong).

the intellectual god himself, he clearly would have been able to make his own work [even] more beautiful.

Beauty or non-beauty, therefore, comes to the image (*eikôn*) from the paradigm, whereas its resemblance or non-resemblance to the archetype comes from the maker. The [term] 'image' is used in relation to both: there is the image of the paradigm on the one hand, there is the 'product' (*ergon*) and 'finished work' (*apotelesma*) of the maker on the other. For this reason he too [Plato], when he speaks of a paradigm, connects the image to it: 'Concerning both the paradigm and its image, then, we must speak in this way (29b3–4).'<sup>362</sup> But when he mentions the Demiurge, he speaks of the 'product': 'those products of which I am maker and father, they are indissoluble as long as I wish it (41a7–8)'.<sup>363</sup>

Since there are three kinds of paradigm, (1) an everlasting<sup>364</sup> paradigm of an everlasting image, (2) an everlasting paradigm of a generated image and (3) a generated paradigm of a generated image, (1) whenever there is an everlasting paradigm of an everlasting image, the fully everlasting is the paradigm of the copy which is everlasting in a certain manner, as the Intellect is paradigm of the soul; and (2) whenever there is an everlasting paradigm of a generated image, the image too is everlasting in a certain manner in terms of unlimited time; but (3) whenever there is a generated paradigm of a generated image, then this image is entirely deprived of eternity, for it is not possible for that which is generated in essence to bring things that are eternal into existence. Those [products] (i.e. (1) and (2)), therefore, share in beauty and order from their paradigms because they are copies of a nature that is stable. These [products] (i.e. (3)), because they come into existence from paradigms that are changing and in movement, are not beautiful. They are not entirely ugly either, but are characterized only through their denial of the beautiful. Even the beauties that are the product of art are not beautiful when compared with that beauty which comes to sense-perceptible copies from the eternal paradigm.<sup>365</sup> And perhaps it is on this account that Timaeus does not state that what comes into existence with regard to the generated paradigm is totally ugly (*aischros*), but only that it is **not beautiful** (28b2). After all, that which comes into existence with regard to an artistic

<sup>362</sup> This is more a paraphrase than an exact quotation. Proclus reverses the order of εἰκόνας and παραδείγματος and replaces διοριστέον by λεκτέον. This text is cited and commented on at 339.3.

<sup>363</sup> This is a very truncated quotation, but all the words are in Plato. The full text in Burnet is: θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων, δι' ἐμοῦ γενόμενα ἄλυστα ἐμοῦ γε μὴ ἐθέλοντος.

<sup>364</sup> The term here is αἰδιος. See n. 156 above.

<sup>365</sup> Proclus adheres to the Platonic view here that artistic works are inferior to the sense-perceptible originals, because they are more distant from the primal ideas.

formula (*pros technikon logon*) has not come into existence with regard to an everlasting paradigm, unless there are paradigms in the mind of artists as well.<sup>366</sup> For this reason it is not absolutely beautiful, but also not just ugly, because it has come into existence wholly in the right manner (*kata logon*).<sup>367</sup> That, therefore, the fundamental propositions [as set out by Timaeus] are true<sup>368</sup> should be recorded by means of these [explanations that I have given].

### *Objections and replies: 266.21–268.22*

Some people are perplexed about the way that Plato has taken as agreed that there is a Demiurge of the universe who looks to a paradigm. For, they think, no Demiurge looking to what remains the same exists. In fact many of the ancients were proponents of this argument.<sup>369</sup> The Epicureans (fr. 383 Usener) deny that a Demiurge exists and state that there is no cause of the universe at all. The [philosophers] from the Stoa (*SVF* II. 307) say he exists, but that he is inseparable from matter. The Peripatetics state that a separated entity exists, but that it is a final rather than an efficient cause. For this reason they have both destroyed the paradigms and placed a non-multiple intellect (*nous aplêthuntos*) at the head of the universe.<sup>370</sup> Plato and the Pythagoreans, however, have celebrated the Demiurge of the universe as separate and transcendent and founder of all things and Providence of the whole. And this is indeed an eminently reasonable view.

(1) If the cosmos loves the Intellect, as Aristotle says,<sup>371</sup> and it comes into motion in relation to the Intellect, where does it obtain this desire from? It is necessary, since the cosmos is not that which is first, that it obtain this desire from a cause which moves it towards love. After all, he himself says that it is the object of desire that moves the desiring subject. If this is true and the cosmos is the desiring subject by the very fact that it exists and in accordance with that one's nature (i.e. the Intellect), it is clear that its entire existence comes from there, including also its being the desiring subject.

<sup>366</sup> As in the case of Phidias and the statue of Zeus mentioned above at 265.18.

<sup>367</sup> The play on words here is impossible to render.

<sup>368</sup> As Festugière notes, this picks up the claim of truth made at 265.9 above.

<sup>369</sup> A typical brief doxography, where every position comes closer to the truth as represented by the view of the Pythagorean/Platonic tradition. The order is systematic, not chronological.

<sup>370</sup> See further on this term below at 295.21. Proclus' main source for Aristotle's theology is of course *Metaphysics* Λ. Aristotle emphasizes the unicity of the Unmoved mover in the final words of the book, §10, 1076a4.

<sup>371</sup> Based on *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072b3.

(2) From where, moreover, does the cosmos, though itself limited, derive its unlimited motion? After all, as he [Aristotle] says, every body has a power that is limited.<sup>372</sup> From where, then, does the universe derive this unlimited power to exist, if it does not obtain it spontaneously in accordance with [the doctrine of] Epicurus? In general, if the Intellect is cause of the unlimited and unwearying and single motion, there exists an entity which is the efficient cause of that which is everlasting. If this is the case, what prevents the cosmos from being both everlasting and derived from the paternal cause? For just as it obtains from the object of desire an unlimited power of motion, through which it moves to infinity, so it will certainly obtain the unlimited power of existence from there in virtue of the argument which states that there can never be an unlimited power in a limited body. The alternative, then, is that the cosmos does not have a power at all through which it is held together.<sup>373</sup> But how could this be? After all, every divisible entity has something indivisible which holds it together, as he himself [Aristotle] says somewhere,<sup>374</sup> and the universe is a living thing (he at any rate says that the god is an ‘everlasting living thing’).<sup>375</sup> Now every living thing is held together by the life present in it. Either (a) it has a power that holds it together, but this power is limited. But that is impossible,<sup>376</sup> for it would fail [at some stage], if it was limited. Or (b) it has unlimited power. But then again it would obtain this not from itself. It is another entity, therefore, which will give it its power of existence, and it will not give it in its entirety at one time, for the cosmos is unable to receive it all at one time.<sup>377</sup> It will therefore give it as a continual gift – and one that continues always – to the extent that the cosmos can accept it. Thus quite suitably it comes into being always and does not exist [autonomously].

(3) But if an Intellect is craftsman (*dêmiourgos*) of the cosmos, does he reason when he makes what he makes, or [does it happen] through the very fact of his existence? It would be absurd if he was involved in deliberation, for he would be connected with change and the affections of the particular soul. And if he deliberated, he certainly first possessed within himself the product about which he was deliberating, as is the case with everyone who deliberates about something. But if [he makes the cosmos] through the very fact of his existence, he makes it similar to himself (cf. 29e3). If this is the case, he himself would have paradigms of

<sup>372</sup> See above 253.8ff. and n. 292.      <sup>373</sup> I.e. ensuring its preservation.

<sup>374</sup> Festugière thinks this may refer to *De An.* 1.5, 411b5, which discusses the relation between soul and body. Same attribution to Aristotle at II. 153.8, II. 197.26.

<sup>375</sup> *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072b29, but this is said of the Unmoved mover, not the cosmos.

<sup>376</sup> I.e. in the case of the cosmos as ‘everlasting living thing’.

<sup>377</sup> Proclus is aware that power from a higher metaphysical plane has to be tempered if it is to be accepted at a lower level. Cf. *ET* §150. See also 366.1.

those things that come into being. Whether these exist in him primarily or not, we shall investigate again [later], as well as the question from where this paradigmatic cause of the universe reaches him.<sup>378</sup>

(4) Furthermore, how do we observe craftsmen (*dēmiourgoi*) here in their creative task? Do they not have blueprints (*logoi*) of their completed products?<sup>379</sup> This is something that the splendid Aristotle too has conceded. But ‘if art imitates nature’,<sup>380</sup> then much prior [than this] nature too must have blueprints of what comes into being through its agency. If nature has these, we shall investigate where its motion and the completion of its works comes from. It is, after all, irrational.<sup>381</sup> And, ascending like this, we shall place the causes of everything in the Intellect.

### *Further observations on the passage: 268.23–271.17*

In relation to Aristotle, then, many refutations have been made by many people. It is time now to put the doctrines of Plato to the test. (1) Firstly, for what reason does he transfer beauty and non-beauty to the things that come into being from the Paradigm, and not from the efficient cause? He certainly could have said that there are two demiurgic causes, the one generated, the other intelligible, the latter creating beautiful things, the former things that are not beautiful. But he did not speak in this way, but stated that the intelligible paradigms were paradigms of beautiful things and the generated paradigms were paradigms of things that are not beautiful (28a8–b1).

(a) Let it be said in reply that the [present] account is educational.<sup>382</sup> It is meant to encourage us not to desist from fine actions.<sup>383</sup> If he had said that that which is generated does not produce beauty, perhaps he might have made us lazier [in our striving] towards fine actions.

(b) But a response that is superior and more in line with natural philosophy would be to say that the same efficient cause is able to look to two kinds of paradigm and in the one case make a beautiful product, in the other a non-beautiful one. Soul, when it looks towards Intellect, gives

<sup>378</sup> The two cross-references are not exact, but see below 323.22–324.14 and 431.14–432.18 on the relation between the Paradigm and the Demiurge.

<sup>379</sup> This is very much the Middle Platonist conception of creation. See, for example, the well-known image of the king, architect and builder at Philo, *De opificio mundi* 17–18.

<sup>380</sup> The famous phrase at *Phys.* 2.2, 194a21

<sup>381</sup> In contrast to the Aristotelian conception, nature occupies a low level in the Neoplatonist hierarchy below the level of Soul. See *ET* §21 and Dodd’s comments ad loc. and now Martijn (2008).

<sup>382</sup> Proclus realizes that ultimately the *Timaeus* has an ethical purpose, as has also recently been argued by Steel (2001).

<sup>383</sup> The term καλός (beautiful, fine) notoriously covers both aesthetic and moral subjects.

birth to truth and knowledge,<sup>384</sup> but when it looks to becoming, it gives birth to imaginings and desires full of passion. It is impossible for the same paradigmatic cause to be cause of both beautiful and non-beautiful products. Quite reasonably, therefore, he determines that beauty and ugliness reach the things that come into being from this source (i.e. the paradigmatic cause). Now, since the cosmos is beautiful, its Paradigm plainly is intelligible and always unchanging and remaining the same. It is this Paradigm on which the Demiurge fixes his gaze and orders the universe. If, then, it is the supplier of beauty, it holds the highest rank among the beings that always exist and exists as one of the first intelligibles, for it is from there that beauty proceeds. It is there, then, that the beauty-producing cause is located, through which all things become beautiful – Intellect and soul and the nature of body.

(c) Again, the Demiurge is cause of form, the Paradigm the cause of beauty, the Good the cause of unity. And the last-mentioned is the provider of all things all together, the Intelligible is the provider of both beauty and form, while the demiurgic cause, because it is intellective, is the provider of the form (*eidōs*) and essential nature (*ousia*).

(d) Furthermore, the demiurgic cause, in looking toward the intelligible, is multiform.<sup>385</sup> For (i) the Demiurge in his entirety creates in one way while looking towards that [intelligible Paradigm] – he has in fact also been united with it through his lofty pre-eminence – but (ii) in another way the demiurgic triad<sup>386</sup> is at work, its first member in the manner of unity, its second in the manner of begetting, its final member in the manner of reversion, while [creation occurs] (iii) in another way among the leading gods, (iv) in another way among the gods who are detached,<sup>387</sup> and (v) in yet another way among the encosmic gods.<sup>388</sup> In addition this one must regard the work of creation as proceeding

<sup>384</sup> Proclus is thinking of Diotima's account in the *Symposium*; cf. 212a.

<sup>385</sup> A fine example of how Proclus regards the creative process as taking place at a large number of different levels and involving a large number of creative agents. Plato provides the starting-point for this by distinguishing between the Demiurge and the young gods as secondary creators (41d–e). The Neoplatonist greatly expands and systematizes the original insight. For a detailed analysis of Proclus' secondary creators see Opsomer (2003).

<sup>386</sup> On this theological conception see above 210.4 and below 310.15. It hypostatizes the creative process associated with the three stages of permanence, procession and reversion.

<sup>387</sup> See above on 220.26.

<sup>388</sup> This is another way of formulating the distinction between the hypercosmic, hypercosmic-encosmic and encosmic gods; see the table in Opsomer (2000) 132–3. The 'leading gods' derive their name from the depiction in the *Phaedrus* myth, 246e–247a.

270 (vi) in another way towards the many demiurgic gods, who from these [encosmic gods] receive and distribute the paternal powers, and (vii) in another way in the case of the demiurgic angels, and (viii) in another way in the case of the demons who are the helpers of this rank, and (ix) in yet another way in the case of the undefiled forms of life which contribute  
5 to the demiurgic series, and (x) in the case of the genera of particular souls who follow in the demiurgic choir. This is as far as the particularity and the manner of creativity and the looking towards the intelligible descends, occurring differently in each category.

(2) Another feature of Plato's text that demands our admiration<sup>389</sup> is how he has *not* stated that that which has come into being in relation to the eternal paradigm is beautiful, but rather that that which has come into being by the Demiurge contemplating that paradigm is 'most beautiful' (29a5), the reason being that what is disharmonious and disordered (cf. 30a4–5) is also generated – after all, it is visible and perceptible (cf. 28b7–8, 30a3), and everything of this kind is generated and has come into being,  
10 as he will say further on (28b7–c2) – and has received some traces (53b2) of forms from the intelligible before the act of creation, but it is not most beautiful, even if it too is beautiful in a sense when compared with the formlessness of matter. Thus it is not simply what has come into being in relation to the everlasting Paradigm that is beautiful, as is the case for that disordered and disharmonious stuff, but rather what has come into being by the [activity of the] Demiurge who looked towards that Paradigm. In the case of that [disharmonious stuff] the Demiurge 'was absent' (53b3), but it too was illuminated by the intelligible [Paradigm] prior to the Demiurge [coming on the scene]. What came into being by the [activity of the] Demiurge, came into being from that [intelligible] realm as well as through the intermediation of the Demiurge's activity. Inasmuch as it has originated from the intelligible realm it has gained *form*, whereas inasmuch as it has originated from the Demiurge it has  
20 received *order*.<sup>390</sup> For it is the Demiurge who is the cause of order (*taxis*), but in the case of form (*eidos*), it is simply caused by the paradigm for those who participate in it.

<sup>389</sup> Proclus makes a somewhat surprising jump here from the basic principle where he speaks of a 'beautiful' product (28a7) to its application at 29a5, where the cosmos is described as 'most beautiful'. It allows him to make a point about the different roles of the Demiurge as efficient cause and the Paradigm as paradigmatic cause. In order to explain the beauty of the cosmos, the intervention of the Demiurge as transcendent efficient cause is required. In the case of the pre-cosmic genesis (cf. 30a3–5, 52d3) there is only the quasi-automatic imaging of form, which leads to no more than a limited kind of beauty.

<sup>390</sup> The pre-cosmic genesis has elements of form, otherwise it would not be visible (30a3), but it is disordered (30a5).

(3) A further point is that it is on the basis of the Paradigm itself that the difference between the demiurgic creators<sup>391</sup> must be grasped. Some look to the entire noetic realm and create in accordance with its entirety, and of these some do this universally, others partially. Some contemplate it [the Paradigm] through unity, others through intuitive knowledge. Others again do not create in accordance with the whole intelligible realm, but of these some are divided up in accordance with the four primary causes, others have advanced to a greater number (of functions), yet others make the ultimate forms paradigms of their own generation and for this reason one is a shepherd of men, another a shepherd of horses, as he says in the *Politicus* (267d10), and similarly in the case of other forms. Since, then, the demiurgic series is multiform and there are different paradigms for different objects, whether more universal or more particular, Timaeus quite suitably does not say that he uses *this* (*toutôî*) noetic paradigm to make that which comes into being beautiful, but rather that he uses one **of such a kind** (*toioutôî*, 28a7). For he who uses [as paradigm] the human being-in-itself uses [an intelligible paradigm] ‘of such a kind’.<sup>392</sup> The part in that realm is indeed in a sense the whole through the unity of the intelligibles, and the multiplicity (*plêthos*) is as similar as can be to the monad through the predominance of sameness (*tautotês*). The reason is that the universal Demiurge does look to the intelligible and All-complete Living Thing (cf. 31b1), but since he possesses the intelligible intellectually, he uses the paradigm within himself, which indeed is also of such a kind as the intelligible on account of its similarity to that Paradigm and at the same time is more particular than that one is. This is the reason that he added to the words ‘of such a kind’ the word **some** (*timi*). For all the intelligibles participate in that paradigm and are more particular than the All-complete Living Thing.

### *Explanation of points of detail: 271.18–272.6*

But what is **the form** (28a8) and what is **the power** (28a8)?<sup>393</sup> Possibly he called the essence (*ousia*) ‘form’, establishing a resemblance between the Paradigm and that which came into being. The act of creation gives both the essences and the powers to that which has been begotten.<sup>394</sup>

<sup>391</sup> As explained above at 269.22–270.8.

<sup>392</sup> The idea of the human being (here indicated by the term τὸ αὐτοάνθρωπον) is part of the Paradigm, which contains other living things within itself (cf. 31c6).

<sup>393</sup> One must recall the differences in the text that Proclus quotes at 264.6; see the remarks in n. 354. The Greek term for ‘form’ is ἰδέα, which could also be translated ‘idea’. Proclus does very little with it.

<sup>394</sup> As Festugière suggests in his translation, Proclus may have in mind here the distinction between essence and non-essential qualities.

Why, on the other hand, in the case of the always-existent does he say **using a paradigm of such a kind** (28a7),<sup>395</sup> but in the case of that which came into being he did not add the [term] ‘of such a kind’, but instead of this concluded with the [term] **generated** (cf. 28b1)?<sup>396</sup> A possible answer is that the intelligible realm had something else similar to itself, since it is at the very peak of being, whereas that which is generated, since it is last, had nothing else that was similar. After all, that which comes into being in relation to it (i.e. the generated paradigm) is generated, and to this paradigm dissimilarity is native, whereas to that Paradigm similarity, sameness and all such traits belong. Let these comments suffice on this too.

The [word] **always** (28a8) we should connect to the [phrase] **remains in the same state**, so that [the entire phrase] is **looks to that which always remains in the same state**. This was also the way that the philosopher Porphyry interpreted the text,<sup>397</sup> and he did so plausibly. He [Plato] in fact does not say that the Demiurge always looks at all things, as Atticus thinks,<sup>398</sup> but that he looks at the intelligible realm which always remains in the same manner.<sup>399</sup> Unless, perhaps, Atticus understood the text to say ‘he always looked’, in case he [the Demiurge], by sometimes looking at the Paradigm and sometimes not, might give non-beauty the chance to sneak into the creative process. As long, therefore, as he is creator, let him look to the everlasting, so that he will produce what resembles it and is beautiful.

### *Naming the cosmos as object of inquiry*

Now the entire heaven or cosmos or whatever name it should best receive, let this be its name for us.<sup>400</sup> (28b2–3)

### *Explanation of the text: 272.10–274.32*

This is the last of the fundamental propositions.<sup>401</sup> In accordance with the [method of the] geometers, a name is posited for the object in question, as they say when discussing the gnomon in parallelograms: ‘let one [area] of whatever shape together with the two complements be

<sup>395</sup> Proclus leaves out the word *τινί* here.

<sup>396</sup> Proclus uses the same variant as in the text cited at 264.8; see n. 354.

<sup>397</sup> Fr. 32 Sodano. <sup>398</sup> Fr. 18 Des Places.

<sup>399</sup> The term *ὡσαύτως* is not used in the text under discussion but does occur at 29a1.

<sup>400</sup> Divergences from Burnet’s OCT text: (1) Proclus leaves out *καὶ ἄλλο* (but cf. 273.1);

(2) Proclus has *μόλιστα* rather than Plato’s *μόλιστ’ ἄν*.

<sup>401</sup> As set out above at 235.32–236.27.

called a gnomon'.<sup>402</sup> Since he [Plato] is about to call the same object both heaven and cosmos, in order to ensure that you do not think he is confusing his teaching by using different terms in different contexts, he first makes a clarificatory remark about the names involved. In fact one should be aware that there is a great deal of ambiguity in the use of these terms by the ancients. The one group called only the region below the moon 'cosmos' and the region beyond it 'heaven', while another group affirmed that heaven was part of the cosmos, and the one group defined it [heaven] as extending to the moon only, but the other also called 'heaven' the highest regions of becoming.<sup>403</sup>

Zeus obtained broad heaven with the sky (*en aitheri*) and the clouds.

For this reason before the entire investigation begins Plato quite suitably makes clarificatory remarks about these terms, naming the universe 'heaven' and 'cosmos', and stating that **the entire heaven** – to ensure that you do not think that he is only calling the divine body this<sup>404</sup> – **let it be called 'cosmos' by us or any other name** that it is pleased **to be called**.<sup>405</sup> It seems that he calls it 'heaven' as [the name that is] the opinion of all people, but 'cosmos' for himself, for he says 'let the heaven be called cosmos by us'.<sup>406</sup> The name 'cosmos' is in fact suitable for it as a work of craftsmanship, even if it is possible also to call it by both [names], 'heaven' (*ouranos*) inasmuch as it sees the things above (*borônta ta anô*),<sup>407</sup> contemplates the intelligible realm and participates in the intellectual essence, 'cosmos' (*kosmos*) inasmuch as it is always filled and decorated (*kosmoumenos*) [starting] from the beings that really exist; also 'heaven' as having reverted [to its source], 'cosmos' as proceeding

<sup>402</sup> This is hardly comprehensible as it stands because Proclus cites only half of the definition as given by Euclid in *Elem.* 2 def. 2. He is only interested in the method of giving a preliminary definition, not the example itself. The full definition reads: 'In the case of every parallelogram area, a gnomon is described as whatever single area is formed by one of the parallelograms along the point of its diagonal together with the two complements.' Thus numerically in the case of a square 5 by 5, the gnomons would be 1 by 1, 2 by 2, etc.

<sup>403</sup> Homer, *Il.* 14.192. The second distinction is a dig at Aristotle who, by claiming that heaven is ungenerated, confines heaven as understood by Platonists, i.e. as belonging to the realm of becoming, to the sublunary realm. The citation of the authoritative Homer shows the error of this viewpoint.

<sup>404</sup> I.e. the ether, as in the Homeric quotation. Once again we have a dig at Aristotle, who calls his quintessence 'divine body' at *Cael.* 2.3, 286a.11.

<sup>405</sup> Proclus slightly juggles the phrasing of the lemma under discussion and now includes the words καὶ ἄλλο, left out when the lemma is first cited.

<sup>406</sup> This can only be extracted from Plato's text through a tendentious paraphrase.

<sup>407</sup> This word-play goes back to Plato, *Crat.* 396c and differs from the one given at *Rep.* 509d (*ouranos-horatos*); same etymology at *PT* IV. 66.6–8 (where the text is cited), in *Crat.* 110, 60.23.

10 [from that source], for it is from there that it is begotten and it reverts  
back to Being. But just as, in the case of sacred statues (*agalmata*) estab-  
lished by the art of the mysteries, some of them are visible, while others  
are hidden away inside as symbols of the presence of the gods and are  
known to the initiates only, in the same manner the cosmos, as sacred  
15 image (*agalma*)<sup>408</sup> of the intelligible and consecrated by the Father, has  
the overt tokens (*gnôrismata*) of its own divinity, but also invisible sig-  
natures (*sunthêmata*) of its participation in Being which it received from  
the Father who consecrated it, so that through his agency it would be  
eternally rooted in Being.

20 The terms ‘heaven’ and ‘cosmos’, then, signify the visible powers in  
it, the one indicating its procession from the higher realm, the other its  
return. But there is also need for a divine name to indicate its permanent  
power, symbol (*sumbolon*) of the signature obtained from the Demiurge,  
inasmuch as it does not wander away from Being, a name that is ineffable,  
25 unpronounceable and known [only] to the gods themselves. For there are  
names that are appropriate for every rank of the realities, divine names for  
the divinities, discursive names for discursive realities, opinable names  
for realities that are the object of opinion.<sup>409</sup> This he himself [Plato]  
says in the *Cratylus* (391e–392a), when he commends Homer for giving  
30 different names for the same objects in the case of the gods and in the  
274 opinions of humankind:<sup>410</sup>

[The river] which the gods call Xanthus, but men call it Scamander,

and

5 [The bird] which the gods call *chalkis*, but men call it *kumindis*,

and similarly for other cases. For just as the knowledge possessed by the  
gods and the particular souls differs, so do the names, those given by the  
gods revealing the entire essence of what is named, whereas the names

<sup>408</sup> Proclus is alluding to 37e7, where Plato describes the cosmos as τῶν ἀδιδίων θεῶν ἄγαλμα, which is generally translated as ‘shrine for the everlasting gods’. Proclus, however, takes the gods to refer to the intelligible beings as causes, so ἄγαλμα can mean sacred statue or image, as required for the comparison with the mysteries to work.

<sup>409</sup> On Neoplatonic theories concerning names given to gods and by gods see the collection of texts at Sorabji (2004) III. 220–6. The division here roughly follows that of the Divided line.

<sup>410</sup> *Il.* 20.74, 14.291. The examples are taken from the *Cratylus* passage, where Plato indicates that they concern a river and a bird respectively. Proclus also refers to these texts at in *Crat.* 71, 34.13ff.

given by humans only touch on them in a partial manner. Knowing, therefore, that in the case of the cosmos this name pre-existed [before it came into being] and that there is a divine name differing from its apparent name, he left this name unspoken, but at the same time introduced it with the utmost caution as a symbolic name of the divine signature in it. For the words **whatever name** and **should receive** are a concealed hymn to the cosmic name as unpronounceable<sup>411</sup> and the recipient of the divine essence, so that it would be coupled with the signifying name that he [Plato] gives it. This is the reason that the divine names for the cosmos have been handed down to the Theurgists as well,<sup>412</sup> both the so-called ineffable names and the names spoken among themselves, the former expressing the invisible powers contained within it, the latter giving expression to the visible elements from which it has been completed. 10 15 20

By means, then, of these principles which serve as hypotheses we are taught the kind (*eidos*) to which the cosmos belongs,<sup>413</sup> its demiurgic cause, the Paradigm and both its apparent and its non-apparent name, of which the former is dyadic, the latter monadic, for the words **whatever name** are indicative of unity (*henotês*). And so you would have the ineffable name as indicating the permanence of the universe in the Father, the name 'cosmos' indicating its procession and the name 'heaven' indicating its return.<sup>414</sup> And through these three names you would obtain the final cause, which makes the cosmos full of the Good, abiding ineffably, proceeding with perfection, and returning to the Good as object of desire.<sup>415</sup> 25 30

But [now] it is at last appropriate to tackle the actual investigation of the realities,<sup>416</sup> bringing to completion what follows on from the principles. 275

<sup>411</sup> I translate ἀφθέγκτου as conjectured by Kroll and Diehl; Festugière retains with Praechter the reading ἀφθεγκτον of the MSS, but the text at 273.24 militates against this.

<sup>412</sup> Proclus means the two Julians, father and son, writers of the *Chaldean Oracles*, who lived in the late second century CE; cf. his more explicit remarks at *in Crat.* 72.8ff. (cited by Festugière). On these obscure figures, whose importance for Neoplatonism cannot be overestimated, see Majercik (1989) 1–5, and the remarks in the Introduction, p. 13.

<sup>413</sup> Once again Proclus anticipates the application of the fundamental propositions to the cosmos as object of inquiry.

<sup>414</sup> As explained above at 273.8.

<sup>415</sup> Through his exegesis Proclus manages to locate the familiar Neoplatonic triad of permanence, procession and reversion in the text of the *Timaeus*.

<sup>416</sup> I.e. the cosmos and its contents.

*IV Three demonstrations based on the first principles:*

275.1–339.2

*Organizing the rest of the treatise*

We should, therefore, first examine concerning it what it is laid down that we must examine concerning every [thing] at the outset.<sup>417</sup> (28b4–5)

*General explanation of the text: 275.3–20*

5 After the prayer and the exhortation to the listeners and the presentation of the hypotheses, there is nothing else remaining than, following on the basic principles (*bupotheseis*) themselves, to organize the entire treatise.<sup>418</sup> It leads off with that well-known heading (*kephalaion*) ‘whether the cosmos has come into being or whether it is ungenerated, having no starting-point of generation’ (cf. 28b6–7).<sup>419</sup> Indeed in the account preceding the  
10 basic principles he said ‘that we who are about to speak about the universe whether it has come into being or even if it is ungenerated’ (see 27c4–5),<sup>420</sup> must ‘invoke gods and goddesses’ (see 27d6),<sup>421</sup> because he is about to start the investigation from this point. Moreover among the basic principles these were the first to be assumed: ‘what is that which always is and has no becoming, and what is that which is becoming but never is being?’ (27d6–28a1).<sup>422</sup> This, then, **we must first examine**, just as it is  
15 **laid down** first among the principles (*archai*).<sup>423</sup>

We must also, as Socrates has stated in the *Phaedrus* (237b7),<sup>424</sup> ‘concerning every subject’ at the outset investigate the [question of] what it is. This is the specific kind (*eidos*) of the subject under investigation. The

<sup>417</sup> Divergences from Burnet’s OCT text: Plato δ’ οὖν, Proclus δὴ οὖν. The same text was cited earlier at 236.6 (where Proclus reads only δὴ). I translate somewhat inelegantly with [thing] because of the discussion below at 275.22.

<sup>418</sup> Proclus gives a summary of the contents of the *proemium* so far: (1) prayer = 27c1–d1; (2) exhortation to listeners = 27d1–4; (3) fundamental propositions = 27d5–28b4.

<sup>419</sup> More a paraphrase than a quotation of Plato’s text. Note that it reverses the order of the two phrases in 28b6–7.

<sup>420</sup> Another paraphrase rather than exact quotation; cf. the full text cited in 217.5–6.

<sup>421</sup> Yet another paraphrase, παρακαλεῖν replacing ἐπικαλουμένους in Plato’s text.

<sup>422</sup> Exact quotation this time.

<sup>423</sup> We here correlate our translation with the translation of the lemma (at this point Proclus’ understanding of ὑπόκειται is made clear).

<sup>424</sup> Proclus acutely observes the similarities between the passage here and the opening words of Socrates’ speech on the nature of love at *Phdr.* 237b7–d3. The words περί παντός are common to both texts (237b7, 28b5); τί ἐστίν in 275.17 picks up οὐσίαν at 237c3 and οἶόν τ’ ἐστίν at 237c8. Dillon in his notes on Iamblichus fr. 31 (see below) suspects that this parallel was firmly established in the commentary tradition.

[terms] ‘generated’ and ‘ungenerated’<sup>425</sup> delimit the specific kind of the cosmos. So it is quite reasonable that this should first be required of the appropriate investigation, which indeed he will immediately carry out after this.

20

### *Explanation of a point of detail: 275.21–276.7*

Among the Platonists many [interpreters] have understood the phrase **concerning every thing** as meaning ‘on every subject’ in accordance with what is said in the *Phaedrus*.<sup>426</sup> But Porphyry (fr. 33) and Iamblichus (fr. 31) take it to refer to the actual universe (*to pan*), namely that it is necessary to speak first ‘concerning the universe’, asking of which kind of nature it is, whether it is found to be ungenerated or generated. We should recognize that the former interpretation is the more natural, for to convert ‘concerning every thing’ into ‘concerning the universe’ is a somewhat inarticulate move.<sup>427</sup> That one should examine these matters absolutely **concerning every thing** we have already understood on the basis of the common conceptions and the primary principles (*hypotheses*). Moreover the fact that he continues with the words ‘whether it has always existed, having no commencement of its generation, or has come into being’ (28b6) shows that the [expression] **concerning every thing** is meant more generally. After all, he [Plato] has presented the [masculine] words ‘having’ (28b6) and ‘visible and tangible’ (28b7) in relation to the cosmos and not to the [word] universe [which is neuter]. This, then, is quite clear.

25

30

276

But since it is first necessary to find out concerning the specific kind (*eidōs*) of the cosmos whether it is to be ranked among the eternal realities or those that are generated, let us see how the philosopher continues his account and travel together with him on his demonstrations.

5

### *In which order of reality should the cosmos be placed?*

**Whether it always existed, having no starting-point of generation, or has come into being, having begun from some starting-point.**<sup>428</sup> (28b6–7)

10

<sup>425</sup> Summing up the alternatives in 28b6–7 based on the first two basic principles at 27d6–28a1.

<sup>426</sup> I.e. παντός in Plato’s text is paraphrased as παντός πράγματος.

<sup>427</sup> I.e. one would not expect the article to be dropped if ‘the universe’ were meant. The participle ὑποψέλλων used by Proclus is virtually a hapax (only the derivative ὑποψέλλως is also found in a Scholiast on Aristophanes according to the *TLG*). It is based on ὑποψέλλω, ‘to lisp’.

<sup>428</sup> No divergences from Burnet’s OCT text. I have translated ἀρχή with ‘starting-point’ because of considerations explained below in n. 461.

*Preliminary analysis of the text: 276.10–30*

He [Plato] has used all the procedures of dialectic in [dealing with] the basic principles.<sup>429</sup> He distinguished Being from that which has come into being and presented the nature of each of them by means of a definition. He also used the analytic method, proceeding from the things that have come into being to their causes, both efficient and exemplary.  
 15 Furthermore with regard to both ineffable and spoken names he revealed his thought as truly in accordance with the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, which states that ‘number is the wisest thing of all, but second to that is the one who places names on things’.<sup>430</sup> So [now] he turns to the demonstrations (*apodeixeis*) required for the problems raised by the cosmos,<sup>431</sup>  
 20 and first, in examining its specific kind (*eidos*), he seeks to discover in which portion (*moira*) it should be placed, the one that always exists or the one that is generated. And this is the reason why he asks whether it has some starting-point of generation or not. He does not ask whether it belongs to those beings which always exist or those that are generated,<sup>432</sup> for it would have been possible for him to say that it was in between those  
 25 beings that are generated and those that always exist, as is the case for soul, but rather he asks whether ‘it always existed, having no starting-point of generation, or it has come into being’ somehow or other, so that he also includes that which is intermediate between the two, which both has a starting-point of generation and is always existent.<sup>433</sup> Then, after having shown that it is generated in virtue of its bodily nature only, he will give it its ungenerated status in virtue of another [trait], that is  
 30 inasmuch as it is also a god, as will become clear as the account advances (34b1, 8).

<sup>429</sup> On this text see Baltes (1976–8) II. 7–8, and especially Phillips (1997) 175–80.

<sup>430</sup> Cf. Iamblichus, *De vita Pythagorica* 82: ‘What is the wisest thing? Number. But second is that which places names on things.’ Festugière, referring to this text, argues that the reading of the MSS **M P**, τὸ τᾶ, is the right one, because it is supported by the Iamblichan text. In a note to their translation of that work, however, Dillon and Hershbelt claim that the usual form of the quotation is with the masculine, i.e. τὸν τᾶ, as found in MS **C** and retained by Diehl. I have followed Diehl.

<sup>431</sup> On the demonstrations based on first principles set out earlier see the Introduction, pp. 18–20.

<sup>432</sup> Proclus thinks Plato would have been ill advised to make an exclusive disjunction, because it is possible that an entity can belong to both, as is the case for soul.

<sup>433</sup> Soul is intermediate between the Intelligible world and the world of physical reality. In terms of the *Timaeus* this means that the Demiurge creates soul (35aff.), but not temporally. Moreover it is in the cosmos (or rather the cosmos is in it), but it also transcends the cosmos.

*What kind of generation is involved? 276.30–277.32*

Such, then, is the question [that is now under discussion].<sup>434</sup> (1) Plutarch and Atticus and many others among the Platonists<sup>435</sup> have understood generation (*genesis*) in temporal terms (*kata chronon*) and say that the question becomes whether the cosmos is ungenerated or generated in temporal terms.<sup>436</sup> Before the creation of the cosmos, they argue, there was disordered movement. But together with movement time is certainly also present as well, so that time too must have existed before the universe [came into being]. Together with the universe time has come into being as number of the movement of the universe,<sup>437</sup> just as that [other time] was number of the disordered movement that existed before the cosmos was created. (2) Crantor and his circle of exegetes of Plato, however, say that the cosmos is said to be generated because it is brought into existence from another cause and is not self-generated and self-subsistent. (3) But Plotinus<sup>438</sup> and the philosophers after him, Porphyry and Iamblichus,<sup>439</sup> say that it is being composite which in this context has been called generated and that the fact that it has been generated from another cause is coexistent with this.<sup>440</sup>

As for our opinion, we say that these [last-mentioned] views are the truest of all: the cosmos is generated both as a composite entity and as requiring other causes for its existence. For this [characteristic] applies to every existent with extension, and the sense-perceptible realm has obtained a nature of that kind. We demand that they (i.e. the supporters of the first view) also look at the other generated existents, I mean time and

<sup>434</sup> On this text see Dörrie–Baltes, PA §5.2, Baltes (1976–8) II. 8–11. On the broader question of what is meant by the ‘generation’ of the cosmos see the Introduction, pp. 20–2.

<sup>435</sup> There is no collection of Plutarch’s fragments that contains this general kind of reference. For Atticus see fr. 19 Des Places. In Book 2 Proclus usually mentions Plutarch and Atticus together; cf. 326.1, 381.26, 384.24; also II. 153.29, III. 212.9 (with Severus).

<sup>436</sup> Plutarch’s interpretation of the creation in the *Timaeus* is fully set out in his extant treatise *On the Creation of the Soul in the Timaeus*. His views were controversial, as he himself realized, and did not persuade most of his successors. See further Dillon (1996) 206–8.

<sup>437</sup> The formulation combines Aristotelian (*Phys.* 4.11, 219b2) and Stoic (cf. *SVF* II. 509–11) definitions, but the more specific origins are Middle Platonist.

<sup>438</sup> This seems to be a general reference, without a specific text in mind.

<sup>439</sup> Fr. 32 Dillon. Sodano does not include this passage in his collection of Porphyry’s fragments.

<sup>440</sup> As Phillips (1997) 180 points out, ‘coexistent’ (συνυπάρχειν) can mean either ‘connected’, i.e. that the two interpretations of ‘generated’ imply each other, or it can mean ‘present as a subordinate (reason)’, i.e. the second interpretation is additional to the first.

20 the soul, and examine what is the common element that extends to these terms too. They should declare (1) the always-existent to be that which exists eternally and has a stable essence together with power and actuality, and (2) that which is generated in absolute terms (*haplôs*) to be that which receives all these attributes (essence, power, actuality) in temporal terms, while (3) that which is generated in a sense (*pêi*) is that which possesses its activity in movement and [temporal] extension.<sup>441</sup> It was stated earlier<sup>442</sup> that Plato defined the two extremes as that which always exists absolutely and that which is generated absolutely, and that he included the intermediates within these. Thus that which does not have its entire essence or its actuality together in a unified stable state is named 'generated', for an existent of this nature certainly subsists only through  
 25 [the process of] becoming and the existence that belongs to it is always coming into being, but not [real] being. Of such a kind are (a) this sense-perceptible cosmos, (b) the time which belongs to things in movement, and (c) the discursive intuitive knowledge (*noêsis*) the souls possess.<sup>443</sup>  
 30

*What kind of eternity is involved? 277.32–279.29*

278 But it is clear that every movement exists partially and not as a whole all together.<sup>444</sup> If the essence of the cosmos involves becoming and its everlasting nature proceeds according to the infinity of time, one should take note of this and on this basis conclude firstly that in between the eternally everlasting beings and those generated in a moment of time  
 5 there must be a substance which is generated according to infinite time, and this substance must be twofold,<sup>445</sup> either (a) having the whole as everlasting for the whole of time and its parts among the parts of time, as in the case of the elements down here, or (b) having both the whole and its parts coextensive with the everlasting nature of time in its entirety, as in the case of the heavenly realm. After all, infinity for the whole of  
 10 time and infinity for eternity are not the same, since eternity and time are themselves not the same.<sup>446</sup>

Secondly one should conclude that what is measured by eternity and exists in eternity must be without parts, for how will the divisible be established in the indivisible and have its essence unchangeably fixed?

<sup>441</sup> The difference between the last two categories refers to that between the soul and the cosmos as stated in 276.24.

<sup>442</sup> 235.28ff.

<sup>443</sup> These three examples cover categories (2) and (3) as stated above, i.e. the cosmos is 'absolutely generated', while time and soul are 'generated in a sense'.

<sup>444</sup> On this text see Baltes (1976–8) II. 12–18.

<sup>445</sup> This refers to the cosmos with its sublunary and its supralunary realm.

<sup>446</sup> See above n. 225.

Thirdly one should conclude that, since the soul exercises its activity temporally (*kata chronon*), the body certainly exists temporally. After all, the activity of the soul stands closer to the eternal realm than the body's essential nature. 15

What, then, will be a proof for us that the essential nature of the heavenly beings is everlasting in the way we propose, namely in a temporal sense? My answer is that if it were separated from the one who gives it order, this nature would no longer exist. This [consideration] makes plain that it has been allotted 'reconditioned' everlastingness<sup>447</sup> and its perpetual becoming is derived from another source. For if it had somehow taken hold of its own essential nature entirely, it would be autonomous (*autarkês*) with respect to its being and would be separated from the maker who gave it its essential nature.<sup>448</sup> 20

His [Plato's] goal, then, is to show that the cosmos is generated in an absolute way, inasmuch as its essential nature and its power and actuality and its very everlastingness are coextensive with the whole of time. At the outset he poses the question whether it is always existent or generated, which is equivalent to: does it belong to the eternal beings, or does it belong to those beings which fall under the sway of time? The [words] **always existed** indicate for Plato the noetic realm, as we have said earlier [in our interpretation of the words]: 'what is that which always exists, having no generation?' (27d6).<sup>449</sup> 25 30

We should not be disturbed by the fact that he later on (37e6) says that [the verb] **existed** (*ên*) is not appropriate for eternal beings, but rather [the verb] 'is' (*estin*). Before the articulation of his argument he follows customary usage. This is the reason why, when he praises the Demiurge, he says that 'he was good' (29e1),<sup>450</sup> even though the Demiurge belongs to the eternal beings, and in the case of the Paradigm he has joined together both [kinds of differently tensed verbs] at the same time when he says 'it was the case that the nature of the Living Thing is eternal' (37d3), taking (the verb) 'was the case' (*etunchane*) together with (the phrase) 'is eternal' (*ousa aiônios*).<sup>451</sup> 279 5

The chief reason he takes this position is because in the case of every limited body its power is not unlimited, as Aristotle has demonstrated.<sup>452</sup>

<sup>447</sup> On this unusual phrase, see n. 324 at 260.15. But there Proclus speaks of 'immortality' rather than 'everlastingness' (ἀιδιότης).

<sup>448</sup> Which of course is not the case.

<sup>449</sup> It is not clear to which earlier passage Proclus refers. Festugière cites 230.4ff. He may be right, but the discussion there is quite different to what is said here.

<sup>450</sup> 'Existed' and 'was' are both the verb ἦν.

<sup>451</sup> This phrase combines an imperfect verb with a present participle when speaking about the eternity of the Paradigm.

<sup>452</sup> See above 253.10, 267.13.

10 Eternity (*aiôn*) is unlimited power. In consequence every limited body cannot admit eternity. The necessary conclusion is that it does not always exist but is always [in a state of] becoming, always receiving that stream [of being] that it is capable of receiving.<sup>453</sup>

‘The existent’ (*to on*) and ‘always-existent’ (*aei on*), as I have said,<sup>454</sup> indicate the eternal. ‘Having come into being’ (*gegonenai*) indicates the receipt of the form of existence (*bupostasis*) that is measured by time, as is the case for the sense-perceptible realm, which indeed is ‘grasped by opinion together with sense-perception’ (28a2). It has been said [earlier on]<sup>455</sup> that the intelligible realm is self-subsistent and eternal, whereas the sense-perceptible is brought into existence by another and coexists with time. Numerical unity in fact differs for the eternal and for the temporal. In the former case numerical unity exists; in the latter case it comes into being. In the one case it is coupled with eternity, in the other with time. The realm of generation, even if it is said to be everlasting, has a form of subsistence that is coextensive with the whole of time, always coming into being and always being ordered by the cause that brings it into existence.

15 If, therefore, ‘the always-existent’ indicates the eternal and ‘that which has a starting-point of generation’ indicates that which is brought into existence in accordance with another cause – for that which is always coming into being is of such a kind – and Plato is investigating whether the cosmos is an entity that always exists or one that has a starting-point of generation, then such an investigation amounts to the same as whether the cosmos belongs to the eternal beings or to those brought into being in accordance with the whole of time, and whether it belongs to those beings that are self-subsistent or those that obtain their order from another cause.

### *Further reflections on being generated: 279.30–281.13*<sup>456</sup>

Moreover, the term ‘generated’ (*genêtos*)<sup>457</sup> belongs to those words which have multiple meanings.<sup>458</sup> (1) It is a well-known usage that something is

<sup>453</sup> The verb ἐπιπλάω is quite rare. It literally means ‘to flow upon’ and is related to πλάω, ‘stream’ or ‘fountain’. See also II. 110.18, 131.3 in similar contexts. Proclus alludes here again to the doctrine of the ‘tempering of being’. See above n. 377 and especially the parallel at Philo, *Opif.* 23.

<sup>454</sup> By implication at 278.28–30; cf. 238.15, etc. <sup>455</sup> Above at 232.13, 239.27, 256.4.

<sup>456</sup> On this text see Baltes (1976–8) II. 19–23.

<sup>457</sup> The term γενητός in fact does not occur in Burnet’s text of the *Timaeus* (it is a variant at 28b1 and 28c2, where γεννητός is to be preferred). But from Aristotle onwards (see *Cael.* 1.10, 279b5, etc.) it summarizes the status of the cosmos as an object that has come into being in time.

<sup>458</sup> Analysis of the notion of ‘being generated’ took place from Aristotle onwards. Particularly noteworthy is the analysis by the Middle Platonist Calvenus Taurus,

called 'generated' which has a temporal starting-point, whether it attains its existence by means of generation or whether it does so without generation, as Aristotle says.<sup>459</sup> (2) Everything that proceeds from a cause is also called 'generated'. (3) What is composite in virtue of its essence is called 'generated' as well, because its existence results from dissimilar causes and it needs something (i.e. another cause) to bring these together. (4) Finally, what has a generated nature is called 'generated', even if it has not actually come into being, as is the case for something that has a visible nature, even if it is not actually being seen.

Against the background of this multiple signification of the term 'generated' [we can say that] what is generated according to time (*kata chronon*) has all the kinds of generation, for it proceeds from a cause, it is composite, and it has a generated nature. But that which is generated in another way<sup>460</sup> certainly does not have all the kinds. If, then, it had been stated 'whether the cosmos has all the kinds of generation or does not have them', we would have said that he was investigating whether it was generated according to time or whether it did not have a temporal starting-point of its generation. But since he did not use this alternative but rather the one '**whether it has no starting-point<sup>461</sup> of generation or it does have one**', he makes it clear even to those whose powers of comprehension are small that he is not puzzling about the question of temporal beginning, but rather about whether, in the light of the many kinds of generation, the universe has some beginning of generation. If it has none, then it belongs to the eternal and self-subsistent beings, in which there is no generation, not to speak of time.

If we should ever say that there are generations of gods when we wish to describe their ineffable procession, we say this in virtue of the otherness that secondary beings show in relation to their causes.<sup>462</sup> The theologians,<sup>463</sup> of course, destroyed all such difficulties in advance. In order to give their fictional presentation of the generations of the gods

preserved by Philoponus, *Aet.* 145.13ff. Rabe, on which see further Dillon (1996) 242–4.

<sup>459</sup> *Cael.* 1.11, 280b15–16.

<sup>460</sup> I.e. meanings 2–4 of the analysis of the term γενητός, which do not necessarily involve time.

<sup>461</sup> It should constantly be borne in mind that the Greek term ἀρχή does not necessarily mean 'beginning' in the temporal sense but can also mean 'first principle' or 'starting-point'. The last-mentioned term is the best way of indicating this ambiguity in English and for this reason I have used it in the translation of this lemma.

<sup>462</sup> Proclus raises an objection to his solution. If the gods belong to the intelligible realm of eternal being, how can one speak of the generations (γενέσεις) of the gods? Yet the early theologians, whose writings the Neoplatonists held in great respect, did do this.

<sup>463</sup> See *Orph. fr.* 68 Kern.

25 a logical basis, they named time as the first item [of their myths], since it was necessary, wherever there is generation, that time first take the lead, in accordance with and by means of which generation takes place. For these people, then, the cause and time amount to the same thing, since the same is the case for procession and generation. What really comes into being is that which does not generate itself, but is brought into  
281 existence by another. It becomes an image (*eidôlon*) of something else, is compounded from a multiplicity of dissimilars, and always receives a ‘reconditioned’ existence.<sup>464</sup> It is such an existent which has time yoked to it, since it has unfailing generation coextensive with the infinity of  
5 time, and it has numerical sameness in always *becoming* a unity, but not in always *being* a unity.

One might even say that what is generated in this way proceeds from non-being (*ek tou mê ontos*). The self-subsistent that is generated from itself does not proceed from non-being. Even if you conceptually distinguish between what causes and what is caused, it proceeds from being.  
10 Producer and product were a unity, with the result that it proceeds from itself as existent, and this is the reason that it is eternal and never abandons itself. But that which exists only in dependence on another existent subsists from non-being, because once separated from its cause, it no longer exists and the cause differs from the resultant product.<sup>465</sup>

***Final conclusion on the nature of the cosmos’s generation:***

**281.14–282.22<sup>466</sup>**

In this way, then, one should analogously adapt the physical principle<sup>467</sup>  
15 to this particular generated entity<sup>468</sup> and should apply to it the [principle] that what comes into being exists in time. We do not claim that this object exists in a part of time, but rather in unlimited time, always coming into being and receiving illumination from that which [really] exists. The matter is obvious. If you were to subtract the active agent, the universe would immediately be incomplete, which is the case for all existents  
20 which are still in the process of coming into being. But this does not mean that it is more incomplete than those existents which have come into being at a certain moment. It does not proceed from incompleteness

<sup>464</sup> Cf. above 278.21.

<sup>465</sup> I.e. it exists although it might not exist, since it is not self-subsistent. It is obvious that this Neoplatonic existence *ex nihilo* is quite different to the Christian doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*.

<sup>466</sup> On this text see Baltes (1976–8) II. 23–7; Phillips (1997) 178–80.

<sup>467</sup> The term is ἄξιωμα, but used in a different sense from when describing the basic principles set out in 27d6–28b4.

<sup>468</sup> I.e. the physical cosmos in its entirety.

to completion as they do but rather comes into being as a whole and all together and complete, and for this reason its [being] always and its completeness exist in accordance with the wholeness of time. For 'time came into being with the heaven' (38b6),<sup>469</sup> not a part of time, but time in its entirety. As a result heaven comes into being in unlimited time and is unceasing in both directions just as is the case for time.<sup>470</sup>

In this sense, then, it is said that the cosmos both has a **starting-point of its generation** and has begun **from a starting-point**,<sup>471</sup> firstly from the most sovereign starting-point (i.e. principle), as he himself will state (29e4), namely the final cause, for it was from this principle that the Father who generated the cosmos commenced its generation. Next, in addition to this, it is always coming into being on account of its generation in the whole of time, both in commencing its coming into being and in attaining its completion. For in the case of the cosmos there is no distinction to be made between 'it has come into being' (*gegonen*, 28b6) and 'it is coming into being' (*ginetai*), so that there is no distinction to be made between starting-point (*archê*) and completion (*telos*).<sup>472</sup> That which comes into being in a part of time begins at one time and achieves its completion at another. But that which comes into being in accordance with the entirety of time is always commencing and always complete (*teleios*). It does have 'a starting-point of generation' in the sense of being completed as the result [of the activity] of another,<sup>473</sup> but it does not have one that has a starting-point involving some part of time. Indeed, since the [term] 'generation' has multiple meanings,<sup>474</sup> the same applies to 'starting-point of generation' (28b6). This means that generation extending to the whole of time is a form of generation, and the starting-point of this is a starting-point of a certain kind of generation, but not of all generation. What, then, is this starting-point? It is one that has its achievement all together and gathered [within itself].

Because, then, the universe itself is body, it comes into being and has a starting-point of generation, but because intellect is the one making it, it has come into being (28b6) and attains achievement of its generation. Through both [factors] together<sup>475</sup> it both commences and is complete

<sup>469</sup> The proof-text has already been used above at 239.23.

<sup>470</sup> Proclus speaks of heaven (οὐρανός) because of the proof-text he has just quoted, but it is meant to refer to the entire cosmos. Cf. his explanation of 28b2–3 above at 272.10–274.32, and also above n. 8.

<sup>471</sup> On the term ἀρχή see the comment at n. 461 above.

<sup>472</sup> Proclus' remarks here play on the double meaning of the term τέλος as both 'end' as final completion and 'perfection' as reaching its goal.

<sup>473</sup> I.e. the Demiurge as efficient cause.

<sup>474</sup> Cf. the analysis of 'generated' above at 279.30–280.6.

<sup>475</sup> I.e. in being corporeal and in having a transcendent cause.

as far as generation is concerned. It has come into being, both as always coming into being and as [already] having done so. In the case of entities that come into being in a part of time these states [of generation] are separate, but in the case of entities that come into being in accordance with the entirety of time they exist together, just like what the movement of the heaven has experienced in – as Aristotle says – ‘always being in [the process of] completion’,<sup>476</sup> something which does not apply to movements down here.

*The cosmos has come into being*

It has come into being. For it is both visible and tangible, and it has a body. All objects of this kind are perceptible, and objects of perception, grasped as they are by opinion together with sense-perception, have appeared [as] things that come into being and have come into being.<sup>477</sup> (28b7–c2)

*Explanation of argumentation of the passage:  
282.27–283.19<sup>478</sup>*

It is by looking towards himself and abiding ‘at all times in his own customary nature’ (42e5–6) that the Demiurge of the universe produces the entire cosmos comprehensively (*holikôs*), all together and always in the same manner, for he does not create at the one moment (*pote*) and not create at another, lest he should depart from eternity. In the same manner Timaeus too has turned to himself and establishes his entire investigation,<sup>479</sup> both advancing to intellect from discursive reason and moving forward to reasoning from intellect. So, when facing difficulties and interrogating himself, he acted in accordance with the self-motion of the soul.<sup>480</sup> But in his reply he imitates the cast of the intellect.<sup>481</sup> First he encompasses the doctrine with a single word<sup>482</sup> and openly proclaims the

<sup>476</sup> *Meteor.* 1.2, 339a26. This is a favourite quotation for Proclus: see also 290.28, 294.19, II. 302.10, III. 90.26, III. 193.9, in *Remp.* I. 35.27.

<sup>477</sup> Divergences from Burnet’s OCT text: Proclus reads γενητά instead of γεννητά in 28c2 (see also above n. 457).

<sup>478</sup> On this text see Baltes (1976–8) II. 27–30.

<sup>479</sup> The verb ἀνατίθησιν may allude to the image of establishing a monument, as translated by Festugière, i.e. ‘establishes the entire monument of his investigation’.

<sup>480</sup> I.e. in the process of discursive reasoning.

<sup>481</sup> This obscure phrase is well illuminated by a parallel passage at in *Parm.* 1125.20: ‘So the stating in advance of the conclusion imitates the immediate comprehension (ἐπιβολή) of the intellect, whereas the procession through the parts of the syllogism represents the unfolding of scientific knowledge’ (translation Morrow and Dillon). Here Proclus uses the simpler word βολή.

<sup>482</sup> I.e. γέγονε, ‘it has come into being’, 28b7.

conclusion in advance of the demonstration, in the manner of the divinely inspired,<sup>483</sup> who see the whole all together and have seized with their intellect the end-point before the process [that produces it], because they see everything that is present [before them] all at once (*homou*). Then, turning to the process of reasoning, he descends from intellect to rational procedures and to the hunt<sup>484</sup> for the nature of the cosmos using [the method of] demonstration. Certainly it is quite marvellous how, starting from the basic principles, he reveals the entire form (*eidos*) of the universe. For if (1) 'the cosmos is visible and tangible and has a body' (28b7–8), (2) what is visible and tangible and has a body is perceptible (cf. 28b8), (3) what is perceptible is opinable 'together with sense-perception' (28c1), and (4) what is opinable with sense-perception is generated, then (5) the cosmos is demonstrably generated as revealed from the definition by conversion of the definition itself.<sup>485</sup> This is the kind of demonstration that geometers use as well. Let these remarks suffice for the form of the argumentation.

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*Explanation of 'it has come into being' and criticism of Atticus:*  
283.19–285.7<sup>486</sup>

Since, as we said (278.27–9), he asked whether the universe is eternal or has a starting-point of generation, and he imitated intellect by introducing this [affirmation] that **it has come into being** (28b7), it is evident that he gives *some* [form of] generation to the cosmos, for this is one alternative of the opposition that he states. But if this is so, he establishes the universe far away from temporal generation. For if the cosmos has *some* starting-point of generation,<sup>487</sup> but not in the full sense, and if what has come into being at a point in time has a complete beginning of generation, then the cosmos is not [the kind of object that] has come into being at a point in time (*apo chronou*).

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In addition we should pursue further the remarkable hypotheses of Atticus (cf. 276.30–277.8). He says that that which moves in a disharmonious and disorderly fashion is ungenerated, but that the cosmos is

<sup>483</sup> Literally ἐνθουσιῶντας, i.e. the language of the mysteries.

<sup>484</sup> On the metaphor of hunting see above n. 353.

<sup>485</sup> The definition at 28a2 stated that 'that which comes into being and passes away' is 'opinionable by opinion together with irrational perception'. Now it is concluded that 'that which is perceptible and thus opinionable by opinion together with sense-perception' is generated, i.e. the subject and the complement are reversed. See further Festugière's note ad loc. Proclus' terminology combines words from 28a2–3 and 28b7–c2.

<sup>486</sup> On this text see Baltes (1976–8) II. 30–5.

<sup>487</sup> Proclus derives the idea of 'some' from Plato's formulation at 28b7.

30 generated at a point in time. Let us say [to begin with] that in its case [i.e. of the cosmos] **it has come into being** is [well stated].<sup>488</sup>

284 Therefore, since he himself [Plato] has assigned the cause (*aitia*) of generation, let us observe what kind this [cause] is when he says **it is visible and tangible**. Is, then, the whole of the sense-perceptible realm generated at a point in time, or does this not apply to the whole? If it does apply to the whole, then that which moves in a disharmonious and disorderly fashion also will be generated at a point in time, for  
5 he states that it too is ‘visible’ (30a3). But if it does not apply to the whole, then the argument as Atticus presents it is invalid and reaches no conclusion, unless he were to state that the cosmos is visible and tangible, but that that which moves in a disharmonious and disorderly fashion *is* now not visible, but *was* visible before the creation of the cosmos, since  
10 Plato speaks about ‘all that *was* visible, moving in a disharmonious and disorderly fashion’ (30a3–5), whereas here he says that **it is visible and tangible and has a body** (28b7–8). Everything, then, which *is* visible and tangible is demonstrably generated, but this would not be the case for that which *was* [visible]. If Atticus, with his cleverness in seizing upon  
15 the literal text, were to speak like this,<sup>489</sup> it must be stated that at least in the definition of that which is generated this does not occur, but it is stated quite simply that all that is generated ‘is opinable by opinion with irrational perception’ (28a2–3). As a result, if an object is perceptible, then it certainly would be generated. But all that is visible is perceptible. So that which moves in a disharmonious and disorderly fashion is also  
20 generated. Moreover Plato clearly states that it too is generated when he says that ‘before the heaven’<sup>490</sup> came into being three things existed: being, space (*chôra*), generation’ (52d3–4),<sup>491</sup> of which the last mentioned was constituted by means of vestiges of forms (cf. 53b2). So that realm of disharmony too is generated, just as it is visible. We should therefore not affirm that that realm is not generated in time whereas it is the  
25 case for the universe, but rather that they are both either generated in time or not generated in time, for both of them are in a similar manner described by Plato as ‘visible’ and as ‘realms of generation’ (*geneseis*). But if both are generated, prior to that [state of disorder] the cosmos would have changed into disharmony, for generation as we know takes place from the one contrary to the other.<sup>492</sup> And if the creator of that realm

<sup>488</sup> Accepting the conjecture of Kroll, τὸ γέγονε [εἰρησθαι] καλῶς.

<sup>489</sup> Proclus makes it quite clear that he is reconstructing Atticus’ reasoning. No doubt he did not have access to his actual comments but depended on reports in the commentary tradition, most likely via Porphyry.

<sup>490</sup> I.e. the cosmos; cf. 28b2.

<sup>491</sup> An important text for Proclus, also cited at 326.6, 328.7, 358.11, 384.17, 400.16.

<sup>492</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 5.1, 225a12ff.

was good, how could he (a) have not constructed<sup>493</sup> it well or (b) [first] constructed it well and then destroyed it?<sup>494</sup> But if he was not good, how did he produce it as an ordered and well-arranged object when he was not good? After all, it is the hallmark of someone who is good to order and arrange other things. But if the universe, though both visible and generated, is not generated in temporal terms, then there is no necessity [for us],<sup>495</sup> because the universe is visible and generated, immediately to make it generated in the temporal sense. These remarks are enough for our response to Atticus.

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*Return to problem of the everlasting nature of the cosmos:*

285.7–286.19<sup>496</sup>

But let us return to our principles,<sup>497</sup> and state as follows: was the cosmos an object which always exists and as such is eternal, or was it not eternal but constituted in time? and was it self-subsistent, or brought into being by another? This is the question, and here is the response. It was brought into existence by another and was constituted together with time. This is what it means to be [an object which is] generated. For if it has a form that is composite, it possesses generation in accordance with its composition, and if it only subsists in consequence of another cause, it is generated because it did not bring itself into being. And if it is not eternal, it has its entire existence in accordance with time. In fact it has been fashioned with something else serving as a paradigm and has come into being as an image derived from Being. The same analogous relation that exists between composite and simple and between time and eternity also exists between generation and Being. If, therefore, essence (*ousia*) is simple and uniform and eternal, generation (*genesis*) is composite and pluriform and coupled with time.

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The statement that it [the universe] ‘has begun from some starting-point’ (28b7) is also marvellously phrased. For that which comes into being at a point in time also began from a temporal starting-point, as well as from an efficient and a final and a material and formal

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<sup>493</sup> Proclus uses the verb ἀρμόζω, ‘fit together’, ‘construct’, ‘harmonize’, which is appropriate to the description of disharmony used for the state of the cosmos before the moment of creation in 30a (which of course he does not take literally).

<sup>494</sup> These considerations are reminiscent of the arguments purportedly used by Aristotle in his *De philosophia* to defend the eternity of the cosmos; see Philo, *Aet.* 39–43 = fr. 19c Ross.

<sup>495</sup> Because the verb ποιεῖν is active, a subject has to be supplied for it. It could be the interpreter (as I have supplied) or the Demiurge.

<sup>496</sup> On this passage see Baltes (1976–8) II. 36–40.

<sup>497</sup> Proclus returns to the line of argument on which he embarked at 283.19.

principle.<sup>498</sup> For, since the [term] ‘starting-point’ (*archê*) is used here in many different ways, it [i.e. that which comes into being at a point in time] began in accordance with all ‘starting-points’ (*archai*) of generation. But the cosmos began from *some* starting-point, not all [kinds of] starting-point. Which one is it then? Not the temporal one, I would say. After all, the object that begins from this [starting-point] also obtained a starting-point of generation from all the others.<sup>499</sup> Rather, it began from the one which he himself will expound as he proceeds further (29e–30a), namely the most sovereign principle (cf. 29e4), by which I mean the final [cause]. In fact it [the cosmos] **came into being** through goodness, and this is the principle (*archê*) of its generation from which it began. It is this principle, at any rate, that he himself<sup>500</sup> will call a ‘most sovereign principle of the generation of the cosmos’ (29e4),<sup>501</sup> so he would probably mean this principle now as well.

First, therefore, he shows that the cosmos is generated from the [viewpoint of] its composition, **for it is tangible and visible**. These [represent] the extremes of the universe.<sup>502</sup> The heaven is visible, while the earth is an object that is tangible. On earth things are visible inasmuch as they participate in light, while in heaven there is tangibility inasmuch as what is earthy has been causally included in it in advance.<sup>503</sup> In absolute terms it [the universe] also **has a body** (28b8), so that you may understand that the intermediate regions of the cosmos also have their fullness.<sup>504</sup> It is in harmony with this again that the oracle has been pronounced:<sup>505</sup>

For it exists as a copy of intellect, but as an artefact it possesses something of body.

<sup>498</sup> ‘Starting-point’ and ‘principle’ both translate ἀρχή here, an unavoidable equivocation in English. See further above n. 461.

<sup>499</sup> The text at 28b7 implies an exclusive ἀρχή and in Proclus’ view this can hardly be a temporal one.

<sup>500</sup> Once again either Plato or Timaeus.

<sup>501</sup> The text in 29e4 is slightly different: ‘principle of generation and cosmos’.

<sup>502</sup> They are linked at 31b with earth and fire respectively.

<sup>503</sup> It is implied at 40a2 that the heavenly bodies have other components than just light (i.e. fire). Proclus is arguing that the two traits are distributed throughout the entire cosmos, if not uniformly. ‘In advance’ refers to the fact that the text discusses principles here before the nature of the cosmos as caused product is discussed.

<sup>504</sup> I.e. Proclus takes the phrase at 28a7–8 and proceeds to relate visibility primarily to the heavenly region, tangibility primarily to earth, and the final phrase about body to all four regions and their corresponding elements. The further text at 31b is assumed here.

<sup>505</sup> *Or. Chald.* fr. 69. ‘It’ presumably refers to the universe, although it could be taken to refer to the heaven.

Inasmuch as the universe has a bodily element, it is generated. In virtue of this it is also visible and tangible. All that is visible and tangible is perceptible, for both touch and sight are [kinds of] sense-perception. That which is perceptible is opinable inasmuch as it is welded together from dissimilar parts and is unable to retain the purity of the intelligible forms. Everything like this is generated inasmuch as its essential nature is composite.

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*Critique of various interpretations: 286.20–290.17*<sup>506</sup>

It is therefore not the case that Plato destroys the everlasting nature of the universe, as some think who have followed the basic principles of Aristotelianism. It is easy to learn that this is true from the following.

(1) He says that time came into existence together with the heaven (38b6).<sup>507</sup> Now if time is everlasting, then the heaven is everlasting as well. But if the universe has a temporal beginning, then time will also have a temporal beginning, which is completely impossible. But, they say,<sup>508</sup> time is of two kinds, the one disordered, the other advancing numerically,<sup>509</sup> for there are also two kinds of movement, the one disordered and disharmonious, the other ordered and harmonious. To each of these a [kind of] time is coupled. But in the case of body it is possible that it moves either regularly or irregularly, whereas for time it is impossible to conceive that it is [both] regular and irregular. For in this way the essential nature of time would be composite. Why should I discuss this? Even when movement is irregular, the [corresponding] time is regular. After all, even now<sup>510</sup> there are many [kinds of] movement, some faster, others slower, the one more regular than the other, but there is but one time for all these which is continuous and advances numerically. It is not correct, therefore, to make time double [in this way]. But if time is single and continuous, then it is ungenerated<sup>511</sup> and the heaven which is co-existent with time is ungenerated as well. But if it is generated, then the result is absurd, if it is the case that time, in order to come into being,

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<sup>506</sup> On this passage see Baltes (1976–8) II. 40–50. Proclus wrote a separate treatise on the eternity of the cosmos, the arguments of which have been preserved by Philoponus; see Lang and Macro (2001).

<sup>507</sup> Reference to the same text cited above at 281.24; see also n. 469.

<sup>508</sup> I.e. the view of Atticus again.

<sup>509</sup> The one kind is derived from the pre-cosmic disorder in 30a4–5, the other from the discussion of time and eternity at 37d6–7.

<sup>510</sup> I.e. in the cosmos as it now exists, not in the pre-existent state envisaged by Atticus.

<sup>511</sup> I.e. in a temporal sense, but *pace* Festugière the usual translation of ἀγέννητος can be retained.

will need time to do so, even though time does not yet exist.<sup>512</sup> For when time was coming into being, time did not yet exist.

(2) In addition, at the same time that the soul of the universe came into existence he joined it up with the body and did not give it a life prior to [the existence of] the corporeal, but from the moment that it exists, he bound it together with the body. But in fact of the soul itself he says that it belongs to the beings that always exist (cf. 37a1).<sup>513</sup> If, then, the body has been constituted together with soul, and soul is something that always exists, then the body too in his view is everlasting.

(3) In addition, in this context Timaeus says that the soul is generated, but the Socrates in the *Phaedrus*<sup>514</sup> says it is ‘ungenerated’ (245d3). If, then, he calls generated what is plainly ungenerated from the temporal point of view, is it any wonder if he should designate the entire cosmos, which is temporally ungenerated, as generated, [albeit] in a different manner?

(4) In addition, he will explicitly state that the cosmos is indestructible,<sup>515</sup> as even the heterodox thinkers have in fact conceded,<sup>516</sup> but in the *Republic* (546a2) he – or rather not he himself but the Muses – clearly determined that ‘for everything that has come into being destruction follows’ necessarily, taking generation in the temporal sense. So understand from these [considerations] what I am telling you. The cosmos is proven to be ungenerated, for if the cosmos is indestructible but nothing that is temporally generated is indestructible, then the cosmos is certainly not temporally generated.

(5) But why do we need syllogisms like this?<sup>517</sup> He himself stated explicitly in the *Laws* that past time is infinite and that in this infinity ‘thousands upon thousands’ (676b9) of humans have been brought forth and carried off.<sup>518</sup> In seeking the starting-point of statehood, from which states change to virtue and vice, he introduced [the words] (676a7–b1): ‘From which point? you say. From, I think, the length and infinity of

<sup>512</sup> This argument basically goes back to Aristotle; see Sorabji (1983) 279.

<sup>513</sup> Festugière refers to *Phdr.* 245d3 alluded to a few lines below (287.19). But it is more likely that Proclus is referring to Plato’s literal words at 37a1 (cf. also *Rep.* 611a1). The interpretation assumed here, where soul belongs to the eternal beings, is one of the three advanced at II. 293.1ff.

<sup>514</sup> For the way of referring to Socrates here see the text above at n. 200 and the comment at n. 277.

<sup>515</sup> The reference here is probably, as argued by Baltes (1976–8) II. 42, to 41a–b rather than 37d1–2, as suggested by Diehl and Festugière.

<sup>516</sup> Another negative reference to the camp of Plutarch and Atticus.

<sup>517</sup> The previous sentence is a classic syllogism in Camestres.

<sup>518</sup> Proclus refers to the opening passage of Book 3 of the *Laws* (676a–c), the so-called ‘Archaeology’. The quotation actually refers to ‘states’, but Proclus changes it to human beings.

time and from the changes that occurred in it.' But still better, so that we may base our commentary on the text at hand, we heard him state a little earlier (22e6–23a1) that 'wherever there has been no extremes of winter or heat, there the race of human beings always exists in greater or lesser numbers'.<sup>519</sup> If the race of human beings always exists, then the universe must necessarily be everlasting as well.<sup>520</sup>

(6) In addition, if the Demiurge belongs to the beings that always exist,<sup>521</sup> he does not create at one point in time and release the rudder at another,<sup>522</sup> for then he would not remain in the same state or be unchangeable. If he is always creating, then the created product also exists always.<sup>523</sup> Why would he decide after spending an infinite time in idleness that he should turn to creative activity? Did he consider that activity better? But was he before then unaware of this better [outcome] or was he not? If as Intellect he was ignorant, that is absurd, for he would be in possession of both ignorance and knowledge. But if he did know [about this better outcome], why did he not begin to generate and create the cosmos earlier? But this [activity] is not better, [someone might say]. Why then did he not remain<sup>524</sup> in his state of idleness, if it is lawful to speak in this way? It is in fact lacking in piety to think that an intellect and a god would pursue the less noble cause instead of the more noble one. But this conclusion is what one necessarily has to admit, if the cosmos is generated in time and has not coexisted with the infinity of time.

(7) It seems to me that those who state that the cosmos at one time did not exist go astray in another way in relation to the Demiurge of the cosmos. If this cosmos did not exist at some stage, then he at that stage was not engaged in activity, for the product and the maker go together. But if he was not engaged in activity at some stage, he would then be the maker potentially. If he was the maker potentially, he would be incomplete and would become complete later, when he engaged in activity. But if we can speak of earlier and later in his case, he would not belong to those beings who are eternally active, but would temporally change from non-activity to activity. But surely it is he himself who brings

<sup>519</sup> Once again more a paraphrase than a literal quotation. Proclus relies on his memory. He has commented on this passage at 122.1–123.15.

<sup>520</sup> Cf. the use of Plato's text in the final argument of Philo, *Aet.* 146–9.

<sup>521</sup> Allusion to 37a1; cf. 230.1 and above n. 158.

<sup>522</sup> The expression comes from the *Politicus* myth at 272e4, which of course Proclus does not interpret literally. Cf. the argument against Severus at 289.13–16.

<sup>523</sup> The following argument goes back to Aristotle, *De philosophia* fr. 19c (though there it is used to prove the cosmos's indestructibility). See also Augustine, *Conf.* 11.12.

<sup>524</sup> The verb ἑμμενεν is used for the Demiurge's activity at 42e5; cf. 282.27.

time into existence. How, then, if he had an activity that required time, did he by means of this activity produce time, which was required so that he could act? This, then, could not be otherwise.<sup>525</sup>

After this opinion let us examine Severus,<sup>526</sup> who says that in absolute terms the cosmos is everlasting, but that the present one which moves in the way it does is generated. For, [he claims,] there are two kinds of revolution, as the Eleatic stranger showed (*Plt.* 270d7–8), the one with which the universe now proceeds and its opposite. Therefore the cosmos which began from a particular starting-point (cf. 28b7) and revolves with its current revolution is generated, but in absolute terms it is not generated.

(1) Against this interpretation we shall make a reply by affirming that you are transferring mythical riddles to natural science in an illegitimate manner.<sup>527</sup> How could the soul in motion grow weary and change its ancient revolution? How would the universe be complete and self-sufficient if it desires change? If both parties – the object moved and the mover – preserve their own disposition, how can there be space<sup>528</sup> for the change of (direction in) their revolutions? How can Timaeus say (36c5–d1) that the revolution of the Same moves to the right in accordance with the craftsman's decision, while the revolution of the Different moves to the left? For if the works of the creator have to remain identical and always existent, then the revolutions must always remain the same as well, and the revolution of the Same must always move with its motion to the right. For at the same time as it proceeded from the Demiurge it also obtained its present revolution.

(2) In addition, is it not inevitable [on this interpretation] that irregularity be introduced into the motion of the heaven? Every object that will cease from its former movement and change to another movement which is opposite is not only forced to a halt but also makes its former movement wither away. If the same activity still stands, what is the cause of the second revolution? These interpretations are not scientific (*phusikai*) and should under no circumstances be accepted.

<sup>525</sup> I.e. the activity of the Demiurge cannot be interpreted temporally and the cosmos must be everlasting.

<sup>526</sup> Fr. 6 T Gioè.

<sup>527</sup> As Baltes (1976–8) II. 49 observes, the *Politicus* myth had to be a 'thorn in the side' for all Platonist interpreters who tried to develop a unified doctrine of Platonic thought, because, although it shares many details and terms with the *Timaeus*, it deviates from it in significant ways.

<sup>528</sup> One would usually translate with 'room' here, but Proclus uses the term χώρα, which is the technical term that Plato introduces in the *Timaeus* for his concept of 'space in which', e.g. at 52d3 cited above at 284.21.

There is also no place for those opinions which explain the matter in more dialectical terms (*logikôteron*),<sup>529</sup> e.g. (1) that the [term] ‘generation’ is used for the cosmos in a conceptual manner only.<sup>530</sup> This would mean that we should also conclude in our arguments that there is a creator of the universe conceptually and not in actual fact. After all, from the fact that the cosmos is generated, it was demonstrated that it has a creative and demiurgic cause.<sup>531</sup>

(2) An alternative is that he supposed<sup>532</sup> that the universe is generated ‘for the sake of clarity of instruction’,<sup>533</sup> in order to teach how great the benefits are that it has received from the providence of the creator. This view is true as far as it goes, but it is not sufficient to do justice to Plato’s theory. For, as Iamblichus says,<sup>534</sup> clarity is a valuable thing, [but only] when it is appropriate for knowledge, since, even in the case when the universe is said to be everlasting, it would still be possible to show that the goods it possesses are given by the gods. Let the comments we have made suffice in response to these interpretations.

### *Two problems of interpretation: 290.17–292.9*<sup>535</sup>

We should return to the beginning and state how the universe is said to be generated, since it is not meant in temporal terms for the reasons that have been stated, and it also does not mean that it is simply derived from a cause, for to say this is insufficient. After all, Intellect too is derived from a cause, namely the first cause, and all entities that exist after the One are derived from a cause, but they are not all generated. And where [would] the eternal [be], if everything is generated, for the One is anterior

<sup>529</sup> In contrast to the mythical approach of Severus which has just been rejected.

<sup>530</sup> The phrase here is κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν, which is frequently used to oppose mental or conceptual activity or status to physical reality; cf. Alcinous, *Did.* 9.1, Posidonius ap. Diog. Laert. 7.135. Here it is related to the process of creation, as also occurs in the doxographical tradition, e.g. at Aëtius ap. Stob. *Ecl.* 1.8.45, 21.6c, 6f.

<sup>531</sup> I.e. in 28a4–6, c2–5.

<sup>532</sup> The verb ὑπέθετο may allude to the notion that the creation is a hypothesis rather than a description of fact. Cf. Simplicius’ comments on the Aristotelian passage cited in the next note, in *Cael.* 334.4.

<sup>533</sup> The interpretation of the *Timaeus*’ creation account that goes back to Speusippus and Xenocrates was known to the later tradition through the report of Aristotle at *Cael.* 1.10, 279b32–280a11 (the phrase ὑπὲρ διδοσκαλίας at 280a1–2). Proclus does not refer by name to Plato’s two successors in this connection.

<sup>534</sup> Fr. 33 Dillon. But it is doubtful whether the entire section is derived from Iamblichus; cf. Baltes (1976–8) II. 51.

<sup>535</sup> On this text see Baltes (1976–8) II. 56–60.

even to eternity?<sup>536</sup> How, then, is the cosmos generated, one might ask. The answer is: as an object that is always coming into being (*gignomenon*) and at the same time has come into being (*gegenêmenon*). It would surely  
25 not be the case that this particular body not only is coming into being but also sometimes has come into being, but that the entire heaven only has its existence in coming to be but does not exist as having come to be and at the same time as being, in the words of Aristotle,<sup>537</sup> ‘always in the process of completion’, the word ‘always’ being taken temporally  
30 in accordance with the infinity of time. Just as the light from the sun always proceeds from its own source, so too the cosmos always comes into being and is always produced and always exists, both as coming into being and at the same time as having come into being. It becomes what it is as itself, because if it is not coming into being, it will no longer exist. And it comes into being as a composite, for every [process of] composition is generation. But if it is always composed, then it has always come into being, which coincides with coming into being. It seems to  
29I me that Plato too knew this when he said **has come into being** (*gegonen*, 28b7) instead of ‘coming into being’, just as in the case of being he said **existed** (28b6) instead of ‘exists’ when he said ‘whether it has always existed’ (*ibid.*). For just as in the case of the intelligible realm ‘have existed’ and ‘exist’ are the same – for everything only exists there in accordance with ‘it exists’,<sup>538</sup> since everything is in the present (*to nun*), which is a more indivisible present than the temporal present – in the same way, I  
10 presume, in the case of the entire perceptible realm ‘comes into being’ amounts to the same as ‘has come into being’. For it has come into being in the sense that it is always coming into being, and it exists in the sense that it is generated. That the generated (*to genêton*) does not indicate the generated taken at any moment of time or simply the composite is clear from what is opposed to it, for in opposition to it he has distinguished the  
15 always-existent.<sup>539</sup> If, then, the always-existent indicated the simple, we would have said that the generated was the composite only. If the always-existent signified that which always exists in time,<sup>540</sup> one would have described that which comes into being (*gignomenon*) as that which begins

<sup>536</sup> Five sentences in a row here begin with the conjunction γάρ, causing the usual difficulties for the translator. The argument is: if only the absolute first cause, the One, is ungenerated because it alone is uncaused, then everything at the level of Intellect would be generated and the ‘eternal being’, which by definition is ungenerated, would be generated, which is a *reductio ad absurdum*.

<sup>537</sup> Already cited above at 282.21.

<sup>538</sup> Literally κατὰ τὸ ἔστιν, an awkward phrase in Greek.

<sup>539</sup> I.e. in the antithesis in 28b6.

<sup>540</sup> Note that αἰεί is used here both for eternity (in the case of true Being) and sempiternity (linked to time).

from a point in time. For one does not set in opposition to the eternal that which exists in a part of time, but that which exists in accordance with the whole of time. But in the present case in opposition to the eternal he has distinguished the generated. It is opposed to that realm [of the eternally existent], therefore, because it has participated in time, and for this reason it is generated. But that the always-existent indicates the eternal (*aiônion*) is apparent, if it is the case that the Demiurge who brings time into existence is called that which always exists and the Paradigm [is called this] as well.<sup>541</sup> It therefore signifies the eternal [form of] existence and not what participates in temporal everlastingness. 20 25

But someone, even if he agrees with these views, might raise the difficulty as to why we have called the cosmos generated on the basis of its body. Taking into account that it possesses a body, which is generated only, but also a divine soul which always exists and a divine intellect prior to soul, why have we on the basis of this knowledge designated it as generated on account of its body and not ungenerated on account of its soul or its mind? After all, it is said everywhere that the cosmos in its entirety is characterized on the basis of its form and not from its underlying nature. As an answer it might be noted that we also call Socrates a mortal, even though he has an immortal soul, because the living thing (*zôion*) in his case is mortal. And if you were to make the point that we are now investigating the somatic aspect of the universe which has not yet been aligned with the soul, you would be speaking correctly. If on the other hand you regard it as endowed with soul and intellect, you will call it 'god', just as Plato in the *Republic* (546b3) thought it appropriate to entitle the cosmos a 'divine generated [being]',<sup>542</sup> but in this work a 'blessed god' (34b8).<sup>543</sup> 30 292 5

### *Admiration for Plato's language and reasoning:*

292.9–293.5<sup>544</sup>

Who in using these very terms could have praised the universe more fulsomely? He could not avoid calling the universe generated.<sup>545</sup> Because he reserved 'ungenerated' for the eternal beings, he called the cosmos generated in this way, but the appellation does not represent any 10

<sup>541</sup> Proclus again alludes to the text at 37a1; cf. above nn. 158, 521.

<sup>542</sup> In this text Proclus appears to read γενητός rather than γεννητός, 'begotten', as in the OCT.

<sup>543</sup> The term here is εὐδαίμων, indicating one who has the best kind of life. I have retained the conventional translation.

<sup>544</sup> On this text see Baltes (1976–8) II. 60–2.

<sup>545</sup> This seems to be the intended meaning here; literally 'since he intended to call . . .'

diminution [of respect] when comparison is made with the eternal.<sup>546</sup> With the fact that **it has come into being** he also entwined its continual becoming,<sup>547</sup> so that inasmuch as it is total and complete, it is revealed as both having come into existence and existent (*gegonos kai to on*), but inasmuch as it has its essence in time [it is revealed] as generated (*genêtos*). Moreover he has given it a starting-point of a *certain* becoming (*genesis tis*), but not of every [kind of becoming]. It is in virtue of its somatic nature that he has called it 'becoming' (29d8), leaving aside the divine powers which it possesses and through which it is also called 'blessed' and 'god' (cf. 34b8).

Another aspect which deserves to be admired is how the proof has proceeded scientifically from the definition. This is the reason why he has reversed the order. In the [account of the] basic principles he defined the generated as object of opinion (cf. 28a2–3), but for the demonstration of the generated nature of the cosmos he has assumed the converse,<sup>548</sup> in order to make the definition the middle term, as should certainly be the case in the demonstrations. This is what was in fact required in order to make the statement (*logos*) a demonstration, for by embracing the reasons (*logoi*) for the generated objects, opinion takes up the rank of cause in relation to them.<sup>549</sup> This is the reason, it seems to me, that he was not satisfied with the term sense-perceptible for designating the generated, but also added that it was opinable, since sense-perception knows the activities of the perceptibles through being acted upon by them, but opinion also knows their essences, for it possesses a preconception of their reasons. In order to show that the actual essence of the perceptibles is generated, he has based the proof of his argument on the fact that the perceptible is opinable.

### *Why Plato does not add that the cosmos is 'passing away':*

**293.6–294.28**<sup>550</sup>

In addition, by not adding 'passing away' (*apollumenon*) to 'coming into being',<sup>551</sup> he reveals the reverence that he has for the cosmos, even

<sup>546</sup> Proclus cannot here of course refer to diminution of ontological status, because that is unavoidable; I follow Festugière in seeing a reference to a denial of diminution of respect, as the reference to 34b8 a few lines later proves.

<sup>547</sup> Proclus no doubt takes γινόμενα in the lemma (28c1) to refer back to γινόμενον in 27d6.

<sup>548</sup> I.e. that the opinable is generated.

<sup>549</sup> Cf. 248.11–13; as Festugière notes, opinion (or rather the opinable) is the cause inasmuch as it is the middle term in the demonstration.

<sup>550</sup> On this text see Baltes (1976–8) II. 62–6.

<sup>551</sup> I.e. at 28c1, corresponding to 28a3 in the second basic principle.

though in a sense this [addition] is true, as we said earlier.<sup>552</sup> Nevertheless this shows how scrupulous Plato is. For, although he subscribes to the fact that it (i.e. passing away) is consequent [upon coming into being], he nevertheless does not add it. This is something that those who think that for Plato the cosmos is generated in time might wonder at. Certainly that which comes into being, which he calls opinable, is at the same time that which passes away (cf. 28a3), but this is not so in that case.<sup>553</sup> 10

The cosmos, then, is both passing away and indestructible (*aphthartos*), but of course the philosopher does not call it passing away and indestructible in the same respect. That would be ridiculous. Rather, it is indestructible in respect of time, just as it is also ungenerated [in that respect]. If that which is generated is destructible, as is written in the *Republic* (546a2),<sup>554</sup> then that which is indestructible is ungenerated. It is passing away inasmuch as it is incapable of holding itself together. For just as the corporeal as far as it depends on itself is unmoved but is moved by something else, in the same way as far as it depends on itself it is destructible but is held together by something else (cf. 41a7–b2). No body has the capacity to engender itself or hold itself together. After all, everything that engenders (*gennân*) produces, and everything that produces is incorporeal. Even if it is a body, it produces by means of incorporeal powers.<sup>555</sup> Therefore everything that engenders is incorporeal, everything that holds together is productive of an effect – I mean of unification and of being unscattered – and everything that produces an effect is indivisible. Therefore everything that holds together is indivisible. That, then, which holds itself together cannot be a body, for holding together does not belong to body. It [the body] is divisible *qua* body, as has been stated in the *Sophist* against those who affirm that all things are bodies.<sup>556</sup> But that which holds together is indivisible. If that which is held together is body and that which holds together is incorporeal, then body is not that which holds itself together. It is necessary, therefore, for that which is held together by itself to be indivisible. Just as, then, the body in accordance with its own nature has a power that is limited, so in accordance with its own nature it is an object that passes away, not because it is [intrinsically] suitable for destruction,<sup>557</sup> but because it is by nature unable to preserve itself, and not because it is potentially 25 30 294 5

<sup>552</sup> At 241.14–19.

<sup>553</sup> I.e. of those who follow the interpretation of Atticus, because the pre-cosmic chaos is ungenerated yet sense-perceptible.

<sup>554</sup> Already cited at 287.26. <sup>555</sup> I.e. of the soul.

<sup>556</sup> The famous passage at *Soph.* 246a7–c3.

<sup>557</sup> With a view to the cosmos, which in fact will not suffer destruction, Proclus argues that body as such is not inherently condemned to destruction but can escape it, as will also be the case for the heavenly bodies in 41a–b.

destructible – so that you would seek that it is also destructible in actuality – but because it is unable to provide itself with indestructibility.

10 What, then, is the source of its everlastingness (*to aidion*) and from where does it receive its unlimited power (*apeiros dunamis*)? My answer would be: from the efficient cause. Just as that is the source of its motion, so it is the source of its generation, and it is always generated. After all, everything that is generated from an unmoved cause has obtained an inexhaustible nature, as the splendid Aristotle says somewhere as well.<sup>558</sup>  
 15 The result is that, in accordance with this argument too, the cosmos should possess everlastingness, since it proceeds from an unmoved creativity. Since as far as its own nature is concerned it is generated, it always comes into being from the Father. And because, being entire and whole, it is not uncompleted, in addition to coming into being it also **has come into being** (28b7), whereby its movement at any rate is ‘always in the process of completion’, as that person [Aristotle] says too.<sup>559</sup> All the more reason, therefore, that the generation [that takes place] in virtue of its essence is always in the process of completion, imitating the completeness of the maker. As a result it is always becoming and **it has come to be** what it is always becoming. It is unable to receive as a whole and all at the same time the infinitude of the power of the one who engenders it, but it is continuously (*aei*) in accordance with the present empowered  
 20 by this power for its existence by virtue of the contact that it has with the infinite in accordance with the present.<sup>560</sup> It does receive something of that [Father], and this occurs on account of the Giver and not on its own account, since it does not have the strength to accept the infinite all together. In this way the everlasting nature of the cosmos remains intact, and there is also room for generation.

### *Comparison between Plato and Aristotle: 294.28–296.12*<sup>561</sup>

30 In this respect at least, the two men do not engage in conflict, but they do differ.<sup>562</sup> Plato says that the essential nature of the heaven is coextensive

<sup>558</sup> Cf. *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072a21ff., as suggested by Festugière. On the epithet cf. above n. 296.

<sup>559</sup> Same quotation already given above at 282.21, 290.27.

<sup>560</sup> On the inability of lower ontological levels fully to accept what higher levels possess see above n. 377 and 546.

<sup>561</sup> On this text see Baltes (1976–8) II. 62–73, and on the comparison between Plato and Aristotle see further the Introduction, pp. 13–14.

<sup>562</sup> A valuable summary of the differences that Proclus perceives between the two great philosophers, in spite of his tendency – shared with other later Neoplatonists – to harmonize their thought. See further the Introduction, p. 14.

with the whole of time,<sup>563</sup> whereas Aristotle simply posits that it is always existing,<sup>564</sup> even if he too is compelled by means of lengthy argumentation to lead it[s nature] back to temporal infinity by calling eternity (*aiôn*) an infinite stable power.<sup>565</sup> But he [also] demonstrates that an infinite power cannot belong to a finite body.<sup>566</sup> It follows, then, that the cosmos, as a somatic entity, must always be receiving the infinite power, but that it never possesses it in its entirety, [precisely] because it is finite. The only way, then, to pronounce the truth in its case is to say that it *becomes* infinite in power but *is not* [ever] such. And if it becomes such, then it is plain that it is infinitized<sup>567</sup> throughout infinite time, for it is fitting for the eternal alone to [actually] *be* infinite, whereas for that which is infinitely coming into being it is the infinitizing together with time that is fitting. Becoming is coupled with time, while existence is coupled with eternity. The result is that he too [Aristotle] would be compelled to agree that the cosmos is coming into being in a sense.

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Both of them also say that the cosmos is numerically the same, but, consistent with their principles, the one [Aristotle] says it *is* such, the other [Plato] that it *becomes* such. The one [Plato] has posited an efficient cause from which the universe derives its existence [as being] prior to the universe; the other [Aristotle] does not teach an efficient cause for any of the everlasting beings. And the one [Plato] has engendered time together with the essential nature of the heaven, while the other [Aristotle] did this together with movement, for time, he claims, is the number of movement.<sup>568</sup>

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Elsewhere too Aristotle was in the habit of doing this (i.e. differing from Plato).<sup>569</sup> For example, (1) what Plato attributes to the One, he ascribes to the Intellect, that is, non-multiplicity, being the object of desire and not having any of the secondary things as object of its thought; and (2) what Plato attributes to the demiurgic Intellect, Aristotle ascribes to the heaven and the heavenly gods, for it is from them that creativity and providence take place; and (3) what Plato attributes to the essential nature of the heaven, this man ascribes to its circular movement, placing theological principles at a distance and spending more time on physical

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<sup>563</sup> Especially when he contrasts the cosmos and the eternal paradigm at 38c1–3.

<sup>564</sup> See his discussion at *Cael.* 1.10.

<sup>565</sup> There does not appear to be a direct textual basis for this in Aristotle's works. Proclus is probably thinking of the discussion at *Cael.* 1.10; cf. also *Cael.* 2.1, 283b28, *Part. an.* 644b23. The term αἰών is in fact rarely used in his writings.

<sup>566</sup> See above 253.8 (and n. 292), 267.13 (and n. 372).

<sup>567</sup> Proclus uses an extremely rare verb here, ἀπειρώω. In the next clause he uses the derivative verb συναπειρώω, which is not recorded in LSJ.

<sup>568</sup> Aristotle's famous definition of time, *Phys.* 4.11, 219b1–2, 220a23–25.

<sup>569</sup> On this text see Steel (1987) 225.

296 argumentation than he should. Since the splendid Aristotle copiously  
prattles all over the place about the reciprocations of the generated and  
the destructible and of the ungenerated and the indestructible,<sup>570</sup> we  
should remind him that much earlier Plato too agrees with these fun-  
damental propositions (*axiōmata*) when he writes in the *Republic* on the  
5 one hand that 'for everything that has come into being destruction fol-  
lows,'<sup>571</sup> and in the *Phaedrus* on the other that what is ungenerated is  
also immortal.<sup>572</sup> How, then, is it possible that he would ascribe gener-  
ation to the universe and not introduce destruction [for it] as well, or  
that he would ascribe destruction to that which is moving in a disharmo-  
nious and disorderly manner without also giving it generation before its  
10 destruction? But in actual fact he has devised for the universe [a form of]  
generation which was different, and has adapted [a form of] everlasting-  
ness [for it] which was appropriate for the manner of its generation.

### *Coming into being requires a cause*

15 Again, in the case of that which came into being we say that it necessarily  
came into being by [the agency of] some cause.<sup>573</sup> (28c2–3)

### *How the argument relates to what precedes: 296.15–29*

The argument proceeds in conjunction with the basic principles (*bupotheseis*), or rather with the order of the realities from which the basic principles have been taken. For just as everywhere the form is dependent on the efficient cause, so the primary basic principles are continuous with the secondary and in relation to the demonstrations they form a  
20 starting-point for those that follow them. Since it has been demonstrated in accordance with the first basic principle that the cosmos is generated, using the opinable as the middle term, he next demonstrates what follows this, that it has come to be by a cause, in accordance with the second basic principle. For if the cosmos is an object that comes into being (cf. 28c1), and everything that comes into being does so by the agency of a  
25 cause (28a4), the cosmos therefore has necessarily come into being by the agency of some cause.<sup>574</sup> What, then, is the efficient cause of the universe which is the source of the coming to be that belongs to the cosmos? After the demonstration we have just had, this is the next subject that we need

<sup>570</sup> Especially in *Cael.* 1.10–11.

<sup>571</sup> 546a2, already cited above at 287.27; cf. also 292.7.      <sup>572</sup> Cf. *Pbdr.* 245d3–4.

<sup>573</sup> No divergences from Burnet's OCT text.

<sup>574</sup> Note how in this formal syllogism Proclus alternates between γινόμενος (present tense) and γέγονε (past tense).

to investigate and let us observe what kinds of arguments he has used on this subject as he proceeds.

***Interpretation in relation to the basic principles: 296.29–299.13***

But now let us briefly recall to our minds that ‘everything which comes into being necessarily does so by the agency of a cause’ (28a4–5). Everything that comes into being is incomplete (*atelês*) as regards its own nature. Being incomplete, it is by nature unable to complete itself, since in fact it cannot even do this to something else. After all, everything that is completed achieves this from a being which is actualized (*kat’ energeian on*). That which is actualized is complete (*teleios*). As a result, everything that completes another thing is always existent in accordance with that form [which it transmits]. But that which is coming into being, inasmuch as it is an object that is coming into being, is incomplete. Therefore that which comes into being, inasmuch as it comes into being, is for this reason by nature unable to complete another thing. If it cannot even complete another thing, then all the more it is incapable of completing itself. This task, of course, is superior to the other one, for the entity that makes itself complete is also able to complete something else. But that which comes into being is not able to complete something else, since it is incomplete, and therefore it does not make itself complete. But if this does not happen by its own agency, then clearly it happens by the agency of another. How will it be in a state of having come to be, if it has not been completed? Once again, then, we must state [as follows]. The cosmos comes into being. Everything that comes into being is incomplete. Everything that is incomplete is completed either by the agency of something else or by its own agency. Everything therefore that comes into being is completed either by the agency of something else or by its own agency. But [in the case of the cosmos] this certainly does not occur by its own agency. Therefore it must occur by the agency of another. The result is that it comes into being from some cause.<sup>575</sup>

In addition, the cosmos is composite and possesses its existence from dissimilar elements. But if it is composite, it has been composed either by its own agency or by that of another, for it must owe its composition to a cause, unless we should make this the result of chance and spontaneity.<sup>576</sup> If, then, it has been composed by its own agency, once again it will complete itself and found its own existence, and without realizing it we will have transferred it to the incorporeal substance. For how does

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<sup>575</sup> This paragraph is a good example of Proclus’ repetitive but didactically very thorough method of presentation.

<sup>576</sup> The alternative dismissed above at 262.1–19.

it compose itself? Do its parts arrange themselves? But then we make bodies self-moving. Do they push each other around? But what part is the first mover? How can it be pious to ascribe [the production of] the entire cosmos to such pushing and levering?<sup>577</sup> How will order (*taxis*) be derived from unordered objects and organization (*kosmos*) from objects that are unorganized? It is everywhere the case that the maker is superior to the product and the begetter to that which is begotten. And if the parts of the cosmos are material causes of its composition, what is the entity that acts on them? This, after all, is what we are seeking. If they are efficient causes, how do unorganized objects effectuate organized products and how do unordered objects effectuate ordered products? But if on the other hand the cosmos is not composite by its own agency, obviously it possesses this composition by the agency of another. If, then, (1) the cosmos is composite, (2) the composite object is composed by the agency of a cause, and (3) this composition is a form of becoming, then (4) the cosmos has its becoming from a cause. From these considerations, then, it is clear that ‘that which comes into being does so by the agency of some cause’ (cf. 28a4–5).<sup>578</sup>

But if he has called the cause of the universe’s coming into being **some cause** (28c2, cf. 28a4), this should cause us no surprise. For that which is the cause in an absolute sense and not ‘some cause’ is the cause of all things. Concerning it Plato himself has said: ‘and That one is cause of all fine things’ (*Ep.* 2, 312e2).<sup>579</sup> That [cause] is also god (*theos*) in an absolute sense. Every [cause] posterior to it is only some god, such as a creative or a life-giving god. ‘Some cause’, then, is the cause of the generated beings, because it differs from the cause of all things. For this reason he said that ‘that which comes into being does so by the agency of some cause’ (cf. 28a4–5).

It is a good thing that Plato says that the one cause stands at the head of the entire [process of] becoming.<sup>580</sup> For the multiplicity [of causes] have been gathered in order around the single first principle and the many henads have been gathered in order around the One. In the case of other philosophers, (1) some have ascribed the causation (*aitia*) [of the cosmos] to the accessory causes, (2) others have referred it to natural

<sup>577</sup> I.e. to a mechanical process, as envisaged by the atomists and Epicurus.

<sup>578</sup> Proclus in the above is in fact mostly explaining 28a4–5 rather than the present lemma.

<sup>579</sup> Festugière is right in taking *καλῶν* as a genitive plural with πάντων, but he does not realize that Proclus is alluding here to the famous text in the *Second Letter* (cited below at 356.8–10, where as here he reads πάντων καλῶν and not δπαντων τῶν καλῶν). So the reference must be to the One as ultimate highest principle, and not to the Demiurge. Both Diehl and Festugière are therefore wrong in thinking that he has 29e–30a in mind here.

<sup>580</sup> I.e. the One as stated by Plato in the *Second Letter*; see above 298.12–13.

powers, (3) others to an infinity of principles scattered [throughout the universe], (4) others to this [visible] nature, (5) yet others to the soul.<sup>581</sup> Plato, however, has dismissed all these causes, positing a single cause as the very first of all. As for this [cause], the rank of soul works with it, nature works under it,<sup>582</sup> while all the accessory causes serve it and are moved in accordance with its will (*boulêsis*). Because, therefore, the demiurgic monad stands at the head of the plurality, he has called it **cause**,<sup>583</sup> for this is indicative of its unicity. But because it does not have the first rank among the causes and is not unparticipated,<sup>584</sup> he added the [word] **some**. As a result the phrase **by [the agency of] some cause** is the same as ‘from a single cause, but not, however, the first one’. It is also, therefore, not reasonable to derive that which comes into being directly from the One, but rather the eternal, so that the entire eternal nature has its being from the One that is prior to eternity, while from it the generated and temporal has its existence. From that which is superior to the beings that produce themselves the self-subsistent beings are derived, while from these [latter] those which come into being through the agency of others arise. For there exists a continuity and series and rank of beings that proceed from the One, and those that are closer to the source (*archê*) become foundational (*bupostatikos*) for those that are further away.

### *The nature of the Demiurge*

Now it is quite a task to find the Maker and Father of this universe, and even when one has found him, to declare him to everyone is impossible.<sup>585</sup> (28c3–5)

### *Introductory remarks: 299.13–21*<sup>586</sup>

Our predecessors have rightly called attention to the fact that, once he had shown that the cosmos has come into being from a cause, Plato in

<sup>581</sup> It is difficult to put name-labels on the various alternatives in this doxography, which are probably meant in general systematizing terms. One might suggest: (1) the early Presocratics; (2) Empedocles; (3) the atomists and Epicureans; (4) Aristotle; (5) the Stoa and other immanentists.

<sup>582</sup> On the role of nature and its relation to the Demiurge and soul in this text see Martijn (2008) ch. 2.

<sup>583</sup> Diehl reads αἰτία with MS C, but it is better to follow P and read αἴτιον, because it is natural to have here a reference to the text being expounded, i.e. 28c2 (αἴτια is found only at 29d7 with reference to the final cause).

<sup>584</sup> On the unparticipated nature of the One see the earlier discussion at 226.15–19.

<sup>585</sup> No divergences from Burnet's OCT text.

<sup>586</sup> On this entire lemma see the detailed analysis of Opsomer (2001). See further the Introduction, pp. 22–4.

15 a manner worthy of his thought immediately ascended to the craftsman  
god (*theos dêmiourgos*), for the crafted nature of the engendered product  
appeared to introduce a reasoned and divine cause, and not chance or  
spontaneity,<sup>587</sup> neither of which are causes and do not have the power  
to make things exist or sustain the well-ordered procession of beings. As  
20 for us, we should first examine the wording (*lexis*) of the text on its own,  
and then proceed to the examination of the theme in its entirety as just  
indicated.<sup>588</sup>

### *Exegesis of the wording of the text: 299.21–303.23*

The **Father** (*patêr*) and the **Maker** (*poiêtês*) differ in relation to each  
other<sup>589</sup> inasmuch as (a) the former is cause of the whole of what exists,  
the latter of the cosmos and of its order and in general of formal causality;  
25 (b) the former exists as supplier of being and of unity, the latter of  
the powers and the multiform essence; (c) the former holds all things  
together in himself in a stable manner, while the latter is cause of pro-  
cession and engendering forth (*apogennêsis*); and (d) the former indicates  
ineffable and divine providence, the latter the unstinting sharing of his  
300 structures (*logoi*).

Porphyrus (fr. 40) says that **Father** is he who engenders the whole from  
himself, whereas **Maker** is he who receives the matter from another.  
5 Hence Ariston is said to be Plato's father as cause of the whole being,  
whereas the builder is said to be maker of the house because he him-  
self did not engender its matter.<sup>590</sup> If this is true, then plainly he  
should not have called the Father the Demiurge, because according to  
Timaeus he did not cause matter to exist. Does he not say this quite  
10 clearly?<sup>591</sup> Perhaps, then, **Maker** should rather be taken as indicat-  
ing the maker of form (*eidopoios*), for we say that all those who bring  
an object into existence from non-existence are 'making'. But when  
the process involves life, then we speak of **Father**, for fathers are the  
causes of living things and of beings that are alive,<sup>592</sup> and they release

<sup>587</sup> Cf. the brief doxography above at 298.19–23.

<sup>588</sup> The last three words render οὕτω, i.e. Proclus will then turn to the major themes already discussed by his predecessors.

<sup>589</sup> A standard exegetical question at least since the time of Plutarch, as witnessed by his little treatise *Quaestiones Platonicae* 2, which asks the question: 'Why did he call the supreme god Father and Maker of all things?' (*Mor.* 1000E).

<sup>590</sup> I.e. the difference between the biological and the technological metaphor.

<sup>591</sup> At 30a2, where the Demiurge acts on the already existent disorderly situation, interpreted by the Neoplatonists as matter.

<sup>592</sup> ζῳῶν ἄτιοι καὶ ζῳόντων τινῶν. It is hard to see what distinction Proclus has in mind here. It could just be an example of unnecessary prolixity.

seeds which contain life. Let this [topic], then, be treated in such a way.

**This universe** indicates not only the corporeal masses and the spheres in their entirety together with all their contents, but also the life-giving and intellective powers that use these masses as their vehicle.<sup>593</sup> It certainly also embraces all the encosmic gods themselves, as well as the entire divinity of the cosmos, which the encosmic gods encircle in their procession. Let therefore the single divinity and the single intellect and the divine soul and the entire mass together with the coupled divine and intellective sets,<sup>594</sup> both in their psychic and their corporeal aspect – for each monad has a plurality coupled with it – be taken as equivalent to **the universe**, for all these things are what **the universe** means. But perhaps the word **this** is added in order to indicate that it is sense-perceptible and in some way partial. For **this** is not said of the entire intelligible realm, since it embraces all the intellective forms. Moreover, the word **this** is also fitting for this universe, in that it has obtained a sense-perceptible and material nature.

It is thus **quite a task to find** the Demiurge of this universe, as he says. Now, discovery is of two kinds, the one proceeding from the primary beings by means of scientific knowledge, the other finding its way from the secondary beings by means of recollection.<sup>595</sup> The first you would describe as difficult, because the discovery of the intermediate powers is connected with the highest doctrine, but I am inclined to say that the discovery from the secondary level is even more difficult than this one. For if we were to view the essential nature of the Demiurge and the entirety of his powers from this level, it is necessary to observe (a) the entire nature of these beings here engendered by him, all the visible regions of the cosmos and the invisible physical powers in it, which have caused the sympathy and antipathy between regions to exist, and (b) prior to these the permanent physical structures (*logoi*) and the [essential] natures themselves, both the more holistic [and the more partial], those which are immaterial and those encased in matter, as well as natures that are both divine and demonic and those of mortal living things, and (c) also the kinds that fall under the domain of life, both everlasting and mortal, those undefiled by matter and those material, those which form wholes and those which are parts, beings that are rational and those

<sup>593</sup> I.e. the realm of soul, including primarily the World-soul.

<sup>594</sup> Literally 'number'.

<sup>595</sup> The distinction is between discovery κατ' ἐπιστήμην and discovery κατὰ ἀνάμνησιν, the former moving downwards from first principles to their detailed unfolding, the latter moving upwards from empirical observation to the noetic realm and the higher realities.

which are irrational, those plenitudes superior to us, through which the entire realm between the gods and the mortal nature has been linked together, all kinds of souls and other sets of gods in accordance with other regions of the universe, and the ineffable and the effable symbols of the cosmos, through which it is linked to the Father.<sup>596</sup> The person who makes the attempt to attain the contemplation of the Demiurge without this [preliminary knowledge] would be less perfect in his understanding of the Father, and it is not lawful for anything imperfect to have contact with the All-perfect.<sup>597</sup>

But it is also necessary for the soul, after becoming an intellectual cosmos and assimilating itself to the extent possible to the entirety of the intelligible cosmos, to make its approach to the Maker of the universe, and from this approach to become familiar<sup>598</sup> with him somehow through its continual concentration – for untiring activity focused on an object summons forth and kindles the rational principles we have in us – and through this familiarity to stand at the gate of the Father and be unified with him.<sup>599</sup> This is the discovery, to encounter him, to be unified, to be together as the soul alone with him alone, to obtain this self-manifestation, to snatch itself from all other activity and focus on him, when it will think that even scientific arguments are stories, as it is together with the Father and feasts with him on the truth of Being and ‘in a pure light it is purely initiated in perfect and unwavering visions’.<sup>600</sup> The act of discovering is something like this, not a discovery involving the faculty of opinion, for that is ambivalent and no further advanced than irrational life. It is also not scientific, for that is syllogistic and composite, and does not attain the intellectual essence of the intellectual Demiurge. Rather it occurs in virtue of the intuitive act of concentrated

<sup>596</sup> I.e. in theurgy. This sentence of seventeen lines undertakes to give the essential structure of the contents of the cosmos primarily in terms of the various beings it contains. It is encouraged by Plato’s language in the *Timaeus*, e.g. at 30c and 39e–40c, but goes into more detail.

<sup>597</sup> Festugière suggests this phrase is a variant on the famous pronouncement at *Phd.* 67b1: it is not lawful for the impure to have contact with what is pure.

<sup>598</sup> In this passage Proclus refers to two different terminologies for the approach of human beings to the divine: (a) assimilation (ὁμοίωσις), famously used by Plato at *Tht.* 176b1; (b) appropriation (οἰκειώσις), which has a Stoic origin but by the time of Philo is frequently used in the Platonist tradition as well.

<sup>599</sup> As noted by Festugière, the image of the gate is found at *Phlb.* 64c1 in relation to the Good. The language of mysticism reminds us of Plotinus, but we should bear in mind that Proclus is only speaking of the Demiurge here.

<sup>600</sup> This is an adaptation of *Phdr.* 250c3–4, the vision that the soul enjoys when it ascends on the wings of love.

vision,<sup>601</sup> the direct contact with the Intelligible and the unification with the demiurgic intellect.<sup>602</sup>

This discovery is what one might properly call **quite a task**, whether because it is difficult and hard to attain, appearing to the souls after the entire passage of life,<sup>603</sup> or because for the souls it is a true contest. For it is only when the soul has passed beyond the distraction of birth and the [process of] purification and beyond the illumination of scientific knowledge that its intellective activity and the intellect in us lights up, anchoring the soul in the Father and establishing it immaculately in the demiurgic thoughts. It connects light with light,<sup>604</sup> not in the manner of scientific knowledge, but in a manner that is more beautiful, more intellective and more unificatory.<sup>605</sup> This is the Paternal harbour,<sup>606</sup> the discovery of the Father, the immaculate unification (*benôsis*) with him.

Next, the [words] **even when one has found him, to declare him to everyone is impossible** could perhaps be taken to reveal the practice of the Pythagoreans.<sup>607</sup> They keep their doctrines about divine things secret and do not discuss them with **everyone**. As the Eleatic stranger says, ‘the eyes of the crowd do not have the strength to gaze at the truth’.<sup>608</sup> Perhaps, however, one could also say this, which would be a much more sublime interpretation. The person who has found him is unable to tell this to others as he has seen it, for the discovery is not made by the soul who makes a statement, but by the soul who is initiated in and lies outstretched towards the divine light, not moving with its own movement, but keeping its own silence as it were. For if it is by nature not able to grasp the essential nature of other realities either by name or by a defining proposition or by scientific knowledge, but by intuitive thought (*noêsis*) alone, as he himself says in the *Letters*,<sup>609</sup> how could it discover the essential nature of the Demiurge in any other way

<sup>601</sup> On the term ἐπιβολή used here see above n. 276.

<sup>602</sup> In terms of the distinction made at 300.30–2 the process of discovery falls under the second category but does not involve the lower reaches of the process of recollection at the empirical level.

<sup>603</sup> Or with Festugière, ‘after they have passed through the entire hierarchy of life’, i.e. all the epistemological stages from opinion to intellect.

<sup>604</sup> Similar thoughts at *in Remp.* I. 177.21, *PT* IV. 67.16.

<sup>605</sup> I.e. the process of coming to know the Demiurge ends with the noetic state of ‘intuitive knowledge’, which is mystical because it transcends the form of knowledge that according to Proclus comes naturally to the human soul, i.e. discursive knowledge.

<sup>606</sup> On this phrase and the entire passage 300.28–302.25 see Van den Berg (2001) 51–6. The concept most probably derives from the Chaldean Oracles.

<sup>607</sup> Cf. Iamblichus, *De vita Pyth.* 32, 226.8–227.9 Deubner.

<sup>608</sup> Quoting from memory, Proclus gives a paraphrase of *Soph.* 254a10–b1 (reference to the soul deleted, ‘truth’ replaces ‘divine’).

<sup>609</sup> *Ep.* 7, 342a7–e2.

than intuitively (*noerôs*)? How could the soul, having found him in this way, be able to report what it had seen by means of nouns and verbs and convey this to others? After all, because discursive thought proceeds through combination, it is unable to express the nature that is unified and simple.

But what is this, one might say? Are we not making many declarations about the Demiurge and the other gods and even about the One itself? As an answer we might say that we speak about them, but we do not describe what they each are in themselves. We are able to speak scientifically, but not intuitively.<sup>610</sup> This is what discovering is, as we said previously.<sup>611</sup> If discovery takes place by the soul who keeps silent, how could the flow of language through the mouth be sufficient to bring to light the essential nature of what has been discovered?

***Who is the Demiurge? Opinions of Proclus' predecessors:***  
**303.24–310.2**

Well, then, let us after these considerations follow the light of scientific knowledge and examine who this Demiurge is and what kind of rank he has been assigned among the beings that exist.<sup>612</sup> [This is worth doing,] for the ancient interpreters have come to different opinions on the matter.<sup>613</sup>

(1) Numenius celebrates three gods.<sup>614</sup> The first he calls 'Father', the second he calls 'Maker', the third he calls 'Product' (*poiëma*), for in his view the cosmos is the third god. As a result, according to him the Demiurge is double, the first god and the second, while what is produced by him is the third god, for it is better to speak in this way rather than to say in his theatrical manner: grandfather, child, grandchild.

He who speaks like this in the first place makes a mistake by counting the Good together with these causes. It is not the Good's nature to be coupled to anything else or to have a rank second to another. In Plato the Father is ranked second to the Maker.<sup>615</sup>

<sup>610</sup> The distinction, as so often, is between discursive knowledge (ἐπιστημονικῶς) and intuitive knowledge (νοεῶς).

<sup>611</sup> Above at 302.1–24.

<sup>612</sup> The emphasis of the following survey is theological rather than philosophical. Proclus is convinced that the Demiurge is to be identified with a particular god in Plato's elaborate theology, i.e. as interpreted by the Neoplatonists, and it is the interpreter's task to identify which god he is. His final answer is given at 317.20–319.21. See further Introduction, pp. 22–4.

<sup>613</sup> Following Festugière in his interpretation of the γάρ at the beginning of the sentence.

<sup>614</sup> Fr. 21 Des Places. On this passage see Dillon (1996) 366–7, Frede (1987) 1055.

<sup>615</sup> Because the text reads 'Maker and Father' in that order. Although Proclus has not

In addition, that which transcends all [forms of] relationship<sup>616</sup> is ranked with those beings that fall under it or after it. But what one should do is refer these [secondary beings] to that which is First, but remove every [form of] relationship from it. He also, therefore, does not succeed in connecting the Paternal principle of the universe to the First [principle]. For principles such as these<sup>617</sup> have emerged in the ranks of gods which are posterior to It [i.e. the One].

Thirdly, beside this, it is not correct to divide up the Father and the Maker, when Plato has celebrated the one and same [god] with both words, for everywhere a single creation and a single Maker and Father has been taught in Plato's doctrine. To follow the literal text and split up the single cause is like saying that Plato has called the universe cosmos and heaven and so has spoken of two products, the one the heaven and the other the cosmos, just as here he speaks of a double demiurgic principle, the one the Father and the other the Maker.

(2) As for Harpocraton,<sup>618</sup> I would be surprised if even he himself would be satisfied with the classification he makes with regard to the Demiurge. He follows that man (i.e. Numenius) in his teaching about the three gods and in making the Demiurge double, but the first god he calls Ouranos and Kronos, the second god Zeus and Zên, the third god Heaven and Cosmos.<sup>619</sup> But then he changes his scheme, calling the first god Zeus and King of the Intelligible realm and the second god Ruler, and [so] the same god becomes for him Zeus and Kronos and Ouranos.<sup>620</sup> All these, then, are the First principle, from which Parmenides has stripped every attribute, that is, every name and every relation and every definition.<sup>621</sup> Whereas we have not even permitted ourselves to call the First principle Father, he has declared the same entity to be father and child and grandchild.<sup>622</sup>

(3) Atticus,<sup>623</sup> who was the teacher of this man (i.e. Harpocraton), of his own accord identifies the Demiurge with the Good, even though he is called 'good' by Plato (29e1) but not 'the Good' and is described as

explained this in any detail, Numenius has clearly identified his first god with the Good as highest principle.

<sup>616</sup> I.e. the One. <sup>617</sup> This is how I render the unexpected plural ταῦτα in the text.

<sup>618</sup> Fr. 13 Dillon, 22 T Giocè. This (and 305.6) is the only reference to him in the Commentary. On this text see Dillon (1996) 259.

<sup>619</sup> Ouranos (Heaven) is thus the name for both the first and the third god. Harpocraton thus awkwardly combines the mythological background and Plato's text at 28b2.

<sup>620</sup> I.e. by combining the first and the second scheme.

<sup>621</sup> In the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides*; cf. 142a.

<sup>622</sup> I.e. using the same titles as in Numenius' interpretation.

<sup>623</sup> Fr. 12 Des Places. On this text see Dillon (1996) 254.

10 Intellect (39e7), whereas the Good is cause of all beingness (*ousia*) and is beyond Being, as we have learnt in the *Republic* (cf. 509b9). What would he say about the Paradigm?<sup>624</sup> Either (a) it is prior to the Demiurge and will then be something more august than the Good, or (b) it is in the Demiurge and so the First principle will be multiple, or (c) it is posterior to the Demiurge, and the Good will turn to what comes after it – something which one is not even permitted to say – and have that as the object of its thought.

15 (4) After these men comes Plotinus the philosopher, who assumes that the Demiurge is double, the one in the Intelligible realm, the other the guiding principle of the universe, and this he affirms correctly,<sup>625</sup> for in a sense the cosmic intellect<sup>626</sup> too is demiurge of the universe. Certainly  
20 Aristotle, who declared this entity to be the First principle, also called him Fate (*Heimarmenê*) and addressed him with the name of Zeus.<sup>627</sup> But, again, he is also the transcendent Father and Creator, whom he posits as existing in the Intelligible, calling the entire realm between the  
25 One and the cosmos intelligible. There in his view is the true Heaven and the kingdom of Kronos and the Intellect of Zeus,<sup>628</sup> just as if someone would say that in heaven there is the sphere of Kronos and of Zeus and of Ares.<sup>629</sup> The Intelligible realm as a whole is indeed a One-many and one Intellect embracing a multiplicity of intelligible objects. These,  
306 then, are the philosophical views that Plotinus gives on the present subject.

(5) Amelius<sup>630</sup> makes the Demiurge triple and says that there are three Intellects and three Kings, one who is, one who has, one who sees.<sup>631</sup> These three differ from each other, because the first Intellect really *is*  
5 what he is, while the second is the Intelligible which is in him, but he *has*

<sup>624</sup> See also 431.14–20.

<sup>625</sup> Proclus' analysis of Plotinus' thought here is based on an interpretation of *Enn.* 3.9.1.23–27; see the analysis of Festugière in his note ad loc.

<sup>626</sup> I.e. the intellect of the World-soul.

<sup>627</sup> I.e. in the Ps.Aristotelian writing *De mundo* (ch. 7, 401a28, b9), which Proclus here cites as if it were authentic. But at III. 272.20, when giving an overview of opinions on Heimarmene, he seems to have some doubts about its authenticity.

<sup>628</sup> Proclus derives these interpretations from *Enn.* 5.1.3.24ff. (see also 5.8.13). He seems intent on forcing Plotinus' views into the theological mould of his Platonist predecessors.

<sup>629</sup> I.e. just as there are various planets in the physical heaven (Saturn, Jupiter, Mars), so there are various intelligible gods in the true intelligible heaven.

<sup>630</sup> There is no adequate fragment collection of Amelius (the collection of Zoumpos (1956) is outdated and rare). See the list of passages at Brisson (1987a) 857 (and on this passage 826); cf. also 431.26–8.

<sup>631</sup> This passage is to be complemented with the further discussions at 361.26–362.9, 398.16–26.

the Intelligible which is prior to him and certainly participates in him, which is the reason why he is second. The third too *is* the Intelligible in him, for every Intellect is the same as the Intelligible that is coupled with him, but he *has* the Intellect in the second and he *sees* the Intellect that is first, for the greater the separation the feebler the possession. He assumes, then, that these three Intellects and Demiurges are [to be identified with] the three Kings in Plato (*Ep.* 2, 312e1–4) and the three in Orpheus<sup>632</sup> – Phanes, Ouranos and Kronos – but the one for him who is the Demiurge in particular is Phanes. 10

Now in response to this man too it is worth saying that Plato everywhere has the habit of ascending from multiplicity to the unities (*henades*) from which the rank consisting of multiples has proceeded. Or rather, even prior to Plato,<sup>633</sup> in accordance with the rank of the realities itself, unity is prior to multiplicity and every divine rank has its starting-point in a monad. It is indeed necessary for the set of gods to proceed from the triad, but prior to the triad is the monad. Where, then, is the demiurgic monad, so that the triad can proceed from it? How is it possible that the cosmos which is one could be fashioned by a cause that is not one? There is a much greater necessity that the cause has been unified and is monadic, so that the cosmos too can be single in its kind. Let, then, the three demiurges stand.<sup>634</sup> But who is the single Demiurge prior to the three, considering that none of the divine ranks has its starting-point in multiplicity? 15 20 25

In addition, if the Paradigm is one and the cosmos is one, how will the Demiurge too not be one prior to the multiples,<sup>635</sup> looking [as he does] towards the single Paradigm and making the cosmos single in its kind?<sup>636</sup> Therefore the sum total of demiurges should commence not from a triad, but from a monad. 30

(6) After Amelius, [we come to] Porphyry (fr. 41).<sup>637</sup> Thinking that he is in agreement with Plotinus, he calls the soul the hypercosmic Demiurge on the one hand and its Intellect, to which it has turned, the Living-Thing-itself (*autozôion*) on the other, so that in his view the Paradigm of the Demiurge is the Intellect. 307

<sup>632</sup> *Orph. fr.* 96 Kern. <sup>633</sup> I.e. from a systematic rather than a historical viewpoint.

<sup>634</sup> I.e. there is a triad involved, but Amelius has not identified it correctly; cf. 308.22, 310.22.

<sup>635</sup> I.e. the three demiurges as postulated by Amelius.

<sup>636</sup> 'Single of its kind' is μονογενής, used climactically by Plato for the universe at 31b3, 92c9.

<sup>637</sup> See also 431.20–3. Having discussed this passage, Opsomer (2001) 61 concludes that 'it does not look like Proclus has made an honest attempt to give a fair account of Porphyry's views'.

5 It is worth asking him in which text Plotinus makes the soul a demiurge. How does he think this is consonant with Plato, who continually names the Demiurge god and Intellect, but never soul?<sup>638</sup> How in this case can he call the cosmos god?<sup>639</sup> How does the soul pass through all the beings within the cosmos? After all, not everything participates in soul, but everything does have a share in the demiurgic Providence. The  
10 divine creative activity is able to engender intellect and gods, but the soul is by nature incapable of bringing forth anything that is beyond the rank of the psychic. It goes without saying that this actual assertion is one of those that needs a good deal of substantiation, if [one is to claim that] Plato ever knows of an imparticipable soul.

15 (7) But after this [interpreter] we come to the divine Iamblichus (fr. 34),<sup>640</sup> who wrote at great length against the opinion of Porphyry, condemning it as [not] being Plotinian.<sup>641</sup> But as for his own teaching, in his doctrine of the gods he names the entire Intelligible cosmos as the Demiurge, as is clear at least from his own words, in which he expresses  
20 himself in the same terms as Plotinus. He declares at any rate in his Commentaries as follows: 'True essential being (*ousia*) and principle of those things that come into being and the intelligible paradigms of the cosmos, which we call "intelligible cosmos", and all those causes which we hold to pre-exist in all natural entities, all of these the Demiurge  
25 god whom we are now seeking has gathered together in unity and holds under his sway.' These are his words. If through them he indicates that in the Demiurge all things exist in a demiurgic mode, including Being itself and the Intelligible cosmos, he will agree both with his own philosophy  
30 and with Orpheus, who says:

308 For all these things lie in the body of mighty Zeus,<sup>642</sup>

and:

All things exist by nature together in the belly of Zeus,<sup>643</sup>

and other such statements. And it is not surprising that each of the  
5 gods is the universe in his own different way, the one demiurgically, another maintainingly, another immutably, another mutably, yet another in another manner according to his own divine nature.<sup>644</sup>

<sup>638</sup> Modern interpreters such as Solmsen, Cherniss and Tarán have also concluded that the Demiurge is a mythical doublet for the World-soul; cf. Brisson (1998) 76–81.

<sup>639</sup> I.e. if the source of the cosmos's order is itself by means of its own Soul.

<sup>640</sup> See also 431.23–6. On this text see Dillon (1973) 307.

<sup>641</sup> The addition of *μή* to the text, as conjectured by Kroll, is clearly necessary.

<sup>642</sup> *Orph. fr.* 168.10 Kern. <sup>643</sup> *Orph. fr.* 167.7 Kern.

<sup>644</sup> As Festugière notes, the first three of these adverbs are found together at III. 315.15–16 in Proclus' comments on *κατά τρόπον* at 42e6, each expressing different aspects of the

But if he thinks that the Demiurge represents the entire level (*platos*) in between the cosmos and the One, it is worth raising some difficulties, and we shall oppose his account on the basis of what he himself has taught us.<sup>645</sup> Where, for example, are the Kings prior to Zeus who are Zeus' fathers? Where are the Kings whom Plato talks about,<sup>646</sup> whom he himself [Iamblichus] requires to be ranked beyond the cosmos after the One? And how, if we said that the always-existent (*to on*) is the most primal Being, could we maintain that the Demiurge is the entire expanse of the Intelligible cosmos, which is itself also always-existent inasmuch as it is the Living-Thing-itself as well? It may be that we shall be compelled in this case to say that the Demiurge is not the always-existent, except perhaps inasmuch as he has embraced this entity (i.e. the Living-Thing-itself) together with all the other beings that always exist.

That, however, Iamblichus himself in these remarks has expressed himself in rather general terms but elsewhere has proclaimed the demiurgic rank more accurately should be understood from the following. In his work *On the Address of Zeus in the Timaeus*<sup>647</sup> he assigns to the Demiurge, after the [three] intelligible triads and the three triads of [intelligible and] intellective gods, the third rank among the Fathers in the intellective seventh [triad].<sup>648</sup> These three gods, he says, are also celebrated among the Pythagoreans. They teach that to the One Intellect, which also contains within itself the universal monads, belongs simplicity and indivisibility and goodness and permanence and unification with the intelligibles and tokens of this kind that indicate transcendence. As regards the middle Intellect, which gathers together the plenitude of the three, they say that the finest indications are the generative power of the gods, the gathering together of the three gods, the completive power of the (divine) activity, the engendering power of the divine life,

Demiurge's activity. συνοχικῶς is as unusual a word in Greek as 'maintainingly' is in English. According to the *TLG* it is found only in these two texts in extant ancient Greek literature.

<sup>645</sup> I.e. Proclus gives a critique of Iamblichus' account based on internal inconsistencies. Iamblichus cannot maintain that the Demiurge represents the entire intelligible realm in between the One and the cosmos because he also has to place other gods in that space.

<sup>646</sup> At *Ep.* 2, 312e1–4, alluded to above at 306.11–12.

<sup>647</sup> Not in Dillon (1973), because it is not a commentary, but cited and discussed on 308, 417–419. As he notes, the metaphysical scheme set out in this work must have been much more elaborate than the one given in his commentary on the *Timaeus*.

<sup>648</sup> Accepting Festugière's emendation of Diehl's text at two points; see his note ad loc. See also the comments of Opsomer (2001) 62.

and above all the processive and beneficent activity. But with regard to the third Intellect, which fashions the universe, they teach that its finest attributes are the stable processions, the making and the maintenance of the universal causes, the separated universal causes assigned to the species, and all the demiurgic processions and properties similar to these.

The theology of Iamblichus, as it relates to the Demiurge of the universe, should thus be judged from this passage. How, indeed, could the Demiurge be the entire realm of eternal Being, if he [Plato] had already tied down the always-existent by means of the defining statement (cf. 28a1–2), but in the case of the Demiurge he says that ‘it is quite a task to find him and, even when one has found him, to declare him to everyone is impossible’? How can these words speak the truth about that which has been presented in a definition and brought to light for all those present?<sup>649</sup>

(8) After Iamblichus Theodore<sup>650</sup> follows [the approach of] Amelius and states that there are three demiurges. He does not, however, order them immediately after the One, but on this side of the Intelligible and Intellective gods. The first he names ‘Essential Intellect’, the second ‘Intellective Essence’, the third ‘Source of souls’. The first is indivisible, the second has been divided into wholes, the third has effectuated the division as far as the individual beings.

Against this man too we must say the same as we also said to the noble Amelius. It is our proclaimed view that these three gods, or gods analogous to these, exist. There are not, however, three Demiurges, but rather the one is the intelligible [paradigm]<sup>651</sup> of the Demiurge, the second is his generative Power, and the third is the true demiurgic Intellect. One should also consider whether the ‘Source of souls’ should be placed third, for the Power [of generation] belongs to the intermediate [deity], as he himself says somewhere, and whether it should be named like this in a partial manner,<sup>652</sup> and not more universally as source of life. After all, the Source of souls is just one of the sources in it. Life exists not only in souls and ensouled beings, but there is also Divine and intellective life prior to the psychic realm,<sup>653</sup> which they say proceeds from there as the various conduits are separated out in accordance with the various forms of life.

<sup>649</sup> I.e. the always-existent, which Iamblichus seemed superficially to identify with the Demiurge.

<sup>650</sup> Test. 12 Deuse. This earlier Platonist has already been cited at 12.9, 213.3.

<sup>651</sup> Accepting the conjecture of Kroll. <sup>652</sup> I.e. as Source of individual souls.

<sup>653</sup> I.e. Life in the triad Being–Life–Intellect in the noetic realm.

*Who is the Demiurge? Opinions of Syrianus and Proclus:*

310.3–319.21

Such, then, is a concise presentation of the doctrines of the ancient interpreters concerning the Demiurge. As for our own teacher's views concerning him,<sup>654</sup> which we believe have come closest of all to reaching Plato's thought on the matter, come, let us write them down in a succinct form.<sup>655</sup>

According to him [Syrianus], therefore, there is a single Demiurge, the god who marks off the limit of the intellectual gods. On the one hand he is replete with the intelligible monads and the sources of life, on the other he projects from himself the entire work of creation and, after placing the more partial fathers<sup>656</sup> in charge of the universe, establishes himself eternally unmoved on the peak of Olympus.<sup>657</sup> He rules over two worlds, the supra-celestial and the heavenly, embracing the beginning, the middle and the ends of the universe.<sup>658</sup> For the demiurgic process of organization there are in fact four causes: (a) the cause of the universe operating universally; (b) the cause of the parts operating universally; (c) the cause of the whole operating partially; (d) the cause of the parts operating partially. The entire work of creation is thus fourfold, but the demiurgic monad has bound to itself the universal providence of the whole. On it [the monad] the demiurgic triad depends, governing the parts in a universal manner and dividing up the power of the monad, just as again in the case of the other divisible work of creation the monad precedes the triad, the one ordering the wholes partially, the other ordering the parts partially. On this triad the entire plurality depends, dancing around it and distributing itself around it, as well as dividing up its activities and being filled up with it (i.e. with its powers). Just as, then, the multiplicity of paradigms is preceded by the One, so too the multiplicity of demiurges is preceded by the Demiurge, so that they all follow each other, the single intelligible Paradigm, the single intellectual Demiurge, and the single sense-perceptible cosmos which is unique in its kind.<sup>659</sup>

If these views are correct, the Demiurge of the universe is the limit of the Intellectual beings. Established in the intelligible realm, he is replete with power, through which he brings forth the universe, and he

<sup>654</sup> I.e. of Syrianus.

<sup>655</sup> As Opsomer (2001) 64 observes, Syrianus continues the theological approach which Proclus has discerned in his predecessors, but tries to introduce greater precision.

<sup>656</sup> I.e. the so-called young gods (42d6) who create the parts of the cosmos.

<sup>657</sup> Proclus here combines 41a–42e with its Homeric inspiration, *Il.* 8.3.

<sup>658</sup> This is an adaptation of *Laws* 716a; cf. the citation at 315.14.

<sup>659</sup> I.e. μονογενής, cf. 396.30 and above n. 330.

converts all things to himself. It is for this reason that Timaeus calls him 'Nous' (39a7) and 'best of causes' (29a6), and says that 'he looks towards the intelligible Paradigm' (29a3). By this [last] phrase he separates him from the primary Intelligible gods, in calling him Nous he distinguishes him from the Intelligible and Intellective gods, and in calling him the best of causes he establishes him above all the other demiurges, both hypercosmic and encosmic. He does indeed give demiurgic agents the name of causes, as in his earlier statement that 'all that which comes into being comes into being through causation' (28a4),<sup>660</sup> and [then] he concluded: 'whenever the Demiurge . . .' and the words that follow (28a6). The Demiurge, then, is an Intellective god who transcends all other demiurges.

But if he was the very first among the Intellective gods, he would only 'remain in his own customary mode of being' (42e5–6), for this is what sets that [god] apart. If he was second, he would be distinguished as cause of life. Now, this Demiurge does generate and activate soul by means of the mixing bowl (41d4), but by himself he generates intellect (30b4). Thus he is none other than the third of the Intellective fathers, for the task that distinguishes him is that of creating intellect, not that of making the body. Indeed, he does not make body on his own but does so together with Necessity, making it by means of the latter. The task of creating soul is also not especially his, for he generates the soul together with the mixing bowl. The task that he does alone is to supply intellect to the universe and establish it there. Since, then, he is creator of intellect, it is plausible that he has the rank of Intellective god. For this reason Plato calls him 'Maker and Father' (28c3), and not just 'Father' alone or 'Maker' alone, and also not 'Father and Maker'. 'Father' and 'Maker' are the extremes. The former holds the peak position in the intelligibles and is prior to the royal series, the latter occupies the limit of this rank (i.e. of the royals).<sup>661</sup> The one is the monad of the Paternal divinity, the other has inherited the creative power in the universe. In between both is the one who is 'Father as well as Maker' and the one who is 'Maker as well as Father'. These are not the same as each other, but in the one case the paternal aspect predominates, in the other the creative aspect. But the paternal aspect is superior to the creative. For this reason in the case of these intermediate gods, even if both of them are characterized by each function, the prior one is more Father, for he is the limit of 'the

<sup>660</sup> Note that Proclus uses the phrase ὑπ' αἰτίας here rather than ὑπ' αἰτίου τινος as in Plato's text. For this reason, as above at 298.20, I use the term 'causation'. But the substitution appears to have little significance.

<sup>661</sup> This text is illuminated by the parallel but more explicit text at III. 168.15–169.9.

Paternal abyss<sup>662</sup> and the source of the Intellective gods. The second one is more Maker, for he is the monad of the entire creative work. Hence, I think, the first is called Mêtis (Wisdom), the second Metietês (All-wise).<sup>663</sup> The one is seen, the other sees; the one is swallowed up, the other is fully filled with the other's power, and what that one is among the Intelligible gods, the other is among the Intellective gods, for the one is the limit of the Intelligible gods, the other the limit of Intellective gods. And concerning the former Orpheus says (fr. 97):

These are what the Father made in his murky cavern.

Concerning the latter Plato says (41a7), 'of these works I am Demiurge and Father', and in the *Politicus* (273b1-2) 'recalling the teaching of the Demiurge and Father', because in the case of the former the paternal aspect predominates, in the case of the latter the demiurgic aspect does. Each of the divine beings is named after his own particularity, even if he contains all attributes. The one who is 'Maker' only is cause of the encosmic creatures, the 'Maker and Father' is cause of hypercosmic and encosmic creatures, the 'Father and Maker' is cause of intellective, hypercosmic and encosmic creatures, and the one who is Father only is cause of intelligible, intellective, hypercosmic and encosmic creatures.<sup>664</sup>

Plato, then, after introducing such a demiurge, has left him ineffable and unnamed, in the knowledge that he has been given the rank 'in the portion of the Good' (*Phlb.* 54c10) at the head of the universe. For in the entire rank of the gods he is the god who is analogous to the One. It is, at any rate, the monad in each cosmos who is of such a kind. But Orpheus, because he receives inspiration from the higher realm, has actually endowed him with a name, the Orpheus whom Plato himself has followed elsewhere.<sup>665</sup> In his writings Zeus, the [god] who precedes the three Kronides, is Demiurge of the universe. At any rate, after the swallowing of Phanes, the forms of all things appeared, as the Theologian states:<sup>666</sup>

For this reason, together with him [Phanes], all things were again produced within Zeus, the gleaming height of the wide Ether and Heaven,

<sup>662</sup> *Or. Chald.* fr. 18, also referred to at II. 92.8.

<sup>663</sup> Cf. *Orph. fr.* 97 Kern; the former refers to Phanes, the latter to Zeus, as the mythical reference in the next sentence makes clear.

<sup>664</sup> See the parallel text at III. 209.2-12, as noted by Festugière.

<sup>665</sup> Important theological references to Zeus at *Phdr.* 246e4, *Gorg.* 523a4, *Crit.* 121b7. But Plato may also be thinking of the text in the *Laws* which he cites at 315.14.

<sup>666</sup> *Orph. fr.* 167b Kern. The last line was already cited above at 308.2. Proclus often refers to Orpheus as the 'theologian': cf. 169.1, 187.10.

the foundations of the barren Sea and the splendid Earth,  
the mighty Ocean and Tartarus, nethermost part of the earth,  
rivers and the boundless sea and all the rest,  
15 all the immortal blessed gods and goddesses,  
all that has been born and all that will be born later,  
all these were born and exist by nature together in the belly of Zeus.

Because he was filled with the ideas, it was by means of them that he  
embraced the universe within himself, as the Theologian went on to  
20 reveal as well:<sup>667</sup>

Zeus was born the first, Zeus of the bright lightning is the last,  
Zeus is the head, Zeus the middle, from Zeus all things have been produced,  
Zeus is the pillar of earth and starry Heaven,  
25 Zeus is the King, Zeus on his own is the Primogenitor of all things,  
born as sole sovereign, sole Daimôn, great Leader of all,  
a single Royal body, in which all things here revolve,  
30 fire and water and earth and ether, night and day.

314 Zeus therefore contains all these wholes in a monadic and intellectual  
manner and according to these oracles of Night he causes all the creatures  
inside the cosmos to exist, both gods and the portions of the universe.  
When at any rate he poses the question to Night:<sup>668</sup>

5 How will all things be one for me and also each separate from the other?

[She replies]:

Wrap all things around with unspeakable Ether, and inside it in the middle  
place Heaven; then inside it place unbounded Earth, inside it place the Sea,  
inside it place all the constellations with which Heaven is crowned.

10 Moreover concerning all the other works of creation she further  
proposed:<sup>669</sup>

But when you stretch a powerful bond over everything,

– this is certainly the powerful and indissoluble bond which proceeds  
15 from nature and soul and intellect, for Plato too says that ‘living things  
were born bound by bonds made up of soul’ (38e5) –

<sup>667</sup> Fr. 168.1–8, except line 3. The full hymn of thirty-two lines is quoted by Porphyry and cited by Eusebius at *PE* 3.9.2. A very similar hymn is cited in Ps.Arist. *De mundo* 7, 401a28–b5.

<sup>668</sup> Fr. 165. Proclus cites the four lines without a break. The first line is also cited at II. 256.21; line 2 and the first words of line 3 were earlier cited at 207.9.

<sup>669</sup> Fr. 166 (together with the following line separated by the parenthesis). These lines are also cited at II. 24.28–9 (the first line also found at *in Crat.* 99, 50.26 Pasquali).

A golden chain suspended from the Ether,

‘golden chain’ being the Homeric way of naming the ranks of gods inside the cosmos.<sup>670</sup> Plato too emulates these verses when he says that the Demiurge created the universe by placing ‘intellect in soul and soul in body’ (30b4–5) and that he caused the young gods<sup>671</sup> to exist, through whom the parts of the cosmos have been ordered. 20

If, then, Zeus is the one who holds ‘the sole sovereignty’,<sup>672</sup> who swallows up Phanes,<sup>673</sup> in whom the intelligible causes of the universe exist primarily, who brings forth all things in accordance with the counsels of Night, who hands over authority to the other gods and also the three Kronides, this god is indeed that single and whole Demiurge of the entire cosmos.<sup>674</sup> He has the fifth rank among the Kings,<sup>675</sup> as has been marvellously demonstrated by our teacher in the *Orphic Conversations*.<sup>676</sup> 25 315  
He is also coupled in the series with Heaven and Phanes, and for this reason he is Maker and Father, each of them in a universal manner.

But that Plato<sup>677</sup> has these notions concerning the supreme Zeus as well has been made clear in the *Cratylus*,<sup>678</sup> where he has revealed on the basis of his names that he [the Demiurge] is the cause and supplier of life for all things, saying that ‘he through whom all beings possess life’, this [god] has in turn been named Dis and Zeus by us [Plato]. It is clear in the *Gorgias* too,<sup>679</sup> where he ranks him together with the Kronides, but also separates him from them, so that he is both prior to the three of them and is participated by them, and he [Plato] establishes the Law together with him, just as Orpheus does, for in his account too he [Zeus] in accordance with the counsels of Night causes the Law to be enthroned beside him.<sup>680</sup> 10  
Further evidence is found in the *Laws* (716a2–3), where he establishes universal Justice as his follower, just as the Theologian does.<sup>681</sup> [It also 15

<sup>670</sup> At *Il.* 8.19; cf. the reference above at 262.23 and n. 344.

<sup>671</sup> See n. 78 above on 218.16. <sup>672</sup> Allusion to *Orph. fr.* 168.6 cited above at 313.25.

<sup>673</sup> Cf. 313.7 above.

<sup>674</sup> This is thus Syrianus’ and Proclus’ answer to the question: who is the Demiurge?

<sup>675</sup> The six Kings are, according to the parallel passage in *III.* 168.19, Phanes, Night, Ouranos, Kronos, Zeus, Dionysus; see also above 306.11–12 (Amelius), 311.29 and n. 661.

<sup>676</sup> On the reading of the Orphic poems in the School of Syrianus see Marinus, *Vita Procli* 26. If the present passage refers to a work of Syrianus, as seems likely, it has not survived.

<sup>677</sup> I.e. proof that Plato holds the same views on the identity of the Demiurge, even though he does not make the identification explicit in the *Timaeus* itself.

<sup>678</sup> A paraphrase of *Crat.* 395b1–3.

<sup>679</sup> A rather general reference to the myth of the *Gorgias*, 523a–524a, where Zeus is said to have gained supreme power in 523b5 and addresses his fellow-gods in 523c1–524a7. The three Kronides mentioned at 523a4 are Zeus, Poseidon and Pluto.

<sup>680</sup> *Orph. fr.* 160 Kern. <sup>681</sup> Cited by Kern as a continuation of fr. 160.

emerges] in the *Philebus*,<sup>682</sup> where he declares in his account of the cause that there pre-exists in Zeus a ‘royal soul and a royal intellect’.

Consistent with these texts he will teach in the present work that the Demiurge, after bringing into existence intellect and soul (30b4–5), will reveal ‘the laws of fate’ (42e2–3), as well as all the ranks of the gods inside the cosmos and all the created living things right down to the lowest, the former generated by him alone, the latter produced through the mediation of the heavenly gods (cf. 41b–d). In the *Politicus* too (273b1–2) he calls Zeus Demiurge and Father of the All, just as in the present work he himself says about him (41a7), ‘of these works I am Demiurge and Father’.<sup>683</sup> He also says that the present ordering of the cosmos takes place ‘in the era of Zeus’ (*Plt.* 272b2), and that the cosmos, even if it moves according to Fate, ‘recalls to mind the teaching of the Demiurge and Father’ (273b1–2) in moving in this way. Since, therefore, it lives its life ‘in the era of Zeus’, it has Zeus as Demiurge and Father of its life. And if he will also introduce the Demiurge as a public orator (cf. 41a–e), this trait too quite simply belongs to Zeus. On this account in the *Minos* (319c3) he has given him the title of ‘Sophist’, because he fills the gods who come after him with all manner of words. The divine poet [Homer] also makes this clear when he teaches that he [Zeus] engages in public oratory from the topmost peak of Olympus:<sup>684</sup>

Listen to me, all you gods and all you goddesses,

and makes the double series of gods turn towards him. The same poet throughout his entire poetic work celebrates him as ‘highest of Lords’ and ‘Father of men and gods’, and honours him with all the demiurgic names.<sup>685</sup>

Now that, therefore, we have made plain that Hellenic theology in its entirety assigns the whole work of creation to Zeus, what should one think of the present statement of Plato but that it is the same god, Zeus the King, who is celebrated as ‘Maker and Father’, and not just as ‘Father’ only or as ‘Father and Maker’? Indeed the ‘Father’ would be the monad, the ‘Father and Maker’ would be the tetrad, while [the ‘Maker and Father’] would be, as the Pythagoreans say, the decad, and this is the rank of the divine realities:<sup>686</sup>

<sup>682</sup> *Phlb.* 30d1–2; mention of the cause at 30c5.

<sup>683</sup> Proclus repeats here what he has said at 312.18–20, quoting the same two texts.

<sup>684</sup> *Il.* 8.3, also alluded to at *III.* 200.28.

<sup>685</sup> First phrase at *Il.* 8.31, *Od.* 1.45, 81, 24.473; second at *Il.* 13.631. Cf. also the parallel passage at 333.21 below.

<sup>686</sup> Cf. *Orph. fr.* 315 Kern, where the various texts are collected. Proclus repeats the quotation at *III.* 107.14, where he calls it a ‘Pythagorean hymn’. Cf. also the less complete citation at *II.* 53.2.

– that is, the divine number in its progression ‘from the undefiled depths of the monad’<sup>687</sup> –

Up to the sacred tetrad, which has given birth to the mother of all,  
the all-receiver, the venerable one, placing a limit around all things,  
the undeviating one, the unwearying one; they call her pure decad.

25

After the paternal monad, therefore, and the tetrad, which is both paternal and creative at the same time, the demiurgic decad has come forth. It is undeviating, because it possesses an unchanging divine essence. It places a limit on all things in that it supplies order to things that are disordered and beautification (*kosmêsis*) to things which lack it. It illuminates souls with intellect, inasmuch as it is a universal intellect, and illuminates bodies with soul, inasmuch as it both possesses and contains its cause (i.e. of soul). It also generates the kinds of being, both the intermediates and the extremes, inasmuch as it has embraced demiurgic Being within itself.

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5

Indeed, it is even possible to calculate the rank of the Demiurge from what has been written in the *Protagoras*.<sup>688</sup> In that passage too Zeus is described as the cause of the entire political order and of the essential *logoi* that have been sown in the souls.<sup>689</sup> This means that he [Zeus] has made the entire creative work dependent on himself and holds all things together by means of his own unchanging powers. For just as the Theologian [Orpheus] establishes the rank of the Kouretes around him,<sup>690</sup> so Plato too says that there are ‘fearsome guards’ around him (*Prot.* 321d7), and just as the former establishes him on the peak of Olympus, so the latter [Plato] has assigned to him the Acropolis (321d6), where, established for all eternity,<sup>691</sup> he beautifies all things by means of the intermediate ranks [of gods].

10

15

Let these words be sufficient to indicate who the Demiurge is and that he is a divine Intellect who is cause of the entire work of creation, and let it be remembered from the present account that it is the same Demiurge who is celebrated as Zeus by both Orpheus and Plato.

20

Now whether we should speak of this Demiurge as belonging to the category of Source or of Ruler or of some other rank, this is a question that it is not right to pass over in silence. It seems, to start with, that

<sup>687</sup> The presentation here is rather awkward, because the passage cited in the parenthesis is in fact the part of the line preceding ‘until it reaches’.

<sup>688</sup> Proclus refers to 321d5, part of the well-known myth of Prometheus.

<sup>689</sup> Cf. *Prot.* 322c–d. <sup>690</sup> *Orph. fr.* 151 Kern.

<sup>691</sup> The systematician Proclus would see here a link with the depiction of the Demiurge at *Tim.* 42e.

all the tasks that the Theurgist assigns to the third class of Rulers<sup>692</sup> the Demiurge also applies to the cosmos. He fashions the heaven after having bent it in a convex shape, he attaches to it the vast assembly of fixed stars, he establishes the seven bands of the planets, and he places the earth in the middle, the water in the earth's hollows and the air above them both.<sup>693</sup> If, however, we should examine the matter with precision, we find the third of the cosmic Rulers [only] dividing the universe into particulars, the second dividing it into wholes as well as being celebrated as demiurgic cause of movement, while the first constructed all things by his will alone and caused the entire cosmos to exist as a unity. The same cosmos is produced by the Demiurge of whom Timaeus speaks. Through his act of will he brought all things into existence and obtained for the universe the division both into wholes and into parts which complete all the whole species (*holotêtes*), for he not only created the universe as a whole made up of wholes (cf. 32c5–33a1), but also the multitude [of particular beings] which make up each whole species.<sup>694</sup> For all these reasons we are right to describe him as beyond the fathers who are rulers and to call him 'unique Source-Cause'. He is that one of whom the Oracles teach that he 'pours forth' the multitudes of the ideas in the primordial Soul,<sup>695</sup> bringing the unified system (*logos*) into existence out of intellect, soul and body, generating our souls and leading them into becoming. Concerning him the Oracles also speak,<sup>696</sup> just as Timaeus does, for he established:

... Intellect in soul, and in the lazy body  
the Father of both men and gods located us.

This is the marvel that among the Greeks is constantly talked about in relation to the one they regard as the Demiurge. But if these matters are spoken about in the same language by both Timaeus and the Oracles, namely that this [god] is a 'Demiurge with the rank of Source',<sup>697</sup> those

<sup>692</sup> *Or. Chald.* fr. 63; cf. III. 124.26–9, 132.26–7. See the Introduction, p. 13 on how the Oracles have obviously made use of the *Timaeus* in their inspired utterances.

<sup>693</sup> General summary of the Demiurge's activity in 33b–40c, using very little of the work's specific terminology.

<sup>694</sup> Proclus speaks here in general terms. Of course the creation of many of the individual species of animals is assigned to the Demiurge's helpers (41e, 42d). But he envisages the task in its entirety at 39e–40a.

<sup>695</sup> As Festugière notes, this is an allusion to *Or. Chald.* fr. 37.2–4. It is puzzlingly left out by Majercik in the citation of this text at fr. 94.

<sup>696</sup> *Or. Chald.* fr. 94. For 'intellect in soul' cf. 30b4, but Plato does not speak of the body in such openly disparaging terms. For the Homeric epithet see above 316.10 and n. 685.

<sup>697</sup> Cf. above 317.20. Allusion again to *Or. Chald.* fr. 37.

who take their starting-point from the divinely transmitted Theology<sup>698</sup> would say that he himself fashioned the entire cosmos in accordance with the ideas, as unique and as variegated and divided both into wholes and into parts. He is celebrated by Plato and Orpheus and the Oracles as unique Maker and Father of the universe, 'Father of both men and gods',<sup>699</sup> generating the multitude of the gods and guiding souls for the generation of men, as Timaeus also says (41e4-42a3).

Moreover, if he is the best of causes, as he himself says (29a6), what mechanism is there for ranking him in the secondary ranks of the Demiurges? After all, the [description] 'best among the demiurges' is indicative of the highest eminence in the demiurgic series. In the entire series the highest position is that of Source, so it is necessary that this Demiurge has the rank of Source, but not of Ruler, since the Ruling Principles (*archai*) are everywhere secondary to their own Source. This is the reason that he himself makes the encosmic gods into demiurges, since he himself is a demiurgic Source.

But since there are many Demiurges who are Sources, the question where we shall rank him in this chorus deserves a more serious examination. From what has been said it is clear in which rank of the gods one should seek him. From these words too it is at last clear in which way **it is quite a task to find him and, even when one has found him, to declare him to everyone** (28c4-5),<sup>700</sup> and how he is Maker and Father, and what is the creative force, and that there is no separation, as some maintain, between being the Maker of the inanimate objects and the Father of the ensouled beings,<sup>701</sup> for it is the same god who is Maker and Father of all things. Indeed, he is also called 'Father of his works',<sup>702</sup> as he states in the public address (41a7), at least in the sense that he is cause of their unity and essence and existence, as well as furnishing existence and providence to the beings that have to come to exist.

### *The paradigm for the cosmos*

**And so again, this [question] must be examined concerning it [the universe]: with regard to which of the two paradigms did its builder construct it, was it the one that is unchanging and remains the same, or the one that has come into being?**<sup>703</sup> (28c5-29a2)

<sup>698</sup> As the close parallel at 408.12-20 shows, this is again a reference to the *Chaldean Oracles*.

<sup>699</sup> The Homeric epithet again; cf. above 316.10.

<sup>700</sup> Note that the ἀδύνατον (impossible) in Plato's lemma is left out here.

<sup>701</sup> On the question of the difference between 'Father' and 'Maker' see n. 589 above.

<sup>702</sup> The same text has already been cited at 312.16, 315.26.

<sup>703</sup> Divergence from Burnet's OCT text: Plato τεκταινόμενος (present participle), Proclus τεκτηνόμενος (past participle).

*Introductory remarks: 319.26–321.2*

After he has stated (1) what kind of thing the cosmic composite is, namely that it is generated, and how it is generated, namely as a sense-perceptible object (note that he has not made any mention of time, because time did not have any kind of existence), and (2) what the demiurgic cause is, namely that it is both creative and paternal at the same time (this is the unparticipated universal intellectual cause), he now proceeds to the third question<sup>704</sup> and investigates (3) what kind of thing the paradigm of the universe is, whether it is generated or eternal. For he has observed that every craftsman (*dēmiourgos*) either takes the paradigm he is using for what he fashions from outside himself, or he himself gives birth to the object from [within] himself. It is just as in the case of craftsmen down here. Some have the capacity to make accurate copies of other things, while others have the creative capacity to invent marvellous configurations and indispensable practical devices. For example, the man who first made a ship devised a paradigm of the ship in himself through use of his imagination. Moreover, he [Plato] also recognized the fact that every being<sup>705</sup> which produces in an orderly manner has a goal (*skopos*) and a measure (*metron*) for its product. If this was not the case, it would go astray in the process of making, and it would not know whether it had reached the end-point (*telos*). How would it know if this was the point of completion? Perhaps there is something missing or something that is not required, perhaps something has to be removed or added. For this reason it also produces bodily objects without the use of reason or intelligence, because it possesses no measure and no cause for what is being produced.<sup>706</sup> The medicine has to be heated to a certain degree. But if there is no medical skill or intelligence present which measures out a limit to the working of the fire, then the fire's effect is excessive<sup>707</sup> and destroys the entire operation by which it was going to contribute to the medicine's formation. This happens because it did not have the form (*eidos*) for the product. It is necessary therefore that every creative agent has the formula (*logos*) for the product, if it is to create in an orderly fashion.

<sup>704</sup> This relates to the 'demonstrations' that follow on from the basic principles as introduced at 276.18 (not the basic principles themselves as Festugière thinks); see also 348.14.

<sup>705</sup> I have retained Proclus' neuter formulation in what follows. He is speaking in general terms and not just of human agents.

<sup>706</sup> Festugière rightly takes this to refer to the paradigmatic cause, i.e. the Paradigm.

<sup>707</sup> πλεον θάτερον is difficult. Festugière renders somewhat freely 'either too violent or too feeble'.

Plato thus made these observations and, in addition to admitting the efficient cause, he also posited a Paradigm for the universe, just as Aristotle, in addition to eliminating the Paradigm, also eliminated the productive agent. After he has determined, then, that there is a paradigm, he enquires in our text what kind of paradigm it is and, making use of the definitions given above, he finds what he is looking for by means of those three basic principles.<sup>708</sup> How he himself will make the discovery and which kind of demonstration he will use, we will observe a little later on.<sup>709</sup> But first we need to make this very point clear, that the cosmos has come into being in accordance with a paradigm, and then what could this paradigm be and in what rank (*taxís*) of beings it must be sought.<sup>710</sup>

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321

*The status of the universe as created in relation to a Paradigm:*

**321.2–24**

If the creation of the universe is indeterminate and without a goal, then there is no paradigmatic cause of the All. But if it is not permissible even to make such a supposition, so if the Demiurge knew what he was making and carries out the work of creation with that knowledge, then (1) the causes of what comes into being are [located] within him, and (2) either (a) he necessarily possesses them at first hand or (b) they descend to him from the superior principles. But whichever of these two options we declare [to be the case], the paradigmatic cause is prior to the cosmos.

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Moreover, since the Demiurge is an Intellect, if he creates by the very fact of his existence,<sup>711</sup> he makes a product that is most similar to himself (cf. 30c7), that is, this involves creating an image (*eikôn*) of himself. If he creates through deliberation,<sup>712</sup> this would certainly be in every respect unworthy of the demiurgic Cause. But even if one were to accept this view, it would at least follow that the form of the object to be created pre-exists in him. For everyone who deliberates has conceived in advance within himself the paradigm of the object about which he is deliberating.

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This view, then, that the Paradigm of the cosmos must necessarily pre-exist when the demiurgic cause has a prior existence, is demonstrable through other proofs as well. For example, the one who creates necessarily either is ignorant of the order of what is created (even though he is intelligent) or has knowledge of it. But if he is ignorant, how will he

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<sup>708</sup> I take the 'definitions' here to be the first two basic principles and the 'three basic principles' the other three, as delineated at 236.20–7. The reference thus differs from the one above at 320.2.

<sup>709</sup> I.e. when explaining the next lemma at 328.16.

<sup>710</sup> On the following passage and Proclus' interpretation of the Paradigm see the Introduction, pp. 24–5.

<sup>711</sup> I.e. as flowing forth from his essential nature. <sup>712</sup> Strongly denied above at 268.7.

know his plan for the universe in advance and how will he order it? But if he has knowledge of it, how is it possible that he does not embrace that which is coming into being in his thinking in accordance with a single [paradigmatic] cause?

*Nature and classification of the Paradigm: 321.24–323.22*

25 But in addition to this question we must examine (a) what this Paradigm is and (b) to which category of existents it belongs, for the more ancient [commentators] have maintained a variety of opinions on the subject.<sup>713</sup>

30 The divine Iamblichus (fr. 35) has defined the Paradigm of the universe as the very Essence of Being,<sup>714</sup> which indeed ‘is grasped by intuitive thought together with reasoning’ (28a1). The One he posits as beyond the Paradigm, while affirming that the very Essence of Being is concurrent with it and declaring that each of them is grasped by intuitive knowledge.  
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As for the philosopher Porphyry (fr. 42), as has been stated previously,<sup>715</sup> he supposed the Demiurge to be the unparticipated Soul and the Paradigm to be the Intellect, since he regarded what was in the superior ranks as also present in the inferior ones. Even though Plato had named the Demiurge Intellect and the Paradigm intelligible,<sup>716</sup> this interpreter has taken the Demiurge to be soul and has called the Paradigm Intellect.  
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Third is the admirable Theodore,<sup>717</sup> who divided the demiurgic triad triadically and, seeing in each monad a first and middle and final figure, entitled the final figure in each of them ‘Living-Thing-itself’ (*autozôion*), and in this way declared the Intellect to be looking towards ‘that which living thing is’ (*to ho esti zôion*),<sup>718</sup> for in his (Theodore’s) opinion he was proximately dependent on the essential living thing. The result was, according to this interpreter, that the essential Demiurge did *not* create by looking at the Living-Thing-itself, nor is there a multiplicity of paradigmatic causes, nor has every creator laid down his own particular creation in accordance with a paradigm, lest the creating agent creates by  
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<sup>713</sup> The doxography of Platonist views on the nature of the Paradigm is in its method similar to that on the Demiurge in 299–319, but it is much briefer and does not dwell on Middle Platonist views.

<sup>714</sup> The phrase is αὐτὸ τὸ ὅπερ ὅν. I have taken over Dillon’s translation.

<sup>715</sup> See 306.31–307.14.

<sup>716</sup> For Demiurge as Intellect see 39e7 (cf. 305.9). For the Paradigm as intelligible see 39e1, 48e6, 92c7.

<sup>717</sup> Theodore of Asine, on whom see n. 46 above. This text is Test. 14 Deuse. Cf. 309.14, 427.10. As Deuse points out in his note on the passage (1973) 110, Theodore attempts to reconcile various texts in the *Timaeus*, especially 29e3 and 39e7–9.

<sup>718</sup> The phrase is τὸ ὃ ἐστὶ ζῶον, paraphrased by τὸ οὐσιῶδες ζῶον in the next line.

looking at what is below him and in this way undergoes the experience of the partial soul without realizing it.

As for our teacher, in accordance with his inspired way of thinking he required that this subject too be given the appropriate treatment. Since some of his predecessors had determined that the Demiurge himself was in possession of the paradigms for the universe, as in the case of Plotinus,<sup>719</sup> while others placed the Paradigm either anterior to him, as in the case of Porphyry,<sup>720</sup> or posterior to him, as in the case of Longinus,<sup>721</sup> he asked whether (1) the Demiurge comes immediately after the One, or (2) whether there are other intelligible ranks [of gods] between the Demiurge and the One. If indeed (1) the Demiurge comes [immediately] after the One, there is the absurdity that the complete multiplicity of the Intelligible gods comes [immediately] after the Non-multiple, for it is by means of the numbers that are proximate to the One that there is a procession towards the entire series of numbers and the entire multiplicity. But (2) if there are other ranks between the One and the Demiurge, we need to ask (a) whether the Paradigm of the universe is principally in him, or whether (b) it is posterior to him or (c) prior to him. If (a) it is principally in him, we shall place the entire intelligible multiplicity in him, for the Paradigm is the 'fairest of the intelligized entities' (30d2). This means once again that it will be intelligible and not intellective, as we demonstrated a little earlier.<sup>722</sup> The Paradigm, however, has four ideas only, whereas he himself has the ideas of the entities that are more particular than they are, namely the sun, the moon and each of the everlasting beings. But if (b) it is posterior to him, he will have his gaze turned to what is inferior and less honorable, which it is not permissible to admit for any of the divine beings. The result is that the Paradigm is prior to the Demiurge.<sup>723</sup> But if it is prior to the Demiurge, is it (α) seen by him or (β) not seen? To say that (α) it is not seen is the view of someone who pays no attention<sup>724</sup> to Plato or to the nature of things. For it would be absurd if our soul were to see that Paradigm and speak about it, but Intellect, and the Universal Intellect at that, were not to do so. And if (β) the Demiurge sees the Intelligible, does he do so with his gaze turned (i) towards himself or (ii) outside himself only? But if he looks (ii) outside

<sup>719</sup> Based, it would seem, on Proclus' reading of *Enn.* 3.9.1, where Plotinus gives an exegesis of *Tim.* 39c.

<sup>720</sup> Fr. 43; cf. above 306.32–307.14.

<sup>721</sup> Fr. 19 Patillon-Brisson. It is the only mention of the well-known contemporary of Plotinus outside the commentary on the Prologue (i.e. 17a–27a), where he figures prominently.

<sup>722</sup> See above 310.29. <sup>723</sup> I.e. the third alternative suggested by Proclus.

<sup>724</sup> I accept here Kroll's emendation ἀνηκόου, also translated by Festugière.

himself only, he sees images of Being<sup>725</sup> and he will have perception rather than intuitive knowledge. If, however, he (i) looks towards himself, object of intellection will be in him as well. The result is that the Paradigm is both prior to the Demiurge and in him, prior to him in the intelligible mode (*noêtôs*), in him in the intellective mode (*noerôs*).

*Agreement of Plato and Orpheus: 323.22–325.11*

It seems in fact that Plato's own words sometimes make the Paradigm different from the Demiurge and sometimes the same as he is. When he states that 'to the extent, then, that Intellect contemplates the ideas that are present in that which is the Living Thing, both in terms of quantity and quality, this many he determined this universe to have as well' (39e7–9),<sup>726</sup> he says that the Demiurge is different from the Paradigm when he reaches out to the Living-Thing-itself. And [the same happens] again when he says, 'in the likeness of which of the living things did the constructor construct it [the universe]? we should insist that it was none of the living things that have a partial nature, but should lay down that it resembles most of all the living thing of which all the other living things, both singly and according to kind, are parts' (30c3–6).<sup>727</sup> In this text too he distinguishes the constructor from the Paradigm. But when he explicitly states the words: 'he was good, and for someone who is good there was never present any jealousy concerning any matter; since this [sentiment] was foreign to him, he willed that all things would become as much like himself as possible' (29e1–3),<sup>728</sup> he appears to disclose the sameness of the Demiurge in relation to the Paradigm. The result is that for Plato they are sometimes the same and they are sometimes different, and each of these two positions is put forward quite suitably. In the intelligible mode<sup>729</sup> the ideas are prior to the work of creation [as] four monads of ideas. But the rank of the forms proceeds to the Demiurge as well, and as the entire number of the ideas it is one of the monads contained within him.

These matters were also revealed by Orpheus,<sup>730</sup> when he said that the intelligible god was swallowed up by the Demiurge of the universe. Plato

<sup>725</sup> As noted by Festugière, Proclus (and Syrianus) takes this objection from Plotinus, *Enn.* 3.9.1.8.

<sup>726</sup> The quotation is accurate except that Proclus omits καὶ τοσαύτας at 39e9. This is the text given exegesis by Plotinus in 3.9.1.

<sup>727</sup> The quotation is accurate except that Proclus leaves out the parenthetical phrase in 30c5.

<sup>728</sup> Proclus reads ἐγγίγνετο instead of Plato's ἐγγίγνεται, and ἡβουλήθη instead of ἐβουλήθη.

<sup>729</sup> See above 323.21. <sup>730</sup> 324.14–325.3 are cited as *Orph. fr.* 167 Kern.

supposed that the Demiurge looked towards the Paradigm, indicating the act of intuitive thinking (*noêsis*) through [the metaphor] of sight, but the Theologian supposed that he leaped as it were on the Intelligible and swallowed it, as the myth stated. In fact, if I am to be explicit about the views of my teacher,<sup>731</sup> the god called Protogonos in Orpheus, who is established at the limit of the Intelligibles, is the Living-Thing-itself in Plato. For this reason it is eternal and the 'fairest of the intelligized entities' (30d2).<sup>732</sup> It is in the Intelligible realm what Zeus is in the Intellective realm, for each is the limit of their respective orders, the one as the very first of the Paradigmatic causes, the other as the most monadic<sup>733</sup> of the Demiurgic causes. For this reason too Zeus is united with him [Protogonos] through the mediation of Night, and when he has been filled from that source he becomes the Intelligible cosmos inasmuch as is possible in the Intellective realm:<sup>734</sup>

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So when he had taken in the might of Erikepaios Protogonos, he possessed the form of all things in his capacious belly, he mixed in his own limbs the power and the force of god, and on this account with him [the god] all things were again formed inside Zeus.<sup>735</sup>

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It is therefore quite suitable that Plato in this present passage too says that he creates while looking towards the Paradigm, so that by thinking its contents he becomes all things and gives existence to the sense-perceptible cosmos. The Paradigm was everything in the intelligible mode, he himself was everything in the intellective mode, and the cosmos is everything in the sense-perceptible mode (*aisthêtôs*). For this reason the Theologian also says:<sup>736</sup>

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After hiding all these things, he again had to bring it forth from his heart into the joyful light, performing a wondrous deed.

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### *What is meant by a 'generated paradigm'? 325.12–327.10*

That the cosmos came into being in relation to a Paradigm, and what this Paradigm is, and how it is on the one hand beyond the demiurgic Intellect yet on the other hand is in him, these explanations have thus

<sup>731</sup> Proclus admits here that his use and interpretation of the Orphic material is derived from his teacher Syrianus.

<sup>732</sup> Already cited in the account of Syrianus' views at 323.4.

<sup>733</sup> No doubt this means it is the very first monad, as Festugière translates.

<sup>734</sup> Because for Syrianus this is where the Demiurge primarily resides; see above 310.7.

<sup>735</sup> The last line was already cited as the beginning of a quotation of eight further verses above at 313.9. Cf. also II. 93.18.

<sup>736</sup> *Orph. fr.* 168.31–2 Kern. The second line was cited above at 207.10.

15 been made plain. Some interpreters, however, raise a difficulty: why did Plato ask the question whether the cosmos has been fashioned in relation to a generated paradigm or an intelligible paradigm? After all, nothing else that is generated exists, in relation to which the universe could be fashioned. If the account was about Socrates or any other particular  
20 being, the question would have a place. But since the inquiry is about the universe, surely it would be impossible for the universe to come into existence in relation to becoming (*gignomenon*, i.e. as paradigm), for which other entity which is coming into being is there, except the universe? We shall solve this difficulty if we recall to mind what has often been said before, namely that Plato also calls the Soul an entity which comes into being to the extent that it has participated in time. The  
25 account thus raises the difficulty: what is the Paradigm for the universe, is it Soul or Intellect or the Intelligible? These [last two] are the only ones that are eternal. So for this reason he inquired whether it was in relation to that which comes into being or that which is eternal that the cosmos came into being. Let it be stated, then, that for some [interpreters] this appeared the right solution.

30 But perhaps it is possible to make a more complete response to the difficulty via another route, and at the same time it will be clear that the disharmonious realm that existed before the cosmos should be not be  
326 called ungenerated, as Atticus and Plutarch thought.<sup>737</sup> For [they argued that] if there was nothing that was generated before the heaven came into being, it would be ridiculous to investigate whether the cosmos had come into being in relation to what is always-existent or is generated. But this is  
5 in fact what he is now investigating. Therefore something generated did exist even before the cosmos. And since it was neither the always-existent nor space (*chôra*), but there were three things before the heaven came into being, Being, space and becoming (*genesis*, see 52d3–4),<sup>738</sup> it is plain that that much-discussed realm of disharmony was the last-named, becoming. That which comes into being, then, is not only the universe but also that  
10 realm of disharmony and disordered movement, as we said previously.<sup>739</sup> The cosmos thus exists with this realm of disharmony as matter and the intelligible realm as pre-existent superior entity. Which, then, of the two does it resemble, that which has the material [nature] within itself or that which is more divine in essence? After all, since it is situated between both extremes, it has necessarily come to resemble one or the other. One  
15 assumes, indeed, that the Demiurge ‘took in hand’ (30a4) that realm (i.e.

<sup>737</sup> See the previous discussion at 276.31. On this text see Baltes (1976–8) II. 35–6.

<sup>738</sup> Already cited above at 284.20; see note 491.

<sup>739</sup> See above 284.23. Proclus argues that the disharmonious realm in no way pre-exists before the cosmos, but is a component of the cosmos as it is created.

of disharmony) and contemplates the Living-Thing-itself. As a result it is plausible to ask which of the two the universe resembles, what he takes in hand or what he gazes at. These words are consistent with what follows, namely that as it was beautiful, it has been made to resemble the Intelligible [Paradigm] and not the realm of disharmony and disorderly movement, for what is made to resemble the latter is ugly.

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But there are actually some interpreters who claim that Plato is not investigating which of the paradigms the Demiurge used in his creative work, but rather that he is speaking about us – we who know that there are two paradigms – [and that he wants to know] in accordance with which of these we shall affirm that the universe came into being. And in a way this approach makes some sense. For it is we who look to both kinds, and not the Demiurge. It is in fact not permissible for him to look to the inferior, whereas we, if we look to both what is anterior to him and posterior, should ask ourselves in which realm the paradigm ought to be placed.

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Others say that it is for the sake of having a complete division that he includes the generated paradigm as well, so that he should not appear to presuppose the question by saying that the paradigm for the cosmos is everlasting. By hypothesizing the generated paradigm, he showed that something absurd is the consequence.

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Yet others state that, since in the case of sense-perceptible objects there are (1) some that are contrary to nature and (2) others that are according to nature, and of these (a) some are images of generated objects while (b) others are copies of ungenerated objects, when he wishes to demonstrate that the cosmos came into being in accordance with the everlasting Paradigm, he eliminated the other paradigms through saying that the universe was the 'fairest' [of created products] (29a5). After all, he argued, the fairest is not contrary to nature, nor is it made from paradigm that is a generated substance, for the product using that as paradigm is not the fairest. And because it is entirely fair, it is not contrary to nature. The solution of the difficulty, then, proceeds along these lines.

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### *Explaining the letter of the text: 327.10–328.11*

It is also worthwhile to grasp the accuracy of the terms used in relation to the thought [of the passage]. The [words] **again** and **must be examined** indicate the order in which the problem is dealt with, namely that it is connected with what preceded it, and that this matter proceeds sequentially from the previous subjects examined. The [words] **concerning it** cause all the enquiries to focus on the one investigation relating to the cosmos. After all, the account concerning the Demiurge and the account concerning the Paradigm are dealt with because of the investigation of

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the universe. The [words] **in relation to which of the two paradigms** distinguish as extreme terms and separate from each other the realms of the Intelligible and the generated, the former as among the very first [ranks] of beings, the other as among the very last.

The [word] **builder**<sup>740</sup> reveals the production of form<sup>741</sup> that descends from the Cause and also the demiurgic skill that proceeds as far as the cosmos, for as the Theologian says,<sup>742</sup> the ‘first manual builders’<sup>743</sup> gave to Zeus the demiurgic powers required for the entire cosmic production:

To Zeus they furnished thunder as a resource and lightning,  
the first manual builders, and to Hephaistos and Athena  
they taught all the items of craftsmanship which heaven encloses within.

Plato thus follows these words [of Orpheus] in using the [word] **builder** and the [words] **did construct** in direct connection with the Demiurge’s creative work.

The [words] **the one that is unchanging and remains the same** indicate the eternal Paradigm of the universe, which is indeed the very first of the eternal Beings, established at the limit of the very first Intelligibles.<sup>744</sup> The [words] **the one that has come into being** on the other hand indicate the realm of disharmonious and disordered movement, for this realm is composite, mixed out of many substances and moved by an extraneous force, and these indeed are elements of the nature that is generated. Therefore it is not correct when they say<sup>745</sup> that disorderly realm is ungenerated and destructible, whereas the cosmos is generated and indestructible.<sup>746</sup> No, that realm ‘has come into being’ (cf. 28b7) because it is moved by an extraneous force and is mixed together. Plato will also make this quite clear when he says<sup>747</sup> that these three exist, space and becoming and Being, by ‘becoming’ plainly referring to the disharmonious realm. This, then, is what ‘becoming’ is, while the cosmos is ungenerated in terms of a becoming that is temporal. These views certainly do harmonize better both with Plato and with our own

<sup>740</sup> Plato literally uses the aorist participle, i.e. ‘the one who has built’.

<sup>741</sup> The term is εἰδοποιεῖν and refers to the making of immanent form.

<sup>742</sup> I.e. Orpheus, *Orph. fr.* 179 Kern.

<sup>743</sup> Literally ‘men with the hands of builders’ (τεκτονόχειρες). This refers to the Cyclops, as we are informed by Hermias in his commentary on *Phdr.* 247c, cited by Kern.

<sup>744</sup> See above 324.21.

<sup>745</sup> Accepting Festugière’s conjecture. The reference is to Plutarch and Atticus; see above 326.1.

<sup>746</sup> I.e. in their view, disputed by Proclus, the disorderly realm is destroyed when the cosmos is created.

<sup>747</sup> A paraphrase of 52d3–4 this time; see above n. 738.

conceptions concerning the universe, which are in agreement with nature and undistorted.

### *The premisses for the argument*

Well, if this cosmos is beautiful and the Demiurge is good, it is clear that he looked to the everlasting [Paradigm]. But if what is not even permissible to say is the case, he looked to the [paradigm] which has come into being.<sup>748</sup> (29a2–4)

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### *Explanation of the logic of the passage: 328.16–330.6*

First let us understand Plato's logical procedure, how he has advanced from the viewpoint of demonstration. From the basic principles (*hypotheses*) he held these two fundamental propositions (*axiômata*) as established (cf. 28a6–b2): that which comes into being with regard to an everlasting paradigm is beautiful; that which comes into being with regard to a generated paradigm is not beautiful. Corresponding to these principles are the converted statements: that which is beautiful has come into being with regard to an everlasting paradigm; that which is not beautiful has come into being with regard to a generated paradigm. For if the contradictory of the consequent follows the contradictory of the antecedent, then these statements are convertible in relation to each other, and the original statements are as well,<sup>749</sup> as is demonstrated by the reduction to the impossible.<sup>750</sup> For if that which is beautiful came into being with regard to a generated [paradigm], and that which came into being in relation to a generated [paradigm] was not beautiful in virtue of the other fundamental proposition, then that which is beautiful will be not beautiful, and reciprocally if that which is not beautiful comes into being in relation to the ungenerated paradigm – for it has come into being in relation to what is eternal – then that which is not beautiful will be beautiful.

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For what reason, then, did he not place<sup>751</sup> these fundamental propositions directly among the basic principles, namely that that which is

<sup>748</sup> Divergence from Burnet's OCT text: Proclus adds the article in πρὸς τὸ γεγονός.

<sup>749</sup> Reading τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς here instead of τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

<sup>750</sup> Proclus recognizes here the logical rule that antecedent and consequent are reversible if they are contradictories of each other (i.e. A and -A). I have accordingly translated ἀντικείμενον as 'contradictory' rather than 'contrary'. One could also choose a neutral translation such as 'antithetical'. It should be noted that he takes everlasting and generated as contradictories; see further Runia (2000) 111.

<sup>751</sup> I have translated παρέλαβε in this way for the sake of clarity, though literally it means 'took to hand'.

beautiful came into being in relation to the everlasting paradigm,<sup>752</sup> and that that which is not beautiful did so in relation to the paradigm that was not everlasting, but rather placed there those of which these principles are the converse, even though for the demonstration he needed to use the former and not the latter? To this we should reply that the former, which  
5 start from the causes, have more affinity with the first principles, whereas the latter, which start from what is caused, have more affinity with what follows from the basic principles. When he says ‘that which has come into being in relation to the everlasting [paradigm] is beautiful’, he begins with the cause and ends with what is caused.<sup>753</sup> But when he says the reverse,<sup>754</sup> ‘the beautiful has come into being in relation to the everlasting [paradigm]’, he makes that which is beautiful the antecedent and the cause the consequent. In order, then, to have terms that are appropriate for principles and causes, in the case of the first principles he took them in that way (i.e. in 28a6–b2), but he converted them in the demonstrations (i.e. in 29a2–5), because he chose what was fitting for the points being shown.

After establishing these four basic principles, he makes a suitable distinction in the case of the universe.<sup>755</sup> Either the cosmos is beautiful or it is not beautiful. If it is beautiful, it has come into being in relation to the everlasting [paradigm], and if it is not beautiful, it has come into being in relation to the generated [paradigm]. But that the cosmos is in fact beautiful, is clear from [the evidence of] sense-perception. It has therefore come into being in relation to the everlasting paradigm. But since the cosmos obtains its beauty from the Paradigm through the mediation of the demiurgic cause, in addition to the cosmos being beautiful he also placed in the antecedent that the Demiurge is good. After all, every good demiurge masters the matter that he has and imposes the form that he wishes on the substrate. *A fortiori* this must apply to the  
15 universal Demiurge, who causes the substrate nature itself to exist,<sup>756</sup> as other texts state somewhere as well, and does this in such a way that

<sup>752</sup> Proclus says this with reference to the first basic principle at 28a6–b2; cf. 264.5ff.

<sup>753</sup> In fact when these basic principles are introduced in 28a6–b2, they include the cause, i.e. ‘whenever the Demiurge looks to an unchanging paradigm . . .’

<sup>754</sup> As in the text now being commented on.

<sup>755</sup> One might wish to dispute this by arguing that the universe is in some respects beautiful, in others not (e.g. when there are tsunamis). Plato would argue that this reasoning is appropriate for parts of the universe, but not for the whole. He would also warn us against excessive anthropocentrism (cf. *Laws* 903c).

<sup>756</sup> Despite appearances Proclus does not have any kind of *creatio ex nihilo* in mind here. The comparison is with human craftsmen, who take their materials, e.g. marble or wood, to hand. The Demiurge first makes the elements before they are fitted together in the creative process.

it has the right pliability for receiving the decoration (*kosmos*) from him and for the work of creation that proceeds from him.

But when he had made this addition in the second premiss,<sup>757</sup> he kept silent about the contradictory [consequent].<sup>758</sup> Even in the case of the cosmos it would be difficult to use negative language, since it is ‘very beautiful’ (29a5) and a ‘blessed god’ (34b8), but in the case of the Demiurge it would be more difficult still. For this reason he placed the [goddess] Themis<sup>759</sup> at the head of his account.<sup>760</sup> She gathers the [cosmic] gods themselves for the Demiurge and does not allow them to be wrenched away from the goodness of the Father, so that thanks to Themis he [Plato] too will not ascribe anything disharmonious or blasphemous to the Demiurge of the universe.

These, then, are the premisses, which have their starting-point in a disjunctive proposition.<sup>761</sup> Let us see what kind of arguments Plato has put forward next.

### *Plato draws his conclusion*

It is surely clear to everyone that it was the everlasting [Paradigm he looked at], for of the things that have come into being, the cosmos is the most beautiful, and of causes the Demiurge is the best. This, then, is the way that it has come into being, fashioned after that which is grasped by a rational account and wisdom and which is unchanging.<sup>762</sup> (29a4–b1)

### *Comment on the reasoning of the passage: 330.12–20*

Through these words he has first presumed the conclusion, as is his custom, giving his demonstrations starting-points that are unexpected.<sup>763</sup> Then he has made reference to the minor premiss, and after that he has added the consequent. The phrase **it is surely clear to everyone that it was the everlasting [Paradigm he looked at]** is in fact the conclusion,

<sup>757</sup> I.e. ‘if the Demiurge is good’ in addition to ‘if the cosmos is beautiful’.

<sup>758</sup> I.e. if the cosmos is not beautiful and the Demiurge is not good’, which Plato replaces with the words ‘but if what is not even permissible to say is the case’.

<sup>759</sup> Proclus takes the word θεμῖς, translated as ‘permissible’, as a reference to the goddess Themis, i.e. a deity based on a linguistic abstraction. Compare the goddess Δίκη (Justice). It is a good example of how he theologizes Plato’s account.

<sup>760</sup> Themis recurs at 30a6 and Proclus explains her role in greater detail at 396.29ff.

<sup>761</sup> This might refer, as Festugière notes, to 29a1–2, πότερον (either) . . . ἢ (or). It might also refer to the text being commented on, i.e. ‘either the cosmos is beautiful or it is not beautiful’.

<sup>762</sup> No substantial divergence from Burnet’s OCT text.

<sup>763</sup> Festugière translates ἀπὸ νοῦ with ‘irrational’, but this seems inappropriate.

while the phrase **for of the things that have come into being, the cosmos is the most beautiful, and of causes the Demiurge is the best** is the rendering of the minor premiss, as the causal conjunction also indicates.<sup>764</sup> The remainder (of the text) is the final conclusion<sup>765</sup> of the entire argument. This, then, is the logical disposition of the text.

*Why the terms ‘most beautiful’ and ‘best’? 330.20–332.17*

But let us turn again to the investigation of the realities and examine first the reason why he changed **beautiful** (29a2) to **most beautiful** (29a5) and **good** (29a3) to **best** (29a6), and then how these terms are true and what relation they have to each other.

That the beautiful product of creation has been fashioned after a Paradigm which is everlasting is abundantly clear, and has been stated earlier.<sup>766</sup> After all, where would its beauty come from except from the imitation of that [Paradigm]? But if this [product] is the most beautiful, then its resemblance has not come just with regard to what is everlasting, but, so to speak, with regard to the most everlasting of the everlasting beings. Every image that participates more distinctly in the form is indeed an image of a paradigm with a higher degree of purity. Just as in the case of statues connected with the practice of initiation, those who obtain a dimmer divine presence enjoy the secondary and the tertiary powers of the divine, but those who obtain a clear presence participate in the very first and highest creations of the divine, in the same way, I imagine, the god who was initiator<sup>767</sup> of the cosmos made it appear most beautiful as an image of the very first of the eternal beings. For it was from there that its great beauty derived, and that great beauty extends to similarity towards that [paradigm] through his own beauty.<sup>768</sup>

Another point to be made is that, if the demiurgic cause is good, he looked to that which is everlasting, but not to that which is generated, lest by looking towards that which is inferior, he would fall away from his goodness, which it is ‘not permissible to say’ (29a4). If, however, the cause is not only good but the best among the causes, then he looked towards that which is most everlasting. The more divine the contemplator, the loftier the object of contemplation. For even if the same object is

<sup>764</sup> I.e. the word γάρ (‘for’) in the text.

<sup>765</sup> The term is ἐπιφορά. I do not understand the relation to λήγον (consequent) above.

<sup>766</sup> This is most probably a general reference to the exegesis of 29a2–4 in 328.16–330.6.

<sup>767</sup> An attempt to render the play on words between ἀπὸ τῆς τελεστικῆς (connected with the telestic or initiatory art) and τελεσιουργός (maker of perfection, accomplisher).

<sup>768</sup> I am assuming ἐαυτοῦ to refer to the Demiurge here. Note that the cosmos resembles the Paradigm, but that the Demiurge also wanted to make things resemble himself as much as possible (29e3).

contemplated by both a superior and an inferior person, this will happen better and more clearly in the case of the one who is superior and less well by the one who is inferior. 15

So it was in order to demonstrate these matters and by means of them secretly convey that [message], namely that the Paradigm for the cosmos did not [just] belong to the multitude of everlasting beings but was the most everlasting of them all and that which was primarily eternal, that Plato added that the cosmos was **most beautiful** and the Demiurge the **best**. That which was most beautiful has indeed come into being in relation to the most divine Paradigm, and that which was best necessarily had to contemplate what was utterly superior. For if that which is most beautiful does not derive from the Paradigm which is the very first, then that Paradigm will be paradigm either of nothing or of something inferior. But it is not permissible (*themis*, cf. 29a4) for the superior beings to produce things that are inferior to what is produced by secondary beings. And if that which is best did not look towards that [Paradigm] which is the very first, either in looking to that Paradigm it produces nothing – and how then will that object have the position of a paradigm? – or that which is not best will have knowledge of it [the Paradigm] – and how can it be that that which is intelligible to the inferior being cannot be grasped by the being who is superior through pre-eminence? It is necessary, then, that (1) the most beautiful object came into being with regard to that which is most divine, and that (2) that which is the best looked towards what which is most everlasting, and that moreover (3) that which is most beautiful is fashioned by that which is the best. After all, of what thing is that which is the best the cause if not the most beautiful of things that have come into being? If it is not the most beautiful, then it will be of one of the inferior objects. So if that which is best is cause of something inferior, then that which is not best is assuredly cause of what is best, and in this way the order of things is completely turned upside down.<sup>769</sup> Let these three statements<sup>770</sup> be laid down as demonstrated by ‘geometrical necessities’, as they say,<sup>771</sup> and let these remarks form a sufficient record on our part concerning how Plato changed the terms [in the text]. 30 332 5

Porphyrus (fr. 44) adds that, if the Demiurge is the best, it does not follow that he looks to that which is everlasting [as paradigm] if he does 10

<sup>769</sup> The worst of results for someone with such a hierarchical cast of mind as Proclus.

<sup>770</sup> I.e. as stated at 331.29–332.2. Note that that sentence starts with ἀνάγκη ἄρα, ‘it is necessary, then’.

<sup>771</sup> A rather erudite allusion to *Rep.* 458d5, ‘Or don’t you think we’re talking about necessities here? The necessities aren’t geometrical but erotic . . .’ (translation Grube and Reeves). The same allusion is made in *Parm.* 645.21, 1132.25.

not create beautiful products, and that, if he were to create beautiful products, it does not follow that he looks to that which is everlasting if he does not as the best craftsman make beautiful objects, but he could do this by chance, and this was the reason that Plato interwove both terms.<sup>772</sup> He adds that, if demons are the craftsmen of mortal beings,<sup>773</sup> even if they are not the best in an absolute sense, nothing prevents the producers and creators of mortal beings from being very good (*aristoi*) and for this reason being the craftsmen of beautiful images. This is the account given by that [interpreter].<sup>774</sup>

*Precision of Plato's descriptions: 332.18–334.27*

It is easy to understand that the cosmos has been correctly described as the **most beautiful** and the Demiurge as the **best of causes**. (1) First, the evident beauty of the heaven, the order of its revolutions, the fixed limits of the seasons, the harmony of the elements and the proportional balance (*analogia*) that extends throughout the whole show to those who are not completely in the dark that the universe is **most beautiful**. In addition,<sup>775</sup> the order of the invisible powers that it contains, in accordance with which the parts of the cosmos are held together, and the gift of the intellective essence,<sup>776</sup> how can these not show that it is the most beautiful of generated beings? For it contains a harmonious dance of souls, a sharing in intellect, an abundance of divine life, an ineffable divinity, a multiplicity of henads – as a result of these it becomes completely saturated with beauty. If it is the case that the soul,<sup>777</sup> when it imitates the universe and becomes ordered, reveals a marvellous beauty within itself, how could it not be that the universe possesses beauty to a much greater degree? For this reason the theologians<sup>778</sup> too coupled Hephaistos with Aphrodite and affirmed that it was thus that he

<sup>772</sup> Presumably ἄριστος and κάλλιστος, though Proclus speaks only of καλὰ in his summary of Porphyry's argument.

<sup>773</sup> The statement here is somewhat surprising because these 'craftsmen' are usually associated with the heavenly beings as 'young gods' (cf. 218.16 and n. 385), whereas demons are lower in the hierarchy of divine beings in the cosmos. For Porphyry's views on demons see *De abst.* 2.37–43, where in 2.37 he distinguishes between the visible gods and the 'remaining crowd of invisible deities'.

<sup>774</sup> The absence of critical comment means, presumably, that Proclus agrees with the points made by his predecessor.

<sup>775</sup> Proclus first outlines those aspects of beauty related to the cosmos's physical state. He then moves on to the beauties associated with soul and intelligence.

<sup>776</sup> As obtained above all by the World-soul.

<sup>777</sup> Presumably the human soul is meant here.

<sup>778</sup> *Orph. fr.* 182 Kern, with reference to frs. 180 and 184.

forged the universe. Moreover they also cause Aglaia, Eukleia, Euthenia, 5  
Euphêmê and Philophrosunê to be born from Hephaistos, and these  
[goddesses] help to make the corporeal part [of the cosmos] fittingly  
beautiful. Indeed this affirmation, that the cosmos is not most beautiful,  
even those who insult the Demiurge have not dared to pronounce,<sup>779</sup>  
but on the contrary they say that the souls are ensnared by its beauty.

(2) But how should we also show that the Demiurge is the best of 10  
causes?<sup>780</sup> Some [interpreters] have understood this to mean ‘the best  
of causes of beings that have come to be’, so that he would not be the  
best of causes in an absolute sense. This would be a falsehood, [they  
affirm,] but not if he was the best of the causes of beings that have come  
to be. After all, the beings that transcend him are not causes of beings  
that have come to be. I myself would be ashamed if I felt the need for 15  
such an (interpretative) contrivance, forgetting what has been said a little  
earlier.<sup>781</sup> There we demonstrated that the Demiurge which Plato has  
now described to us is the source and the monad of the entire demiurgic  
rank. For this reason he is also the best of the causes, because he has  
obtained the very first rank among the demiurges of the universe. Here 20  
too Plato is explicitly emulating Homer, who calls him ‘Father’ of the  
universe and ‘highest of lords’,<sup>782</sup> even though he has recorded the gods  
anterior to him right up to Night herself.<sup>783</sup> Because, therefore, he is  
the most ancient of demiurgic causes, he is celebrated by Homer as the 25  
‘highest of lords’ and by Plato as the ‘best of the causes’.

Other interpreters do not have the temerity to cast blame on the  
Demiurge in any way but put the blame on this universe and make  
allegations by using the words of the ancients who call the cosmos a  
‘cave’ and a ‘prison’ and a ‘grotto’.<sup>784</sup> Others, such as Heraclitus, have 334  
said that the Demiurge ‘is playing’ when he manufactures the cosmos.<sup>785</sup>

It is easy to reply to these [allegations]. Even if the cosmos is **most**  
**beautiful** and a ‘blessed god’ (34b8), as Plato says, when it is compared 5  
to the intelligible realm and its transcendent location it is quite suitably

<sup>779</sup> Probably a reference to the Gnostics against whom Plotinus polemicizes in *Enn.* 2.9.

<sup>780</sup> Proclus’ method here shows that he considers it the more difficult question of the two.

<sup>781</sup> A general reference to the long discussion on the identity of the Demiurge at 310.3–319.21.

<sup>782</sup> Same epithets as above 316.9–10.

<sup>783</sup> This looks like a slip on Proclus’ part here, because it is not Homer who records the presence of Night, but Orpheus; cf. 313.29–314.3, 314.25, 315.13.

<sup>784</sup> Proclus has in mind here Pherecydes fr. 6 DK, Empedocles 31B120 DK (ἄντρον), *Phd.* 62b4 (φρουρά), *Rep.* 514a5 (σπήλαιον). For the exegesis cf. Plot. *Enn.* 4.8.1.31ff., Porphyry, *De antro* 8.

<sup>785</sup> 22B52 DK; but in this fragment, as preserved by Hippolytus, the subject is αἰών (eternity).

called a ‘cave’ and a ‘grotto’, and especially in the case of the individual souls who show an inclination towards the bodies and matter.<sup>786</sup> As for the Demiurge, even if he is the **best of the causes**, one might call all his providential activities towards his recently fashioned works ‘playfulness’,<sup>787</sup> when compared to the activities which transcend the sense-perceptible realm. These are the reasons, then, that the Demiurge obtained such high praise from Plato in the present context.

We must also understand how the alignment of the most beautiful to the best is dependent on the very first principles. For just as among them beauty is attached to the Good and the Cause that makes beauty is attached to the source of all good things, so indeed in this context the cosmos has been called **the most beautiful** and the Demiurge **the best**, and the most beautiful is dependent on the best. Moreover, the account concerning the cosmos’s creation imitates that creation itself. For just as the cosmos itself is led from disharmony to order and to imitation of the intelligible realm by the process of creation, so indeed the account of the cosmos first used incongruous language,<sup>788</sup> describing it as coming into being and passing away, but now in turn it uses highly reverent language, addressing it as the most beautiful of beings that have come to be, progeny of a Father who is the best, and image (*agalma*, cf. 37c7) of a most divine Paradigm. A little later he will celebrate it with the most sacred language as well.<sup>789</sup>

### *The cosmos as image*

**These things being as they are, there is, again, every necessity that this cosmos is an image of something.**<sup>790</sup> (29b1–2)

### *General explanation: 334.30–336.26*

It might seem to the more simple-minded folk that this statement is the same as what has been said before. What is the difference, one might

<sup>786</sup> Accepting Festugière’s minimal conjecture.

<sup>787</sup> Allusion to the Heraclitean fragment cited in 334.2. But see also 127.14–19 on 23b5.

<sup>788</sup> This does not refer to 28a (where the discussion is about principles, not the cosmos) but the earlier discourse at 22c; cf. 105.4ff.

<sup>789</sup> It is a bit unclear what Proclus refers to here. Diehl thinks it is the description of the act of creation in 29e. Festugière’s suggestion of 34c8, where he calls the cosmos a ‘blessed god’ (referred to above at 334.4) is more plausible. Because of the way the cross-reference is formulated the allusion is probably not to the final words of the work, which are the most celebratory of all. On the hymnic language of the *Timaeus* see Hadot (1983).

<sup>790</sup> No divergence from Burnet’s OCT text.

say if one does not look precisely, between saying that the cosmos has been fashioned with regard to a paradigm or that it is **an image of something**? But the truth is that each of these expressions is distinguished from the other. In fact it is possible that the Demiurge did his work with regard to a Paradigm, but the fashioned product did not become an image of the Paradigm because there was not complete mastery on the part of the demiurgic cause. So in order that you do not think this happened in the case of the cosmos, he [Plato] showed on the one hand that the Demiurge looked towards a Paradigm, and because he was 'the best' (29a6) he looked to the Paradigm that was most divine, through his statement that the universe was modelled in relation to the intelligible [Paradigm]. But that on the other hand the universe has also been mastered in terms of form and has truly imitated the Paradigm, he has made clear through this text. For if the cosmos is an **image** (*eikôn*), it has come to resemble the entire intelligible realm. After all, that which is not dissimilar but similar and resembling is an image.

You have, then, (1) the sense-perceptible universe as most beautiful of images, (2) the entire intellective universe as the best of causes, (3) the intelligible Paradigm as the most divine of paradigms, and each of them is everywhere, since (1) the sense-perceptible realm participates in Intellect and Being, and (2) the intellective realm contains the sense-perceptibles in a unitary manner (*benoeidôs*) and the intelligibles secondarily,<sup>791</sup> while (3) the intelligible realm has embraced in advance both the intellective and the sense-perceptible objects in a principal (*archikôs*) and unified (*bênômenôs*) manner. But in each rank the universe [is disposed] in an appropriate manner (*oikeiôs*).<sup>792</sup> The sense-perceptible realm is presented as a fashioned product, while the cause is presented as demiurgic on the one hand and as paradigmatic on the other. Yet the paradigmatic cause is also present in the demiurgic cause, for it creates by looking at itself. After all, every mind sees itself and forms an identity in relation to the intelligible [object] that is within itself.<sup>793</sup> And in turn the creative cause is present in the paradigmatic cause, for it too creates that which comes into being. For it is not a paradigm like the example made by the

<sup>791</sup> The Demiurge as the primary intellective cause (cf. 310.8ff.) contains all the sense-perceptible objects that are to be created in a unitary form. As Festugière points out, 'secondarily' here refers to the fact that the primary location of the intelligibles is in the intelligible realm, not in the Demiurge as intellective cause.

<sup>792</sup> This recalls the famous Neoplatonic slogan 'all in all but appropriately'; cf. *ET* §103 and Dodds' notes, Siorvanes (1996) 51–6.

<sup>793</sup> The Aristotelian doctrine that *nous* is identical with its object has been absorbed into the Platonist tradition.

image-maker,<sup>794</sup> and it is also not like the image of Socrates which is the image of another image,<sup>795</sup> but through its very existence the paradigmatic cause creates secondary things that are similar to itself. Nevertheless creating in the manner of a paradigm and being a paradigm in the manner of a demiurge do differ. In the one case it is a matter of being active in an essential manner,<sup>796</sup> in the other of giving existence in an active manner. In the one case there is knowing in an intelligible manner, in the other there is being intelligible in an intellective manner. For it belongs to the role of a paradigm to create through [the fact of] being, whereas it belongs to the role of a demiurge to create through being active. Creating through [the fact of] being is not the same as creating through knowing and being active by means knowledge.<sup>797</sup> The soul too causes life through [the sole fact of] being, but it creates in a skilful manner (*technikôs*) through its knowing. The one capacity it has through its being, the other through its acting.

But why should I go on at length in this philosophical manner?<sup>798</sup> Long ago the Theologian celebrated the demiurgic Cause in Phanes. There he existed and pre-existed, as he (i.e. Orpheus) himself has said,<sup>799</sup>

Both mighty Bromios and Zeus the all-seer,

in order that he might have the sources, as it were, of the double creation. And in Zeus he celebrated the paradigmatic Cause, for he in turn is also Mêtis, as he says,<sup>800</sup>

And Zeus the first Generator is Mêtis and highly delightful Erôs,

while Dionysus himself is continually called both Phanes and Erikepaios.

All of these causes, therefore, have participated in each other and exist in each other. As a result both he who states that the Demiurge contains the Paradigm in himself, as the divine Iamblichus decrees (fr. 36), and he who declares the Paradigm to be the Demiurge, as the noble Amelius claims, speak correctly in a way. The latter saw the characteristic trait of the Demiurge pre-existing in the Paradigm, for there Zeus is the very first and for this reason he made Phanes a demiurge.<sup>801</sup> But the former saw the Paradigm in the Demiurge, for it was also in this one (i.e. the

<sup>794</sup> Proclus refers here to a κοροπλάσθης, a maker of small images; cf. Plato *Tht.* 147c. The same negative comparison is used below at 394.7.

<sup>795</sup> Because Socrates himself in his physical manifestation is a sense-perceptible object.

<sup>796</sup> οὐσιωδῶς, i.e. in a manner corresponding to the fact that one has being.

<sup>797</sup> I accept here Festugière's emendation of Diehl's text.

<sup>798</sup> Philosophy merely articulates and explicates in a philosophical manner what is already present in the theology of the ancients.

<sup>799</sup> *Orph. fr.* 170. <sup>800</sup> *Orph. fr.* 169.4.

<sup>801</sup> For the views of Amelius on the Demiurge see above 306.1–31 (on Phanes 306.14).

Demiurge) that Mêtis had been absorbed, and it is for this reason that he identified the paradigmatic Cause with the demiurgic Cause.<sup>802</sup> This is what we need to say on these themes. 25

### *Explanation of details: 336.26–337.7*

We should not be surprised if Plato has called the cosmos an **image**. For even though it is ‘most beautiful’ (29a5), it remains an image of the intelligible Beauty and its preservation depends on this similarity. Just as, therefore, Orpheus fashions replicas of Dionysus which preside over the process of becoming and have received the entire form of the Paradigm, so the philosopher has also given the cosmos the appellation ‘image of the intelligible’ inasmuch as it resembles its own paradigm. 30 337

The addition of the word **necessity** reveals the marvellous and ineffable and truly indissoluble resemblance of the cosmos to that [Paradigm], as well as testifying that the demonstration has the characteristics of indisputability and fixity. For it has proceeded from the basic principles themselves. 5

### *The importance of the starting-point*

Now of every [subject] the greatest thing is to make a starting-point that is in accordance with nature. (29b2–3) 10

### *Controversies on how to read the sentence: 337.10–23*

Some [interpreters] read this [sentence] by placing a comma after **all**.<sup>803</sup> For them the text discloses that the greatest of all things is to present a starting-point of the accounts which is the starting-point that is in accordance with nature.<sup>804</sup> Others place the comma after **the greatest thing**, connecting **of every [subject]** with what follows. For them the phrase means that the greatest thing is to make a start of every [subject] from the starting-point that is in accordance with nature. Moreover, some say that these words are said on account of the prior statements, namely that they have been correctly concluded on account of the basic 15

<sup>802</sup> Dillon (1973) 310 rightly concludes that the identification with Mêtis was made by Iamblichus. The same identification has already been made above at 169.17, citing the same Orphic verse.

<sup>803</sup> πάντως can mean ‘of every thing or subject’, as in the translation we have given of the text, or ‘of all’. In the latter case one would translate ‘Now the greatest thing of all . . .’

<sup>804</sup> On the translation of ἀρχή as ‘starting-point’ see above n. 461. With this term we attempt to cover the two meanings of ‘principle’ and ‘beginning’.

principles which are necessarily true. Others say it is on account of what will be said immediately afterwards, namely that if we are to present the required starting-point we should determine in advance what kind of arguments there should be concerning the sense-perceptible realm. Yet others say it is on account of the teaching about the final Cause which will follow, for this is the principle that is greatest and in accordance with nature, which one should above all investigate and which makes the starting-point required for the exposition that follows.

*Proclus' interpretation: 337.23–339.2*

But before we shall give an account of this (Cause),<sup>805</sup> we should state what will be the kind of accounts given of the physical realm. I am convinced that this fundamental principle is correctly stated for all subjects.<sup>806</sup> It is universal and connects with what has been said before and what follows and what will be said later on, indeed not only with these accounts, but with the entire work of creation. For just as it is from a starting-point in accordance with nature that all things proceed, namely from the everlastingness of the gods and the Source of what exists, so too the scientific account takes its departure from the starting-point in accordance with nature, just like a root, and makes the subsequent reasonings about the Cause correspond to that starting-point, and the scientific knowledge (*epistêmê*) itself makes the appropriate conclusions from the appropriate basic principles. Scientific knowledge, then, follows the order of the realities and this is followed by the didactic account.

This is the **greatest thing**, firstly because it imitates the universal order and the procession of what exists, secondly because even the tiniest thing which is wrongly viewed at the beginning is multiplied many times as one advances, and thirdly because the beginning is said to be 'half of the whole'.<sup>807</sup> If this is so, then it has a very large part of the matter. But if, as some say,<sup>808</sup> the beginning is an even larger part of the whole, then it is marvellous how the [phrase] **greatest thing** has been attached to it.<sup>809</sup> This is shown by the poets when they say that all affairs:

<sup>805</sup> At 355.16ff.

<sup>806</sup> I.e. Proclus agrees with the second interpretation given above.

<sup>807</sup> This common proverb is found at Plato, *Laws* 753e6, and also at Aristotle, *EN* 1.7, 1098b7.

<sup>808</sup> Cf. Hesiod, *Op.* 40.

<sup>809</sup> My interpretation here differs somewhat from Festugière's, but like him I accept Schneider's emendation to προσέφϋ.

If they have fine beginnings,  
usually proceed and end well for mortal beings.<sup>810</sup>

And it is surely for this reason that the Athenian stranger calls the starting-point a god, if it obtains what is suitable. For he says:<sup>811</sup> '(the) starting-point, established as a god among human beings, makes all things right, if it obtains the part that is fitting [for it]'. 15

But what does **in accordance with nature** mean? Either (1) that which imitates the nature of things, or (2) that which has received all that it is owed, or (3) that which first proceeds from what is essential. A starting-point is indeed the final point in relation to us, but not in relation to what is in accordance with nature. The [phrase] 'in accordance with nature' is also appropriate to the present subject, in which the account deals with the whole of nature and the works of nature, as well as to the starting-point of the present subject. We can speak, then, of **a starting-point in accordance with nature** [in various ways]: in the case of the universe it is the final Cause, in the case of the proofs it consists of the basic principles, in the case of the accounts (*logoi*) it is the determination of the kind of teaching involved, whether it should be taken as fixed and unalterable and fully precise, or as a likely discourse<sup>812</sup> which is not truth but persuasion and what resembles the truth (cf. 29c3). 20 25 339

### *V On the logos of the science of nature and its listeners:*

339.3–355.15

#### *The account imitates the act of creation itself*

Concerning an image and its paradigm, then, we must distinguish in this way,<sup>813</sup> (29b3–4) 5

#### *General explanation: 339.5–340.13*

There are three things which have a natural interrelation with each other: realities (*pragmata*), thoughts (*noêmata*) and accounts (*logoi*).<sup>814</sup> The first basic principles that he took in hand were related to realities

<sup>810</sup> A fragment from an unknown tragedian, taken up as *TrGF* 2.433 Kannicht-Snell (it has the same number in the earlier collection of Nauck).

<sup>811</sup> Proclus here paraphrases Plato, *Laws* 775e2–4.

<sup>812</sup> The term εἰκοτολογία is used here for the first time in the commentary. It will be prominent in Proclus' treatment of *Tim.* 29b3–d2; cf. 340.26, 345.1, 348.26, 350.20.

<sup>813</sup> No divergence from Burnet's OCT text.

<sup>814</sup> I.e. the same things are viewed from an ontological, epistemological and 'logical' point of view.

and thoughts. The distinction he will make now is related to accounts. When he separated that which comes into being from Being, he applied himself to the investigation of realities, and when in the case of realities he distinguished our forms of cognition (*gnôseis*), he applied himself to the investigation of thoughts. But now, partitioning off the accounts in accordance with the different forms of cognition, he will show us the separate nature of those accounts. As a result these will [all] be in correspondence with each other: two kinds of realities, Being and becoming; two kinds of cognition, intuitive thought and opinion; two kinds of account, those that are stable and those that are likely. And where else do the forms of cognition come from than from the objects of knowledge? Where else does the differentiation of accounts come from than from the kinds of cognition?

Some thus say that distinguishing in advance what the method of giving an account is and what kind of reader one should have is a matter of literary composition and that Aristotle and many other more recent writers have emulated this.<sup>815</sup> I myself would say that it is the act of creation itself which the account imitates. For just as it first produces the invisible principles of life in the cosmos and then causes the visible reality to exist and also contains its definition prior to the cosmos in its entirety [coming into existence], in the same way Timaeus too applies himself to the investigation of realities, makes the form of the account appropriate for the realities [being described],<sup>816</sup> and prior to the entire investigation first treats and defines in advance the method of giving an account, so that the teaching in its entirety can be calibrated in accordance with this definition.

Why, then, does he do this now and not earlier? Because necessarily it is only after the demonstration that the cosmos is generated that one defines what kind of account should be given of realities that are sense-perceptible, but not earlier, when the nature of the universe was still unknown. When, however, he calls the universe **an image**, we should take this to be the kind of image which we consider souls to be, just as we should not think **the paradigm** is sterile or feeble. Instead we should ascribe to the cosmos resemblance to the intelligible, firstly in accordance with the productive power of the paradigm – for by its very existence it

<sup>815</sup> I.e. it is part of the introduction of a treatise (its *proemium*) to make a statement on method and audience. This was practised *de facto* by Plato's predecessors; see Runia (1997) 105. The reference to Aristotle may be to *Rhet.* 1.3, 1358a36ff., as noted by Diehl, although that primarily concerns speeches.

<sup>816</sup> The analogy between creation and Plato's composition is far-fetched. Festugière relates it to (1) the creation of soul (34b–42e), (2) the formation of bodies (53c–55e), and (3) the prior treatment of first principles and definitions (27d–34b). But in fact Plato speaks about bodies before soul in the actual structure of the discourse (31b–34b).

produces the copy from itself, secondly in accordance with the demiurgic cause which makes the universe completely similar to the intelligible through the activities directed towards it, and thirdly in accordance with the reversion of the cosmos itself towards the production of forms and the participation in the intelligibles, for, as the Oracle says,<sup>817</sup> it makes itself resemble them by 'eagerly' clothing itself with the 'mark' (*tupos*) of the copies (*eidōla*) which the intelligible gods extend to it.

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### *The single principle involved*

how namely the accounts are also akin to these very things of which they are explanatory.<sup>818</sup> (29b4–5)

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### *General explanation: 340.16–341.24*

Just as the procession of beings occurs from the One prior to multiplicity and the procession of encosmic beings from the monad to the appropriate number, in the same way too Timaeus' account, because, as he himself says (29b5), it resembles the things that exist, begins from the single and universal fundamental principle and then in this way introduces the distinction in **the accounts**. What, then, is the single and common principle in these matters? That the account should be **akin** to the realities of which it is in fact **explanatory**.<sup>819</sup>

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It appears that the Platonists in the circle of Albinus and Gaius<sup>820</sup> take their point of departure from here when they determine in how many ways Plato presents his doctrine, and that he does so in two ways, either scientifically or as a likely discourse.<sup>821</sup> The various kinds of account do not proceed in a single manner or have a single [kind of] precision, whether they concern things that truly exist or that exist through becoming, but the accounts have the same divisions as the realities themselves, and in terms of their accuracy and clarity they run parallel to the realities that underlie them, so that some of the accounts<sup>822</sup> state that the realities are so and could not be otherwise, while others state that what the realities have is likelihood of a certain kind, and it is necessary that the account resemble the realities [which it describes], for it would not

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<sup>817</sup> *Or. Chald.* fr. 37.7–9. Proclus has referred to the adjacent passage above at 318.12.

<sup>818</sup> No divergence from Burnet's OCT text except in the orthography of ξυγγενεῖς.

<sup>819</sup> The term in Plato's text is ἐξηγηταί, literally 'exegetes'.

<sup>820</sup> Gaius fr. 9 T Gioè, Albinus fr. 9 T Gioè. Festugière's reference to Alcinoüs' *Did.* 154.22 is not to the point, because the latter work cannot be attributed to Albinus.

<sup>821</sup> Contrast between ἐπιστημονικῶς and εἰκοτολογικῶς.

<sup>822</sup> Deleting τῶν δογμάτων λεγόντων, as suggested by Kroll.

explain their nature unless it had a familial relation<sup>823</sup> to them. What the thing (*pragma*) is in a contracted mode, the account should be in an articulated mode, so that it reveals the thing and is subordinated to its nature.

10 In the same way the divine causes of the account reveal both the essences of the realities prior to them and are linked to them by nature. Thus among the gods the messenger of Zeus,<sup>824</sup> who is the ‘account’ (*logos*) in relation to the Intellect of the Father, recounts his will to the secondary gods. And among the essences the Soul, who is the ‘account’  
15 (*logos*) of the intelligibles, reveals the unified cause of the accounts present within them, since it is from them that it obtains its existence.<sup>825</sup> But in the ranks superior to us, the messenger class<sup>826</sup> which obtains its existence from the gods continually interprets and transmits the ineffable [command] of the gods. Suitably therefore this account of the  
20 realities is akin to the realities [there] and is, as it were, their offspring. For it is completed from the insights present in us, which are coupled with the realities.

So much for the single and universal fundamental proposition preceding what is distinguished. What follows divides the different kinds of account in conjunction with the qualitative nature (*poiêtês*) of the realities  
25 [they describe].

### *The terminology used for the Paradigm and its logos*

342 Of the [reality that is] stable and reliable and transparent to intellect the accounts are stable and unaltering, and to the extent and possibility that it is fitting for accounts to be irrefutable and invincible, there should be nothing failing from [the achievement of] this,<sup>827</sup> (29b5–c1)

### *General explanation: 342.3–343.15*

5 Previously he called the paradigm ‘that which always is’ (27d6) and ‘that which always remains in the same state’ (28a6, cf. a2) and ‘grasped by intuitive knowledge’ (28a1), now he calls it **stable** – this instead of ‘always-existent’ – and **reliable** – this instead of ‘always remaining in the same state’ – and **transparent to intellect** – this instead of the final

<sup>823</sup> συγγενῶς, picking up συγγενεῖς at 29b5.

<sup>824</sup> Hermes, the patron god of hermeneutics.

<sup>825</sup> Retaining, with Festugière, λαβοῦσα. Proclus’ doctrine of *logos* here recalls that of Plotinus, for whom *logos* is the translation and exposition of *nous* at a lower ontological level; cf. Rist (1967) 84–102.

<sup>826</sup> ἀγγελικὴ τάξις, but to translate ‘angelic class’ with Festugière is misleading. This class is also referred to at III. 248.28, 262.15.

<sup>827</sup> Divergence from Burnet’s OCT text: Proclus leaves out καὶ before ἀνελέγκτοις.

term 'grasped by intellect'. The accounts given of it he calls **stable** so that by using the identical term<sup>828</sup> he might indicate the likeness to the realities which they present. He also calls them **unaltering** so that they might form an image of the reliability of the object, and **irrefutable** so that they imitate what is grasped by intuitive knowledge and proceed in a scientific manner.<sup>829</sup> For if the accounts were to be 'fitting' (cf. 29b8) for the intelligible realities, they should possess accuracy and be well fitted, since they deal with realities that are of that kind themselves. Just as the knowledge of the everlasting realities is **unaltering**, so the account should be as well, for it is knowledge that has been articulated.<sup>830</sup> But (1) since this account proceeds to multiplicity and has obtained a composite nature and for this reason is inferior to the unity and indivisibility of the [noetic] object, he named that **stable** (*monimou*) and **reliable** and **transparent to understanding** in the singular, where he uses the plural for accounts that are **stable** (*monimous*) and **unaltering** and **irrefutable**. And (2) since in the account there is similarity in relation to the paradigm, but also dissimilarity, and this is [in fact] greater, he only used one term in common, namely **stable**,<sup>831</sup> and made the other terms different. And (3) since the scientific account is **irrefutable** (*anelengtos*) as far as it relates to our knowledge – for there is nothing in us that is superior to knowledge – but it is convicted of error (*elenchetai*) by the [intelligible] object itself in not being able to grasp its nature as it really is and in falling short of its indivisibility, he added the words **to the extent and possibility**. This knowledge inasmuch as it is present in souls is irrefutable, but it is convicted of error by intellect. For it is intellect alone that will state Being as it is, whereas knowledge at a secondary level articulates the indivisibility [of the intelligible object] and grapples with its simplicity by means of composition. Indeed in the case of (1) sensation it is convicted of error by imagination, because of what it comes to know through experience (*pathos*) involving inclusion or separation of what it itself purifies. And (2) opinion convicts imagination of error, because the latter is accompanied by a mark and a form to which opinion itself is superior. And (3) knowledge does the same to opinion, because the latter comes to know without causal reasoning, which knowledge itself especially requires.<sup>832</sup> And finally (4) intellect, as has been stated, convicts knowledge of error, because the latter discursively divides up the object of knowledge, whereas intellect itself knows its object all together<sup>833</sup>

<sup>828</sup> μόνιμος is the only term that Plato uses for both the original and the account given of it.

<sup>829</sup> ἐπιστημονικῶς, as above at 340.25. <sup>830</sup> Cf. the same term above at 341.7.

<sup>831</sup> The same observation was made above at 342.8. <sup>832</sup> Reference to *Meno* 98a3–4.

<sup>833</sup> ὁμοῦ πᾶν again; cf. above 241.23, 256.4 and n. 241.

together with the cause. It is intellect, then, that alone is **invincible**. Science and the scientific account are subject to the authority of intellect in accordance with the [form of] cognition of (i.e. appropriate to) being.

### *The terminology used for the image and its logos*

but those accounts of what has been formed as an image in relation to that [paradigm], being of an image (*eikôn*) are likely (*eikos*)<sup>834</sup> (29C1–2)

### *General explanation: 343.18–344.25*

That the account about what is generated is about images (*eikones*), and that for this reason it must itself be called **likely** (*eikos*), is obvious.<sup>835</sup> But perhaps one might ask what kind of accounts one should in the final instance give of those objects that have not been made as images in relation to the intelligible realm but nevertheless exist in the universe, such as we say imagistic products (*eikasta*) and artistic products (*technêta*) are.<sup>836</sup> As an answer it might be suggested that for these things conjectural accounts (*eikastikoi*) are suitable, which are different from likely accounts. Indeed, conjecturing (*eikazein*) is one thing, for this activity is in fact even feebler than sense-perception. But resembling (*eoikenai*) is another, for it is suitable for the accounts that give explanation of the images of Being. Artistic and imagistic products, then, give an interpretation by means of accounts that are conjectural.<sup>837</sup> Unless perhaps that for the objects which are truly imagistic, as we said, they are such,<sup>838</sup> but in the case of artistic products the first level based on the forms are likely (*eikotes*), whereas those that exist on a secondary level, which are at a third stage from the truth, are like the accounts given of the objects that are imagistic by nature. After all, these latter as imagistic objects are images of sense-perceptible things, just as those ones (i.e. on

<sup>834</sup> No divergence from Burnet's OCT text. Contrary to Proclus' usual practice he breaks off the Platonic text at a point where there is no punctuation.

<sup>835</sup> The word-play is difficult in English. We could translate εἰκός as 'imagistic', but that would obscure the epistemological distinctions that Proclus now goes on to draw.

<sup>836</sup> Proclus lumps together the images of natural objects which constitute the lowest region of Plato's Divided Line in the *Republic* and artistic products, but then he checks himself and makes a distinction between them, since in the latter case it is possible that the artist does not use a natural object as paradigm but makes the product on the basis of the form present in his mind.

<sup>837</sup> Note that Proclus uses hermeneutical terms here: ἐξηγηταί (translated 'give explanation', literally 'exegetes'); ἐρμηνεύεται ('give an interpretation').

<sup>838</sup> I.e. that the accounts are imagistic.

the secondary level) certainly are, like the bed that has been drawn is a copy of the bed produced by the craftsman.

A further point that should be considered is that Plato is now discussing natural images and for this reason he has divided the accounts in two ways, for the objects that have been made as images in relation to the intelligible realm (cf. 29c1) are objects that exist by nature (*phusei*), and not those that exist by artistic skill (*technêi*). The skilled craftsman does not make what he makes in accordance with certain [ideal] forms, even if Socrates in the *Republic* (596b) seems to say this.<sup>839</sup> But the subject matter of that passage concerns a paradigm. It is not about the actual Forms, but about the forms used down here.<sup>840</sup> After all, he says that their maker is the god and Demiurge, but he is not the demiurgic maker of the Forms. In the *Protagoras* it is plainly demonstrated that according to Plato neither are there accounts in us of artistic skills – and this applies all the more for the products of such skills – nor do paradigms of them exist among the gods. These products (of artistic skill), therefore, have not come to be in relation to the intelligible. Plato has now divided the accounts into one about the intelligible and one about the image of the intelligible. It was to indicate this that he made the statement: **but those accounts of what has been formed as an image in relation to that (paradigm), being of an image are likely.** What has been formed as an image in relation to the intelligible are the works of nature, not those made in accordance with artistic skill, just as it is not individual characteristics taken separately [that have been formed as an image in relation to the intelligible], but the universal characteristics that they have. These subjects have been discussed elsewhere.

### *Comparing accounts and corresponding forms of knowledge*

and stand in proportion to those accounts: what being is in relation to becoming, truth is in relation to convincingness.<sup>841</sup> (29c2–3)

### *General explanation of passage: 344.28–346.3*

Previously he placed two terms in the leading positions,<sup>842</sup> ‘intelligible’ and ‘generated’ or ‘paradigm’ and ‘image’, and he assumed two terms

<sup>839</sup> Proclus discusses this passage at *in Remp.* II. 86.5–87.8. See further the analysis at D’Hoine (2006).

<sup>840</sup> I.e. the immanent forms in the mind of the craftsman, not the transcendent Forms.

<sup>841</sup> No divergence from Burnet’s OCT text. My translation of πίστις follows Zeyl.

<sup>842</sup> I.e. in the passage starting at 29b5 Plato begins with the object of knowledge (τοῦ μυνίμου . . .) and the created product (τοῦ πρὸς ἐκείνο ἀπεικασθέντος), relating them

in proportion to them, ‘knowledge’ and ‘likelihood’ or ‘truth’ and ‘convincingness’. As truth stands in relation to the intelligible paradigm, so convincingness stands to the generated image. But now in the geometrical manner he has also added the alternate relation. For if there is ‘as truth stands in relation to the intelligible, so convincingness stands in relation to the generated’, so there is also the alternate ‘as truth stands in relation to convincingness, so the intelligible stands in relation to the generated’. Certainly he did well when he placed the intelligible and truth as antecedents and nevertheless [in this phrase] started off with the generated and convincingness,<sup>843</sup> so that he would mix what directly concerns us with the order in accordance with nature, preserving the true worth of the realities as well as starting his undertaking from what is familiar to us.<sup>844</sup>

Plato has thus explicitly made a division in which both the accounts and the forms of knowledge correspond to the objects of knowledge. The same was indicated by Parmenides as well, even if he did so with a lack of clarity on account of his poetic manner of discourse, when he says (fr. 1.29–30):<sup>845</sup>

Both the steadfast heart of resplendent<sup>846</sup> truth  
and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true convincingness.<sup>847</sup>

And again (fr. 2.1–6):

Come, I shall speak, and do you listen and convey the story,  
what routes of inquiry alone there are for thinking:  
the one, how it is and how it cannot not be,  
is the path of Persuasion (for it attends upon Truth),  
the other, how it is not and how it needs must not be,  
that I point out to you is a track that is completely unpersuasive.<sup>848</sup>

both to the epistemological status of the accounts given of them. Now he compares the two objects and the two accounts.

<sup>843</sup> Because in the Greek text *πρὸς γένεσιν* and *πρὸς πίστιν* precede the nouns *οὐσία* and *ἀλήθεια* (it is unnatural to try to reproduce this in English).

<sup>844</sup> The familiar Aristotelian distinction between what is most knowable in absolute terms and what is most knowable for us as human knowers.

<sup>845</sup> Based on Gallop’s translation. The quotation flows on from the first part of the sentence in the previous line: ‘And it is right that you should learn all things . . .’

<sup>846</sup> Proclus reads *εὐφειγέος* instead of *εὐκυκλέος* read by Diels on the authority of Simplicius. His preference for this reading is made clear at 346.2.

<sup>847</sup> Parmenides, writing well over a century before Plato, used exactly the same two terms that we find at 29c, *ἀλήθεια* and *πίστις*.

<sup>848</sup> According to the manuscripts Proclus has written *παναπειθέα* and not *παναπευθέα*, as read by Diels on the authority of Simplicius. Diehl was not justified in amending the text.

And also (fr. 2.7–8):

For neither could you know what is not (for it is not attainable),  
nor could you express it.

This philosopher too, therefore, states that there are two kinds of knowledge relating to two kinds of realities, being and non-being, **truth** which he also has called resplendent, inasmuch as it illuminates with intellectual light, and **convincingness**, which he excludes from stable knowledge.

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### *Interpretation of 'convincingness': 346.3–347.2*

But it seems that the convincingness which Plato has taught in the present passage differs from the one he talks about in the *Republic* in the division of the line (511e1).<sup>849</sup> That convincingness is an irrational [form of] cognition. Hence it is distinguished from conjecture, but is classified in terms of sense-perception. This convincingness [here], on the other hand, is rational, but it is combined with irrational forms of cognition. It makes use of sense-perception and conjecture, and for this reason it is also filled with a good deal of instability. It is only by taking the existence<sup>850</sup> of a thing from sense-perception or conjecture that it supplies its causes. These forms of knowledge possess much confusion and instability.

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For this reason in the *Phaedo* Socrates makes many accusations against sense-perception, arguing that there is no precision in what we hear or see.<sup>851</sup> How, then, could cognition which has its starting-point in sense-perception possess precision and infallibility? After all, it is [cognitive] processes involving use of knowledge alone that fully grasp the entire knowable object with precision, whereas [cognitive] processes involving sense-perception miss their mark and fail to attain precision because of sense-perception and the instability of the object of knowledge itself. How would one express in words the material realm which is always changing and in flux, and indeed by nature is unable to remain at rest even for a moment? The heavenly realm, on the other hand, because it is far away from us, is not easily knowable and cannot be grasped by scientific knowledge, but in our investigation of its nature we should be content with approximative and probable results.<sup>852</sup> After all, every

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<sup>849</sup> The emphasis differs between the two accounts. In the *Republic* Plato focuses on the cognitive states; here he is interested in the λόγοι given. Proclus wrongly concludes that there are two different epistemologies involved.

<sup>850</sup> τὸ ὅτι, i.e. literally 'the that [it is]'.

<sup>851</sup> A very general reference to *Phd.* 83a4–5, with no verbal echoes.

<sup>852</sup> There is a kind of trade-off involved. As far as physical objects are concerned, heaven is the most stable object of knowledge that there is, so humans should be able to

25 object that is spatially located needs someone who will be present there  
in order for its nature to be entirely known. But this is not the case for  
the intelligible realm, for it is not spatially separated from our cognition.  
Wherever one locates one's understanding, the truth is grasped as if it  
30 were omnipresent. If it is possible to say anything reliable about it (i.e.  
the heaven), this is possible inasmuch as it has participated in being and  
inasmuch as it is graspable by intuitive knowledge. For, if it is necessary  
to reach solid conclusions about it, this is possible solely through the  
347 agency of geometrical demonstrations which have a universal validity.<sup>853</sup>  
But as an object of sense-perception it is difficult to grasp and difficult  
to investigate. Let this suffice about these subjects.

*A further difficulty: 347.2–19*

A difficulty that one might raise is how one could still say that 'it is quite a  
task to find the Demiurge, and when found, impossible to tell everyone'  
5 (28c3–5), when in fact we are able to give stable and unchanging and  
irrefutable accounts about the Paradigm. As an answer we might say  
that what is spoken about the Demiurge is much more fitting for the  
Paradigm itself. For it is far greater a task to find it and when found  
impossible to tell everyone. But he did not reject the possibility of there  
10 being scientific accounts either about the Demiurge or any other of  
the beings that always remain identical to themselves. After all, in what  
way would Plato differ from other philosophers of nature if not in the  
demonstrations he makes of the scientific knowledge about the divine  
beings? But if it is especially in the case of the demiurgic cause that  
15 he reminds us that it is quite a task to find it, this should cause us no  
surprise. He recognized, I believe, that the other philosophers of nature  
attributed the efficient cause to physical powers. In order, then, that we  
should not suffer the same fate, he declares that the demiurgic principle  
is hard to find and hard to know. Let this answer suffice in response to  
20 the difficulty.

*What does 'truth' mean in this context? 347.20–348.7*

As for **truth**, Plato follows the Theologians in assuming that it is found in  
many places in the realm of Being. (1) One [kind of] truth is that which is  
uni-form (*benoeidês*), the light that proceeds from the Good, which is also

obtain quite reliable information about it. But because it is so far removed from earth  
and observation is required to obtain that knowledge, the results will necessarily be  
imperfect.

<sup>853</sup> The kind of astronomy that Plato envisages in *Rep.* 529c–530c.

purity, as he calls it in the *Philebus* (55c7, 58c7), and brings unification to the intelligible realm in the *Republic*.<sup>854</sup> (2) Another [kind of] truth is that which comes from the intelligibles and illuminates the intellectual classes. It is first received 'by the essence which has no shape or colour or tactility' (*Phdr.* 247c6–7), where 'the plain of truth' (*Phdr.* 248b6) is also found, as has been written in the *Phaedrus*. (3) Yet another is the truth that is innate in the souls, which through intuitive thought (*noêsis*) fastens on to Being and by means of scientific knowledge has intercourse with the objects of knowledge. For, to speak in spatial terms, the psychic light is at a third remove from the intelligible, the intellectual plane first being filled [with light] from the intelligible and then the psychic plane undergoing the same from the intellectual. Therefore it is this truth found in souls that we must assume in the present context too, since it was this kind of convincingness (i.e. of the soul) that we assumed as well,<sup>855</sup> not the kind that is irrational and has had all rational fixity stripped away. The one [form of cognition] must be linked with the intelligibles (i.e. truth), the other with the sensibles (i.e. convincingness).

### *Preparing the listener*

If then, Socrates, on many subjects – on gods and the coming to be of the universe – we should very often be unable to give accounts that are in every respect completely consistent with each other and fully precise, do not be surprised.<sup>856</sup> (29c4–7)

### *General explanation of context and passage: 348.13–349.6*

First he furnished the basic principles for the entire science of nature and inferred the propositions<sup>857</sup> which are needed for the investigation.<sup>858</sup> These latter are three [in number], while the former are five. Secondly he defined the manner of the discourses.<sup>859</sup> Thirdly he [now] prepares the listener, as befits those who are about to receive discourses [for instruction]. This person must listen to what is said about the realm of nature not as discourses that are **fully precise** (29c6) or as truly scientific,

<sup>854</sup> A general reference to the image of the sun, *Rep.* 508e–509b.

<sup>855</sup> By implication at 346.8.

<sup>856</sup> Divergence from Burnet's OCT text: Proclus places λόγους after ἀποδοῦναι instead of after ὁμολογουμένους.

<sup>857</sup> The term is λήμματα, used only here and at 355.24, where the meaning is made clearer. They are propositions derived from the basic principles in relation to the cosmos as object of inquiry. Earlier Proclus called them 'demonstrations'; cf. above n. 704.

<sup>858</sup> I.e. in 27d5 to 29b1. <sup>859</sup> I.e. in 29b1–c3.

but as resembling those. Moreover, he needs to know that, just as the cosmos has been mixed together from natural powers and a substance that is intellectual and divine – for the works of nature have come into existence with the intellectual light-beam of the Father, as the Oracle says<sup>860</sup> – in the same way the account given of it produces a mixture of convincingness and truth. After all, that which is drawn from sense-perception has a large admixture of likelihood, whereas that which issues forth from the intelligibles possesses precision and infallibility. Whenever we speak about the Demiurge himself, that he deliberates and reflects and that he does this instead of that,<sup>861</sup> we are departing from the truth of the realities. So if, when speaking about how the eternal beings exercise forethought for the universe we are compelled to divide up what is indivisible and make temporal what is eternal, how much more would the accounts about the actual sense-perceptible things fail to attain precision?

*Some difficulties raised by the text: 349.6–351.14*

But someone might say, what have we here? Do we not give precise accounts about the heaven, such as that the celestial circles bisect each other?<sup>862</sup> And when we are content not to obtain precision but what is close to it, is it not through our own weakness and not through the nature of the object that we fail to reach precision? But the fact is that whenever we take our starting-points not from sense-perception but from universal propositions (*logoi*), in the context of sense-perceptible reality the accounts we give on the heaven do reveal precision and irrefutability, but in the context of the objects of science these too are refuted by means of the immaterial forms. Let us look at the very statement that has just been made. The largest [heavenly] circles, they say, bisect each other. The intersection, therefore, necessarily takes place at [two] points. But this point is indivisible. What, then, is such a thing doing in the realm of the divisible? What is a substance without extension doing in the realm of the extended? After all, everything that comes to be in the bodily realm is physically divided together with its substrate. [But the response might be again:] What have we here? Is there not such a thing as a physical point? But this departs from what is truly indivisible. A point

<sup>860</sup> Proclus alludes to the passage (*Chald. Or.* fr. 39) cited at II. 54.14, where we find the original verb ὑφασμένα, i.e. ‘woven with’, to which Proclus here alludes with the more neutral term συνυφίσταται. Festugière’s ‘comportent dans leur substance’ interprets what Proclus means to say.

<sup>861</sup> As the Demiurge in Plato’s *Timaeus* actually does a good deal, e.g. at 32c8, 33b7.

<sup>862</sup> I.e. the circles of the same and different introduced at 36c. Proclus returns to the subject discussed above in 347.21–6.

does exist in the physical realm, but it is not a point in absolute terms, with the result that the account of the point does not harmonize precisely with such a thing (i.e. the physical point). In general terms, just as the accounts about the intelligibles do not harmonize with the objects of discursive thought (*dianoëta*), so the accounts of the objects of science do not harmonize with the objects of sense-perception, for the intelligibles are paradigms for the objects of discursive thought, while the objects of discursive thought are paradigms for the sense-perceptibles. After all, it is a soul which has ordered the mighty heaven and it continues to do so together with the Father.<sup>863</sup> As a result, whenever we speak about circles in heaven and contacts and bisections and equalities, from the viewpoint of speaking about sense-perceptibles we are speaking with precision. But in the perspective of the immaterial realities, all such expressions are idle chatter.<sup>864</sup>

But if someone were to ask us: What have we here?<sup>865</sup> Is not that which is truly equal a relation (*logos*), and is not the true circle non-extended?<sup>866</sup> After all, each of them is universal, and the universal is *logos* and indivisible form. But what is in the heaven is divisible and bisected and in a substrate, so again<sup>867</sup> we say that here in the sense-perceptible realm there are no [true] circles or equalities or any other such thing, and it is in this way that we furnish our own accounts that are 'not consistent with each other' (cf. 29c6). We state by way of summary, therefore, that Plato defines science (*epistêmê*), (1) sometimes only in terms of giving the causes, (2) sometimes in its subject matter's having a completely stable essence together with the presentation of the causal reasonings, and (3) sometimes in the first principles' not [just] being hypotheses. In accordance with this [last-mentioned] kind he defines one science (3) as the science that ascends right up to the true first principle,<sup>868</sup> for this science places at its head the first principle that is

<sup>863</sup> The discursive thought involved in the creation of the cosmos is the work of the World-soul, not the Demiurge; cf. above 349.1, where Proclus uses the verb διανοεῖται for the activity which corresponds to the discursive thought discussed here.

<sup>864</sup> Comparison with 349.13–15 shows that it is better to retain the readings of Diehl (349.30 μέν, 350.1 ὁύλων) than to accept the alternative readings accepted by Festugière (349.30 μή, 350.1 ἐνύλων). In a letter to Porphyry Amelius says the opponents of Plotinus use the same term (φληναφος) to describe him; cf. *V. Plot.* 17.

<sup>865</sup> The third time that Proclus uses the expression τί οὖν or τί δέ to express an objection; cf. above 349.6, 21.

<sup>866</sup> I.e. they are both conceptual and not spatial.

<sup>867</sup> There seems to be a conjunction missing before πάλιν, e.g. καί or ὥστε.

<sup>868</sup> Another reference to the Divided Line; cf. *Rep.* 510b–511d (ἐπιστήμη at 511c5). As the context makes clear 'one science' refers to the third in the list, i.e. the highest form of science.

15 truly a principle without hypothesis.<sup>869</sup> It has as its subject matter true being and starts from a cause when making its accounts. In accordance with the second kind (2) he also calls discursive knowledge science. But it is only in accordance with the first kind (1) that he would grant the title of science to the study of nature. In the present context, however, 20 having the second kind (of science) in view, he required that we call it (i.e. the study of nature) a likely discourse.<sup>870</sup>

This is what we have to say in relation to the problem [raised by the text]. As for the entire wording (of the sentence), which has some difficulty with regard to its composition, it must be internally adjusted by means of a short addition as follows:<sup>871</sup> **if, Socrates**, when speaking 25 **very often on many subjects**, for these many subjects he then added for the purpose of demonstration [the words] **on gods and the coming to be of the universe**. For he will in fact speak about the coming to be of the young gods<sup>872</sup> and of the coming to be of the universe. This is what the 'many subjects' refers to. **If then**, he says, when speaking **very often on many subjects on the coming to be of the universe and the gods in it**, since each of these are copious themes, **we should not be able to give accounts that are fully precise, do not be surprised**. 30 He said this because it is not surprising to be constrained by necessities. The lack of precision is necessary for two reasons, because the object of knowledge is neither stable (cf. 29b6) nor clear, and because of our 35 **human nature** (29d1).

Plato, therefore, shows considerable circumspection in his discourses. Others do not proceed in this manner. Heraclitus states that he himself knows everything and considers all others to be devoid of scientific knowledge.<sup>873</sup> Empedocles pronounces that he will teach the truth itself 10 (fr. 3.8 DK):

And these words, I tell you, are enthroned on the heights of wisdom.

These statements are not in accordance with philosophical caution. As for the Stoics, they have attributed the same excellence to gods and

<sup>869</sup> Accepting the text as read by Praechter and Festugière. For ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος cf. *Rep.* 511b6.

<sup>870</sup> The term again is εἰκοτολογία; cf. 348.26.

<sup>871</sup> The sentence does not flow because Proclus is combining citation of the text and comment on it.

<sup>872</sup> I.e. below at 42e. Although Festugière refers to this text, he leaves out the reference to the 'young' gods in his translation.

<sup>873</sup> Reference to Heraclitus' famous statement that forms the opening words of his book (fr. 22B1 DK).

human beings,<sup>874</sup> falling well short of being emulators of Platonic piety and Socratic moderation.

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### *The limitations of being human*

But if then we should furnish accounts no less likely than any, one ought to be content, bearing in mind that both I as speaker and you as judges have a nature that is human, so that it befits us to accept the likely tale on these matters and not to search for anything further beyond this.<sup>875</sup>  
(29c7–d3)

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### *General explanation: 351.20–353.29*

Timaeus has recounted that the lack of reliability and precision in the case of the accounts on nature has two sources, (1) the essential nature of the realities themselves – for when immaterial realities become material, when indivisible realities become divisible, when what is separate (i.e. transcendent) finds itself in an alien location, and when universals become individualized and partial, they are not receptive of the scientific and irrefutable account which is fitting for the universal and immaterial and indivisible forms, and (2) the lack of power on the part of those carrying out the investigation. For if it is necessary to obtain some knowledge about them, one has to embrace the kind of cognition that is coupled with them, and this is sense-perception.<sup>876</sup> If one was up there,<sup>877</sup> the deception might have been less, but since we live here in the last part of the universe and furthest removed from those realities, our perception is opaque and faulty. This is the way we are, for we have obtained **a nature that is human**. Our human nature brings with it a life that is material and obscured by the body.<sup>878</sup> It is divided and even requires forms of cognition that are irrational. The gods themselves, however, know<sup>879</sup> that which has come to be uncreatedly,<sup>880</sup> that which is extended

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<sup>874</sup> Because both gods and men share the same divine logos. This passage is cited by Von Arnim as *SVF* I. 564, 3.252. Compare Plutarch's complaint at *De comm. not.* 1076a.

<sup>875</sup> Divergence from Burnet's OCT text: Proclus records the singular *μεμνημένον* instead of the plural *μεμνημένους*.

<sup>876</sup> For the deficiencies of knowledge based on sense-perception see above 346.15–20.

<sup>877</sup> I.e. in the heavenly realm.

<sup>878</sup> The verb found here is used to describe the occultation of the sun or moon in an eclipse.

<sup>879</sup> The verb here is actually in the perfect tense, *ἐγνώκασι*, i.e. literally 'in a state of having come to know'. There is an implicit comparison with humans who gain knowledge in the present.

<sup>880</sup> The first of five adverbs indicating modes of cognition. The same technique in lines 16–18.

unextendedly, that which is divided undividedly, that which is temporal eternally and that which is possible necessarily. For in the very act of knowing they generate all things, and what they generate they generate from the undivided and eternal and immaterial forms. As a result they know these things in this way. Let us not think that the knowledge they have is characterized by the natures of the objects of knowledge, nor that what has no reliability is not reliable in the case of the gods, as the philosopher Porphyry says (fr. 45). This is again something that man has proclaimed ‘which would be better left unsaid’.<sup>881</sup> Let us rather think that the manner of knowing differs according the diversity of the knowers. For the very same object is known by god unitarily, by intellect holistically, by reason universally, by imagination figuratively, by sense-perception passively. And it is *not* the case that because the object of knowledge is one, the knowledge is also one [and the same].

Moreover, if in the case of the gods their knowledge is in accordance with the essence [of things] and their intuitive thought is not something that is additional, then they will they know what they know in accordance with how they are. They are immaterial, eternal, unified and undefiled. Therefore they know in a manner that is immaterial, eternal, unified and undefiled.<sup>882</sup> Of the material realm they have prior knowledge<sup>883</sup> immaterially, of the scattered multiplicity in a unified manner, of that which changes temporally in a reliable and eternal manner, and of all that is contrary to nature and dark and not pure in a manner that is undefiled.

But it would be superfluous to require a prolonged explanation of this point. We should, however, grasp hold of another point from what has been said, namely that it is from our weakness that the lack of precision derives in our investigation of the images of [true] Being. For the [acquisition of] knowledge we indeed need visual presentation and sense-perception and many other instruments. These objects have also been comprehended by the gods, but through their unified and divine intuition (*noêsis*). In the case of the sublunary objects we should be content to grasp what is ‘for the most part’ on account of the instability of the matter that forms their substrate. In the case of the heavenly beings we once again need to make use of sense-perception and instruments and so are filled with a good deal of likelihood.<sup>884</sup> For this reason in the

<sup>881</sup> Tag from Homer, *Od.* 14.466.

<sup>882</sup> Here too we have a sequence of adverbs, but this time we have chosen not to translate them literally.

<sup>883</sup> It is obvious that this priority of their knowledge is meant ontologically, not temporally.

<sup>884</sup> See above n. 852.

case of those objects we have to be content with approximation, we who dwell far away at the 'bottom', as they say, of the universe.<sup>885</sup> This is also clear from those who have dealt with these objects in their studies, drawing the same conclusions on the basis of differing hypotheses and 'saving the phenomena'<sup>886</sup> in the one case through eccentric circles, in another through epicycles, in yet another through contrary axial motion.<sup>887</sup> 10

What then, someone might say. Well, let us be content to listen to the natural science of Plato as well as that of others, and let us cherish the [words] **no less likely than any** (29c7). Indeed it is fitting to speak about these matters especially to sensible people, who pursue a course midway 15 between false modesty and brazen self-audacity. The latter would be saying 'more likely than any other,' the former 'less likely than any other', while the middle position is 'no less likely than any'. Furthermore, the [words] **no less likely than any** may mean not only 'than those students of nature who have gone before', but also 'than the likely realities themselves', as if he said: if we too should ourselves furnish accounts that 20 are no less likely than the actual realities and we should not depart from the nature of the objects of our knowledge, we should be content. The gods, it is true, know these in a superior manner, but for us it suffices if we hit them quite close to the mark. For we are human beings and we have been given a posting in the body. We have been brought forth as a partial 25 form of life and have been filled with a great deal of likelihood, with the result that we shall give accounts that suitably resemble tales (*muthoi*, cf. 29d2). Our account is replete with much of the opacity and irrationality which the tale discloses, and it is necessary to make allowance for human nature.

### *Socrates welcomes Timaeus' proposal*

**Excellent, Timaeus. We must by all means welcome your proposal. Your prelude we have welcomed with great admiration. Please now complete for us the development of your main theme.**<sup>888</sup> (29d4-6) 354  
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<sup>885</sup> Proclus is perhaps thinking of *Phd.* 109c, where living at the bottom of the sea as portrayed in the myth means one cannot see the heavenly bodies clearly. The word *πυθμήν* used here by Proclus is found at 109c5.

<sup>886</sup> Proclus uses the technical term for the astronomical practice started by Plato himself; see Vlastos (1975) 60, 111-12, G.E.R. Lloyd (1991) 248-77, 333-51.

<sup>887</sup> The final example refers to Plato's theory at 40b9 on the contrary motion of earth.

<sup>888</sup> Divergence from Burnet's OCT text: τε omitted after πάντ' ἄπασιν in some MSS and in the citation below.

**General explanation: 354.5–355.15**

In the *Republic*, while Socrates was setting out the discourse, Timaeus was silently present, not exhibiting his own verdicts upon what was being said.<sup>889</sup> Here it is marvellous how Socrates welcomes Timaeus. This happens in the (higher) realities as well, of which the persons are images. When the secondary beings are active, the primary beings remain established in themselves, neither proceeding from themselves nor inclining to what is inferior. But when the beings with a more divine status enter into movement, those who are less replete<sup>890</sup> are roused to participation in them through a fullness of love and admiration. It is thus quite suitable that in these words Socrates should lay down highly positive language about Timaeus, for through his admiration he becomes better connected with him.

Moreover **excellent** reveals the perfection and intellectual quality of Timaeus' teaching, as well as its knowledge content and its sufficiency, but it also reveals the analogy that can be made between him and the Demiurge. For just as the latter is the most excellent of causes (cf. 29a6) in the realm of action, so the former is the most excellent in the realm of discourse.

The words **we must by all means welcome your proposal** disclose what kind of person he should be who receives the discourse on divine matters in the right manner, attaching himself tenaciously<sup>891</sup> to his teacher, carrying out what he is commanded by him with all his strength, and persuading himself that it is right to obey what has been said by him.

Furthermore, the [word] **prelude** (*prooimion*)<sup>892</sup> reveals the complete extent of the thoughts contained in the fundamental propositions. At any rate all the preludes<sup>893</sup> are to be found in it, namely (1) in what sense<sup>894</sup> has it been called the prelude, (2) what the specific nature of the subject

<sup>889</sup> As explained at 8.30–9.9. The previous day Socrates had repeated the argument of the *Republic* to Timaeus, Critias, Hermocrates and a mysterious fourth person. Cf. above n. 138.

<sup>890</sup> Literally 'more hollow' or 'emptier' (τὰ κοιλότερα).

<sup>891</sup> The same idiom used at 222.14 and 381.27. Literally λιπαρῶς means richly or sleekly. Festugière's guess as to what Proclus means is as good as any.

<sup>892</sup> The term is clearly meant by Plato to refer to the passage 27d–29d. Proclus, however, vacillates in what he regards as the work's *proemium*. At 26.9 and also at 204.16 and 205.4 it refers to the first part of the work, 17a–27b; see above n. 1. But here, without discussing the question explicitly, he does appear to take it as referring to 27d–29d. See further the Introduction, pp. 16–17.

<sup>893</sup> Here rather surprisingly and awkwardly the plural προοίμια is used. It appears to mean something like 'preliminary questions'. Both Taylor and Kroll conjecture that the text should read ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ προοίμῳ, but the similar usage at 355.21 militates against this.

<sup>894</sup> Retaining Diehl's τί τε against the variant κατὰ τί τε preferred by Festugière.

being researched is, (3) on what fundamental propositions it depends and on what prior propositions demonstrated on the basis of these principles, (4) what kind of discourse it is, and (5) what kind of listener there is.

The term **main theme** (*nomos*) is taken from the musical strains (*nomoi*) of the lyre players. These are certain kinds of songs, some composed for Athena, others for Ares, some inspired by gods, others intended to instil good behaviour. Preceding these main themes it is the custom to place preludes, which for this reason they also call 'preliminary strums'.<sup>895</sup> This is where the term comes from. It contributes to the present subject, because the entire observable creation, since it has a harmonic structure, continues to exist enduringly<sup>896</sup> on account of the goodness of its causes. It does so also, moreover, because it proceeds from Intellect and in accordance with Intellect, and because it keeps the entirety of its powers well separated and well ordered according to what is fitting for each. Indeed they called melodies *nomoi* because they remained unchanged and because each of them has what was fitting apportioned to them.<sup>897</sup>

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<sup>895</sup> The word προσηλαφήμα is found only here in extant Greek literature.

<sup>896</sup> In this context διαιωνίως cannot be rendered eternally.

<sup>897</sup> This is the end of the section translated by David Runia. The remainder of the book is translated by Michael Share.

PART TWO: ON THE CREATION OF THE COSMOS

*I The constitution of the cosmos: 355.16–416.5*

*Introduction of the final cause, the Good*

Let us, then, state on account of what cause<sup>1</sup> he who constructed generation and this universe constructed them<sup>2</sup> (29d7–e1)

*Recapitulation of the preliminaries to the creation: 355.18–28*

Everything said so far has been providing us with preliminaries to the science of nature in its entirety. Some of it has presented the doctrine of the cosmos by means of images and symbols,<sup>3</sup> while some<sup>4</sup> has put in place preludes<sup>5</sup> to the entire dissertation.<sup>6</sup> Of the presentation by means of images or symbols, one part<sup>7</sup> showed the unity of things in the cosmos, another<sup>8</sup> their separateness, and of the preludes, some were basic principles (*hupotheseis*), others were like propositions (*lêmmata*)<sup>9</sup> demonstrated by means of these basic principles, since one could even count what is said about the nature of the discourse among the things so demonstrated, because [it is] from its having been proved that the cosmos is generated [that] it follows that the dissertation on the cosmos is [only] likely discourse.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I have rendered δι' ἣν τινα αἰτίαν 'on account of what cause' with an eye to Proclus' interpretation of the phrase at 357.16–17; in other circumstances I would prefer 'the reason why'.

<sup>2</sup> No significant divergences from Burnet's OCT text.

<sup>3</sup> On symbolic interpretation in Proclus, see Tarrant's introduction to vol. I, pp. 53–4. The reference here is to the summary of the ideal state and the story of Atlantis at 17a1–27b9. At 4.7ff. these are both said to be images, or at least to consist of or contain images, while at 30.11–14 the former is described as an image, the latter as a symbol. In fact, as Dillon has shown (Dillon 1990), Proclus fails to maintain a clear distinction between the two terms.

<sup>4</sup> 27c1–29d6.

<sup>5</sup> On the plural προοίμια, see the note at 355.1. 'Preludes', of course, sounds a bit odd here and if I had not already used it for παρασκευάς in line 18, I would probably have settled for 'preliminaries'.

<sup>6</sup> Or perhaps 'treatise' or 'study'. <sup>7</sup> The summary of the ideal state (17b6–19b1).

<sup>8</sup> The Atlantis myth (19b3–27a1).

<sup>9</sup> 'These 'basic principles' and 'propositions' are discussed in the Introduction, pp. 18–20. On the term λήμματα, here a variation on the more common ἀποδείξεις ('demonstration'), see the note at 348.14.

<sup>10</sup> At 348.13–17 Proclus divided the 'preludes' into sections on (1) the five basic principles (27d6–28b4; they are listed at 236.21–7) and three propositions (28b4–29b2) (2) the nature of Timaeus' account (29b3–c3) (3) its ideal auditor (29c4–d3), and a similar division is implied at 355.2–4, but now, ignoring the section on the ideal auditor and assimilating that on the nature of Timaeus' account to the propositions, he divides them

*General explanation: 355.28–357.12*

But once these matters have received a fitting conclusion and Timaeus begins on the creation of the universe,<sup>11</sup> he makes a beginning with the Good, believing that his best point of departure is the discovery of the final cause. For, just as the Good is the cause of everything that exists, so too does the generation of the cosmos proceed from this the most primary of principles.<sup>12</sup> Because all things are from the Good: things for which demiurgic intellect is not responsible, for example matter, have the Good as their cause, and things for whose existence the Paradigm is not responsible also derive their existence from that source (*ekeithen*). ‘All things exist on account of it, and it is the cause of all beautiful things’, as is said in the *Letters* (312e2–3).<sup>13</sup> For this reason Timaeus refers the other causes to this, the one cause. For, having discovered the form of the cosmos, and its paradigmatic cause and its efficient cause, by way of the basic principles (*bupotheseis*), he will now wish to give the most sovereign and venerable of causes, the final [cause], which one should be especially desirous of [discovering] in the case of the universal creation.<sup>14</sup> After all, when even the human being who lives according to [the dictates of] intellect does everything for the sake of the Good, will it not be much more the case that Intellect itself, divine Intellect, creates all things on account of the final cause? For even if the good

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into (1) the basic principles (still 27d6–28b4) and (2) the propositions (presumably 28b4–29d3).

<sup>11</sup> For the major divisions of Timaeus’ account of the creation as Proclus sees them, see the Introduction, pp. 2–3 and, for more detail, Lernould (2001) 44–51; for a detailed analysis of the first phase of the ‘first creation’, which takes up the remainder of Book two, see Lernould (2001) ch. 18.

<sup>12</sup> Preferring δὴ (C M) to δεῖ (P Diehl) at 356.4 with Festugière.

<sup>13</sup> Cited again at 393.19–21. The first line of a key passage for the Neoplatonists, on which see *PT* II. 8–9 and pp. xx–lix of Saffrey and Westerink’s introduction to *PT* II.

<sup>14</sup> The universal creation, or creation of wholes (ἡ ὅλη, ὀλική, δημιουργία, ἡ δημιουργία τῶν ὅλων), and the particular (μεριστή, μερική) creation are alternative descriptions of the first and second creations, for which the Demiurge and the ‘young gods’ are respectively responsible. (For a good description of the differences between the two creations, see 443.9–21.) It is of course mandatory for Proclus to find the Good in the *Timaeus* and he has already (247.27–30) found a reference to it in the names of the cosmos. Now, rather than just argue that its existence is implied by the goodness of the Demiurge, he construes the phrase δι’ ἣν τινα αἴτιαν (‘on account of what cause’) in the lemma as referring directly to it rather than, as it clearly does, to the goodness of the Demiurge. (Lest there be any doubt about this, cf. 368.15–29, where he unambiguously attributes the same reference to the phrase ἀρχὴ κυριωτάτη (29e4), which refers back to the present phrase.) This exegetical sleight of hand allows him to put the Good at the forefront of his account of the final cause where it belongs.

20 human being often seems to do something for the sake<sup>15</sup> of the body, or  
of inferior things generally, this, [I mean] the good of his body or that of  
the inferior thing, is not his end, but he does even [such things] for the  
sake of resemblance to the divine, and he makes that the end [he keeps]  
25 most in view. How much more then will the Demiurge of [the] universe  
create for the sake of the Good and the final cause! After all, he does not  
engage in activity which is aimless or indeterminate. This, it seems to me,  
is why Plato does not even ask at the outset whether there is a final cause  
of the framing of the cosmos, but, on the ground that this is accepted by  
everyone, [merely] asks what [this] final cause is.<sup>16</sup> After all, the hypoth-  
30 esis is that it is an intellect and a god that is the Demiurge,<sup>17</sup> not chance,  
as some<sup>18</sup> claim. And if an intellect<sup>19</sup> is what produces, there is surely  
357 a ‘for the sake of which’ in the creation. For, just as a virtuous<sup>20</sup> soul  
always does everything according to [the dictates of] intellect, so does an  
intellect that creates bring all things into existence in conformity with  
god; which is the same thing as in conformity with the Good. If, then,  
the Aristotelian [schedule of] questions (*problēmata*) is to be followed,  
5 after ‘what’ the universe is and ‘what kind’ of thing it is, one must ask  
‘why’ it is; for it has [already] been stated that it is something generated  
and the image of being and it is [now] necessary to investigate in addition  
‘for the sake of’ what it has come to be. Alternatively, following the Pla-  
tonic [scheme of] causes, after the demiurgic agency and the paradigm  
it is appropriate to find the final cause of the production of the cosmos.  
10 It is to this that everything else is referable – the divine nature of the  
Paradigm, the goodness of the Maker, the perfection of what has come

<sup>15</sup> So far in this paragraph I have translated ἐνεκα ‘on account of’ and χάριν ‘for the sake of’, but either English phrase can render either Greek word, and here and in line 22 ‘for the sake of’ seems to render ἐνεκα rather better than ‘on account of’.

<sup>16</sup> As a *TLG* search will show, it is a commonplace in the philosophical (Asclepius, David, Elias, Olympiodorus, Simplicius, Sophonias) and rhetorical commentators that one should commence any investigation by asking the four ‘Aristotelian’ (cf. 357.3) questions ‘whether it is’, ‘what it is’, ‘what kind of thing it is’ and ‘why it is’ (εἰ ἔστι, τί ἔστι, ποῖόν ἐστι, διὰ τί ἔστι; for the last two see 357.4–5). One of the sources of this doctrine is clearly *An. post.* 2.1. Proclus also had occasion to explain why Plato failed to pose the first of the four questions at 227.19ff.

<sup>17</sup> Or, construing the Greek as Festugière does, ‘For the hypothesis is that Intellect is Demiurge and God . . .’

<sup>18</sup> As the discussion at 262.1–29 shows, he is thinking of the Epicureans and the Aristotelians.

<sup>19</sup> Or, ‘and if Intellect . . .’

<sup>20</sup> Almost ‘a soul that keeps on the straight and narrow’. The word, like the cognate noun κορθωμα, has Stoic resonances.

to be – and it is to this that ascent [is possible] for those who are devoted to contemplation.<sup>21</sup>

*The phrase ‘on account of what cause’: 357.12–23*

[Philosophers] normally call the final cause the ‘on account of which’, the paradigmatic the ‘after which’, the demiurgic the ‘by which’, the instrumental the ‘by means of which’, the form the ‘in accordance with which’, the matter the ‘out of which’ or ‘in which’, adopting terms which are also approved by Plato himself. Indeed, here [in the lemma], seeking the final cause, he says ‘*on account of what cause*’, seeking the paradigmatic [at 28c6], ‘*after which of the paradigms*’ and seeking the demiurgic [at 28a4–5], ‘in the case of that which comes to be we say that it necessarily comes to be *by some cause*’. We shall draw attention to<sup>22</sup> the remaining terms<sup>23</sup> when we come to actual occurrences of them in Plato, but meanwhile it should be pointed out that they are among the scientific distinctions<sup>24</sup> made by the philosopher.<sup>25</sup>

*The words ‘generation’ and ‘this universe’: 357.23–359.2*

But what is **generation** and what is **the universe** (*to pan*)? Some have understood **generation** as the sublunary region [and] have claimed that **the universe** is the cosmos as a whole, but these people have entirely missed Plato’s meaning. The Demiurge is not depicted (*paradidonai*) forming enmattered things in one operation (*idiâi*) and the cosmos as a whole in another (*idiâi*). And, besides, generation is itself part of the universe. And if they would say that the heaven is [**the**] **universe** because it is the largest part of the cosmos – for the rest is small – or because it is the most divine and most sovereign part (cf. 44d5–6) and as it were the head of the entire cosmos – for **the whole** (*to pan*) is also called ‘the head’, as in

<sup>21</sup> For this ascent see, for example, *PT I*. §11.

<sup>22</sup> Whether one accepts Diehl’s ἐπισκεψόμεθα (a correction of C’s ἐπισκεψώμεθα) or prefers ἐπιστημανόμεθα, the reading of **M** and **P**, the required sense seems to be ‘note’, ‘draw attention to’.

<sup>23</sup> Sc. the ‘by means of which’ and the ‘in accordance with which’.

<sup>24</sup> More literally, ‘belong to the philosopher’s science of distinctions’.

<sup>25</sup> For these six ‘Platonic’ causes (the four Aristotelian causes with the addition of the paradigmatic and instrumental causes), see Philoponus, *Aet.* 159.5–13 with my note ad loc. in Share (2005b). (In *in Tm.*, five of the six – the instrumental was irrelevant there – were introduced and discussed as early as 2.1–4.5.) On the so-called ‘prepositional metaphysics’, of which the present passage is an excellent example, cf. the note at 239.27. Five of the six causes (all but the instrumental) and the prepositional scheme are attributed to Plato as early as Seneca (on this, see Hankinson (1998) 338).

‘Teucer, dear head’ (Homer, *Il.* 8.281),

and it is for [the head’s] sake, says (cf. 44d3ff.; 69c5–7) Plato himself, that the rest of the body’s bulk has been wrapped around us – it is nevertheless the case that Plato habitually calls<sup>26</sup> it too [sc. the heaven] ‘generation’.

Others have applied **generation** to matter and **the universe** to that which has been organized out of matter. These people must reject much of what has been written by Plato, since he states (28b7–c1) that everything generated and all **generation** is perceptible, or tangible and visible. And, moreover, he to a degree<sup>27</sup> opposes **generation** to matter, as for example when he says (52d3–4) that these three, being, place, generation, the [entities] from which the universe derives its existence, are separate things (*einai chōris*).

Our teacher for his part says that the production of the cosmos is being conceived of as in two phases (*dichōs*). One phase of it has to do with creating bodies, the other with arranging the bodies for the completion of a single cosmos.<sup>28</sup> For it is one [task] to form the bodies themselves, using the [geometrical] figures, another to arrange the formed [bodies] in the universe. Accordingly, [he says,] the forming of bodies has been called **generation**, as it is a movement towards the wholeness and perfection of the **universe**; after all, a thing composed of parts presupposes the production of those parts. So all [production] between matter and the total ordering and unique completion of the universe should be called **generation**,<sup>29</sup> so that **generation** is a path towards the whole which is in a sense intermediate between the absence of order and the [ordered] cosmos. A **universe**, on the other hand, is [he says] the whole formed from the parts, in which the parts are [all] embraced; for it is this that is ‘a complete universe’<sup>30</sup> composed of complete [parts]<sup>31</sup> in accordance with the one [fitting] arrangement (*harmonia*) of the wholes.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Not, as far as I can see, in as many words, although he does of course refer to its ‘generation’ (at 37e2, 48b3, 52d4).

<sup>27</sup> Or perhaps, ‘in places’.

<sup>28</sup> On these two phases in the production of the cosmos, cf. 383.1–23 below, which confirms that the ‘bodies’ in question are, as some of the language here suggests, the four elements.

<sup>29</sup> This might seem to suggest that ‘generation’ should cover the production of ‘parts’ of the universe such as the stars and planets and not just that of the elements, but Syrianus would, I think, include this under ‘the total ordering and unique completion of the universe’. (Cf. 357.26–8 above, where Proclus says that the Demiurge does not fashion τὰ ἐνυλὰ and the cosmos as a whole in two separate operations.)

<sup>30</sup> Removing the comma after πᾶν at 358.26.

<sup>31</sup> A near quotation of 32d1. (Notice that the ‘parts’ there too are the four elements.)

<sup>32</sup> Or perhaps, ‘with the harmony [or ‘harmonious arrangement’] of the wholes’. Notice that ἀρμονίαν takes up ἀρμοστικόν (‘to do with arranging’) in line 15 and ἐναρμόζειν (‘to

And since this whole is a perceptible universe, not an intelligible one – that was the Paradigm – nor an intellective one – that was the demiurgic [cause] – for that reason [Plato]<sup>33</sup> has added **this**, indicating thereby [that he means] the perceptible and particular [universe], for everything corporeal is particular, even if it is a whole. However, [that which is] ‘whole’ in the strictest sense is the immaterial and non-spatial, in short that [other] intellective and intelligible universe. But enough on this subject. 30 359

### *The words xunistas and sunestêse: 359.2–19*

How should we understand *sustasis*?<sup>34</sup> Perhaps it shows that the cosmos is compounded from many [elements] and its generation from dissimilar [components], and perhaps too that unity and permanence have come to it from the universal creation. For the prefix **sun** is indicative of unity and the cooperation (*sumpnoia*) of all [of the components] to one [end], and **stasis** indicates the stability and permanence of the object created (*demiourgêma*). Further, combining the tenses, [i.e.] the present and the past [tenses], shows the self-completeness of the creation and its eternity. The [present form] **sunistas** signifies a production which is continuous and always carried through in the same way, the [past form] **sunestêse** one which is absolutely complete and whose allotted being [lies] in [its] fullness.<sup>35</sup> 5 10

And indicating both tenses by the same verb [shows] that divine creation proceeds through sameness and likeness. For, whatever the nature of the productive [agency], of that same nature is the activity it possesses, and as it is, so does it create, because it produces in accordance with its very being and out of its own essence.<sup>36</sup> 15

### *The relation between the Good and the Demiurge*

He was good, and in the good no jealousy ever arose in regard to anything<sup>37</sup> (29e1–2). 20

arrange in’) in line 17, which could then at a pinch be translated ‘to do with harmonizing’ and ‘to harmonize in’.

<sup>33</sup> As Harold Tarrant points out, it is often not clear whether one should supply ‘[Plato]’ or ‘[Timaeus]’ in cases like this. Except for a few passages where ‘[Timaeus]’ is clearly preferable (e.g. 438.2off.), I have opted for ‘[Plato]’.

<sup>34</sup> The noun *sustasis* (‘composition’, ‘constitution’), which is not itself present in the lemma, refers to the idea present in the cognate verb *sunistanai* (‘construct’, ‘put together’, ‘compose’) which occurs in two different forms in the lemma.

<sup>35</sup> With 359.9–14, cf. the similar comments on 30c3 at 420.28–421.3. <sup>36</sup> Cf. *ET* §18.

<sup>37</sup> Divergences from Burnet’s OCT text: Proclus reads ἐγγίγνεται rather than ἐγγίνεται at 29d2.

*Importance of distinguishing the Good and the Demiurge:*  
359.22–360.4

Those who have identified the Demiurge and the first god,<sup>38</sup> whom  
Socrates celebrated as ‘good’ in the *Republic* (379b1–380c5), because  
25 [Plato] has also called the Demiurge good [here] are altogether ridicu-  
lous.<sup>39</sup> The Good and a good [being] are not the same thing. The former  
is imparticipable, alone by itself, transcending all things; the latter is good  
because it participates it.<sup>40</sup> The former rules over all the Intelligibles;  
30 the latter, if it is identical with the Paradigm, *is* the Intelligibles them-  
selves but does not rule over the Intelligibles; and if it is posterior to the  
360 Paradigm, it is much inferior to that which rules over all of the Intelli-  
gibles.<sup>41</sup> And, speaking generally, every god is some [particular] good,  
[one that is] demiurgic, for example, or productive of life, or perfective,  
but the Good is not a particular good, but simply good. If you call it  
‘demiurgic’, you detract from its simplicity.<sup>42</sup>

*The words agathos ên: 360.4–362.16*

5 Now that these [two] have been distinguished, looking next at the begin-  
ning of the sentence, we start with this observation. Just as when seeking  
the Form of the cosmos<sup>43</sup> and asking whether the cosmos has come to  
be or is ungenerated, he introduced [the conclusion that] ‘it has come to  
10 be’ (28b7) ahead of the whole proof, and just as when tracking down the  
paradigmatic cause he assumed in advance that ‘it is clear to everyone  
that [the cosmos has been made] after an eternal [paradigm]’ (29a4–5),  
thereby placing the conclusion ahead of the whole argument,<sup>44</sup> in just the

<sup>38</sup> For the use of ὁ πρῶτος θεός to designate the supreme deity, which goes back to Middle Platonism and beyond, see Whittaker (1987) 291.

<sup>39</sup> As 305.6–11 and 394.8 show, the main target here is Atticus.

<sup>40</sup> Dodds explains how it is that transcendent, unparticipated entities (including the One itself) can be said to be participated in his commentary to *ET* §23. Briefly, the answer is that although such entities are not participated in their own right, they can be *indirectly* participated by way of immanent, participable entities which they produce. (See also Festugière’s discussion of this and other similar passages in *in Tim.* in his note to 226.19.)

<sup>41</sup> The latter alternative best reflects the position of Syrianus and Proclus (cf. 310.3ff.), but Proclus believes (cf. 323.22–324.14; 360.17–21) that both views are present in the *Timaeus* and therefore that, when properly understood, both are correct.

<sup>42</sup> (1) Translating ἐλαττοῖς αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀπλῶς (M P Diehl) rather than ἐλαττον αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀπλῶς (C Praechter Festugière) at 360.4. (2) With 360.1–4 cf. *ET* §133, in *Parm.* 804.33–7, in *Tim.* III. 194.11–12 and 198.25–199.2, and, although it is written from a rather different perspective, *PT* I. 91.9–21.

<sup>43</sup> Sc. its formal cause.

<sup>44</sup> On the formal cause, see 283.4–11, on the paradigmatic, 330.6–14, and compare the similar remarks on “Ὑνα (31a3) at 438.20–439.2 and the illuminating passage from *in*

same way, having set himself the task of discovering the final cause for all things, he introduces [the conclusion] **he was good**, imitating by means of this pronouncement Intellect and [its] immediate grasp of the whole. For in this phrase is contained everything that is being sought, because the final cause is this: goodness, both absolute Goodness and demiurgic goodness. For, just as the Paradigm is twofold – one is intelligible, the other intellective<sup>45</sup> – and one is<sup>46</sup> prior to the Demiurge, [being] primally eternal and unified and comprehensive of all intelligible living things, the other in the Demiurge, embracing in a unified manner the whole demiurgic series (*arithmos*) of Forms,<sup>47</sup> in just the same way one goodness is absolute (*haplôs*) and the other is that in the demiurgic intellect, and the former is the source of all goods, intelligible and intellective, hypercosmic and encosmic, and the latter, being a particular good, is the cause and source of some things, but has been allotted to a lower order than others. Because should we wish to examine what makes a god an intelligible god, or an intellective or supercelestial or encosmic one, we would find that it is nothing other than the Good.<sup>48</sup> For what makes each body ensouled other than an image (*indalma*) of Soul? What makes the intellective souls such if not the intellect in them, which is an irradiation (*ellampsis*) of Intellect as a whole? And what in that case is it that gives divinity to Intellect and intellective being other than participation in the First and the radiation (*prolampsis*) from it?<sup>49</sup>

What, then, is the First? If it were in fact the Beautiful,<sup>50</sup> we would say that it is through Beauty that Intellect is a god. But since it is the Good, and Intellect is a god by participating goodness, it is therefore this [goodness] which is the very being of the gods, this goodness which is, if it is permissible to say it, the essence of the gods, it is through it that every god has [the property of] being a god, and it is because of it that [each god] is providential, whether demiurgically, or as producer of life, or as

*Parm.* cited in the note at 283.5. In all four cases, as here in lines 13–14, Proclus likens Plato's procedure to the functioning of intellectual intuition.

<sup>45</sup> Taking τὸ μὲν νοητὸν ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ νοερόν (360.17–18) as parenthetic, but the Greek is rather awkward and something may have gone wrong.

<sup>46</sup> Preferring ἐστὶ (C) to ἔτι (M P Diehl) at 360.18 with Festugière.

<sup>47</sup> 'The whole series of the demiurgic Forms' would be more natural ('demiurgic Forms' appear at 203.19; III. 103.11 (by emendation); *PT* V. 55.18 and a dozen times in *in Parm.*, including the very phrase at 877.26), but emendation would involve changing the order of the words as well as the termination of 'demiurgic'.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. *ET* §133 with Dodds' commentary.

<sup>49</sup> 'Irradiation' describes the manner in which unparticipated entities affect entities below them in the same causal chain (cf. Dodds' remarks at *ET*, p. 211). For both 'images' and 'irradiations', see too *ET* §64 with Dodds' note.

<sup>50</sup> Reading <τὸ> καλόν (Praechter) with Festugière.

10 sustainer.<sup>51</sup> For it is the nature of intellect *qua* intellect to apprehend (*noein*) things (*onta*) and to know them, but to exercise providence [in regard to them] is clearly divine.<sup>52</sup> And so even the demiurgic intellect has the property of being demiurgic on account of the goodness in him. For it is on account of this that the intellect in him is a producer of being and not merely able to know it and that the paradigm that is<sup>53</sup> in  
15 him is active and produces just by being and is not merely perfective of intellect. And intellect, while it produces, receives power from both: from the Paradigm because it produces with reference to it, from Goodness because it is thanks to it that it creates. The Paradigm, on the other hand, [receives its power] from the henad.<sup>54</sup>

20 You have, then, these three in a series, Goodness, the Paradigm, Intellect, [and] in one fashion in the Demiurge, in another before the Demiurge. And if you like to put it so, the One which is beyond the Intelligibles themselves is first Goodness, for that is imparticipable Goodness;  
25 the Intelligible, which embraces the entire sum of the Forms as a unity, is the Paradigm; and intellective Intellect,<sup>55</sup> the bringer of being to all things, is the Creator. And so, if Amelius was intending his three Demiurges in this way, detecting this triad in the one [Demiurge], he was speaking correctly. ‘One of them’, he says, ‘is creating with his hands (*metacheirêsis*), another by command alone, another by will  
30 alone; the [first], like a manual worker, is subordinate, the [second], like an architect, is earlier on the scene, the [third], like a king, is established before both [of the others].’<sup>56</sup> So, to the extent that the Demiurge is Intellect, he produces all things by means of his thoughts; to the extent that he is an Intelligible, he creates just by being; to the extent that he is  
362 5 a god, [he creates] by willing alone. But if on the other hand he would

<sup>51</sup> Reading προνοητικός ἔστιν ἡ δημιουργικῶς ἡ ζωογονικῶς ἡ συνεκτικῶς at 361.8–9 with Praechter and Festugière. With the passage cf. 360.1–4.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. *ET* §134: ‘Every divine intelligence exercises intellection *qua* intelligence, but providence *qua* god’ (Dodds).

<sup>53</sup> Deleting the second τὸ at 361.14 with Festugière.

<sup>54</sup> Festugière comments: ‘C’est à dire, si j’entends bien, à partir du premier terme dans toute la hiérarchie de l’ἀγαθότης, donc à partir du τῶγαθόν lui-même.’ Perhaps, but Proclus chooses to highlight the unity of the Paradigm, which of course derives from the One, alongside the goodness of the Demiurge elsewhere in this section (cf. 360.17ff. and 361.23–5) and I suspect that is what he is doing here.

<sup>55</sup> On νοῦς ὁ νοερός (and the coordinate terms νοῦς τοῦ πατρός and νοῦς νοητός), cf. *PT* III. 74.23–75.21, with Saffrey and Westerink’s note at 75.11, and, with Festugière, III. 101.3–102.1 below.

<sup>56</sup> Or, emphasizing logical rather than chronological priority: ‘. . . the second, like an architect, is [his] supervisor, the third, like a king, is enthroned above both [of them]’. For the three levels, cf. the image in Philo, *Opif.* 17–18 with Runia’s commentary in Runia (2001).

separate these three Demiurges from the one, we shall not tolerate [it], for we follow Plato. One and the same [being, we hold,] is (1) good *qua* god and on account of [his] goodness produces all things by an act of will, and is (2) intelligible in the intellective mode – for such is [the nature of] demiurgic being – and is (3) cosmos-creating intellect.<sup>57</sup>

That, then, is the interpretation of [the phrase] **he was good**, in which **was** indicates the surplendency and absolute completeness and supereternity of divine being.<sup>58</sup> For ‘is’ is used to refer to eternal things, ‘was’ to the supereternal henads, and ‘will be’ to things existing in time. Because if ‘is’ is right for eternal things, ‘was’ will be appropriate to the things prior to them, and ‘will be’ to the things posterior to eternal things, and these [last] are those which have need of time.<sup>59</sup>

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### *The words oudeis phthonos: 362.17–365.3*

And since the Demiurge is good, **no jealousy in regard to anything ever arises in him**. But, one might ask, why is it surprising if Intellect is not jealous? After all, that is characteristic even of moderate people. Well, let us take **ever** as indicative of [Intellect’s] eternal perfection, since souls become passionate at one time and return to a dispassionate state at another, and **in regard to anything** [as indicative of its] self-sufficiency, since *we* are often free of envy with respect to other things, but in cases where we think we are worse off [than others] are overcome by this feeling.

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And what might the reason be for **no**? Did he add **no** because there are many kinds of envy? Or is it uttered redundantly, effecting a total negation of envy? But what redundancy can be found in statements about the gods? All words or thoughts applied to them fall short of their due. Perhaps, then, envy is, on the one hand, displeasure at the advantages (*agatha*) of others, this feeling being produced in us as an amalgam of pleasure and pain, as Socrates showed in the *Philebus* (48b8–c1). And perhaps envy is also having the power to do good, but not doing good and keeping the good to oneself. And perhaps, moreover, envy is also the very

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<sup>57</sup> Proclus has already described and dismissed this doctrine of the three Demiurges at 12.1–11 and at 306.1–31 and will return to it at 398.16–26, 431.26–8 and III. 103.18–28. In the last of these passages he claims that Amelius in large part based it on *Tim.* 39e8–10, where he construed νοῦς, the Forms in the αὐτοζῶον and the αὐτοζῶον itself as a triad of intellects or demiurges.

<sup>58</sup> For the doctrine that Being is metaphysically prior to Eternity, see *ET* §§87–8 with Dodds’ commentary.

<sup>59</sup> See Plass (1993) for discussion of this (p. 148, n. 6) and other passages in Proclus on the meaning of the tenses.

5 lack<sup>60</sup> of good things.<sup>61</sup> This above all is, I think, [the sense of the word] the philosopher is employing now, when excluding [jealousy] from the divine essence; after all, in the nature of things [envy] is excluded from it alone, since it [alone] is substantiated in accordance with Goodness itself.<sup>62</sup> For although being irked by the advantages of others and keeping  
10 the good to oneself are behaviours (*pathai*) of particular souls, a lack of good things is found in all things that are good [only] by participation and not primally so. [This is] because acquired good is one thing, good by participation another, and primal good [yet] another. The first of these is mixed with its opposite, just as acquired beauty is mingled with ugliness;  
15 the second is entirely good in form, but is such [only] by participation; but the Good-itself (*autoagathon*) is primally good, since just as Mind-itself is primally mind, and just as the Beautiful-itself is primally beautiful, so is the Good-itself primally good.<sup>63</sup> What then is this [Good-itself]?<sup>64</sup> It is the divine nature (*theotês*) of each thing, by which each thing with  
20 real being<sup>65</sup> is a god. For this in no way differs from Goodness (*agathotês*); and if anything at the second level is described as good or a god, it is one of the things that is made a god or made good and that is a god by participation and not on account of its own essence or by itself. It was this participation, then, that Plato also used to call 'lack', as for example when he described Eros as 'lacking in beautiful and good [qualities]' in  
25 the *Symposium* (201a2–c7).

<sup>60</sup> Despite occasional awkwardness, I have kept to 'lack' and 'lacking in' for ἐνδεῖα and ἐνδεής throughout the present argument. Alternative renderings, which would at times work better, would be 'deficiency'/'deficient in' and 'want'/'wanting in'.

<sup>61</sup> Even apart from semantic considerations, it seems odd that Proclus should choose to gloss 'envy' by 'a lack of good things', since the lack of the former is used to explain procession (cf., for example, 135–21 and the many passages in *PTI* – listed in the note to 73.10 there – where ἄφθονος is used of the gods' providential activities) and the presence of the latter to account for reversion (cf. *ET* §§8–10; *PTI*. 90.14–91.21). He would have done better to restrict himself to the argument that envy results from lack of the good, which he uses at 363.26–8.

<sup>62</sup> For the last statement, cf. *ET* §119.

<sup>63</sup> For a similar description of the Good, see in *Remp.* I. 28.11–23.

<sup>64</sup> In *ET* §§8–10 Proclus seems to restrict the absence of 'lack' to the Good itself, but in what follows he extends it to the gods, partly by downplaying the gap between the One and the gods at 364.5–10.

<sup>65</sup> Sc. the Intelligibles and the Intellectives, as 365.13–19 confirms. Strictly speaking, only the henads, which are metaphysically prior to Being, are gods and anything on a lower level that is described as divine or a god, including the Demiurge, is only such by participation, but Proclus is inconsistent about this when it suits him. (Cf. *ET* §115 with Dodds' commentary and §129.)

The divine, then, to the extent to which it is such essentially<sup>66</sup> and not by participation, is good, and so not lacking in the good either.<sup>67</sup> Consequently, it is superior to all envy. Just as darkness cannot draw near to the sun, because [the sun] is productive of light, but is confined somewhere far off in the hollows of the earth, so in the same way is it out of the question for envy to draw near to the divine. For what lack is there on the part of such great abundance? What weakness on the part of all-powerful divinity? What participation on the part of the source of [all] good things? Therefore, by the very fact that he is good, the<sup>68</sup> Demiurge is above all lack and all participation stemming from another, being united with the One itself and not departing from the One. For intellectual union is one thing and [the union which is] prior to Intellect, through which the generative divinity and all-embracing goodness (*agathotês*) of the Demiurge are joined to the One itself, is another. For this goodness (*agathon*) is not, as some claim, some power, but the measure of all power; nor a willing, but willing [stems] from it; nor a condition, for a condition belongs to something other [than itself], but Goodness belongs to itself; nor, in short, some substantial entity, but that which unifies substance and an ineffable bond which is productive of demiurgic powers and activities.<sup>69</sup> So, just as every intellect is substantiated by virtue of being an intellect but what is participated by it is that which is above Intellect, and just as every soul [is substantiated] precisely by virtue of being a soul but what is participated by it is Intellect, in just the same way every god is substantiated, or, rather, super-substantiated, in being a god, but nothing is participated by it, because the gods are the most senior of all things. And therefore the demiurgic intellect, in so far as it is a god, is, in being a god, primally a god and not one by participation. And this is the same thing as [its being] good. If one were to call envy ‘a lack of intellect’, even particular intellect would be superior to envy, but soul would not be superior, because the latter lacks intellect, since it is its nature to become intellective by participation in intellect. In just the same way, in

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<sup>66</sup> Adding κατ’ οὐσίαν after either καθὼ or ἐστὶ at 363.26 with Festugière.

<sup>67</sup> ὥστε οὐδὲ ἐνδεές (ὥστ’ οὐδενδεές **M**) ἀγαθοῦ (363.27). Although I have translated Diehl’s text, οὐδέ seems a little awkward and I suspect Proclus may have written ὥστε οὐδενὸς ἐνδεές ἀγαθοῦ (‘and so lacking no good’).

<sup>68</sup> Reading ὁ before δημιουργός with **5** at 364.5. I use **5** for the character that Diehl uses when reporting the readings of the first printed edition, the ‘recensio vulgata’.

<sup>69</sup> With lines 10–16, cf. *PT* V. 60.8–13 and *ET* §119. (Notice that the variation between ἀγαθότης and ἀγαθὸν to describe the goodness of the Demiurge that occurs here is also present in the passage from *ET*.) I have taken the rather convoluted last clause of the passage as equivalent to ἀλλὰ ἐνωτική τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἀρρητος συνοχὴ οἰστική [οὔσα] δυνάμεων τε καὶ ἐνεργειῶν δημιουργικῶν. Festugière construes it differently.

the case of goodness, if envy is ‘the lack of good things’, and<sup>70</sup> everything that is not good primarily lacks [them, then] soul and intellect lack good things, because they are not [good] primarily, [whereas] a god, being, *qua* god, good, transcends all envy and is above all lack of whatever kind, whether based on inferiority<sup>71</sup> or on deviance;<sup>72</sup> for lack is of two kinds, and while one of them is not an evil, the other, as it is said, is an evil.

### *Ungrudging character of the Demiurge*

And, being free of [jealousy], he wanted all things to come into being as much like himself as possible.<sup>73</sup> (29e2–3)

### *General explanation: 365.6–366.20*

This was something that followed from the previously stated fundamental principles (*axiōmata*).<sup>74</sup> The first clause [there]<sup>75</sup> revealed the status of the Demiurge and the nature of his being, [namely] that he is a god. And, since one kind of god is imparticipable, another participated,<sup>76</sup> he also revealed by means of the same [clause] that he is participated. For he did not say that he was the Good, but that ‘he was good’; and one who is good participates Goodness,<sup>77</sup> and it is this Goodness which is primarily a good, while Intellect or Being are a good by virtue of participation.

The second [clause],<sup>78</sup> for its part, [showed] that the Demiurge is not one of the divinized [gods]. For there is that which is in every way imparticipable, namely the Good, that which is good by participating something else, as is everything divinized, and that which, while itself also

<sup>70</sup> Reading ἐνδεές <δέ> with Schneider and Festugière at 364.28.

<sup>71</sup> Sc. on being lower in the scale of being. <sup>72</sup> Festugière has a note on this dichotomy.

<sup>73</sup> Divergences from Burnet’s OCT text: Proclus reads αὐτῷ rather than ἐαυτῷ at 29e3, but Festugière’s argument (224, n. 2) for correcting to αὐτῷ or ἐαυτῷ both here and when this passage is quoted later at 365.24, 367.15 and 370.23 seems convincing and I have translated accordingly.

<sup>74</sup> The principles in question are those stated in the previous sentence rather than the five which Proclus derives from 27d6–28b4 at 235.32–238.5. For ‘he was good’ as a ‘fundamental principle’, cf. 410.26–7.

<sup>75</sup> Sc. ‘He was good’, the first clause of the previous lemma.

<sup>76</sup> ‘Every god is participable, except the One’ (ET 102.13).

<sup>77</sup> And so not himself the Good and therefore not an imparticipable god. (On participating the Good, see the note at 359.28.)

<sup>78</sup> Sc. ‘and in the good no jealousy ever arises in regard to anything’, the second clause of the previous lemma.

primally good, is participated and midway between both of the above, as all of the intelligible and intellectual orders of gods are said to be.<sup>79</sup>

And this third [clause] itself<sup>80</sup> contains the specific character of the Demiurge. For to be not only good<sup>81</sup> itself, but to go forth (*proienai*) to all things on account of its superabundance and expansiveness is the mark of the demiurgic and productive cause, which desires to fill all things with itself and to make all things good in order that, **as far as possible, all things should become like himself**,<sup>82</sup> participating in a kind of divinity and in ineffable symbols which have come to them from the universal creation (*poiêsis*).<sup>83</sup>

If, then, the creator of the universe is **free of** all want, transcends all weakness – and that eternally, since the [word] **being**<sup>84</sup> indicates the eternal – and, as far as possible, makes all things good,<sup>85</sup> he radiates to all things a measure of the good a greater than which none of the recipients is in any way equipped to accommodate,<sup>86</sup> which shows the expansiveness<sup>87</sup> of providence.

And, if he wishes to bestow participation in the Good **on all things**, there is nothing in the universe which is simply (*monôs*) evil, and so [nothing simply] disordered or outside of providence or indeterminate, but all things participate beauty and order to the extent that they are of a nature to receive them.

<sup>79</sup> But notice that Proclus has just (lines 12–13) said that Intellect and Being are good by participation.

<sup>80</sup> Sc. the one which constitutes the current lemma.

<sup>81</sup> Deleting τό before ἀγαθόν at 365.20 with Schneider, Praechter and Festugière. However, the neuter αὐτό remains something of a problem and, in view of the fact that he can call henads αὐτοαγαθότητες at ET 112.33, Proclus may have written αὐτοαγαθόν (which I would translate in much the same way).

<sup>82</sup> Reading αὐτῷ or ἐαυτῷ rather than αὐτῶ, the reading of the manuscripts. (Cf. the note at 365.3.)

<sup>83</sup> Or perhaps, ‘from [its] universal productivity’. For these ‘symbols’, cf., with Festugière, 210.11ff.

<sup>84</sup> Reading ὄν for δὲν with Schneider and Festugière.

<sup>85</sup> Festugière makes the protasis conclude with ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ παντός (365.27), but the lack of a connective before πᾶσιν ἐπιλάμπει is against that and it seems more likely that it ends with ἀγαθύνει (365.29). (A further point in favour of construing the sentence in this way is the circumstance that each of the propositions which are thereby transferred from the apodosis to the protasis has already been stated or argued for earlier (ἐξήρηται πάσης ἀσθενείας at 364.3–4; καὶ τοῦτο αἰωνίως, as Proclus now claims, by implication in ὦν in the lemma; ὅτι μάλιστα πάντα ἀγαθύνει at 364.23–4) and only πᾶσιν ἐπιλάμπει . . . πέφυκεν still needs to be established.)

<sup>86</sup> On this doctrine of ‘measured accommodation’, cf. ET §122 and 268.2–5 above with Runia’s note. For its importance in Neoplatonic and later interpretations of Aristotle’s physics and metaphysics, see Sorabji (1990), especially p. 184.

<sup>87</sup> On ἐκτένεια, cf. Saffrey and Westerink’s note at PT III. 31.23.

He makes all things, then, like himself, [and so,] inasmuch as he is a god, makes [all] that comes to be good; but, for the rest, he produces different things in accordance with different paradigmatic principles. 'For just as', says Atticus, 'everything the joiner makes is a work of joinery, but he makes different things according to different principles,<sup>88</sup> [making] one a bench, another a bed, in the same way the god, inasmuch as he is good, assimilates all things to himself, rendering them [all] good, but [also], looking to [their] paradigmatic causes, creates [them] according to the species which separate the essences of each.'<sup>89</sup> And Porphyry,<sup>90</sup> after first approving these [words], thinks it appropriate to specify what it is that generated things have acquired so as to be good, and says that it is harmony and proportion and order, since these are beautiful, and everything beautiful is good.<sup>91</sup> [And] Plato does indeed show that the good [lies] in these in the passage where he says (30a1–6) that the god reduced the disordered to order out of a wish for the sharing around of good things.

### *Creation is eternal: 366.20–368.11*

From all of this it is easy to conclude that the Demiurge creates eternally and that the cosmos is everlasting with the [kind of] everlastingness that extends to all time,<sup>92</sup> and that [the latter] is always becoming ordered, and that it is not the case that it always *is* imperishable, but [that it] is always *becoming* so, being made good, but not being good of itself like the Father who begat it; for everything in it exists by becoming (*ginomenôs*)<sup>93</sup> rather than by being (*ontôs*), as [is the case] among eternal things.

<sup>88</sup> Or 'patterns', 'designs', but I translated λόγους 'principles' in the previous sentence.

<sup>89</sup> Fr. 13 Des Places. <sup>90</sup> 366.14–27 = fr. 46 Sodano.

<sup>91</sup> Although I have followed Festugière in ending the citation from Porphyry at this point, I am not at all sure that it does not extend to line 20, and Sodano (fr. 46) makes it run to line 27.

<sup>92</sup> As I point out in the introduction to my translation of Philoponus, *Aet.* 1–5, 'Proclus always reserves *aiônios* ('eternal') for entities which are outside of time, such as God or transcendent form, but uses *aídios* ('everlasting') and *aei* ('always') either of these same entities or of things which endure for ever in time, which, for him, include the world, matter, immanent [not, of course, imminent!] form, generation and time itself (Share (2005a) 7).

<sup>93</sup> γινομένως is a conjecture of Schneider for the difficult ἡνωμένως. Although a *TLG* search does not turn up any other occurrences of the word, there is nothing against such a formation in principle and it provides the required sense.

Look at it this way (*phere gar*).<sup>94</sup> If the universe was generated and did not previously exist,<sup>95</sup> was this on account of the Demiurge or on account of its substrate,<sup>96</sup> which was disorderly?

If it is on account of the Demiurge, is it that he too has not existed eternally? It is clearly not permissible even to say such a thing, and, besides, it would be pointless. The same kind of question [will arise] in regard to him, and we shall either make all things generated or there will be something primally ungenerated. And it is better to assume that this is the Demiurge in an inactive condition (*ouk energounta*).<sup>97</sup> So does he not create because he does not wish to or because he is not able to? If we say that it is because he does not wish to, we inadvertently do away with his goodness. And if that it is because he is not able to, it is absurd that he should have power at one time and [display] a lack of power at another; for [then] we shall be doing away with his eternity.<sup>98</sup>

But if it was on account of the substrate, was this unready or ready?<sup>99</sup> If it was ready, it was not on its account; for then [the characteristic] which every substrate has was present in it too.<sup>100</sup> And if it was unready, how is it that, after being unready for an infinite time, it has now changed? Has it bestirred (*kekinêken*) itself? No, it is not self-moved, but is moved (*kekinêtai*) by the Demiurge. And why, when he could see that coming into being was good for the things that come into being, did he not [move it] earlier, if he was indeed good at that time too and **wanted all things to come to be resembling himself**?<sup>101</sup>

The expansiveness of providence, then, is bound up with the goodness of the Father, the eternal productive activity of the Demiurge with

<sup>94</sup> With what follows, cf. 392.7–19 and 394.12–25 below and Proclus' twelfth argument in Philoponus' *Aet.*; on Proclus' own view of the 'fitness' of the substrate, cf. too II. 80.16–31 and III. 7.4–15.

<sup>95</sup> Following Praechter and Festugière in deleting the words καὶ πρότερον οὐκ ἦν from 366.28 and inserting them after πᾶν in the previous line.

<sup>96</sup> Assuming that ὑποκειμένη φύσις (more literally, 'underlying nature') is both here and at 367.7 merely periphrastic for ὑποκείμενον, as πᾶν τὸ ὑποκείμενον at 367.9 suggests.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. the similar regress argument in Proclus' third proof at Philoponus, *Aet.* 42.12–43.15.

<sup>98</sup> The Neoplatonists equated eternity with infinite power. With 2–6, cf. the similar argument from the eternity, goodness, will and power of the Creator in Proclus' first proof in *Aet.* (Share (2005a) 19–20).

<sup>99</sup> For literature on this concept of 'readiness' (sometimes translated 'fitness' or 'suitability'), which is also important in Neoplatonic theurgy, see Siorvanes (1996) 200, n. 23.

<sup>100</sup> I.e. it would be no different from any other substrate or raw material and therefore no more responsible for the timing of its employment. (Festugière understands the passage differently.)

<sup>101</sup> Reading αὐτῷ or ἐαυτῷ rather than αὐτῶ, the reading of the manuscripts. (Cf. the note at 365.3.)

it, the everlastingness of the universe through infinite time (an everlastingness which is always coming to be and not fixed) with it, and the same argument does away with this [everlastingness] and with the goodness of him who has created [the universe]. For if the Demiurge is always good, he always wants what is good<sup>102</sup> for all things. Just as the sun, as long as it is [present], illuminates everything, and fire [while it is present] heats [everything]<sup>103</sup> – for the former is essentially productive of light, and fire of heat – so too does that which is always good always wish for what is good. And if he always wishes for what is good, he is always capable of what is good, for otherwise, by wishing for [it] but being incapable [of it], he would be in the same state as the least virtuous of humans; for even a virtuous human being does not wish for what is beyond his capacity. And if he is always capable of what is good, he is always actualizing what is good, for otherwise he would be the possessor of a power which is ineffectual. And if he is always actualizing what is good, he is always creating (*poiein*) what is good. And if he is always creating, a cosmos<sup>104</sup> is always coming to be. Therefore the cosmos is everlasting, since the Demiurge is always good. But the cosmos is not an everlasting cosmos by everlastingly *being* but by everlastingly coming to be. Therefore the everlastingness of the universe is, as we said (367.15), bound up with the goodness of the Creator. Indeed the orderly arrangement of the universe too is quite enough to reveal the [operation of the] demiurgic power; for while matter, on account of its formlessness and shapelessness, has seemed to some<sup>105</sup> to be *ipso facto*<sup>106</sup> divorced from god (*atheos*) and [its] discordancy and disorderliness remote from divine providence, the universe, which has been well ordered and is resplendent in its beauty, clearly reveals the handiwork (*poiësis*) of god. This manifest order, then, being the offspring of the demiurgic cause, is linked to<sup>107</sup> the goodness of the Father.

<sup>102</sup> Here and in what follows ‘what is good’ translates τὰ ἀγαθὰ, a more literal rendering of which would be ‘goods’ or ‘good things’.

<sup>103</sup> Proclus often uses such similes to describe the nature of the dissemination of good from deity. For the sun and light, cf. *PT* I. 87.14–15, for fire and heat, in *Tim.* 373.29–31, 375.23–5 and III. 340.22–3; *PT* I. 75.19; in *Parm.* 830.14–16; *De mal. subs.* §41, 9–11, and for snow and cold, see 375.24 below and *PT* I. 75.20.

<sup>104</sup> Or just ‘cosmos’, i.e. ‘order’.

<sup>105</sup> At 384.12 the issue of whether matter is ἄθεος is raised again in a context where the views of Plutarch and Atticus are under discussion and at 392.4 matter is assumed to be ἄθεος in an argument directed at Atticus by Porphyry. (Proclus himself, amplifying the phrase τὸ ἄθεον καὶ σκοτεινόν from *Alc.* I 134e4, refers to τὸ ἄθεον καὶ σκοτεινὸν τῆς ὕλης at in *Alc.* 34.2–3.)

<sup>106</sup> ἥδη (*‘ipso facto’*) here expresses ‘logical proximity’ (cf. LSJ s.v. I.4).

<sup>107</sup> *suniphestêke* is here effectively a synonym for *sunêrtêtai* (367.15; 368.2). For the verb in this sense, cf. Lampe s.v. B.3.

*The Good is the most sovereign principle*

Should one accept this above all [others] from wise men as the most sovereign principle of generation and order,<sup>108</sup> one would do so correctly.<sup>109</sup> (29e4–30a2)

*General explanation: 368.15–369.3*

[Plato] has [just] given an account of the final cause as it relates to the goodness of the Demiurge, [that goodness] in accordance with which, after uniting himself with the First and in imitation of it, he produces all things – for [the First] is that which ultimately (*prôtôs*) brings all things into being – [and now] he calls it<sup>110</sup> the **most sovereign principle**, because it is what sets in motion even the causes themselves; for, while the demiurgic [cause] moves that which comes to be, it is [itself] moved from that quarter (*ekeithen*), and, while the paradigmatic [cause] moves the universal creation, it is itself moved from goodness, because the Good is prior even to the Intelligibles and the Paradigm is intelligible and the Demiurge intellective, and all<sup>111</sup> things intelligible and intellective are in the sphere of the Good, while the order of the Intellectives is in the sphere of the Intelligible. So even the productive cause is sovereign, but the paradigmatic is more sovereign, and the final **most sovereign**. For this last is ‘that for the sake of which’ all things [exist] and ‘to which’ [all] other things are referable and the real end of the creation. Hence, too, the cosmos is made perfect when it is endowed with soul and becomes the possessor of intellect, but is completely perfect (*teleiôtatos*) in so far as it participates the Good and the unification which [then] pervades it through and through (*di’ holôn*).<sup>112</sup> For, just as the Good presides over all things, so does the goodness in each and every thing hold the first rank in each.

<sup>108</sup> The absence of an article in the Greek suggests this rendering for κόσμος; cf. Cornford’s ‘order in the world’.

<sup>109</sup> No divergences from Burnet’s OCT text.

<sup>110</sup> In Plato of course this ‘most sovereign principle’ is not the Good but the goodness of the Demiurge; cf. the note at 356.16 on the similar deliberate misconstruction of αἴτιαν at 29d7.

<sup>111</sup> Accepting, like Festugière, Diehl’s suggestion πάντα <τὰ> (see vol. III, p. 503, *Corrigenda*).

<sup>112</sup> For this cf. *ET* §13, especially p. 14.29–31, ‘... the Good, wherever it is present, makes the participant one, and holds its being together in virtue of this unification (ἐνωσιν)’ (Dodds’ translation). (Another possibility for the last part of the sentence would be, ‘... and the unification which pervades all things.’)

*Points of detail: 369.4–370.10*

5 It is for these reasons, then, that he called the final cause the **most sovereign principle**. [And], in fact, the designation **principle** [on its own would have] taken in the accessory causes,<sup>113</sup> but the addition **most sovereign** picks out the true cause [alone]. For the causes of things which come to be are ‘more sovereign’ principles, while the accessory causes are [principles] subservient to other [causes] and reside in the products themselves.

10 **Generation** and **order**,<sup>114</sup> as was said earlier (358.18–27), are to be explained [respectively] as (1) the path between matter and total organization (*diataxis*) and (2) the actual perfected state of the universe.

And since in [the teaching of] doctrines about the very highest causes there is need both of a speaker with intellectual capacity<sup>115</sup> and for wise (*emphrôn*) judgement on the part of listeners, and especially so in accounts of the Good – for Intellect can reach up towards the Good, both universal [Intellect] towards the absolute Good and intellect in us towards [the good] in us – for this reason he believes both that those who say anything about the **most sovereign principle** should be **wise** (*phronimos*) and that those who listen should **receive** their words **correctly**.  
 20 What? Couldn’t anyone at all say something about God and the final cause? And isn’t it possible to hear plenty of people saying ‘God is good’ every day? Yes, but ‘the word “God” is’, as Plotinus says,<sup>116</sup> ‘a different thing from (*chôris*) virtue’ and is uttered by the many not out of wisdom (*phronêsis*) but in a random manner.<sup>117</sup> Well then, don’t the demons that dance attendance upon him also know the goodness of the Father, and the demiurgic angels who go in procession before the Father’s creation (*poiêsis*), and the gods who receive the demiurgic powers [which issue] from the One Cause? Yes, but the gods [know it] in a unitary manner,  
 25 the angels intellectually, the demons immaculately and everlastingly and in a fashion akin to the beings prior to them, while we must be content to know it wisely (*emphronôs*), because we are in a sense midway between  
 30 [these] more divine beings and the many, between intellectual beings and  
 370

<sup>113</sup> For accessory causes, see 261.12–16 with Runia’s note and 298.19–27.

<sup>114</sup> For this translation of κόσμος, see the note at 368.12.

<sup>115</sup> Or, ‘of an intellectual disposition’.

<sup>116</sup> Diehl refers to *Enn.* 1.2.1f., which cannot be right, and Festugière suggests that this is an error for 1. 2.1.27ff., although this too, as he says, seems wrong. In fact, there can, I think, be little doubt that Proclus had in mind 2.9.15.38–40, where Plotinus writes: ἀρετὴ μὲν οὖν εἰς τέλος προιοῦσα καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ ἐγγενομένη θεὸν δείκνυσιν· ἀνευ δὲ ἀρετῆς ἀληθινῆς θεὸς λεγόμενος ὀνομά ἐστιν.

<sup>117</sup> I suspect that these remarks (369.19–25) constitute another of the veiled attacks on the Christians identified in Saffrey (1975).

those of no intellect. That is the nature of human wisdom (*phronêsis*). On the one hand it issues from intellect and intellection, on the other it rules over life which is devoid of mind. And so, even when we talk about the **most sovereign principle**, our words should be **received** as coming **from wise men**; for wisdom (*phronêsis*) falls between intellect and opinion – and for that reason too correct judgement is what will accord with it.

It is for the same reason that he has added **should one above all**, for this account **above all** should be **accepted from wise men** (*emphrôn*); from beings above men one should look for a superior [account] and from the many a foolish one.<sup>118</sup>

### *The Demiurge's desire that all things be good*

The god, wishing all things to be good and nothing to be bad to the full extent of his power.<sup>119</sup> (30a2–3)<sup>120</sup>

### *Structure of the argument: 370.13–371.8*

The divine creation and intellective productive activity proceeds from entities which are without parts to those with parts, from entities which are unified to the pluralized, and from entities which are without extension to bodies (*onkoî*) extended in every [dimension].<sup>121</sup> Imaging it, [Plato's] account of it has proclaimed the final cause first sententiously, then discursively, and, thirdly, in detail, teaching [us] the entire ordering and procession [which result] from it. For 'he was good' embraces in a unified manner all that is final and most divine in the causes; 'in the good

<sup>118</sup> 369.12–370.10. φρόνιμος and ἔμφρων range between 'prudent' and 'intelligent' and a case could be made for rendering both 'intelligent' (and φρόνησις 'intelligence') in the present passage. However, at *PT* I. 10.15, where Proclus is also describing the qualities expected of a student of theology, φρόνησις is clearly predominantly a moral virtue and I have opted for 'wise' and 'wisdom'. (For a similar problem in relation to the translation of σωφροσύνη at 214.26–215.29, see the note at 215.19.) As well as discussing the qualities of the ideal student at *PT* I. 10.9–11.26, Proclus explains what is required of both student and teacher at *in Parm.* 926.7–928.27.

<sup>119</sup> This rendering of κατὰ δύναμιν is explained in the note at 381.18.

<sup>120</sup> No divergences from Burnet's OCT text.

<sup>121</sup> I suspect that the threefold movement of this sentence is designed to obscure the circumstance that the creation, as Proclus describes it here, is a movement between two poles, (a) the partless, unified and extensionless, and (b) the divisible, pluralized and extended, whereas the account that he will claim images it falls, as he analyzes it, into three parts.

no jealousy ever arises in regard to anything; so, being free of [jealousy], he wanted all things to come into being as much like himself<sup>122</sup> as possible' is what<sup>123</sup> has added, after the single intuition<sup>124</sup> of the intellect, the point by point (*diêirêmenos*) consideration<sup>125</sup> of the same [topic]; and what comes immediately afterwards<sup>126</sup> [is what has added] the understanding (*noêsis*)<sup>127</sup> proceeding into all [the details of] multiplicity and extension, [and thereby] unfolding the whole of demiurgic providence and all of the parts of the creation.

And indeed the third [of these sections] is continuous with the second and the second with the first; for, because the first short clause was 'he was good', he began the second [section] with [the word] 'good' and continued as far as the will (*boulêsis*) of the Father, and the third for its part, starting from this will, gives an account of the whole of [divine] providence. For, if [the Father] was good, he wished to make all things good, and if he [so] wished, he also did so and brought the universe into an orderly condition (*taxis*); for [his] providence depends on [his] will, and [his] will on [his] goodness.

But enough on the sequence and interconnection of [Plato's] statements.

<sup>122</sup> Reading αὐτῷ or ἐαυτῷ rather than αὐτῶ, the reading of the manuscripts. (Cf. the note at 365.3.)

<sup>123</sup> Diehl indicates a lacuna after ἡβουλήθη in line 24 in the text and in the apparatus reports that Taylor thought that διεξοδικῶς has dropped out but Schneider 'plura desiderat'; Festugière would insert διεξοδικῶς plus a verb to govern τὴν προιοῦσαν νόησιν in line 26. It seems to me, however, that if one assumes the ellipse of ἐστιν and takes ὅτι as the nominative neuter singular of ὅστις rather than as the conjunction, it is possible to retain the text of the manuscripts.

<sup>124</sup> Sc. after the brief initial statement ἀγαθὸς ἦν. Although ἐπιβολή is common in this sense, the dictionaries do not list it for βολή, but cf. (with Diehl) 283.5 above.

<sup>125</sup> Or perhaps, in view of the note struck by ἀνύμνησεν ('proclaimed') in line 18, 'contemplation'.

<sup>126</sup> Proclus' description of this 'third section' at 371.3–6 makes it probable that it runs from βουλήθεις in 30a2 to ἀμεινον in 30a6, but the reference to providence both here and there suggests that it could run all the way to πρόνοιαν in 30c1.

<sup>127</sup> A comparison of the two contexts shows that νόησις takes up ἡ νοερά ποίησις in line 13 and Festugière, quite reasonably given that in the case of the gods ποίησις is νόησις (Diehl lists passages where this equation is made under νόησις in his word index), assumes that the νόησις in question is demiurgic intellection, but if the analogy between the creation and Plato's account of it is to be played through to the end, it should refer to the type of understanding that is embodied in this part of the account, giving the series (1) 'the single intuition of the intellect' (2) 'point by point consideration' (3) 'the understanding [which unfolds]'.

*Divine will and goodness: 371.9–372.19*

Next, let us see what kind of thing will is in itself, so as to find out how it is connected to goodness.<sup>128</sup> 10

Now, the supersubstantial unity of the gods, on its own, isolated from [all other] entities,<sup>129</sup> is one and ineffable and indefinable, possessing by virtue of [this] very oneness the [characteristic of being] uncircumscribed and incomprehensible. But if one must even so, on the basis of (*apo*) its dependent [participants], conclude that the unitary triad also exists in it,<sup>130</sup> [then] Goodness heads [this triad], Will is second, and Providence third;<sup>131</sup> [and] Goodness produces perfection, sufficiency and desirability,<sup>132</sup> Will exhibits surplenditude, expansiveness and productivity, and Providence provides efficacy, accomplishment and purity. 15 20

And, in conformity with this ineffable and unified triadic structure (*huparxis*), the Intelligible too is divided three ways by Substance and Power and Activity,<sup>133</sup> Substance being enduringly established in itself and self-complete, Power maintaining an uninterrupted and infinite procession, and Activity having as its portion perfection and essential productivity.<sup>134</sup> 25

<sup>128</sup> Presumably Proclus feels that he achieves this through the analogies he establishes between the structure of the 'unitary triad' and those of the other three he describes, but his real interests seem to be identifying the triad Goodness, Will, Providence, linking it to the other three (perhaps he feels that this somehow authenticates it), and using the first three of the four linked triads to explain the qualities of the Demiurge.

<sup>129</sup> Or perhaps, '[taken] on its own, transcending [as it does] all existents'.

<sup>130</sup> Festugière refers to *ET* §123 and 162 where Proclus produces arguments for this doctrine that the gods, or henads, are unknowable in themselves but can be known analogically through their participants.

<sup>131</sup> This seems to be the only place where Proclus explicitly refers to this triad. (In the reference to 171.10–25 in Opsomer and Steel (2003) n. 377, 171 is a misprint for 371.) At *PT* V. 60.2–61.3, commenting on the same passage of the *Timaeus* (surely not just 29e1–2 as Saffrey and Westerink suggest at 69, n. 1), he again derives the goodness, will and providence of the Demiurge from his divinity, but is more interested in relating them to the triad Father, Power, Intellect as it exists at the demiurgic level than in constituting them as a triad in their own right.

<sup>132</sup> This triad, which Proclus derives from *Philebus* 20d, also appears at *PT* I. 101.14–104.20 and III. 79.9–17; in *Alc.* 153.10–20; Damascius, in *Phil.* §76–9; Olympiodorus, in *Phaed.* 30.14–20; and (in part) at II. 90.2–3 below. (References from *PT* I. 101, n. 3 and in *Alc.* p. 218, n. 2.)

<sup>133</sup> On this 'Aristotelian' triad and the triad Being, Life, Intelligence in lines 26–7, see Siorvanes (1996) 109–10. The latter triad is often used to subdivide the second hypothesis into its three major levels and can also be used to further divide any one of those three levels, and since the two triads are interchangeable (cf. Siorvanes (1996) 110, and Wallis (1972) 130–3 and the table in A. Lloyd (1967) 314 for other instances of interchangeable triads in the Neoplatonists), the same should also apply to the former.

<sup>134</sup> As Festugière points out, οὐσιωδῶς ποιεῖν is the same as αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιεῖν.

And on the same principle Intellect in its turn [is likewise divided] three ways, by Being, Life, Intelligence (*to noeron*);<sup>135</sup> for the first bestows [the gift] of existing, the second of living, the third of knowing.

And, in addition to these, Soul [too is divided three ways] by the Object of Knowledge, Knowledge, That Which Knows;<sup>136</sup> for the first of these is what is knowable, the second the knowledge [itself], the third that which brings both [of these] to fulfilment.

Since, then, these four triads are analogous, as Goodness is to Will, so is Substance to Power and Being to Life and the Object of Knowledge to Knowledge; and as Will is to Providence, so is Power to Activity and Life to Intellect and Knowledge to the Knower. For Substance, Being and the Object of Knowledge have an analogous status to Goodness, since cohesiveness and permanence and singleness and perfectiveness [are features] of Goodness; and [analogous to] Will [are] Power, Life, Knowledge, since self-production and comprehending all things and providing measure [are features] of Will; and [analogous] to Providence are Activity and Intellect and the Knower, since efficaciousness and penetrating all things and to have grasped all things in advance are likenesses (*indalmata*) of divine providence.

Since, then, the Demiurge is both a god and an unparticipated intellect, *qua* god he possesses Goodness and Will and Providence, *qua* Intellect, Substance and Powers and Activities, and *qua* Intellect he exists and has life and has knowledge of wholes;<sup>137</sup> and the monad in him maintains<sup>138</sup> the triad, the ineffable henad the monad.<sup>139</sup>

But enough on the subject of Will.

### *The sense in which the Demiurge wishes everything to be good:* *372.19–373.21*

The next thing to ask is in what sense [the Demiurge] wishes all things to be good, and whether this is possible, and how. If this was his wish, they argue, procession would have had to stop at the gods and the immaculate essences, and if he created not only these but beasts and reptiles and

<sup>135</sup> At 372.4 and 10 τὸ νοερόν is replaced by the more usual νοῦς, which is of course also the name of the whole triad.

<sup>136</sup> At 372.5 and 10 τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν is replaced by τὸ ἐπιστήμων.

<sup>137</sup> Although Proclus thought it worth tracing analogies to the triad Goodness, Will, Providence as far as Soul, he cannot, of course, even though the Demiurge contains Soul in the causal mode (cf. 406.28–31), use the triad he locates there to account for the Demiurge's own qualities.

<sup>138</sup> Or perhaps just 'embraces'.

<sup>139</sup> For the demiurgic triad and its monad, cf. *PTV*. 44.19–45.20. The 'ineffable henad' is the demiurgic henad. The former is an unparticipated intellect, the latter a god.

human beings and everything enmattered, he did not wish all things to be good. (He certainly does not will [only] better things but create less good things as well!) So, if he wished all things to be good, he would have halted creation (*poiêsis*) at the gods.

But, we shall reply, if procession [advances only] as far as the gods, not all things will be good. The Firsts, through having been allocated the lowest rank, will lose their goodness, and [entities] which have the power to procreate, and because of their own goodness wish to, by being ranked last become sterile and [no longer] good.

They, then, say that if all things are good, procession [only advances] as far as the gods, and we shall reply that if procession [only advances] as far as the gods, not all things are good. For how could it be good for the divine to be sterile? And it will be sterile if it comes last. Everything that procreates is better than what is procreated, and if there is no inferior, there is no room for a better. Therefore we should let the gods<sup>140</sup> hold the very first rank and, after the gods, allow existence to inferior beings<sup>141</sup> all the way down to matter itself. Let us grant admission to all beings, from the foremost to the last. Let none of [even] the most lowly be lacking and let no part [of the scale of being] be empty.<sup>142</sup>

And indeed what [part of it] would be empty when there are first [of all entities which are simply] themselves, in the second place [entities which belong] to themselves, in the third, [entities which belong] to themselves<sup>143</sup> and to another, in the fourth, [entities] which have become another's, and, holding the fifth rank, things which are [themselves] other;<sup>144</sup> and when on either side of [each of] these [classes] are arrayed the dissimilarly similar;<sup>145</sup> and when there is [given all of this] such great continuity in things? And what deficiency could there be when the unmoving [entities] are established at the first [level], the self-moved at the second, those which are moved by another, which are the lowest

<sup>140</sup> Following Praechter and Festugière in adopting οἱ θεοὶ, the reading of C, in preference to θεοὶ (M P Diehl).

<sup>141</sup> Supplying τὰ δευτέρα or τὰ χεῖρω to fill the obvious lacuna after ὑφίστάσθω in 373.5 as suggested by Diehl in his apparatus. (Although he does not print a note, Festugière too evidently accepts Diehl's suggestion.)

<sup>142</sup> With 372.27–373.7 cf. *De mal. subs.* §7.22–30 and *De dec. dub.* V. 28.5–9, where Proclus cites *Tim.* 41b7–8: 'There remain still three kinds of mortal beings that have not yet been begotten; and as long as they have not come to be, the heaven will be incomplete' (tr. Zeyl).

<sup>143</sup> Reading αὐτοῦ for both instances of αὐτοῦ at 373 with Festugière.

<sup>144</sup> For this series, cf. (as does Festugière) 10.31ff. with Tarrant's note.

<sup>145</sup> Sc. the One and matter, which are said to be 'dissimilarly similar' because both, in their different ways, are perfectly simple. (On this similarity, see *ET* §59, for the term 'dissimilarly similar', the note at 385.29.)

of all existing things, at the third – for [between them] those mentioned constitute all there is – and when, in a word, it has been shown by many arguments that the production of things is continuous and, if you would like to put it so, there is proportionality from the top down to the lowest levels in regard to the orderly procession of all things from the One?

So let all this be taken as settled and let it be agreed that the generation of things is extended thus far.

### *Is there evil in the universe? 373.22–381.21*

But is there nothing that is evil among these things [we have been discussing],<sup>146</sup> or shall we concede that the evil which is said [to be present] in both bodies and souls also in some sense exists?<sup>147</sup> Starting from this puzzle, some have gone as far as to totally do away with evil, while others have despaired of providence, the former believing that if providence exists all things are good, the latter being unable to believe that things are governed by providence if evil things exist.<sup>148</sup> For, on the one hand, if God wishes evil to exist, how can he be good? After all, [it is the property] of a good being, one to whom good belongs essentially, to make everything (*to pan*)<sup>149</sup> good, just as it is the property of a hot thing, something to which heat belongs essentially, to heat,<sup>150</sup> and it is not permitted for a good being to do anything other than good. And, on the other hand, if [God] does not wish [evil to exist], how *does* evil exist? There would be something which had come into existence against the will of the Father of all things. Such, then, is the puzzle [we must solve].

### *Doctrine of Syrianus: 374.2–375.5*

If we are to adhere to Plato's own [views], we must, with our teacher [Syrianus], reply that the mode of God's relation to things is of course

<sup>146</sup> Although it is oriented towards *De mal. subs.*, the summary of Proclus' views on evil in Opsomer and Steel (2003) 20–31 is a good introduction to what he says about it in the *Timaeus*.

<sup>147</sup> Proclus poses the same question early in *De mal. subs.* at §1.15–16.

<sup>148</sup> The compatibility of providence with the existence of evil is the theme of the fifth essay of *De dec. dub.* and the same two camps are mentioned in its opening paragraph. Although the Epicureans and Aristotle notoriously denied providence it was not on these grounds and the doxography there is probably no more than a way of expressing a well-known dilemma.

<sup>149</sup> But τὰ πάντα would be more expected and perhaps one should after all, if a little awkwardly, translate 'the universe', as at 371.6.

<sup>150</sup> For occurrences of this and similar similes for the dissemination of good, see the note at 367.22.

different from our own, and so too is that of things to the divine and to us, for wholes have one [kind of] relation (*logos*) to [their] parts and the parts another [kind] to one another. Accordingly, for God nothing is evil, not even any of the things we describe as evil. He makes good use even of them. But for particular beings, on the other hand, whose nature it is to suffer from it, there is such a thing as evil. And the same thing may be evil for a part but for the universe or for wholes not evil but good;<sup>151</sup> since to the extent that it has existence and to the extent that it partakes (*metechein*) of order of some kind it is good.<sup>152</sup> For if you conceive of this thing we call evil as devoid of all good, you are putting it beyond even absolute non-being. Just as Good-itself is prior to Being, so is Evil-itself posterior to the nothingness of non-being; for the thing which is furthest removed from the Good is evil and not absolute non-being. So if absolute non-being has more existence<sup>153</sup> than Evil-itself but is among things that cannot exist, then [evil] is to a much greater degree unable to.<sup>154</sup> But if [you conceive of it as] not totally evil but interwoven<sup>155</sup> with good, you will be giving it a place among existing things and [thereby] making it good for wholes. How does this [last] follow from its having existence? A thing with existence participates Being. A thing which participates Being also participates the One. A thing which participates the One participates the Good. Therefore evil, if it has existence,<sup>156</sup> participates the Good.<sup>157</sup> And on that account it is not purely evil or entirely discordant or indeterminate.

Who, then, gives it this character? Who confers measure and order and limit on it? Clearly the Demiurge, who makes all things like himself. He fills both wholes and parts with goods.<sup>158</sup> So, if he makes all things

<sup>151</sup> Preferring οὐ κακόν, ἀλλὰ ἀγαθόν (C Diehl) to οὐ κακόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθόν (M P Praechter, Festugière). Incidentally, Festugière's translation suggests the ellipse of οὐ μόνον before οὐ rather than (as he suggests in his note) that of μόνον after it, which would make Proclus say something quite different.

<sup>152</sup> That nothing is evil from the perspective of the whole is a key plank of Neoplatonic theodicy which crops up repeatedly both in what follows under the present lemma and in other passages where Proclus discusses evil. There is a particularly clear statement of the doctrine at *PT I*. 84.14–85.5.

<sup>153</sup> Accenting μάλλον ἔστιν with Festugière rather than μάλλον ἔστιν with Diehl at 374.18. Kroll's conjecture <εῖναι> ἀδύνατον at 374.20 (which Festugière adopts) is attractive but not, I think, entirely necessary.

<sup>154</sup> The same argument occurs at *De mal. subs.* §3.1–9, where Proclus gives it to those who would deny the existence of evil altogether, and at *PT I*. 86.19–22.

<sup>155</sup> Proclus used the same metaphor at *de mal. subs.* §10.25, as the corresponding passage in Isaac Sebastocrator (19.7–8) shows.

<sup>156</sup> Accenting ἔστιν with Festugière at 374.25.

<sup>157</sup> For the premisses of this argument, cf. *ET* §§11–13.

<sup>158</sup> For this aspect of the activity of the Demiurge, cf. 365.19–26.

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good and colours<sup>159</sup> Evil itself with good, there is nothing bad as far as it lies within the power<sup>160</sup> of the god *and* that of the recipients [of his goodness].<sup>161</sup> For the power [involved] is twofold. There is that of the god, which makes even the most execrable evil good, and that of the recipients, which have participated the goodness of the Demiurge to the capacity (*metron*) of their respective ranks.<sup>162</sup> Therefore for the Demiurge, who wishes nothing to be evil, nothing is evil.<sup>163</sup>

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### *On the origin of evil: 375.6–378.22*

If there are those who will hold [the Demiurge] responsible for evils on the ground that he brought particulars into existence, they do away with the creation of the cosmos<sup>164</sup> (*kosmopoiia*), they annul the power which is generative of wholes, they merge into one the nature of the foremost entities and that of the last.

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That in saying this we are reflecting Plato's views is easy to see from his writings.

In the *Politicus*<sup>165</sup> he says, to quote him: '[The cosmos] has acquired all the beautiful (*kalos*)<sup>166</sup> things [it contains] from him who created it; from its former state of being [derive] all the unjust and irksome things that come about in the cosmos (*ouranos*).' [In other words,] because generation and perishing exist, that which is contrary to nature too has an incidental existence and because the deformity of matter fills particular souls with ugliness as a result of the time they spend in its sphere, the contrarational too obtains a kind of incidental existence.<sup>167</sup> But even so all

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<sup>159</sup> Proclus uses the same metaphor at 380.1, 381.8 and at *in Parm.* 835.18.

<sup>160</sup> This is not intended to imply any limitation on the power of the Demiurge (cf. the note on Proclus' interpretation of the phrase κατὰ δύναμιν at 381.18).

<sup>161</sup> As Proclus goes on to explain, the power of the Demiurge is his power to make things good, that of the things he creates, their capacity to receive goodness. The former is unlimited, but the latter variable and limited, which is how evil arises. By translating '... il ne reste plus rien de mauvais, en vertu et de la puissance de Dieu et de la capacité des sujets récepteurs', Festugière obscures this point and seems to eliminate evil altogether.

<sup>162</sup> The themes of this paragraph are developed at greater length at *PT* I. 83.12–85.5.

<sup>163</sup> The language of this last paragraph echoes that of the *Timaeus* at various points: παραπλήσια (374.28), for example, picks up παραπλήσια at 29e3, φλαῦρον κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν (374.31) the same words at 30a2–3, and βουλομένω (375.5) βουληθείς at 30a2.

<sup>164</sup> Or perhaps, 'the creation of order'.<sup>165</sup> 273b6–c1.

<sup>166</sup> As often, *kalos* ('beautiful') covers both the aesthetically and morally 'beautiful' and I could almost equally well have rendered it 'good'.

<sup>167</sup> Proclus reads the *Politicus* passage in the same way at *De mal. subs.* §34.7–12 but sets against it other passages which, he argues, show that Plato held that matter is 'divine' and 'good'. For παραπρόστασις ('incidental existence'), cf. 381.6–12 and the note there.

things, including these, become beautiful thanks to the goodness of him who has created the universe.

And in the *Republic*<sup>168</sup> [he says]: ‘Nothing but God should be held responsible for good things, but one must seek other causes of one kind or another for evils.’ By means of these [words] he has shown both that evils do not stem from God – cooling is not a property of fire, people say, nor heating of snow,<sup>169</sup> nor producing evil of the All-good – and that one should posit particular causes for them, and indeterminate ones at that. For while in the case of good things the One and the primally Good precedes the many, it is not so in the case of evils because of the indeterminate diffusion of evil. The [words] ‘other’ and ‘of one kind or another’, then, indicate the particular and indeterminate nature of the causes of evil. For it is not the case that soul contains the cause of things which are contrary to nature. On the contrary. If they are contrary to nature, they shun nature, and nature too is soul.<sup>170</sup> And nor is it the case that body [contains the cause] of things which are contrary to reason. After all, the virtuous too possess a body, and virtue along with that body.

And in the *Theaetetus*<sup>171</sup> [he says]: ‘No, Theodorus, it is neither possible for evils to cease to exist nor for them to exist among the gods. They of necessity haunt mortal nature and this [earthly] sphere.’ Now, if it is necessarily in the mortal sphere that evil has its circulation, it *could* not be, for Plato at least, absolute non-being or be separated from all existing things.

And so, according to [Plato], evil exists, it stems from particular causes, and it is rendered good thanks to the boniform providence of the Demiurge, because nothing is altogether evil but in one way or another

<sup>168</sup> 379c5–7. Also cited at *in Remp.* I. 38.8–9 and II. 355.28–9, *in Parm.* 830.19–20 and *De mal. subs.* §34.18–19, §41.13–14 and §47.17–18. Cf. too *PT* I 81.14–17.

<sup>169</sup> For occurrences of these and similar similes for the dissemination of good, see the note at 367.22. As Tarrant points out, *Phaedo* 103c10–d12 seems to lurk in the background here and I am tempted to read φησί (‘he [sc. Plato] says’) rather than φασί (‘people say’) at 375.23 with **b** (Grynaeus) and **s** (Schneider).

<sup>170</sup> Proclus’ argument seems to be that neither soul nor body can be the *sole* source of evil because soul cannot be the cause of the ‘contrary to nature’ or body of the ‘contrary to reason’. Although Festugière’s transposition of ψυχῇ and φύσιν at 376.3 has its attractions, I have translated Diehl’s text, which is that of all the manuscripts. Proclus’ point is, I think, that soul cannot contain both the cause of the contrary to nature (which he goes on to describe as being itself contrary to nature) and nature itself. It is of course difficult that Proclus nowhere else explicitly treats nature as an aspect of soul, but see the discussion at Siorvanes (1996) 137.

<sup>171</sup> 176a5–8. Also cited at *in Remp.* II. 31.8–9; *De mal. subs.* §43.4–5 and §48.6–7; *in Eucl.* 150.6–7; *Eclogae de philosophia chaldaica* fr. 3.6–7. In addition, according to a scholium on *in Remp.* I. 37.23, Proclus used it as the starting-point for a disquisition on evil in his (no longer extant) commentary on the *Theaetetus*.

15 each thing is produced in accordance with justice and [the purposes of] God.<sup>172</sup>

[To show that this is so] let us carry out the following division.

[If we take] all the things in the cosmos, (1) some are wholes, some parts. Of the parts, (2) some eternally protect their own good, as do the particular intellect and the [various] kinds of particular demons, while others cannot always preserve their own good. Further, of these last,  
20 (3) some are moved by another, others self-moved; and of those that are self-moved, (4a) some are prey to vice (*kakia*) which goes no further than their choices,<sup>173</sup> (4b) others go on to deeds as well.<sup>174</sup>

Now, (1) the wholes are entirely good and bestow goodness not only upon themselves but upon their parts as well. (2) The things which  
25 are parts of other things but protect their own good possess good in a secondary and partial manner. (3) The things which are both parts and moved by others, since they receive their existence from others, depend upon the providence of these [others] and undergo change as and when they must (*kata to deon*), as is evidently the case with all bodies which

<sup>172</sup> Festugière begins a new sentence with ἄλλ' ἔστιν (376.14) and translates 'Néanmoins il arrive que tel mal particulier se réalise en vertu d'un décret de justice et selon Dieu', but it seems to me that the ἄλλά clause is in fact expegetical of μηδὲν παντὶ ἄσπιλον. (For both form and sense, cf. ἔστι δὲ ὅπῃ καὶ τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν καὶ κατὰ θεὸν at 377.9.)

<sup>173</sup> Since we are talking about 'things in the cosmos' these 'wholes' and 'parts' should be those produced in the various 'creations' Proclus distinguishes in the *Timaeus*. This is confirmed by similar passages in *PT* and *in Remp*. In the former (I. 86.12–14) the 'wholes' that are immune from evil are said to be the principal components of the universe; in the latter (I. 38.7–8) they are specified as intellect, soul and body. (For wholes and parts in *in Tim*. see pp. 2, 25–6 of the Introduction and pp. 3–6 of Baltzly's introduction to vol. III; Proclus' fullest and most general discussion of wholes and parts is at *ET* §66–74.) (Festugière suggests that the particular intellects of (2) are those of human beings, but I imagine they also include those of, for example, the stars.)

<sup>174</sup> This distinction between evil choice and evil action appears again at *De mal subs.* §58.44–50. Here, since both 4a and 4b are, as becomes apparent, human souls, Proclus might have done better to halt the division with 'the self-moved' rather than write as though souls can be divided into those which make evil choices but never act on them and those which make evil choices and always act on them. He could then have dealt with evil choices and evil actions within a single section on the human soul. The subsequent discussions of 4a and 4b show that the αἱρέσεις referred to govern the moral character of individual souls. To judge from *De mal. subs.* §59, which parallels the later discussions of 4a and 4b at 377.7–378.22, and from III. 274.14–275.15, which also covers much of the same ground, the αἱρέσεις in question should include the αἱρέσεις βίων made by incarnate souls prior to each incarnation, and some of the language of these discussions themselves makes best sense if the moral choices of incarnate souls are also meant to be covered. (At times in what follows renderings such as 'decisions' or 'intentions' suggest themselves for αἱρέσεις but I have thought it best to use 'choices' throughout.)

come to be and perish. After all, if generation has to exist, perishing also has to exist, because generation is by way of change and is [itself] a kind of change. But if there is to be perishing, the contrary to nature must also have a way in. So, just as that which has perished has perished in its own right (*beautôi*) but has not ceased to exist for the universe [as a whole] – it is [now] air or water or another of the things into which it has changed – so too is that which is contrary to nature without order in its own right but ordered from the point of view of the universe [as a whole]. For if even by perishing and being totally deprived of order, it does not dissolve the order of the universe, how would<sup>175</sup> it destroy the whole world-order by being contrary to nature and not even deprived of all order itself?

On the other hand, (4b) beings which are particular but are autonomous<sup>176</sup> and act externally<sup>177</sup> produce an outcome which is evil for themselves, but in one way or another this too is good and in accordance with [the purposes of] God. For, since impulses and deeds derive from choices, deeds follow upon choices with justice whenever the person who made the choice is deserving<sup>178</sup> not only of the choice but of the deed [which follows] upon it. Yet the deed is not a good absolutely, but for the person who chose such a course and who had such an impulse it follows with justice and is a good in relation to that person and that kind of life. For of goods, some are goods for all things, some for things of a particular species,<sup>179</sup> some even for individuals *qua* individuals. Hellebore, for example, is not good for all things, and not even for all bodies, or indeed all sick bodies, but is healthful for [a body] which is sick in a particular way and from a particular cause (*archê*). So [even] if a deed is intemperate or unjust, for those who perform it is a good from the perspective of justice (*bôs kata dikên*), although it is not a good either in itself (*haplôs*) or for them, but a very great evil. To the extent that it is self-inflicted<sup>180</sup> it is an evil, but to the extent that it is [inflicted] on them by the universe [as a whole] it is not an evil; and to the extent that they have acted against themselves they have ruined their lives by becoming

<sup>175</sup> πῶς ἄρ' ἂν (Praechter Festugière) is attractive but would not affect the translation.

<sup>176</sup> More literally 'self-moving'. In view of αὐτοκινήτως ἐνεργοῦντα at 378.1, perhaps one should emend αὐτοκίνητα here to αὐτοκινήτως and translate, 'beings which are particular and act autonomously and externally'.

<sup>177</sup> Sc. souls which not only make [bad] choices but go on to act on them in the world as compared with those who 'take their depravity [only] as far as [making evil] choices' at 378.1–2.

<sup>178</sup> Sc. deserving of the consequences.

<sup>179</sup> More literally 'others for things which differ in species'.

<sup>180</sup> More literally 'as being from them and against them'.

actively evil, but to the extent that they have suffered<sup>181</sup> at the hands of the universe, they have made requital for their [evil] choice. In this way, they say, the god himself permitted [certain] men who had planned to betray a suppliant to do so precisely so they would suffer punishment for their intention.<sup>182</sup>

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(4a) But now we must consider what remains, [namely] beings which are particular and which, acting autonomously, take their depravity [only] as far as [making evil] choices. In the first place, that these too pay a penalty just for their thoughts goes without saying: as has been stated,<sup>183</sup>

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there is also a penalty for mere imagination and for impulse and for design. The gods govern us from within,<sup>184</sup> and just as they reward boniform choices, so do they punish those of the opposite kind. But how could even this<sup>185</sup> [kind of] choice have [the property of being] in line with justice and [the purposes of] god? Because there had to be such an entity (*ousia*) and such a capacity, one that can go either way and hesitates between<sup>186</sup> different lives.<sup>187</sup> So if that which has control

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over choice is from God, choice too is from God; and, if so, it is also a

<sup>181</sup> Preferring παθόντες (P) to ὄντες (C Diehl Festugière): (1) ὡς δὲ ἐκ τοῦ παντός παθόντες sits better with the parallel phrase ὡς δὲ ἐκ τοῦ παντός εἰς αὐτούς earlier in the sentence than does ὡς δὲ ἐκ τοῦ παντός ὄντες (2) ἀπόντες, the reading of M, is more likely to have arisen from παθόντες than from ὄντες (3) δράσαντες and παθόντες are a much more likely pairing than are δράσαντες and ὄντες (though, admittedly, this in itself could have led to the corruption of an original ὄντες) (4) (the clincher, I think) Proclus, as the Greek of Isaac Sebastocrator shows, wrote ὦν δὲ ἐκ μόνου τοῦ παντός πάσχομεν, εἶτε βελτιόνων εἶτε χειρόνων, τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀξίαν αἰτιατέον in a very similar passage at *De dec. dub.* VI. 29–31.

<sup>182</sup> Reading ἐπιτρέψαι <καὶ αὐτὸν> τὸν θεὸν δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο [καὶ κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν θεὸν] ἢ ἵνα at 377.27–8 with Diehl (apparatus) and Festugière. For the anecdote, see (with Diehl and Festugière) Herodotus 1.159ff.

<sup>183</sup> Cf. 377.9–15; 26. <sup>184</sup> Proclus expands on this theme at III. 274.20–275.15.

<sup>185</sup> Sc. the kind we are discussing, or perhaps, with more specific reference, the kind that the gods punish. This is a little awkward and Festugière emends to αὐτῇ, giving: 'but how could even choice itself [sc. choice which is not followed by action] . . .' Part of what follows over the next few lines seems to favour the former reading, part the latter, but in the broader context Proclus should be showing that even evil choice is ultimately a good.

<sup>186</sup> Or perhaps 'comes down on the side of different lives [on different occasions]'.

<sup>187</sup> I have assumed that both οὐσία and δύναμις refer to αἴρεσις, the latter being epexegetic of the former (for the idea that the faculties of the soul are οὐσίαι, see Simplicius, in *DA* 286.36–8), but it is conceivable (and perhaps the continuation favours it) that the οὐσία is the soul, the δύναμις its capacity for choice and ἀμφίβολον καὶ ῥέπουσαν ἐπὶ διαφόρους ζωάς applies to both. (Proclus' statement that προαίρεσις καὶ ἀμφίβολος ῥοπή should not be attributed to the Demiurge at 390.10–11 is, I think, compatible with either interpretation.) The last phrase presumably refers in the first instance to the choice of a way of life here on earth but could extend to the selection of future lives by discarnate souls.

good. And indeed the soul moves from one rank to another simply [as a result of] having made a choice, for every choice either elevates the soul or drags it down. So if from the soul, choice is an evil, but if it assigns (*methistanai*) the maker of the choice to its proper rank,<sup>188</sup> it is in accordance with justice and a good.<sup>189</sup> For it is this<sup>190</sup> choice which brings justice to the person who has made the choice, or, rather, [itself] becomes the punishment (*dikê*) within him, because it has seduced the soul away from good things. For just as boniform choice becomes its own reward, so does depraved become its own penalty. This is the way of it with autonomous (*autokinêtos*) capacities.

[It follows], then, that there is no evil which is not in some way also a good, but all things participate in providence.<sup>191</sup>

### *Why is there a cause of evil in the first place? 378.22–379.26*

If some people wonder why a maleficent cause has been produced in the first place, even if it is not one of the wholes but [only] a particular,<sup>192</sup> one should point out to them that the procession of things is continuous<sup>193</sup> and no void has been left in [the spectrum of] beings.<sup>194</sup> So was it the case [we shall ask them] that all self-moving life should not have existed? But in that event we shall also be doing away with many divine beings. Or should [only] those self-moving beings that are wholes exist and those that are parts not exist? But how is it possible for a whole (*holotês*) to exist if it has been robbed of its parts? And how will the continuity of things be preserved if beings which are whole and self-moved and those which are partial and moved by another already exist (*proûparchein*),

<sup>188</sup> Presumably equivalent to: 'So as coming from the soul choice is an evil, but as assigning . . .' (Cf. the parallel statement at 377.22–4 in the discussion of (4b).)

<sup>189</sup> Festugière compares II. 108.14–22.

<sup>190</sup> Here too Festugière would, perhaps rightly, emend αὐτῇ to αὐτῆ.

<sup>191</sup> With this section (sc. 376.15–378.22), cf. *De mal. subs.* §§11–28, where, seeking the location of evil, Proclus begins by eliminating one by one the gods, angels, demons and heroes, then goes on to find it first in souls and then in nature.

<sup>192</sup> As Proclus has just argued at 376.22–378.22.

<sup>193</sup> As Proclus has argued at 372.19–373.21.

<sup>194</sup> Rejecting Diehl's <ὄν> at 378.24, removing the commas around κακοποιὸν αἴτιον and construing it as the subject of παρῆκται. Festugière accepts <ὄν>, assumes that πάντα (l. 22) is still the subject, construes κακοποιὸν αἴτιον <ὄν> as a nominative absolute, and translates, 'Que si certains demandent pourquoi, de toute façon, toutes choses ont été produites, alors qu'il existe une cause maléfique et que, même si cette cause n'est nullement maléfique pour le Tout, elle l'est du moins pour la partie . . .', but (1) Proclus goes on to explain why self-moving particulars (sc. souls) must exist, not why 'all things' must exist and (2) I doubt whether one can really get 'et que, même si cette cause n'est nullement maléfique pour le Tout, elle l'est du moins pour la partie' out of καὶ εἰ μὴ δὲν εἴη τοῦτο τῶν ὅλων, ἀλλὰ μερικόν.

but we get rid of what comes between them, [namely] things which are self-moved but nevertheless particular, and which, because of their particular nature (*eidos*),<sup>195</sup> come into being in relation [to something else], but, because they are self-moved, are at times freed from that relation? It is therefore necessary for this [form of] life to exist as well [to serve as] the middle term in [the spectrum of] things and as the link between [classes] ranked in opposition, so to speak, to one another.

But the fact that [this form of life] by its essence disposes of choices does not mean that evil is natural to it.<sup>196</sup> The body too has, by its essence, a tendency to disease; it is after all essentially perishable. Disease is not, however, natural [to it]. For this reason the disease in itself is an evil for the particular nature<sup>197</sup> to which has fallen [the task of] keeping this or that body together, but a good for the totality of bodies. After all, a thing that had come into being out of other things was [always] going to have to change into something else. So, just as the transformation of food is a good for the 'nature' in us if the organism (*zôion*) is to be preserved, in just the same way the destruction of a part is a good for nature as a whole if it is always to preserve wholes (*holotês*) ahead of parts. For if parts were to come into being out of [wholes], and to remain in existence once they come into being, everything would quickly be used up, the wholes having turned into particulars.<sup>198</sup> For if there is continuous subtraction from finite [entities], the whole (*to sumpan*) must give out. And if [wholes] do not [any longer] exist,<sup>199</sup> either generation will come to a halt or particulars will be transformed into one another.<sup>200</sup> But that was our initial assumption<sup>201</sup> and was to apply even when wholes were preserved. And, just as what is an evil for a particular nature is a good for [nature] as a whole, so too is what is an evil for a particular life a good for life as a whole.

<sup>195</sup> Could εἶδος be an error for εἶναι?

<sup>196</sup> Punctuating with a full stop rather than a comma after τεταγμένων in line 7. καὶ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο . . . ἐπειδὴ . . . is, I think, simply a variation of the more usual καὶ οὐκ ἐπειδὴ . . . διὰ τοῦτο . . . ; cf. καὶ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο . . . διότι . . . at *in Remp.* I. 83.10 and *ET* 38.5.

<sup>197</sup> A thing's 'nature' is its enmattered form, which is what disease in the first instance destroys. On this nature and its relation to universal Nature, see Siorvanes (1996) 137. (Festugière takes the relative clause with ἡ νόσος and translates 'qui s'est emparée de tel ou tel corps'.)

<sup>198</sup> Translating the text printed by Diehl at 379.19. (Festugière prefers γεγόμενα (**M P**) to γινόμενα (**C**) and adds <ἐκ> before τῶν ὅλων, but neither change strikes me as essential and the second alters the argument.)

<sup>199</sup> Festugière translates τοῦτων δὲ οὐκ ὄντων 'et si, d'autre part, il n'en va pas ainsi' and adds the comment 'scil. s'il n'y a pas διαπάνησις du Tout', which in the long run perhaps comes to the same thing.

<sup>200</sup> More literally: 'or transformation for particulars will be out of others'.

<sup>201</sup> Cf. 379.13–14.

*Is evil willed by God? 379.26–381.21*

Let us start again from the beginning and put the question in yet another way.

If someone should ask us whether God wanted evil to exist or did not want it to, we shall reply: ‘both’. To the extent that *he* bestows existence upon all things, he wanted it to exist; for everything that exists in any sense at all in the universe has proceeded from the demiurgic cause. On the other hand, to the extent that he makes all things good, he did not want it to exist; indeed, he has concealed even evil under a coating of goodness.<sup>202</sup> And if you wish to approach [the matter] from a physical perspective,<sup>203</sup> to the extent that evil is evil, it comes *per se* from the particular soul, accidentally from God – provided, that is, one also accepts that he gave existence to the soul! But to the extent that it is good – for it possesses goodness because it is produced in accordance with justice – it comes *per se* from the divine cause, accidentally from the soul.<sup>204</sup>

Further, in the *Laws*<sup>205</sup> Plato has defined the nature of retribution. [He says] that it seems to vex its victim [continuously] and that it resembles the opening of abscesses;<sup>206</sup> and he challenges anyone who cannot be cured without such a procedure [to resort] to it so that, rid of its travail and its fascination with vice and having become penitent, the soul may take the first step towards the cleansing of its ills. For shameful and unjust deeds are attractive in prospect to the foolish,<sup>207</sup> but, once performed, fill their perpetrators with remorse; in the planning, they ulcerate the soul, actually committed, they expose their own paltriness (*astheneia*) and release the soul from a most shameful travail. This retribution some show evidence of [paying] for their whole way of life,<sup>208</sup> others [only] in respect

<sup>202</sup> For other occurrences of this metaphor in Proclus, see the note at 374.31.

<sup>203</sup> As Festugière remarks, ‘from a physical perspective’ in that the opposition ‘*per se*’ and ‘accidentally’ is employed.

<sup>204</sup> Rather surprisingly, even though Proclus soon (lines 27ff.) goes on to distinguish moral and physical evil, he only addresses the former here.

<sup>205</sup> 728c2–5; although what Proclus attributes to Plato here goes well beyond anything in the *Laws* passage, the fact that he follows a quotation from the same passage with a similar excursus on the opening of wounds in *in Remp.* (quotation at I. 102.29–103.2; continuation, 103.2–11) confirms, as Festugière points out, that he is thinking of it here.

<sup>206</sup> This simile of the lancing of abscesses or reopening of festering wounds also occurs at *in Remp.* I. 103.7–11, *in Alc.* 119.11–16 and *De mal. subs.* §59.15–17.

<sup>207</sup> Or perhaps ‘to those smitten [with them]’.

<sup>208</sup> The obvious rendering would be ‘throughout their whole life’, but then *kata tas merikas energeias* would presumably have to mean something like ‘during particular activities’, which strikes me as difficult.

of particular activities. For *anyone*<sup>209</sup> who does something wrong<sup>210</sup> does it after having made a choice and going after what he has chosen and bringing what previously existed [only] in the imagination to fruition.

25 Let us then say in summary that evil exists neither in the Intellectives, because the entire class of Intellectives is untouched by evil, nor in universal souls or universal bodies, because all wholes are untouched by evil, since they are everlasting and always in accord with nature. It therefore remains that it exists in particular souls or particular bodies. But, even in  
30 their case, neither in their essences, because all their essences are from God, nor in their powers, because these are in accord with nature. It therefore remains that [it exists] in their activities. And in [the case of]  
381 souls [it exists] neither in their rational activities, since these all aim at the good, nor in their irrational [activities], since even these take place in accord with nature, but in the mutual incommensurability of these. And in [the case of] bodies [it exists] neither in their form, since this wishes  
5 to master matter, nor in this [matter], since this desires to be reduced to order, but in the incommensurability of form with matter.

From this it is also clear that all evil exists<sup>211</sup> [only] as a by-product. But, despite this, even it, because it is coloured<sup>212</sup> with good, has substantial existence.<sup>213</sup> And so, by the will of God, all things are good, and, to  
10 the full extent of his power,<sup>214</sup> nothing is devoid of good,<sup>215</sup> even though evil in some sense exists.<sup>216</sup> In fact, given the occurrence of generation, it was impossible [for evil] too not to have arisen as a by-product, since it was necessary to the perfection of wholes.<sup>217</sup>

15 On evils, on how they come to exist, on the nature of the providence even they meet with from the gods, this is enough for present purposes; they have been discussed at greater length in other writings [of ours].<sup>218</sup>

<sup>209</sup> The point seems to be that the same mechanism applies in the case of isolated misdeeds as in the case of systematic wrongdoing.

<sup>210</sup> More literally 'untoward', 'unreasonable'. Perhaps 'contrary to reason' is the intended sense.

<sup>211</sup> Accenting ἔστι rather than ἔστω.

<sup>212</sup> For other occurrences of this metaphor in Proclus, see the note at 374.31.

<sup>213</sup> Festugière takes a rather different view of this sentence.

<sup>214</sup> For the reason for this rendering of κατὰ δύναμιν, see the note at 381.18.

<sup>215</sup> Sc. each thing is as good as it could possibly be.

<sup>216</sup> Accenting ἔστι with Festugière rather than ἔστω with Diehl.

<sup>217</sup> For a discussion of this doctrine (which has already made an appearance at 375.14–18) that evil is a παραρπαστασις ('by-product'), an unwanted but inevitable side-effect of procession, which perhaps originated with Iamblichus, see Opsomer and Steel (2003) 23–8.

<sup>218</sup> Other significant discussions of evil in Proclus occur in *de mal. subs.*; *de dec. dub.* V; in *Remp.* I. 37.23–39.1; 96.1–100.18; II. 89.6–91.18; *PT* I. 83.12–88.10; in *Parm.* 829.23–831.24 (on whether there are Forms of evils). A scholium on *in Remp.* I. 37.23 further

This much at least is surely clear from what has been said. (1) God's **willing**<sup>219</sup> is not in vain, for all things are good from God's perspective and there is nothing in existence that is not mastered by the good.<sup>220</sup> (2) The [phrase] **to the full extent of his power**<sup>221</sup> is not added superfluously.<sup>222</sup> It does not indicate an imperfect power but one which masters all things and, thanks to its superabundance of goods, renders all things good.

20

### *The Demiurge imposes order on the universe*

This being so, taking over all that was visible, which was not in a state of rest but moving in a discordant and disorderly manner, he brought it to order from disorder, having judged that the former was in every way better than the latter<sup>223</sup> (30a3–6)

25

### *The cosmos has not come to be in time: 381.26–383.22*

Those around Plutarch of Chaeronea and Atticus<sup>224</sup> cling tenaciously to these words in the belief that they witness on their behalf to the generation of the cosmos from a [point of] time.<sup>225</sup> And what is more, they say that unordered matter pre-existed prior to this generation, and, further, that there pre-existed maleficent soul moving this discordant [mass]. For where did this movement come from, [they ask,] if not from soul? And if the movement was unordered, [it must have derived] from unordered

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refers to discussions in a treatise on Diotima's speech in the *Symposium*, in a commentary on the *Theaetetus* (on 176a), and in a commentary on Plotinus' *Περὶ τοῦ τίνα καὶ πότεν τὰ κακὰ* (*Enn.* 1.8), all of which are now lost.

<sup>219</sup> βούλησις looks back to βουληθεῖς in the lemma.

<sup>220</sup> For periphrastic phrases formed with the noun μοῖρα, see LSJ s.v. A. V., and for ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖρα, cf., with Festugière, *Phlb.* 54c10 and 60b3–4.

<sup>221</sup> This rendering of κατὰ δύναμιν is intended to respect the interpretation of the phrase which follows (and which appears again at *PT* V. 61.18–22). Other possibilities might be 'as befits his power' or simply 'through his power'. 'As far as possible' would be a better rendering of the phrase in Plato.

<sup>222</sup> Proclus goes on to combat a possible misunderstanding (as he sees it) of the phrase rather than to defend its necessity.

<sup>223</sup> Divergences from Burnet's OCT text: Proclus reads ἦγεν rather than ἦγαγεν at 30a5.

<sup>224</sup> οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ Πλούταρχον . . . καὶ Ἀττικόν (381.16). Such phrases (for other instances, see 382.12, 384.4 and 391.7) are notoriously difficult to pin down. Often, for chronological or other reasons, they cannot be intended to describe an actual 'circle' (for a clear case see II. 38.1, where Proclus can hardly have had evidence for a circle of 'Ocellus') and probably mean little more than 'those who side with x' (or, as in this case, 'x and y'), or perhaps 'x and those who side with him'.

<sup>225</sup> ἀπὸ χρόνου rather than ἐν χρόνῳ in such contexts because time itself (if only ordered time for Plutarch and Atticus) comes into being along with the cosmos.

5 soul. At any rate, [they continue,] it was stated in the *Laws*<sup>226</sup> that boni-  
form soul oversees correct and rational [behaviour] but maleficent soul  
moves chaotically [itself] and agitates (*agein*) what is under its governance  
in a discordant fashion. Once the production of the cosmos at the hands  
10 of the Demiurge has supervened, matter changes [its nature] for the for-  
mation of the cosmos, and maleficent soul, having participated Intellect,  
is rendered rational (*emphrôn*) and produces ordered movement; for par-  
ticipation in form reduces the former to order, the presence of Intellect  
the latter.<sup>227</sup>

15 Those around<sup>228</sup> Porphyry and Iamblichus<sup>229</sup> castigate this position  
on the grounds that it puts<sup>230</sup> the disordered before the ordered, the  
incomplete before the complete and the unintelligent before the intelli-  
gent in the universe,<sup>231</sup> and that it involves impiety not only in relation  
to the cosmos but in relation to the Demiurge himself, and, moreover,  
20 completely does away with either his boniform will or his productive  
power; for if these two coincide, it must also be the case that the cos-  
mos is eternally created by him. They themselves say that Plato wants  
to show the number and magnitude of the good things<sup>232</sup> for which the  
providence which reaches down from the Demiurge to the universe,  
the bounty (*chorêgia*) which stems from Intellect, and the presence of  
25 soul are responsible in the cosmos. [Accordingly], he first considers how  
discordant and unordered the whole corporeal fabric (*sustasis*) is on its  
own, so that, having observed both the order which stems from soul

<sup>226</sup> What follows is a loose paraphrase of 897b2–3, presumably going back to Proclus' source for the views of Plutarch and Atticus, but, interestingly, when Proclus himself cites the same passage at *De mal. subs.* §27.12, he again seems (cf. the note of Opsomer and Steel (2003) ad loc.), as here, to have written ἔμφρονα ('rational') rather than εὐδαίμονα ('happy', 'blessed'), the reading of the manuscripts of Plato.

<sup>227</sup> 381.26–382.12 = Atticus, fr. 23 Des Places. For Plutarch, see his *de an. proc.*, especially 1014B–1016C. Proclus has already alluded to these views of Plutarch and Atticus at 276.30ff., 283.27ff. and 325.30ff. and will do so again in *in Tim.* on some half a dozen other occasions; the relevant passages constitute fr. 19–24, 26–31 and 35 in Des Places.

<sup>228</sup> On 'those around', see the note at 381.26.

<sup>229</sup> 382.12–383.1 = fr. 37 Dillon. We have evidence, including direct quotation, for Porphyry's comments on this lemma at Philoponus, *Aet.* 164.12ff. and 543.5ff. (= Sodano fr. 47–50) which does not tally very closely with this passage and Sodano and Dillon agree in assigning it to Iamblichus, who had presumably, as Dillon (p. 311) suggests, claimed to be in accord with Porphyry.

<sup>230</sup> Or perhaps 'separates off' or even 'misplaces'. ἀποτιθεμένην is not easy and emendation to ὑποτιθεμένην would be tempting, but cf. ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος [Iamblichus again!] . . . τοὺς τὰ γένη τοῦ ὄντος ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἀποτιθεμένους ἡτίασατο (*PTI.* 52.3–5) – where, incidentally, Saffrey and Westerink translate 'transportent'.

<sup>231</sup> For 'universe' as a rendering of τὰ ὅλα, see for example 37.19; 53.24. Another possible rendering here might be 'in things [which are] wholes'.

<sup>232</sup> Omitting αἰτίων after ἡλικίων with **P** and Festugière.

and the demiurgic ordering in isolation, one may determine what nature the corporeal has in its own right and what organization it has received from the creative process. [In reality], the cosmos itself is always in existence and it is [only] the account which separates that which comes to be from [its] creator and brings things which have [always] coexisted side by side into existence over time, since everything generated is composite.<sup>233</sup>

One could also add to these points, which are well made,<sup>234</sup> that, given that the demiurgic productive activity is in two phases (*dittos*), the one producing body, the other the ordered cosmos,<sup>235</sup> and given that Plato is beginning [his account] with the latter, he altogether reasonably assumes that everything corporeal [already] exists and that it is moving in a discordant and disorderly manner. Taken by itself, that is its nature. It has movement because it is enlivened (*empneomenos*) by nature, but [only] disorderly movement because, taken on its own, it has not yet come to be possessed of intellect or been ensouled through the agency of intellective soul. When the universe does become such, it [is because it] then participates powers which transcend [its own] nature.<sup>236</sup> But if it is moved as a result of being moved by nature and not through the agency of intellect or rational soul, from which order [derives], it will produce disorderly movement. A little later<sup>237</sup> [Plato] will also instruct us in the phase of demiurgic providence which produces body. For in his view the Demiurge [himself] moulds all the corporeal [element] which he here says he **takes over** – ‘he’ being the creator, the imposer of order, the artificer, the manufacturer!<sup>238</sup> So, if he also<sup>239</sup> brings the first bodies into existence, it is quite clear that the generation of [the corporeal] too

<sup>233</sup> And so only notionally divisible into its components.

<sup>234</sup> τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὀρθῶς εἰρημένοις is odd, but the similar phrase ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ὀρθῶς εἰρημένον occurs at II. 5.16, so I have made the best of it.

<sup>235</sup> Not temporally, of course, except within the myth.

<sup>236</sup> For this sense of ὑπερφύης, cf. Lampe s.v. 2.

<sup>237</sup> Festugière follows Diehl in seeing a reference to 31b and 36d, but I think the passage makes better sense if the reference is already to 53b1–5, as it clearly is in the next sentence.

<sup>238</sup> (1) αὐτῷ in line 14, which must refer to Plato, strikes me as rather awkward. Perhaps Proclus actually wrote αὐτός or αὐτῷ (in either case referring to the Demiurge) or αὐτοῦ (‘there’). (2) Grammatically, the words αὐτὸν τὸν κοσμητὴν . . . χειρουργόν (lines 16–17) should look back to αὐτόν in line 15, and my translation reflects this, but Festugière may be right to translate as though they looked back to ὁ δημιουργός earlier in the same line, in which case I would translate: ‘For in his view the Demiurge [himself] moulds all the corporeal [element] which he here says he **takes over** [and] is himself the creator, the imposer of order, the artificer, the manufacturer.’

<sup>239</sup> Sc. the four elements (τὰ πρῶτα σώματα) as well as the bodies he fashions from them. (But ‘even’ would also be a possible rendering.)

20 is part of the creation, the visible having received certain traces<sup>240</sup> of the [immanent] forms which were precursors of their [full] differentiation, with the advent of which each [of the bodies] is fully (*teleôs*) ordered and has its appropriate place and rank in the universe.

*Is matter uncreated or created? 383.22–387.5*

25 About the [mass] in discordant and disorderly movement there is not much to say, for [Plato] himself will state (36d9–10) quite explicitly that the god fabricates all that is corporeal inside soul. And with regard to soul too, it is clear that it was not the case that its substrate [already] existed and [the god] only introduced order [to it]. In fact, he even made being itself and the same and the other,<sup>241</sup> the elements of which it consists, first. So if he brought both the elements [of the soul] and the mixture that was [formed] from them into existence, he brought the whole of it into existence and did not receive<sup>242</sup> part of it [already] in existence and add part of it himself.

384 Now, in the case of soul, which is incorporeal, this is [clearly] true. In the case of body, on the other hand, while we have shown (383.17–22) in regard to [its] first forms<sup>243</sup> that the god is responsible for them too, one may ask with regard to matter itself whether it is ungenerated by [any] 5 cause, as Plutarch and Atticus claim, or whether it is generated, and [if so] from what cause.<sup>244</sup>

Aristotle, indeed, has demonstrated that it is ungenerated in other ways, [namely] as being incomposite, as not coming into existence out of other matter, and as not being resolved back into other [matter].<sup>245</sup> [Our] present argument, for its part, [first] asserts that it is everlasting, [then] goes on to ask whether it is ungenerated by [any] cause, and whether 10 in Plato's view one should posit two principles<sup>246</sup> of the universe

<sup>240</sup> For these traces, cf. *Tim.* 53b2, and for other references to them, the note at 387.15.

<sup>241</sup> Festugière translates 'car il en a créé d'abord la substance même, à savoir le Même et l'Autre . . .', making καὶ τὸ ταυτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον expegetic of τὴν οὐσίαν, but the reference is clearly to *Tim.* 35a1–6, where the Demiurge creates intermediate forms of being, sameness and otherness as a first step in the fabrication of soul.

<sup>242</sup> ἔλαβεν ('receive') looks back to παραλαβὼν in the lemma.

<sup>243</sup> These are the τῶν εἰδῶν ἵχνη of 383.20. <sup>244</sup> 384.2–5 = Atticus, fr. 24 Des Places.

<sup>245</sup> Festugière refers the reader to chs. 6–9 of *Phys.* 1 on the ὑποκείμενον (which is referred to as ὕλη at 192a31): that matter is incomposite would follow from its being designated an ἀρχή; that it is not derived from other matter, from what is said at 189a27–32; that it is not resolved back into other matter, from what is said at 192a28–34.

<sup>246</sup> This is reminiscent of the two-principle doctrine as it occurs in early Platonism; cf. Dörrie–Baltes, PA §119.

(*ta hola*), [namely] matter<sup>247</sup> and God, with neither God producing matter nor matter God, so that [matter] will be totally everlasting and without God<sup>248</sup> and [God] totally without matter and simple.<sup>249</sup>

The issue is one that is much discussed, and it has been addressed by us elsewhere.<sup>250</sup> For present purposes, in responding to these people,<sup>251</sup> it is enough to point out the nature of Plato's thinking [on the subject].

In the first place, then, that it is not the Demiurge who originally (*prôtôs*) brings matter into existence is clear from the fact that he will go on to say<sup>252</sup> that 'the trio being and place and generation pre-exists the generation of the cosmos', and that generation is the offspring and place the mother.<sup>253</sup> By these words he certainly seems to be opposing, as it were, matter and the Demiurge after the fashion of a mother and father and to be deriving generation from the Demiurge and matter.

So perhaps he brings [matter] into existence from another order of [causes], the one positioned above the Demiurge. At any rate, in the *Philebus* (23c9–10), he writes, to quote his words: 'We were saying, I think, that God has revealed the limit and the unlimited<sup>254</sup> in things (*onta*)', from which the constitution of bodies and everything [else] takes place.<sup>255</sup> If, then, bodies too<sup>256</sup> [derive] from Limit and Unlimitedness,

<sup>247</sup> On Proclus' failure to distinguish between the 'receptacle' of the *Timaeus* and Aristotelian matter (in which he was in good company), see Baltzly's note at II. 10.9.

<sup>248</sup> At 368.5 above Proclus reports that some people had described matter as ἄθεος on the ground that it is ἀνείδεος and ἄμορφος.

<sup>249</sup> Festugière comments 'ἀπλοῦς étonne', and it does seem at best unnecessary. I suspect that it is only present to balance ἀίδιος – which, given that Proclus has just said that he will concede that matter is ἀίδιος, is itself arguably otiose.

<sup>250</sup> Festugière refers the reader to *De mal. subs.* §34.12–18 and §35.5–14, where Proclus cites the *Philebus* to show that matter derives from the One and is therefore ἐνθεος and ἀγαθός, but they, along with much else in *De mal. subs.* §§34–5, are perhaps better compared with the review of Plato's opinions which follows. However, that said, I have nothing better to offer, although *De mal. subs.* §31.7ff., where Proclus asks whether matter (if it is to be identified with Evil) is an ἀρχή and the many other passages where he states that matter derives directly from the One, for example the corollary to *ET* §72; *PT* I. 13.20–14.4 and 70.13–21; in *Parm.* 1064.7–12 and 1154.13–14, are relevant to the issue.

<sup>251</sup> Sc. Plutarch and Atticus.

<sup>252</sup> 52d3–5. Actually a paraphrase rather than a quotation. The passage is also cited at 284.20–2, 326.6–7, 328.6–7, 358.11 and 400.16.

<sup>253</sup> For this last statement, cf. 50d2–4.

<sup>254</sup> For other possible translations of πέρως ('limit') and ἄπειρον ('unlimited') (and of ἀπειρία ('unlimitedness'), which first appears in the next sentence), see Gosling (1975) 84.

<sup>255</sup> The Greek is constructed as though the words 'from which the constitution of bodies and everything [else] takes place' were part of the quotation, which they are not.

<sup>256</sup> I take it that καὶ here looks back to καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καὶ τοῖς πᾶσιν in the previous line and means something like 'as well as everything else'.

what in them is limit? And what unlimitedness? Well, evidently we shall say that matter is the unlimitedness and form the limit. So if, as we have stated,<sup>257</sup> God brings all unlimitedness into existence,<sup>258</sup> he also brings matter, which is ultimate unlimitedness, into existence. And this<sup>259</sup> is the very first and ineffable cause of matter.

But since Plato everywhere derives (*buphistanaî*) the [properties] in sensible things which correspond to the intelligible causes from those [causes] – the equal here below (*entautha*), for example, from the Equal-itself, and likewise (*to homoion*)<sup>260</sup> all living creatures and plants here below – he obviously also derives the unlimitedness here below from the First Unlimitedness in the same way as he derives the limit here below from Limit there above.<sup>261</sup> And it has been shown elsewhere<sup>262</sup> that [Plato] placed first Unlimitedness, the [unlimitedness] which is prior to the mixed, at the summit of the Intelligibles and extends its irradiation<sup>263</sup> from that point (*ekeithen*) all the way to the lowest [reaches of being].

And so,<sup>264</sup> according to [Plato], matter proceeds both from the One and from the Unlimitedness which is prior to One Being, and, if you wish, inasmuch as it is potential being, from One Being too. Hence it is a good of a kind, a thing without limit, and the most indistinct [grade of]

<sup>257</sup> As Festugière says, the reference is clearly to lines 25–6 above rather than to 267.20ff. as Diehl suggests.

<sup>258</sup> As Festugière points out, the δειξαί ('reveals') of the *Philebus* quotation is here (illegitimately) glossed by ὑφίστησι ('brings into existence'). The same interpretation of δειξαί is, as Saffrey and Westerink indicate in their note, implied when Proclus quotes the *Philebus* passage again at *PT* III. 32.6–7 and he explains it at some length a few pages later (*PT* III. 36.10–19).

<sup>259</sup> Or 'and He . . .'

<sup>260</sup> Taking τὸ ὅμοιον as equivalent to ὁμοίως, which strikes me as difficult. Perhaps Proclus actually wrote something rather different (τὰ ὅμοια, say, or even ὁμοίως) and a copyist wrote τὸ ὅμοιον under the influence of the common conjunction of τὸ ἴσον and τὸ ὅμοιον. (Radermacher's conjecture of κατὰ for καί in line 5, which Festugière records in his apparatus, would create an interesting parallelism between κατὰ τὸ ὅμοιον καί and καθάπερ καί later in the sentence but not, I think, yield appropriate sense.)

<sup>261</sup> Sc. immanent form from transcendent Form. There is a kind of circularity to the construction. In English one would write something like, 'but since Plato everywhere derives the [properties] in sensible things which correspond to the intelligible causes from those [causes] . . . thereby deriving the limit here below from Limit there above, he clearly likewise derives the unlimitedness here below from the first Unlimitedness'.

<sup>262</sup> Festugière cites *ET* §§89–92, particularly 92 [93 is a misprint], p. 82.30–5, but nothing there is very close to the present passage and Proclus may not have any single passage in mind or may be referring to a lost work. (*PT* III §§7–9, which were presumably written later, elaborate on many of the themes of 384.22–385.12.)

<sup>263</sup> Cf. the note at 361.3.

<sup>264</sup> Punctuating with a full stop rather than a comma after ἐσχάτων: the conclusion clearly rests on more than just the last sentence.

being.<sup>265</sup> And [it is] devoid of form,<sup>266</sup> on which account [it is] these<sup>267</sup> prior to the Forms and their manifestation.<sup>268</sup>

And Orpheus (fr. 66 Kern) teaches exactly the same [doctrine]. For just as Plato derived (*paragein*) two causes, Limit and Unlimitedness, from the One, so also did the Theologian bring Aether and Chaos into existence from Time, Aether as the cause of limit wherever it is found, and Chaos [as the cause] of unlimitedness.<sup>269</sup> And from these two principles he generates both the divine and the visible orders. From the superior one [he generates] all that is stable, that makes [things remain] the same, that provides measure, that holds things together; from the other, all that procession which causes movement and makes [things] other and never ceases, and that nature which is delimited by others and sustained by others, and, last of all, ultimate unlimitedness, by which matter too is embraced, on account of which it<sup>270</sup> has become dissimilarly similar to itself. For it<sup>271</sup> is a 'gulf' in that it is the place and region of the Forms and there is no 'limit', no 'bottom', no 'seat' to it,<sup>272</sup> since it is unstable and unlimited and indeterminate, and, moreover, it too could be called 'continuous darkness' because it has been allotted a nature

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<sup>265</sup> Matter is 'a good of a kind' as proceeding from the One, 'a thing without limit' as proceeding from Unlimitedness, and 'the most indistinct being' inasmuch as it is potential being.

<sup>266</sup> Punctuating with a full stop after ὅν and retaining the manuscript reading ἀνείδεος (ἀνείδεον<sup>5</sup> Diehl).

<sup>267</sup> Sc. a good of a kind, etc.

<sup>268</sup> These last two sentences are by no means easy and both Festugière and Siorvanes (1996, p. 185) take a quite different view of them.

<sup>269</sup> Festugière refers to 176.6–15 above and to *in Remp.* II. 138.8ff. (= *Orph. fr.* 66a) for other instances of these equations.

<sup>270</sup> The (unstated) subject of the verb must, I think, be 'ultimate unlimitedness' (ἐσχάτη ἀπειρία) rather than matter as Festugière supposes. Proclus will then, since χάος = ἀπειρία, be claiming that in its final declension, which is, or at least embraces, matter, ἀπειρία has become 'dissimilarly similar' to itself, and not only does this make better sense than such a claim in relation to matter would, but it fits in much better with what follows, where he goes on, first indirectly (385.29–386.3) and then directly (386.4–8), to point out the 'dissimilar similarity' between matter and χάος/ἀπειρία. (As the references collected by Saffrey and Westerink in their notes to *PT* I. 57.20 and III. 40.20 show, it is normally the One that matter is said to be dissimilarly similar to. Presumably it is in part at least because the language used of χάος in the Orphic literature is more readily applicable to matter than is anything said of χρόνος, the Orphic equivalent of the Neoplatonic One, that Proclus here leaves the One out of account. However, it should be noted that matter is also compared to τὸ ἀπειρον at *PT* III. 40.12–23).

<sup>271</sup> Sc. ἐσχάτη ἀπειρία, or matter, to which, Proclus goes on to argue, the language used of χάος in the Orphic poems is, with the appropriate reservations, applicable.

<sup>272</sup> For 'limit', 'bottom' and 'seat', Festugière compares *Orph. fr.* 66b (= *Simpl. in Phys.* I. 528.12ff.), where Simplicius quotes the verse, οὐδέ τι πείραρ ὑπῆν, οὐ πυθμήν, οὐδέ τις ἔδρα.

which is devoid of form. And so on this basis (*logos*) Orpheus too derives matter from the very first level (*hupostasis*) of the Intelligibles;<sup>273</sup> for ‘continuous darkness’ and the unlimited are [located] there – and that too more powerfully<sup>274</sup> than those that come later (*ta ephexês*), while, in the case of matter, absence of illumination is the result of deficiency and want of limitation due not to a superabundance of power but to a lack [of it].

And indeed Egyptian tradition also says the same about [matter]. At any rate, the divine Iamblichus<sup>275</sup> reported that Hermes too wants materiality to be derived from substantiality. And in fact it is even likely, [he adds,] that Plato gets this kind of view of matter from [Hermes] as well.

In the first instance (*prôtôs*), then, it is from the above-mentioned principles<sup>276</sup> that matter derives its existence, but the second- and third-level causes (the intelligible and the intellective, the supercelestial<sup>277</sup> and the encosmic)<sup>278</sup> bring it into existence – but why am I talking of the gods alone (*autoi*)?<sup>279</sup> Universal Nature (*hê tou pantos phusis*) also produces matter – with the proviso that it exists in accordance with its own mode of existence as well; for with regard to this last it participates the very first cause.<sup>280</sup>

<sup>273</sup> Sc. from his equivalent of One Being.

<sup>274</sup> I am tempted to read κρείττονα for κρείττόνως and translate: ‘for ‘continuous darkness’ and the unlimited are [located] there, and these are more powerful than those that come later, whereas, in the case of matter . . .’

<sup>275</sup> 386.8–13 = fr. 38 Dillon. Dillon draws attention to certain verbal similarities to *De mysteriis* 8.3.265 but feels that Proclus’ source is nevertheless likely to be Iamblichus’ commentary on the *Timaeus*. He also points out that both ὑλότης (‘materiality’) and οὐσιότης (‘substantiality’) occur in the Hermetic corpus and that the former seems to have been used by Plotinus’ Gnostic opponents.

<sup>276</sup> Sc. the One, Unlimitedness and One Being (cf. 385.12–14).

<sup>277</sup> Proclus occasionally uses ὑπερουράνιος as an alternative to the more common ὑπερκόσμιος. On the two terms, the former of which had the authority of Plato (*Phdr.* 247c3), the latter that of the Oracles, see the remarks of Saffrey and Westerink at *PT* VI. ixff.

<sup>278</sup> In other words, all of the causes, or gods, below the level of the One, since, as Saffrey and Westerink point out (*PT* IV. xxxiv–vi and VI. xviii–xx), Proclus not infrequently omits the intelligible-intellective and the hypercosmic-encosmic gods in such enumerations.

<sup>279</sup> This seems to imply that φύσις is not a god. While it is true that Proclus is rather ambivalent about its status (at *in Parm.* 1046.4–7 it has its own henad and is called a god without any qualification; at 11.12–14 above he describes it as θεός μὲν, τῷ δὲ ἐκθεοῦσθαι καὶ οὐκ αὐτόθεν ἔχουσα τὸ εἶναι θεός; at 8.7–8 above he says that it κατευθύνει τὸ σωματοειδὲς καὶ οὔτε ὡς θεός ἐστιν οὔτε ἔξω τῆς θείας ιδιότητος), it is surprising that he should refuse to call it a god precisely when he is about to say that it is involved in the production of matter, which even the Demiurge can only produce *qua* god and through its henad (for this cf. lines 19–21).

<sup>280</sup> καὶ τί λέγω περὶ τῶν θεῶν αὐτῶν; ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντός φύσις παράγει τὴν ὕλην καθόσον ἐστὶ καὶ (καὶ οἱμ. **P**) κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς ὑπαρξιν· κατὰ γὰρ ταύτην μετέχει τῆς πρωτίστης

So, with respect to the *henad*<sup>281</sup> within him, in virtue of which he is also a god,<sup>282</sup> the Demiurge too is responsible for even the lowest [grade of] matter, but with respect to demiurgic being he is responsible not for it, but for bodies *qua* bodies and for corporeal qualities (for which reason generation is the offspring of being), and with respect to the life within him, for the animation which pervades all things, and with respect to the intellect [within him], for the provision of intellect to the universe.<sup>283</sup> And everything he creates by virtue of [his] inferior powers he produces with [his] superior powers [as well]; for everything with intellect also participates life and being and unity, and a thing that is alive has being (*esti*) and is one, and a thing that has being is sustained by its own unity. But the reverse is not the case. He does not create everything he creates by virtue of the One [in him] by virtue of the Being [in him] as well, nor everything he creates by virtue of the Being [in him] by virtue of the Source of life [in him] as well, nor everything he creates by virtue of [the Source of life in him] by virtue of the royal Intellect<sup>284</sup> [in him] as well, but extends his providence furthest by means of [his] higher powers.<sup>285</sup>

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αἰτίας (386.16–19). These lines are difficult. Thomas Taylor assumed a lacuna before ἐστὶ in line 17 and supplied θεός, which would make good sense in itself but is, I think, ruled out by καὶ τί λέγω περὶ τῶν θεῶν αὐτῶν; (cf. the previous note). Festugière, who followed Taylor in assuming a lacuna before ἐστὶ, supplied αἴτιον (though, as he says, only *exempli gratia*), and translated, ‘c’est aussi la Nature universelle qui fait venir à l’être la Matière, pour autant qu’elle est une <cause> et selon son propre mode d’être: car c’est en vertu de la Nature que la Matière participe à La Cause toute première’. This makes tolerable sense (although there are still difficulties), but only by having ταύτην refer back to ἡ τοῦ παντός φύσις and making ὕλη the subject of μετέχει when the obvious referent of ταύτην would be τὴν ἐαυτῆς ὑπαρξιν and the obvious subject for μετέχει would be ἡ τοῦ παντός φύσις. I have retained Diehl’s text (which is that of C and M), but (1) regarded ἀλλὰ καὶ . . . ὕλην (16–17) as parenthetical, and (2) accented ἔστι in line 17. The words καθόσον ἔστι καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐαυτῆς ὑπαρξιν· κατὰ γὰρ ταύτην μετέχει τῆς πρωτίστης αἰτίας will then serve to define the terms on which the range of causes between the Intelligibles and Nature can be said to produce matter. (Cf. the words καθόσον ἔστι δυνάμει ὄν at 385.14, which similarly explain how τὸ ἐν ὄν can be said to produce matter.) I don’t see this as a wholly satisfactory solution, but I think it is probably on the right track.

<sup>281</sup> Because it is the One that produces matter.

<sup>282</sup> Cf. 360.26–361.19 and 364.4–23, where the emphasis was on goodness, which is of course identical with oneness.

<sup>283</sup> Festugière draws attention to the similarity between 19–25 and II. 99.9–15 below.

<sup>284</sup> For the phrase, cf. *Phlb.* 30d2.

<sup>285</sup> As Festugière points out, this section exemplifies the principles stated in *ET* §56 (‘All that is produced by secondary beings is in a greater measure produced from those prior and more determinative principles from which the secondary were themselves derived’) and §57 (‘Every cause both operates prior to its consequent and gives rise to a greater number of posterior terms’) (both in Dodds’ translation), although in the

5 But these matters have also been examined at greater length in other works.

*Points of detail: 387.5–391.4*

We must now go back to the text<sup>286</sup> and see in what sense each part of it is intended.

**This being so** links the whole of the ordering [of the cosmos] to the goodness, in other words the divinity, of the Demiurge.

10 **All that was visible** in the first place leaves nothing bereft of the providence of God, in the second (*epeita*) shows that this visible [mass] is corporeal, since it would not be visible if it were incorporeal and without qualities. And so [these words] do not refer to either matter or the second substrate,<sup>287</sup> but [the visible] is that which, having already participated the Forms and containing certain traces and reflections of them, moves in a discordant and disorderly manner. For the ghostly  
15 and disjointed presences of the Forms create various movements in [this visible mass], as Timaeus himself will say later;<sup>288</sup> and all of the orders of gods prior to the Demiurge irradiate<sup>289</sup> these [presences], but the Paradigm especially irradiates [them], just by being, even before the  
20 creation. For the higher causes are active even before those of the second rank, and while the Demiurge creates conjointly with the Paradigm,

previous paragraph they operate purely within the Demiurge. However, I doubt that the reference here is to *ET*.

<sup>286</sup> Sc. to the lemma stated at 381.22–25.

<sup>287</sup> Proclus refers to the δεύτερον ὑποκείμενον only here and to the πρώτον ὑποκείμενον only at *in Parm.* 971.7 and does not define either. Aristotle uses the latter term at *Phys.* 1.9, 192a31 and *Metaph.* Z 3, 1029a2 of matter (in precisely what sense is controversial), but never the former. In the commentary tradition from Ammonius onwards (which should be a reasonable guide to Proclus' use of the terms) the πρώτον ὑποκείμενον is prime matter (notice that Proclus pairs ὕλη with the δεύτερον ὑποκείμενον here) and the δεύτερον ὑποκείμενον is body with bulk and extension but without qualities (ἄποιον σῶμα). The passage which best illustrates the usage of the commentators is probably Philoponus, *in Cat.* 65. 8–27 (where Philoponus uses πρώτη ὕλη to refer to the πρώτον ὑποκείμενον), and (for the δεύτερον ὑποκείμενον in particular) see also Ammonius, *in Cat.* 54.4–6; Philoponus, *in Cat.* 83.14–18; *in Phys.* 156.12–17; 225.11–16; 579.3–6, and Simplicius, *in Cael.* 564.29–565.6; 576.6–10. For a discussion of what Simplicius and Philoponus have to say about the Aristotelian passages that gave rise to these conceptions and of Philoponus' own later views on these matters, see Sorabji (1988) ch. 1–2.

<sup>288</sup> The reference is to the description of the Receptacle and its contents before the Demiurge begins his work at 52a4–53b4; note in particular the 'traces' (ἵχνη) at 53b2. Other discussions of this passage can be found at 270.14–21; 383.17–22; 388.2–28; 419.26–420.2.

<sup>289</sup> Cf. the note at 361.3.

[the Paradigm] both [creates] before the Demiurge and penetrates to [depths] which the activity of demiurgic providence does not reach. So, if you wish to distinguish the [different] originating (*prôtourgōs*) causes and their [respective] effects, you will say (1) that the Good, being the cause of all things, is also the cause of matter – for which reason [matter] is a necessary thing – and of the production of form – because every form too<sup>290</sup> is a measure – and of order – because order is the relation<sup>291</sup> between the things which are ordered; and (2) that the Paradigm is not [a cause] of matter, but [is a cause] of the production of form and of the order among [those] forms; and (3) that the demiurgic [cause is a cause] of order [alone]. For this reason [the Demiurge] **took over**, says [Plato], matter after it had already progressed towards participation in the Forms; for this disordered [mass], having already been configured to some degree, was superior to something [entirely] without form.

All [of these],<sup>292</sup> then, being always and simultaneously causes of these<sup>293</sup> effects,<sup>294</sup> but, on account of the reach of the higher [causes], some [only] as far as the final reaches [of being],<sup>295</sup> others as far as what lies beyond both [limits of being],<sup>296</sup> the Paradigm **takes over** matter from the Good and informs it – for the forms *qua* forms are offspring of the Paradigm – and the demiurgic [cause], receiving the Forms from the Paradigm, regulates (*diakosmein*) them by means of numbers and imposes order upon them by means of proportions (*logoi*).<sup>297</sup> If you distinguish the causes in this fashion, even should you claim that the Demiurge alone (*autos*) is the single cause of all things, he will create in one way in

<sup>290</sup> Sc. as is the One; at *ET* 82.32 Proclus describes the One/Good itself as μέτρον πάντων (cf. also in *Alc.* 339.5 and *De mal. subs.* §30.13–14) and in his note on the passage Dodds compares *Laws* 716c4 (which Proclus himself cites at *PT* III. 44.11–12 and at in *Parm.* 1124.16–17 and 1210.4–5), where Plato says that God is ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον, and *Enn.* 5.5.4.13–14, where Plotinus says of the One that it is μέτρον αὐτὸ καὶ οὐ μετρούμενον.

<sup>291</sup> Or perhaps, ‘because order too is a principle of ordered things’, which would give some point to καὶ γάρ, although it is hard to believe that Proclus would be prepared to call the One a λόγος τῶν τεταγμένων. (For the One as the *source* of order cf., for example, ἀπὸ γοῦν θεοῦ (sc. τοῦ ἐνός) τοῖς μὲν διηρημένοις ἔνωσις, τοῖς δὲ ἀτάκτοις τάξις at in *Parm.* 621.3–4.)

<sup>292</sup> Sc. the Good, the Paradigm and the Demiurge.

<sup>293</sup> Reading τῶνδε for τῶν δὲ at 388.2.

<sup>294</sup> Sc. matter, the production of form and order.

<sup>295</sup> Sc. sensible particulars; cf., for example, 373.15, where τὰ ἑτεροκίνητα are said to be πάντων ἔσχατα τῶν ὄντων.

<sup>296</sup> Sc. the entities prior to being on the one hand, matter on the other.

<sup>297</sup> I have to confess that I am quite unsure of what to make of the first part of this sentence (sc. πάντων . . . ἐκτένειαν), and the approach I have taken is just one of several (equally unconvincing) possibilities. Festugière retains the transmitted text and also translates quite differently in other respects.

relation to his goodness, in another in relation to the Paradigm in him, in another, as we have said (383.14ff.), in relation to his own character of creator and artisan. And, although he creates all at once and eternally, different things proceed from the different [levels] within him: owing to (kata) the Good, matter, form and order; owing to the Paradigm in him, form; owing to his character of artisan, order.

And so this informed [mass], [even] before [it has] order, has these reflections of the Forms from the Paradigm, which is by its own nature an Intelligible. And the *Oracles* too derive 'polymorphous matter' from this order [of reality]<sup>298</sup> when they say]:

thence<sup>299</sup> unceasingly springs the generation of polymorphous matter.<sup>300</sup>

For prime [matter] is not polymorphous, and generation is not of it, but of that which contains traces<sup>301</sup> which are precursors of the Forms. [And] from this it is also clear that the Paradigm and the Demiurge differ from one another, if indeed matter participates the former even before the production of the cosmos, when the Demiurge was by hypothesis absent, whereas it participates the Demiurge above all else once it becomes an ordered and organized entity and the Demiurge is then present to it.

So **taking over** could, I think, be said, with reference to the paradigmatic cause which transcends demiurgic providence from which [the Demiurge] 'takes over' the substrate already diversified by certain traces of forms, but could also be said because one power 'takes over' the work of another to achieve the final ordering<sup>302</sup> even if we consider that all [of the powers involved] are in the Demiurge; for [then] it would be the same [being] who took things over and who passed them on in the course of giving them substantial existence with one set of powers or ordering them with another.

**Not in a state of rest but moving** shows that the hypothesis has attributed to [the visible] only the nature from which movement [derives]; for, since [that] nature is irrational and without guidance

<sup>298</sup> Sc. from the Paradigm. (Although, there is an initial temptation to refer ἀπὸ ταύτης δὲ τῆς τάξεως back to πρὸ τῆς τάξεως in line 17, it must in fact take up ἀπὸ τοῦ παραδείγματος in the same line. Presumably Proclus failed to notice this awkwardness.)

<sup>299</sup> As Festugière points out, in the present context ἐνθεν must mean 'from the Paradigm'. (On his suggestion that Proclus interprets ἐνθεν differently when he quotes this same verse at 451.19, see my note there.)

<sup>300</sup> = *Or. Chald.* fr. 34.1 Majercik. Quoted with the addition of three other lines at 451.19–22.

<sup>301</sup> For these traces, cf. *Tim.* 52b2, and for other references to them, the note at 387.15.

<sup>302</sup> Diehl's supplements at 389.1–2 seem unnecessary and I have translated the text of the manuscripts.

from God, what order could it maintain in addition [to that]?<sup>303</sup> [Plato] indicates this in the *Politicus* (272e5–6) as well. [There], after he has removed the Demiurge from the cosmos, he says that it moves by itself precisely ‘by a kind of destiny and connatural<sup>304</sup> desire’. So it is by here postulating before the creation what he there postulated after the creation that he has introduced into the movement of the visible a disorder which arises without [the involvement of] intellect. So much for this [phrase].

The **bringing [of it] to order from disorder** comes about through [its] participation in intellect and intellective life.

**Having judged** shows that the thought of the Demiurge is in conformity (*analogon*) with his will and power. So, having previously referred to his will in the words ‘having wished’ (30a2) and to his power in the words ‘to the full extent of his power’ (30a3),<sup>305</sup> he has, with the words ‘having judged’, added his intellectual knowledge as a third. Indeed, it was by these [three] again<sup>306</sup> – goodness, power, knowledge – that he characterized divine providence in the *Laws*<sup>307</sup> too. Goodness is paternal and associated with the first [principles], power is the mother and [comes] second, and cognitive intellect [comes] third. For Goodness is the first, ‘Power [resides] with it’ – with the first of the triad – ‘and Intellect [issues] from it’ [as] a third.<sup>308</sup>

Next, **the former was better than the latter** means that order is better than disorder, for **the former** is order, **the latter** disorder. [This is clear] since it has [just] been stated that ‘he brought it to order from

<sup>303</sup> Contrast with this the *physis* described at 8.5–9.

<sup>304</sup> I would prefer ‘inborn’, but the argument in part depends on a play on the cognate words *physis* (‘nature’) and *sumphutos* (‘connatural’).

<sup>305</sup> This rendering of κατὰ δύναμιν was explained in the note at 381.18.

<sup>306</sup> This, or something like it, seems to be the thrust of τούτοις γὰρ αὖ even though ἀγαθότης replaces βούλησις in the *Laws*. Perhaps Proclus can write in this way because of the close association between the Demiurge’s ἀγαθότης and his βούλησις, for which see, for example, 371.10–16.

<sup>307</sup> Goodness 900d6; power 901d7–8; knowledge 901d3–5. The same triad is discernible in *ET* §121 and in *PTI*. §15, where the divine attribute of providence is derived from the *Laws* (knowledge 71.14ff.; power 72.4ff.; goodness 73.24ff.), and at *in Remp.* I. 28.3–9 Proclus even manages to find it in the *Republic*. For its occurrence in earlier and later authors, both pagan and Christian, see Whittaker (1987) 283–7.

<sup>308</sup> As Festugière points out, taken together, the words ἡ δὲ δύναμις σὺν ἐκείνῳ and ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀπ’ ἐκείνου almost constitute a quotation of *Or. Chald.* fr. 4 Majercik, from which the Neoplatonists derived the so-called Chaldean triad πατήρ – δύναμις – νοῦς and which Proclus quotes at *in Alc.* 84.16–17 and *PT VI* 42.10–11 and refers to (in a passage very similar to this) at *in Alc.* 160.20–161.4. (For other references to the triad in Proclus and in Damascius and for modern discussions, see the notes of Festugière on the present passage, and those of Segonds and Saffrey–Westerink respectively on the *in Alc.* and *PT* passages.)

disorder' [and] so he has called what was mentioned later **the latter** and [what was mentioned] earlier **the former**. In addition, **the latter** contains a reference to the existing disorder, which the Demiurge has 'taken over', and **the former** to the order pre-existing in the Demiurge, in accordance with which he will bring order to the disordered as well.<sup>309</sup>

Now Aristotle, it is true, does not recognize the order in the Demiurge, but [only] that in his products – although he does locate the good (*to eu*) in both, so that for him Intellect is an object of desire for secondary [beings] but is not in any way creative.<sup>310</sup> Plato, however, following Orpheus,<sup>311</sup> says that order and the 'whole before the parts' are in the first instance in the Demiurge. It is because he is all things in the intellectual mode that he is going to<sup>312</sup> create those same things in the sensible mode. For if he creates just by being – and this is necessary if we are not to ascribe a prior choice and [a period of] indecision to him – he either creates by [self]-fragmentation and the diminution of his powers, as does fire, or, remaining as he is (*hos estin*),<sup>313</sup> brings the thing which come after him into existence just by being. [It would be] extraordinary if it were by [self]-fragmentation. Not even nature is diminished when it produces hair or teeth or some other part [of the body]. Much more then should [we] keep transcendent and self-substantiating Being free of diminution. And if, remaining what he is, he creates just by being, on account of the latter [circumstance] he creates things like himself, on account of the former, [he creates] with his whole being (*kath' holon beauton*); for that which is being diminished is not creating with its whole [being].<sup>314</sup> All

<sup>309</sup> Or 'even to [these] disordered things'.

<sup>310</sup> With this criticism of Aristotle cf. 2.15–29 with Tarrant's notes, and for a discussion of these and other passages where Proclus criticizes Aristotle's conception of efficient causation see Steel (1987). Festugière points out that no single Aristotelian passage lies behind Proclus' present remarks and adduces *Metaph.* Λ 10, 1075a11ff. for the presence of the good in both the Demiurge and his products; *Metaph.* Λ 7 (especially 1072b3) for Intellect as an object of desire; and *Metaph.* Λ 9 (especially 1074b25ff.) for the statement that Intellect does not create.

<sup>311</sup> He has in mind the myth of the ingestion of Phanes, whom the Neoplatonists identified with the Paradigm, by Zeus, whom they identified with the Demiurge. Festugière compares 313.6ff. and 324.14ff., where the myth is directly alluded to (and where *Orph. fr.* 167b and *Orph. fr.* 167a are respectively quoted) and the same Platonic equations are evident. On this and other instances of ingestion in 'Orpheus', cf. Baltzly's note at II. 91.20.

<sup>312</sup> ἐμελλεν (which has already been used in line 3) possibly picks up the same word at 313.15 (= *Orph. fr.* 167b, line 7).

<sup>313</sup> Either δ ἔστιν (cf. δπερ ἔστι in line 18) or ὥς ἔστιν would be easier.

<sup>314</sup> Most of what is said of the creative activity of the Demiurge here (sc. at 390.9–20) is said of productive causes in general, often in very similar language, in *ET* §§26–9. For the phrase αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ('just by being'), which Proclus employs frequently (more than twenty times in *in Tim.* I alone), and the complex of ideas associated with it (many

things, then, are in the first instance (*prôtôs*) in [the Demiurge] himself, and things outside [of him] are images of his all-ness.<sup>315</sup> Further, order is present in products in one way, but in [their] paradigms in another. The former is interwoven with disordered [elements], the latter is Order-itself, existing in and of itself, so that it can order disordered things as well while remaining removed from them and preserving its own essence undefiled.

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That is all we have to say on the phrasing of the text. But one should not neglect to mention that in giving existence to the discordant and unordered ahead of the production of the cosmos [Plato] is copying the theologians. For just as they introduce wars and uprisings of the Titans against the Olympians, so too does Plato assume two starting-points, namely the unorganized (*akosmos*) and that which produces organization (*kosmopoios*), so that the former may be organized and participate in order. But whereas [the theologians] transferred order from the gods to the things governed [by them] in the theological style – they range actual champions of the body<sup>316</sup> against the Olympians – Plato does so by philosophical means.<sup>317</sup>

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### *Arguments of Porphyry against Atticus: 391.4–396.26*

Let us now provide a brief summary of the thoughts the philosopher Porphyry<sup>318</sup> has passed down [to us] on these questions, [thoughts which are entirely] appropriate to the sacredness of the subject.

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In the first place he holds forth against those around Atticus<sup>319</sup> – the people who also claim that matter, being moved by ungenerated but irrational and maleficent soul, tosses in discordant and disorderly motion, and who [thereby] make matter chronologically prior to the sensible, irrationality to reason, and disorder to order – for hypothesizing many interconnected principles, [to wit] matter, the Demiurge and the Forms.<sup>320</sup>

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of which occur in the present passage), see Trouillard (1958) and D'Ancona Costa (1996).

<sup>315</sup> For 'all-ness' see the note at 426.24.

<sup>316</sup> A more literal rendering would be, 'actual presiders over bodies'.

<sup>317</sup> Punctuating with dashes rather than semicolons after θεολογικῶς and Ὀλυμπίοις.

<sup>318</sup> 391.4–396.26 = fr. 51 Sodano. <sup>319</sup> On 'those around', see the note at 381.26.

<sup>320</sup> 391.4–12 = Atticus, fr. 26 Des Places. For irrational soul and/or the existence of disorder prior to order, cf. 283.27–30; 325.30–326.5; 381.26–382–12 and 384.2–5. I have read πολλὰς ὑποτιθεμένους ἀρχὰς συναπτούσας ἀλλήλαις (*sic* codices) <τὴν ὕλην καὶ> τὸν δημιουργὸν καὶ τὰς ἰδέας with Festugière at 391.7–8 because, although the plurality of the Forms could, at a pinch, account for πολλὰς, matter certainly should be mentioned here since much of what follows is directed precisely against the idea

Let it be assumed then, [he says,] that both matter and God are, as they claim, ungenerated<sup>321</sup> by [any] cause.<sup>322</sup> In that case [being] ungenerated is common to [both of] them. But they differ from one another nevertheless. So [it must be] by something else, and not by [being] ungenerated. So this thing by which they differ from one another could not be [something] ungenerated. Therefore it is [something] generated. But it is impossible for ungenerated [things] to differ by [something that is] generated.<sup>323</sup>

Next, what is the cause of their differentiation and that which has made the one preservative, the other destructive?<sup>324</sup> If it were [being] ungenerated, that would be extraordinary. [Either] everything ungenerated would be preservative, or<sup>325</sup> everything ungenerated [would be] destructive, if, that is, it were the case that God's<sup>326</sup> [being] ungenerated made God preservative or matter's [being] ungenerated [made] matter destructive. And if we must say that this [cause] is something else, is this in its turn ungenerated or generated? If the cause of ungenerated things were to be generated, that would be extraordinary. And if it were ungenerated, how could there be a further ungenerated cause of things which are altogether ungenerated? Inasmuch as they are all ungenerated, it will no more be a cause for them than they for it. And so we shall once more be seeking another cause of their difference prior to these, and there will be an ascent to infinity. For if there is to be no cause of the difference between [these] differing [entities], [no cause] of the one's being preservative, the other's being destructive, chance will hold sway<sup>327</sup> over the first principles. For if causation (*aitia*) is eliminated, the

that it is an ἀρχή, the Forms only being an issue at 394.2–8. Perhaps the omitted words were deliberately left out by someone who believed that matter is introduced as a third ἀρχή only in the relative clause (which I have repositioned to make translation easier) although it actually seems to be intended as a reminder of Atticus' other sins.

<sup>321</sup> As Festugière points out, in what follows τὸ ἀγέννητον is equivocal between 'the fact of being ungenerated' and 'that which is ungenerated' and I have opted for bringing this out in the translation.

<sup>322</sup> ἀγέννητα ἄμφω ἀπ' αἰτίας (391.13). Cf. εἴτε [ἡ ὕλη] ἀγέννητός ἐστιν ἀπ' αἰτίας at 384.3–4, where the position of 'those around Plutarch and Atticus' is being reported. Presumably the rather unusual and cumbersome expression ἀγέννητα ἀπ' αἰτίας either goes back to Atticus, since he is common to both passages, or is Porphyry's, and he is the source for the earlier passage too.

<sup>323</sup> Or perhaps 'by [being] generated'.

<sup>324</sup> Presumably because it is material things that are subject to generation and perishing.

<sup>325</sup> The argument would be clearer if Proclus had written 'and' rather than 'or' both here and later in the sentence.

<sup>326</sup> Following Festugière in reading εἴπερ τὸ ἀγέννητον <τοῦ θεοῦ> at 391.21 with **5**.

<sup>327</sup> The same phrase occurs in line 16, where Proclus is paraphrasing the *Laws*.

coming together of principles such as these will be without rhyme or reason.

Also, it is absurd to make evil<sup>328</sup> eternal like the Good. That which is ‘without God’ (*atheos*)<sup>329</sup> is not of equal honour with the divine nor is it ungenerated on the same basis or in any sense its opposite. For in what respect is either one more self-sufficient, more immutable, more unchangeable, if each of them [exists] from eternity, having no need of the other?

Also, if the one is ready to be organized (*kosmein*), the other to organize, what is the origin of their readiness?<sup>330</sup> There must be something that brings them both together and makes them proportionate to one another. They do not, one imagines, if they are separated from one another and in opposition, make *themselves* ready to come together. Unless, perhaps, they would claim that this too comes about spontaneously, taking notice neither of the Athenian Stranger when he says<sup>331</sup> that it is ‘a source of mindless ideas’ to claim that unreason exists before reason and that chance holds sway before intelligent art, nor of Socrates in the *Republic* (523c4–526c7) when he says that one should not rest at multiplicity but ascend from the many to their shared monads.<sup>332</sup>

Also, one should not characterize the highest principle merely by its not itself having a further principle [from which it derives] – this does not yet reveal its [true] dignity – but by the fact that all things [derive] from it. And if this is so, there could not be more than one principle. Otherwise God will not be responsible for all things but [only] for some. And if he is the originating principle<sup>333</sup> of matter as well, there is one principle and not many.

Also, if being a principle consists in this, in being [a principle] of something (*tinôn*) and in organizing (*kosmein*) the unordered, [a principle] will be simultaneous with its effects (*ta ex autês*), and it will be no more [the case that] when the principle is eliminated, the [effects] are gone than that when there are no [effects], the principle is eliminated.<sup>334</sup> This

<sup>328</sup> One would expect it to be the maleficent soul rather than matter itself that was evil for Atticus.

<sup>329</sup> See the note at 368.6 for other passages in which matter is described as ἀθεος.

<sup>330</sup> On ‘readiness’, cf. the note at 367.8.

<sup>331</sup> *Laws* 888d7ff., the direct quotation at *Laws* 891c7.

<sup>332</sup> With 392.7–19, cf. 366.27–367.15 (plus notes) and 394.12–25.

<sup>333</sup> ἀρχοι would, I think, have to mean something like ‘rule over’, but I suspect that Proclus wrote either ἀρχή or αἰτίας. The latter would fit the argument rather better, but the former is an easier correction, so that is what I have translated. (Festugière’s ‘est principe de’ is not, I think, a possible rendering of ἀρχοι. Perhaps he too read ἀρχή but lost track of the need for a note.)

<sup>334</sup> I.e. it will be just as true to say that when there is no effect there is no cause as that when there is no cause there is no effect.

[will be so for them] because they repeatedly say that the essence of the principle lies in this, in [its] creating (*dêmiourgein*). And if this is true it is not possible for the principle to exist if the cosmos does not exist.<sup>335</sup>

On the other hand, shifting ground, they [also] say that the god exists even without creating, not even realizing that genuine powers act just through existing<sup>336</sup> and that the power of growth and the nutritive power, [for example,] nourish the body and make it grow just by existing. And this indeed is also how the soul animates, vivifies and moves its instrument, [the body,] for it is not as a result of decisions on our part that the body has perceptions or has a pulse, but the mere presence of soul produces these activities. Besides, everything which<sup>337</sup> is naturally disposed to [produce some effect] (*pephukos pros ti*) always possesses that capacity essentially, while something which changes [its behaviour] on different occasions [possesses it only] by acquisition. So, if the god always creates (*dêmiourgein*), he must possess his demiurgic power as part of his nature, while if he does not, [he has it] by acquisition. [And] how then,<sup>338</sup> after being imperfect, does he become perfect and, after not being an artisan, an artisan?

The second and next section [of Porphyry's work] is the one which shows that Plato too refers all things to a single principle. [It does so] on the basis of: (1) the passage in the *Republic*<sup>339</sup> where [Plato] makes the sun responsible for visible things and the Good for intelligible things and moreover calls the sun itself 'offspring of the Good' (508b12–13); (2) the passage in the *Letters*<sup>340</sup> where he says that 'all things attend upon the King of All and all things exist on his account'; for if all things are turned towards him and are in attendance upon him, he is the principle of all things and not [merely] of some; whatever you [choose to] consider, it will be from that source (*ekeithen*); (3) the passage in the *Philebus*<sup>341</sup> where he clearly states that all things [derive] from Limit and Unlimitedness and that God pre-exists these principles themselves as a single cause, so that there is both a single principle and multiple principles, but the latter are subordinate to the single [principle]; (4) the passage in the *Sophist*<sup>342</sup> where, in opposition to those who claim that there are multiple existents

<sup>335</sup> With this compare Proclus' similar argument in relation to the *Paradigm* and the cosmos at Philoponus, *Aet.* 24.

<sup>336</sup> 393.1–3 = Atticus, fr. 27 Des Places.

<sup>337</sup> Reading ἔτι πᾶν τὸ (S: ἔτι τὸ πᾶν C M P Diehl) at 393.9 with Festugière.

<sup>338</sup> Sc. in the latter case.

<sup>339</sup> 508b9–509b10; also cited at 228.4–7, 429.9–13 and III. 82.26–9.

<sup>340</sup> II. 312e1–2; already cited at 356.8–10.

<sup>341</sup> 23c9–27c1; cf. 262.29–263.6 and 384.24–7.

<sup>342</sup> Perhaps 242c4–245e5; it would be clearer if the commentary that Proclus seems to have written on the *Sophist* (for which see Saffrey and Westerink's note at *PT* III. 67.26) had

and, separately, to those who put forward Being itself as the principle, he shows that one must begin neither from the multitude of existents nor from the One Being but from the One itself.

Thirdly, one would go as far as to deny that any of the principles they assume is in Plato.<sup>343</sup> [According to Plato] the Forms do not exist on their own in separation from Intellect, but Intellect sees all the Forms when it is turned towards itself. It is for this reason that the Athenian Stranger (*Laws* 898b2) likened the activity of Intellect to the revolution ‘of a sphere turned on the lathe’. But *they* represent the Forms as inert, like waxworks,<sup>344</sup> existing on their own and situated outside Intellect.<sup>345</sup> Nor, [according to Plato,] is the Demiurge the very first god; *he* is superior to all intellective being. Nor does some irrational soul move the discordantly and chaotically (*ataktôs*) moving [mass]: *every* soul is the offspring of the gods. Nor, in short, does the universe become orderly after [first] being disorderly.<sup>346</sup> For, if the god wishes to bring all things into an orderly condition, how does he wish this? Always, or at a particular time? If it is [only] at a particular time, this is either due to himself or due to matter. It would be extraordinary if it were due to himself because he is always good and everything good<sup>347</sup> is at all times (*aei*) productive of good. And if it is due to matter’s resisting, how is it that it is ordered now? Because, they claim, it has become ready to receive

survived. There are passages on the *Sophist* with much in common with this one at *PT* I. 18.13–20, *PT* II. 34.12–35.9 and *PT* III. §§20.

<sup>343</sup> ὅτι οὐδὲ ὁ (εἰ **M P**) ποιητής, ὃν (ὦν **M P**) παραλαμβάνουσιν ἀρχήν (ἀρχῶν **M P**), προσήκει τῷ (προσήκει τί τῷ **M**) Πλάτωνι (394.1–2). Diehl’s text (which is the text of **C**) would need to be translated something like ‘that not even the creator they employ as [their] principle is in Plato’ (Festugière has ‘que le Créateur qu’ Atticus assume comme principe ne correspond pas non plus à la pensée de Platon’). There are at least two problems with this. (1) One would expect ὡς ἀρχήν rather than just ἀρχήν. (2) Proclus goes on to discuss the Forms, the Demiurge (not ὁ ποιητής, notice), irrational soul and matter (in that order) and not just the creator/Demiurge. I prefer to read ὅτι οὐδὲ εἴποι ἂν τις ὦν παραλαμβάνουσιν ἀρχῶν προσήκειν τι τῷ Πλάτωνι, which is palaeographically close to the texts of both **M** and **P** and grammatically and contextually superior to the text of **C** and Diehl.

<sup>344</sup> See the note at 335.25, where Proclus employs the same image.

<sup>345</sup> As far as we can see, the conception of the Forms that Proclus advances here was first developed by Plotinus (see especially *Enn.* 6.7), although the idea that the Forms exist in the mind of God may go back as far as Antiochus in the first century BCE (see Merlan (1967) 53–5) and is certainly present in Philo and Seneca. Most modern scholars have read Plato as Atticus is said to here. (Actually, the evidence for Atticus’ views on the status of the Forms is difficult to interpret. On the issue, see Festugière’s note here and Dillon (1996) 254–6.)

<sup>346</sup> 393.31–394.12 = Atticus, fr. 28 Des Places.

<sup>347</sup> Festugière, perhaps rightly, reads τὸ δὲ <ἀεὶ> ἀγαθὸν πᾶν ἀεὶ εὖ ποιητικόν at 394.15–16.

the demiurgic plan (*logos*);<sup>348</sup> in fact, the god was even watching for this readiness<sup>349</sup> on its part. So it must not have been disordered when it was brought into an orderly condition – it would not have been ‘ready’ in that case – but have [already] stopped being in disorder. In fact, its unreadiness *is* its disordered movement. Therefore matter is not the cause of lack of order. But nor, clearly, is the will of God, for he is always good. Therefore the cosmos was always being set in order and the Demiurge was always ordering the discordant and disorderly element (*phusis*).<sup>350</sup>

So why exactly has [Plato] hypothesized [a state of] disorder? Because, so that we would be able to see that the generation of bodies is one thing, their arrangement once they have come into being another, they had to be portrayed (*hupotheton*) as [already] existing but moving in a disorderly manner. After all, bodies cannot bring order to themselves. It was, then, out of a wish to highlight (*paradeiknunai*) the order which has come to them from another source that he has shown the disorder which is intrinsic to their movements in the absence of the divine Cause.

And if Aristotle<sup>351</sup> criticized those who had claimed that it is [only] hypothetically that disorder is assumed to exist before order, saying that what emerges is not the things on the basis of which the hypothesis is formulated, as is the case in geometry, since those must exist on their own, one should reply<sup>352</sup> that it is not hypothetically in that

<sup>348</sup> Or perhaps ‘demiurgic reason’. <sup>349</sup> On ‘readiness’, cf. the note at 367.8.

<sup>350</sup> With 394.12–25, cf. 366.27–367.15 (plus notes) and 392.7–19.

<sup>351</sup> As Festugière points out, the reference is clearly to *Cael.* 1.10, 279b32–280a10.

<sup>352</sup> εἰ δὲ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἡτιάσατο τὸν εἰπόντα καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν προειληφθαι τοῦ κόσμου τὸ ἄκοσμον, λέγων μὴ συμβαίνειν ταῦτα, ἐφ’ ὧν αἱ ὑποθέσεις παραλαμβάνονται οἷον ἐπὶ γεωμετρίας – δύνασθαι γὰρ εἶναι ταύτας καθ’ ἑαυτάς – ῥητέον, ὅτι οὐχ οὕτως καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν λέγεται τὸ ἄκοσμον προυποκείσθαι δεῖν . . . (395.1–6). This, the text of Diehl and of the manuscripts, I would translate: ‘and if Aristotle criticized those who had claimed that it is [only] hypothetically that disorder is assumed to exist before order, saying that they are not of a piece with [see LSJ] συμβαίνω II.3 for similar uses of the verb] the things [assuming the suppression of an antecedent such as ἐκείνοις] with respect to which hypotheses are employed in for example geometry, since these [sc. the hypotheses] can exist on their own, one should reply that it is not hypothetically in that sense that it is said that disorder must pre-exist . . .’ There are, I think, two major difficulties here. (1) As λέγων shows, Proclus purports to be reproducing Aristotle’s criticism, and his συμβαίνειν clearly picks up Aristotle’s συμβαίνει at 280a5. Ignoring the complexities of Aristotle’s argument (in fact, I believe that translators have not usually got it quite right), he is concerned with what ‘results’ (συμβαίνει) when the components of a geometric diagram, as compared with those of the hypothesis he is criticizing, are assembled. Proclus seems to be making a rather different point which involves a different sense of συμβαίνειν. (Although Festugière’s ‘qu’on ne trouve pas ici’ does not make this immediately clear, I think he understands the force of συμβαίνειν in much the same way as I do.) (2) It is not clear what it means to say that hypotheses ‘can exist on their own’, let alone how this serves to clarify what has just been said. I believe that

way<sup>353</sup> that disorder is said to pre-exist. Rather, just as he himself discerns formlessness as prior to the Forms even though it never exists apart from them, even so has that which is informed but not yet fully articulated been apprehended as prior to order even though it never existed prior to order but has coexisted along with order.

Fourth and next is the section of [Porphyrus's] arguments in which he shows that divine Intellect practises a mode of creation [which is performed] just by being and establishes [this] by a number of arguments. Even artisans [he says] need tools for their activity [only] because they do not have mastery over all<sup>354</sup> [their] material (*bulê*). They show this themselves<sup>355</sup> by using these tools to get [their] material ready for use (*euergos*) by drilling, planing or turning it, all of which [operations] do not add form, but [merely] eliminate the unreadiness of the [material which is] to receive the form. The actual conformation (*logos*) [of the work], on the other hand, supervenes upon (*paraginesthai*) the material (*bupokeimenon*) instantaneously from the art<sup>356</sup> once all inhibiting factors have been removed. And if there were no inhibiting factor in the case of [artisans] either, they [too] would add the form to the matter all at once and have absolutely no need of tools. And likewise the imagination too produces many effects in the body simply by its own action. For example, a person is ashamed at imagining something indecent and

the transmitted text is corrupt and requires emendation. I would make the following changes. (1) emend αἱ ὑποθέσεις παραλαμβάνονται το ἡ ὑπόthesis παραλαμβάνεται. (This allows συμβαίνειν to have the meaning it has in Aristotle.) (2) Change ταύτας καθ' ἑαυτάς το ταῦτα καθ' ἑαυτά. (This makes the clause refer to ὁ κόσμος and τὸ ἄκοσμον rather than to αἱ ὑποθέσεις, which is more coherent and more in line with what Aristotle says; Festugière tries, I think, to achieve the same effect by translating δύνασθαι γὰρ εἶναι τὰυτας καθ' ἑαυτάς 'car ce qu'on assume hypothétiquement en géométrie peut être une chose qui existe par elle-même' but this, it seems to me, is to read too much into the Greek.) (3) Interchange δύνασθαι and δεῖν. (It is not enough for Aristotle to say that disorder and order *can* exist separately, and δύνασθαι would make better sense in line 6 than δεῖν does. If such an interchange seems too implausible, one could change δύνασθαι to δεῖν in line 4 and delete δεῖν in line 6 on the assumption that δεῖν was displaced and δύνασθαι then incorrectly supplied in line 4.) So emended, the passage would read 'εἰ δὲ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἠτιάσατο τὸν εἰπόντα καθ' ὑπόthesis προεληφθαι τοῦ κόσμου τὸ ἄκοσμον, λέγων μὴ συμβαίνειν ταῦτα, ἐφ' ὧν ἡ ὑπόthesis παραλαμβάνεται οἷον ἐπὶ γεωμετρίας - δεῖν γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτα καθ' ἑαυτά - ῥητέον, ὅτι οὐχ οὕτως καθ' ὑπόthesis λέγεται τὸ ἄκοσμον προυποκείσθαι δύνασθαι . . .', which is what I have translated.

<sup>353</sup> Sc. not as in a geometrical hypothesis.

<sup>354</sup> πάντως or πάντη ('do not have complete mastery') would be easier.

<sup>355</sup> Changing αὐτοῖς (395.15) to αὐτοί and beginning a new sentence with δηλοῦσι. (For similar constructions, see *PT IV*. 101.1; in *Tim*. 338.12; II. 269.22.)

<sup>356</sup> For the idea that the form or plan of a work of art in some sense resides in the art (τέχνη) itself, see, for example, Proclus, in *Eucl.* 137.4-8; Syrianus, in *Metaph.* 149.4-8; Anon. in *Cat.* 40.15.

blushes or is frightened by the thought of something dangerous and turns pale. [In such cases] the effects occur in the body but their cause is the mental imagery (*phantasma*), which does not work by pushing or pulling but achieves its effect just by its presence. And, again, according to the theologians there are also certain powers,<sup>357</sup> superior to us, which make use of images which are efficacious and able to bring about whatever they wish the moment they appear.<sup>358</sup> [These powers] practice the art of drawing down [supernatural] illuminations and display certain divine forms by means of their own movements, exhibiting outward appearances of this kind to those who are able to see them.<sup>359</sup>

If, then, human arts and the imaginations of individual [human] souls and the operations of demons achieve such results, is it surprising that the Demiurge should bring perceptible [reality] into existence just by thinking the universe, generating the material immaterially and the tangible intangibly, and partlessly<sup>360</sup> extending the extended?<sup>361</sup>

And one should not be surprised if something which is incorporeal and unextended should be able to cause the existence of this universe. If it is the case that human semen, which is so small in bulk yet contains within itself all of the [seminal] reasons, gives rise to so many differences in (1) our hard parts, such as bones which may be either solid or hollow, in (2) our soft parts, like the lungs and the liver, in (3) our dry parts, like our nails and hair, in (4) our fluid parts, like blood and phlegm, in (5) our viscous parts, like marrow and fat, in (6) our bitter parts, like bile, in (7) our insipid parts, like saliva, in (8) our dense parts, like the tendons, in (9) our thinly stretched parts, like the membranes – for it somehow gives rise to all of these, both those that are homoeomerous and those formed from them, from [its own] small bulk, or, rather, from no bulk [at all], because it is the [seminal] reasons which produce these things, and they are without bulk, since they are everywhere; for in any portion of semen you choose to take you will find all things – it will certainly be much more the case that demiurgic reason is able to bring all things into existence, since it has had no need at all of matter for its existence, as

<sup>357</sup> At 396.4 it becomes apparent that these are demons. For Chaldean demonology, which we seem to be dealing with here, see Lewy (1978) 259–309; for demons in the Platonic tradition and in Proclus himself, see Baltzly's note at II. 11.10.

<sup>358</sup> Sc. just by their presence.

<sup>359</sup> (395.29–396.3). Festugière compares *in Remp.* I. 39.1ff., where Proclus explains apparitions of the gods, and especially 39.11ff. which bear a number of resemblances to the present passage. (Although I have, like Festugière, done my best with the transmitted text, I am neither sure that it is correct nor confident that I have understood it properly.)

<sup>360</sup> ὅλως . . . ἀναφῶς . . . ἀμερῶς (396.6–7). Sc. not by any physical means.

<sup>361</sup> Rejecting Diehl's <παράγοντα> at 396.6 with Festugière.

has [the reason] associated with the semen. For this latter is not outside of matter, whereas the creator (*bupostatês*) of all things is eternally fixed in himself, and has brought all things into existence out of his abiding (*menein*) self.<sup>362</sup>

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### *Themis and the Demiurge*

It was not, nor is it [ever], permissible (*themis*) for the best to do anything other than what is most beautiful.<sup>363</sup> (30a6–7)<sup>364</sup>

### *Exegesis of the text: 396.29–398.12*

**Themis**<sup>365</sup> is appropriately included among the principles<sup>366</sup> of the creation. It is she who is responsible for the demiurgic ordinances (*thesmoi*) and thanks to her the order of the universe was indissolubly framed. For this reason she remains a virgin prior to the procession of the Demiurge, [or], according to the oracles of Night,

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Until Rhea, in union with Kronos, bore him a son (*Orph. fr.* 144 Kern)

but [then] joins with Zeus in producing the triad of Seasons,<sup>367</sup>

5

To whom have been entrusted the vast heaven and Olympus,  
To clear away or bring down the dense cloud

(*Iliad* 5.750–1)

She is, then, the monad of the entire cosmic order, on account of which [order] Socrates in the *Republic* (616c4, 617b4) called her Anankê, as has been shown in [my commentary on that work],<sup>368</sup> and had her

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<sup>362</sup> μένοντος is reminiscent of ἔμενεν at *Tim.* 42e5, and ἐν ἑαυτῷ διαιωνίως ἔστηκε is echoed by ἡ δὲ ἰδρυσις αὐτῇ διαιωνίως ἔστι καὶ αἰὲν ὡσαύτως ἔστωσα at III 315.11–12 in Proclus' commentary on the *Timaeus* passage.

<sup>363</sup> 'Best' would be a reasonable translation of τὸ κάλλιστον in Plato, but Proclus clearly often reads it as 'most beautiful' in what follows and I have thought it best to settle on a single rendering throughout.

<sup>364</sup> Divergences from Burnet's OCT text: Proclus adds τι after ἄλλο at 30a7.

<sup>365</sup> As at 330.2 (cf. the note there), Proclus sees a reference to the goddess Themis in the word θέμις ('permissible').

<sup>366</sup> Or perhaps just, 'in the early stages of the creation', i.e. early in Plato's account of the creation. (For ἐν ἀρχαῖς in this or a similar sense, cf. III 134.20, the only other passage in Proclus where the phrase occurs, and the use of παραλαμβάνειν with ἐν ἀρχῇ at *in Parm.* 1103.29.)

<sup>367</sup> Festugière compares, with Kern, *Hymn. Orph.* 43.1 (Quandt), 'The Seasons, the daughters of Themis and Lord Zeus'.

<sup>368</sup> At *in Remp.* II. 207.14–208.26. (Our current lemma is quoted at 208.19–20.)

revolve the cosmos ‘on her lap’, for ever keeping [its] order immutable and unshaken.

So it is in accordance with this divine cause of order that the Demiurge too, when bringing the discordant [mass] into order, gives a portion of beauty (*kallós*) to all things and makes the cosmos like himself and continuous with himself.<sup>369</sup> For, being **the best**, he properly makes it **the most beautiful**, because even Beauty itself, pre-eminent and intelligible [Beauty], depends on goodness and resides (*esti*) in it. And on account of this the cosmos too, being **most beautiful**, depends on the Demiurge, who is **the best**. And because the Good is the cause of Beauty (*kallônê*), on that account the **best** father is also the creator (*hupostatêtês*) of the **most beautiful** offspring.

Further, since **Themis** is the guardian of the sacred laws and they ensure that the generation of the secondary [entities] from the primary [takes place] in [due] order and preserve the continuity of the divine [entities] and the resemblances of the secondary [entities] to the primary, on that account the Demiurge, since he works with **Themis**, [and] is himself **the best**, makes the universe **most beautiful**. When even Socrates, a [mere] human being, says that ‘it is not permissible (*themitos*) for him to agree to anything false or to suppress the truth’ (*Theaetetus* 151d2–3), how could we say that the demiurgic intellect itself creates anything but the beautiful, banishing the ugly, when it is one with **Themis** and **Themis** is always present to it?

The words **it was not, nor is it [ever]** are used very fittingly of him who is **the best**. Earlier (29e1), he called the Demiurge ‘good’ and used ‘was’ in connection with him, as in [the phrase] ‘he was good’; for the simplicity which is beyond Intellect and [is] the very mark (*idiôma*) of divinity has more affinity with ‘was’ as being something that is above eternity and superior to all intellection.<sup>370</sup> But now, after calling him **the best** on the ground that he is an intellect filled with divinity – for that which participates divinity<sup>371</sup> is the best – he applies [both] **was** and **is** to him, **was** *qua* god and **is** *qua* intellect, so as to reveal at one and the same time both his divine unity and his eternal existence.

<sup>369</sup> An instance of the principle of the continuity of procession, for which cf. *ET* §§28–9 with Dodds’ notes and *PT* III. 6.14–7.27 with those of Saffrey and Westerink.

<sup>370</sup> Cf. 362.10–13.

<sup>371</sup> At 398.9 Diehl prints τὸ γὰρ \*\*\* μετέχον τὸ ἄριστόν ἐστι and comments: θεοῦ sim. excidisse vidit Kroll. Festugière translates ‘car ce qui participe au divin est le meilleur’ without any note. I have, for purposes of translation, assumed that the missing text is τοῦ θείου.

# *The relation between beauty and intellect*

So, after taking thought,<sup>372</sup> he found that among things that are visible by nature, taking them as wholes, nothing without intellect will ever be a more beautiful work than something which has intellect.<sup>373</sup> (30b1–3)

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## *The words ‘after taking thought’: 398.16–399.28*

Amelius ingeniously (*thaumastôs*) contends that Plato is aware of the [several] different causes of the creation but smoothly<sup>374</sup> leaps ‘with silent tread’<sup>375</sup> from one to the other. Thanks to the continuity of the divine causes themselves, he reveals nothing of this but, due to the mutual union of the Demiurges, arranges [his material] as though he were dealing with one and the same [Demiurge throughout]. For, in fact, [Amelius claims,] all [of them together] are one, and that one is all [of them], since even here<sup>376</sup> it is one [Demiurge] who ‘willed’, another who ‘takes thought’, another who ‘took over’, and the first of these creates by will alone, the second by intellection and by [the act of] thinking (*to noein*), and the third manually; for [this last one] ‘puts intellect in soul and soul in body and participates in the fabrication of the universe in that way’.<sup>377</sup>

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<sup>372</sup> I render λογίσεσθαι ‘take thought’ (with Cornford), and its noun λογισμός ‘thought’ or ‘thinking’, rather than using, say, ‘calculate’ and ‘calculation’ or ‘reason’ and ‘reasoning’, with an eye to Proclus’ interpretation of the words at 399.9–28.

<sup>373</sup> No significant divergences from Burnet’s OCT text.

<sup>374</sup> The circumstance that the nature of these transitions is explained by ‘the continuity (συνέχειαν) of the divine causes themselves’ suggests some such rendering for συνεχῶς.

<sup>375</sup> ἀψόφω κελεύθω (398.18). Cf., with Festugière, πάντα γὰρ δι’ ἀψόφου | βαίνων κελεύθου κατὰ δίκην τὰ θνήτ’ ἄγεις (Eurip. *Tr.* 887–8). *TLG* searches turn up eleven echoes of the phrase, including one in Plotinus and no fewer than four others in Proclus, and a further eight (two of them uncertain) of the words πάντα γὰρ κατὰ δίκην ἄγεις, of which Proclus contributes five, all of them, I think, certain. (References to most of these passages can be found in Saffrey and Westerink’s notes to *PT* I. 75.7 and 77.8–9 and IV. 45.3; for δι’ ἀψόφου κελεύθου add Psellus, *opusc.* 43.19, and for πάντα γὰρ κατὰ δίκην ἄγεις, Proclus, *in Remp.* I. 94.18; I. 107.23 and *PT* I. 59.19; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. Rom.* 6.80.4, and possibly Eusebius, *PE* 7.13.3.4 and Simplicius, *in Phys.* 374.28.)

<sup>376</sup> Sc. in the part of the *Timaeus* currently under discussion: cf. ἐβουλήθη (29ε3), βουληθείς (30α2); λογισάμενος (30b1); παραλαβών (30α4).

<sup>377</sup> The words between quotation marks are an interpretative paraphrase of *Tim.* 30b5–6. (1) As Festugière argues, Amelius is probably giving συντεκταίνομαι (‘participate in the construction of’) a different sense from the one it bears in the *Timaeus*, where it seems to mean no more than ‘construct’, ‘put together’. (2) ‘puts’ (τίθησι, which replaces Plato’s συνιστάς) is intended to bring out the manual nature of the operation. (3) ‘in that way’ (οὕτω, which does not appear in Plato) is probably intended to mean ‘by

The divine Iamblichus,<sup>378</sup> for his part, criticizes any such interpretation on the ground that it would be excessively elaborate,<sup>379</sup> and he distinguishes between the **thought**<sup>380</sup> which precedes things as their cause, that which is creative of being itself, and that which is [always] unvarying in its activity, by which [last] all [these] instances of **thought** are embraced and from which they have their being.<sup>381</sup>

As for us, we have already<sup>382</sup> stated that [Plato] is talking about one and the same Demiurge [throughout], and we repeat it now. For even if there is a plurality of Demiurges, one must set the monad before the plurality.

We shall, however, ask the divine Iamblichus to consider this. Is it perhaps the case that this single Demiurge, since he is also the whole intellective cosmos,<sup>383</sup> is multi-powered and creates (*dêmiourgein*) different things with different powers as well as being the single Father of all things? Let us indeed grant that *qua* good and *qua* God he is the sole (*autos*) creator (*bupostatês*) of all things; for all things participate unity (*to hen*). But since he unites (*sullambanein*) within himself the cause of all created things (*dêmiourgêmata*) and gives existence to the whole in one way, the parts in another, the former all at once and as a whole, the latter separately, each thing according to its own causes, [it follows that] he gives order to the whole by means of a single [act of] intellection and generates it all at once (which is why the cosmos is a single living thing), but [orders and generates] the parts [contained] within it by **thinking** – they too [of course] as wholes (the whole of mind, the whole of soul and the entire mass of body), because he is the Demiurge of universal [entities].

[manually] placing'. For other passages in *in Tim.* where Proclus refers to Amelius' triad of Demiurges, see the note at 362.9 above.

<sup>378</sup> 398.26–399.1 = fr. 39 Dillon.

<sup>379</sup> Taking this as passive rather than middle as Festugière does.

<sup>380</sup> I have put 'thought' and 'thinking' in bold print when they translate λογισμός because it in effect stands in for λογισάμενος.

<sup>381</sup> λογισμὸν . . . ἔχουσιν (398.28–399.1). I think that the point is that it is only within the terms of the myth that the Demiurge makes decisions before creating and during the process of creation; in reality, his intellectual activity is continuous and unvarying and he 'creates' constantly just by existing. From this it follows that the first two kinds of 'thought' in a sense derive from the third. (Festugière and Dillon translate differently.)

<sup>382</sup> Proclus stated that the Demiurge is one as early as 12.6 and has reiterated this on a number of occasions. Here he probably has in mind 362.4–6 or 304.16–17, where he specifically attributes this position to Plato.

<sup>383</sup> Festugière, perhaps correctly given that the Demiurge is sometimes described as εἰς καὶ ὅλος in other passages, takes ὅλος with δημιουργός and translates, 'si par hasard le Dêmiurge unique et total, qui est un "Monde Intellectif", ne serait pas doué de puissances multiples'.

For this reason, when he constructs the parts, he is said to create (*poiein*) by **thinking**, for **thinking** is going through the parts separately and causing things one by one.<sup>384</sup> **Thinking** is not [here the mental state] of one who is in doubt [as to how to proceed], since neither an art nor a science experiences doubt, but artisans and scientists when they lack experience; and if [art and science] do not experience doubt, what way is there for Intellect to experience doubt? There is none. And so [his] **thinking** was not out of doubt as to what should come into being.<sup>385</sup> On the other hand,<sup>386</sup> when he orders the whole, he will create by intellection; for intellection is simple and collects a plurality into one, just as **thinking** divides a one into a multiplicity.

So much for the meaning of **after taking thought**.

### *Explanation of the remainder of the lemma: 399.28–402.12*

To claim that **the things visible by nature** are sensible things would be absolutely absurd.<sup>387</sup> Not only had these not yet been dealt with in [Timaeus'] account, but it is an impossibility for the Demiurge to revert upon<sup>388</sup> them. How can he stoop to [the level of] something inferior, or what kind of image can he receive of material things, when it is not even propitious for the individual soul to stoop to [their level]? Better then, as the divine Iamblichus<sup>389</sup> proposes, to deem the Intelligibles such.<sup>390</sup> That they are indeed **visible** is clear from the fact that [Plato] says that the Demiurge 'sees' them: a little later (397–9) he will say 'just, then, as Intellect sees Forms present in the Living Thing that [truly] is, to the

<sup>384</sup> For the identity of thinking (there νόησις) and creating at the level of Intellect, see *ET* §174.

<sup>385</sup> λογισμός, then, appears to be the kind of discursive thought that moves from object to object (on which see Wallis (1972) 52), which the Neoplatonists normally attribute to soul rather than to intellect, whose proper mode of cognition is intellection (νόησις), a kind of timeless intuition. When Proclus again has occasion to comment on this passage at *PT* V. 62.4–63.4, he softens this by calling it 'divided intellection' and 'stable intellection which knows (νοεῖν) the multiple causes of things' and describing it as instantaneous and not involving any transition.

<sup>386</sup> The words, 'Thinking is not here . . . what should come into being' are in effect parenthetical.

<sup>387</sup> However, as Festugière points out, this is clearly what they are for Plato. A good example of the lengths to which Proclus will go to make the *Timaeus* conform to his own system.

<sup>388</sup> Intellect is creative in procession and contemplative in reversion (on which see, for example, Siorvanes (1996) 148). For the doctrine that intellects do not 'revert upon' their inferiors but have knowledge only of themselves and (through this knowledge) of their priors, see *ET* §166 and *PT* V. 22.21–8.

<sup>389</sup> 399.28–400.11 = fr. 40 Dillon. <sup>390</sup> Sc. 'visible by nature'.

same number and of the same kind . . .’ And that they are also ‘**visible by nature**’ is clear if you reflect<sup>391</sup> that some things are visible relative to us, others by nature, and that those which are visible relative to us are dark and unclear in their own nature, while those which are visible by nature are truly knowable and illuminated by divine light,<sup>392</sup> and that the Intelligibles are of this latter kind.

And perhaps it is because he has also called ‘[all] that was moving in a discordant and disorderly manner’, which is *unnatural* (*para phusin*) relative to the creation, **visible** that he has [here] called those intelligible paradigms of the Demiurge **visible by nature**. It was for this reason too that it was settled (*deiknunai*) in the preliminaries<sup>393</sup> whether the paradigm of the cosmos should be considered everlasting or generated given that the two of them, [I mean] both being and generation,<sup>394</sup> existed before the heaven came into being.

And where else but in the Intelligibles would the Demiurge **find** the causes of generated things? [This] finding is neither a chance discovery nor some kind of apprehension (*epibolē*) based on reasoning – that is [only] appropriate to individual souls – but union with the intelligible causes of the parts of the universe and vision and fulfilment from that source (*ekeithen*).<sup>395</sup> For since at the levels above [the Demiurge] all things exist in a paradigmatic mode, both those that are **endowed with intellect** and those **without intellect** (for true Being unitively embraced the cause of both intelligent (*noeros*) [beings] and those which do not participate intellect), and since there above [entities] with intellect are superior, and the rest inferior (for even though all things there have been endowed with intellect and *are* intellects, in some the cause also contains [within itself] the intelligence of [its] effects, in others [their] lack of intellect

<sup>391</sup> Or perhaps ‘reason’.

<sup>392</sup> The Good sheds ‘divine light’ upon the Intelligibles and from there it is passed down from level to level of reality. The ultimate origin of the metaphor is the famous passage where Plato likens the Good to the sun (*Rep.* 506d8–509b10) and it figures prominently at *in Remp.* I. 276.23–281.7 (on the passage just cited), at *PT* II. 32.1–34.8 and III. 16.18–17.1, and at *in Tim.* III. 82.23–83.11. Cf. too Siorvanes (1996) 242.

<sup>393</sup> Cf. 28c5–29a6 along with Proclus’ discussion at 325.14–327.10 of why Plato needed to ask whether the cosmos was fashioned after a generated model or after an intelligible one, but I would not like to have to say what the precise reference of *διό* is.

<sup>394</sup> If the paradigm were an instance of ‘being’, it would be everlasting, if of ‘generation’, it would be generated; the words *ὄντων πρὸ τοῦ οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι τῶν δύο, τοῦ τε ὄντος καὶ τῆς γενέσεως* (16–17) seem to look to 52d3–4.

<sup>395</sup> For the union of Intellect with its objects, the Intelligibles, see, for example, *ET* §134, especially lines 20–5. The language here (*ἔνωσις, θέα, πλήρωσις*) resembles that of mystical union; compare the language used in Proclus’ account at *PT* IV. §9 of the ascent of gods and souls under the leadership of Zeus (who Proclus identifies with the Demiurge) to union with the Intelligible in the *Phaedrus*.

and reason, [in which last case] the causes themselves are intelligent, the things [deriving] from them without intellect), it is appropriate that it is looking in that direction that the Demiurge considers that which is endowed with intellect more august (*semnos*) than that which is without intellect, both genus than genus and individuals than individuals.<sup>396</sup> [The genus] ‘human being’, for instance, is **more beautiful**<sup>397</sup> than [the genus] ‘horse’ and an individual human than all horses precisely through being endowed with intellect. If you take a *part* of an individual human being, on the other hand, and a horse, the one is not invariably **more beautiful** [than the other];<sup>398</sup> and if you take a human being created (*dēmiourgeîn*) by nature and one fashioned by the art of the sculptor, the natural (*ek tēs phuseôs*) one is not in every case more august in its [external] form; art takes more pains with many things.<sup>399</sup> But one *whole* is certainly altogether superior to another when the one is endowed with intellect and the other without intellect. And indeed it is impossible for bodies to participate in intelligible beauty through anything else but intellect; for it is intellect that is the first thing (*to prôtôs*) to be filled with the gift of beauty.

So let no one imagine that Plato is making a division of Forms into those endowed with intellect and those without intellect; as we have said (400.27–28), all [entities] up there (*ekei*) – where Plato calls all things gods – are intellects. Rather, let us say<sup>400</sup> that in the course of attending to entities there [the Demiurge] also saw the difference between things endowed with intellect and those without intellect here below. And for that reason [Plato] said **nothing without intellect will be more beautiful than something with intellect** on the basis that the difference between these exists in the **works**,<sup>401</sup> but pre-exists there above in the cause.

Observe again how, this being the case, Plato says that it is on account of the more sovereign causes that the secondary causes act, the former having more of final causality and the latter being dependent on them. Because the Demiurge is good, he therefore makes the cosmos ‘very beautiful’; for goodness is the cause of beauty. And because he makes the

<sup>396</sup> At this point it becomes apparent that Proclus is now turning his attention to the phrase *ὅλον ὅλου*.

<sup>397</sup> After ‘superior’ (26) and ‘more august’ (32), ‘nobler’ would work better here and at 401.5, but it is hard to avoid ‘beauty’ for *κάλλος* at 401.9 and 10 and on balance it seems best to keep to ‘beautiful’.

<sup>398</sup> Perhaps he would argue that a human head is more ‘noble’ than a horse; a finger nail, less. (But perhaps one should read *ἱππου* in 1.2 and translate ‘[one] of a horse’.)

<sup>399</sup> Probably a reminiscence of the phrase *ἡ φύσις οὐκ ἀκριβοῖ* at Arist. *GA* 4.10, 778a6.

<sup>400</sup> Reading *εἴπωμεν* for *εἶπομεν* at 401.14 with Festugière.

<sup>401</sup> Referring to *ἔργον* in the lemma.

universe ‘very beautiful’, he makes it ‘possessed of intellect’ (*ennous*); for beauty fills intellect first [of all] with its power. And because he makes the universe ‘possessed of intellect’, he imparts soul to it; for soul proceeds from intellect. And because he makes the cosmos ‘ensouled’, he implants life in what was formerly ‘moving in discordant and disorderly fashion’ (30a4–5); for once this has been ordered in a beautiful manner, it will be able to participate soul, and soul intellect, and intellect beauty, and the entire cosmos, having become ‘most beautiful’, the good. And in this way it will be, and should be called, ‘a blessed god’ (34b8).

And in this passage (*en toutois*) [the Demiurge] seems to view (*horan*) all of the paradigms – it is these indeed that [Plato] has called **visible by nature** – not only the one in Living-Thing-itself, but also those which are more particular than the four Forms there. Otherwise how does he see paradigms of both things with intellect<sup>402</sup> and those without intellect, which are certainly not distinguished in the Living-Thing-itself? [Plato] will indeed mention this Living-Thing-itself soon (30c3ff.), when he<sup>403</sup> makes the universe a living thing. For *qua* living thing [the universe] is its image, and *qua* quadripartite. But, to the extent that it is further divided into species<sup>404</sup> with and without intellect (*noounta kai mê noounta*), to that extent it certainly derives from other, more particular, paradigms rather than being based on the above-mentioned four Forms. And so the Living-Thing-itself is a paradigm,<sup>405</sup> but not every paradigm is the Living-Thing-itself.

But now that we have dealt with these questions let us turn to what comes next.

### *Soul is a necessary intermediary between intellect and body*

And further that it is impossible for intellect to be present in anything apart from soul.<sup>406</sup> (30b3)

### *General explanation: 402.15–403.31*

Intellective substance is undivided, uniform and eternal, that of bodies divided, pluralized and coexistent with temporal extension. Because of this they are diametrically opposed to one another and have need of a mean which is able to bring them together, one that is at once divided

<sup>402</sup> Preferring νοητικῶν (M N Festugière) to νοητῶν (P Diehl).

<sup>403</sup> Presumably Plato, although it is the Demiurge who does the work.

<sup>404</sup> Reading διήρηται εἶδη ταύτη (N) at 402.8 with Praechter and Festugière.

<sup>405</sup> Like Festugière, omitting Diehl’s <τι> at 402.10.

<sup>406</sup> No significant divergences from Burnet’s OCT text.

and undivided, complex and simple, eternal and generated. Plato makes the psychic order such [a mean, representing it as] at the same time intelligible and the first of things that come to be, eternal and in time, undivided and divided. So if the universe must come into being with intellect (*enmous*), there is also need of soul; for it is the receptacle of intellect and it is through it that intellect makes its appearance in the material substances (*onkoî*) of the universe. It is not that intellect has need of soul. In that case it would be of lower status than soul. Rather, is it that bodies have need of soul if they are to participate intellect; for it is the lowest [levels of being] that have need of means,<sup>407</sup> not the first;<sup>408</sup> they are everywhere present without any intermediary.<sup>409</sup>

Further, it is also necessary to realize that the soul which links intellect to the sensible must be intellective and not devoid of intellect. How indeed could something devoid of intellect be [directly] joined to intellect? There would need to be a further mean in their case too. But, if [the soul] is [intellective], it will on the one hand guide everything corporeal in a prudent and orderly manner and on the other imitate [the movement of] intellect by circling around it.<sup>410</sup>

Further, if wholes are superior to parts and things which are everlasting to those which exist for a time (*kata chronon*) and productive agencies (*ta poiounta*) to the things they produce, it must also be the case that the heaven as a whole is more divine than all of the parts [contained] within it. If, then, some of the living things in the cosmos, despite being particular and enmattered and perishable, are naturally equipped to participate intellect, what must we say about the cosmos as a whole? [Must we not say] that from end to end it reveals the presence of intellect to it?<sup>411</sup> Indeed I would claim that its shape, the order [it displays] and the degree of its powers are clear proofs of the superintendence of intellect.

And if intellect is set over wholes and pilots the universe, there must also be intellective soul in between which gives order to bodies and administers them – at the same time [remaining] separate from the things administered – and fills them all with life, in order that, through it, the cosmos may be set fast in intellect and intellect may irradiate<sup>412</sup> the cosmos.

<sup>407</sup> Emending σωμάτων to μεσοτήτων at 402.28.

<sup>408</sup> Of which Intellect is of course one.

<sup>409</sup> On this intermediate nature of soul, cf. II. 1.9–18 and Baltzly's note there.

<sup>410</sup> Festugière compares *Tim.* 37c1 and 414.12–13 below.

<sup>411</sup> With Praechter and Festugière, reading αὐτὸν (**M N**) rather than αὐτὸν (**P** Diehl) at 403.10.

<sup>412</sup> Cf. the note at 361.3.

20 If you will bear with me, let us also recollect what is written in the  
*Philebus* (29a9–30e3), where Socrates, in the course of demonstrating  
that the cosmos is endowed with intellect and soul, told how our earthy  
part derives from the universe<sup>413</sup> and the fire in us from cosmic fire and  
how the same goes for air and water, and that it would be absurd for  
the inferior [elements] in us to pre-exist in the universe (*holon*) and for  
25 the more divine, [namely] universal intellect and universal soul,<sup>414</sup> not  
to be in some analogous fashion present in the universe as well. Either  
we must say that no living thing [at all] is endowed with intellect, or,  
if there is any living thing which is, it is absurd that any other should  
participate intellect ahead of the universe. For [the universe] is always  
ordered and, on account of [its] unvaryingness (*bôsaútôs*),<sup>415</sup> closer to  
intellective substance, while disorder and discordance are very much a  
30 feature of particular living things. Therefore the universe is very much  
more ordered than are particular living things. Therefore we must say  
that it is endowed with intellect and with soul.

### *The doctrines of Plato and Aristotle on intellect: 403.31–405.7*

404 Plato for his part, in altogether inspired fashion, both hypothesizes two  
intellects, the one unparticipated and demiurgic, the other participated  
and inseparable – for things which exist in others and are ranked with the  
inferior [levels of being] derive from things which exist in themselves<sup>416</sup>  
– and accords a twofold life to the universe, the one inborn, the other  
5 separable, in order that the cosmos may be a living thing thanks to the  
life within it, ensouled thanks to the intellective soul, and endowed with  
intellect thanks to most precious intellect itself.

As for Aristotle, he went half-way towards removing unparticipated  
intellect from [Plato's]<sup>417</sup> philosophy – for him the first intellect is that of  
the sphere of the fixed stars – and he cuts out the intellective soul which

<sup>413</sup> Festugière has 'du terreux total', presumably assuming the ellipse of γήινου after παν-  
τός, but (1) Proclus would, I think, have written something like ἐκ τῆς γῆς τῆς ὅλης  
rather than ἐκ τοῦ παντός [γήινου], and (2) it seems to me that the whole thrust of both  
the present passage and of the *Philebus* passage which lies behind it favours understand-  
ing τοῦ παντός as 'the universe'.

<sup>414</sup> νοῦν τὸν ὅλον καὶ ψυχὴν τὴν ὅλην (403.25). Just νοῦν καὶ ψυχὴν would be more logical.

<sup>415</sup> Commenting on τὸ ὡσαύτως, Festugière writes: 'Il faut sous-entendre, semble-t-il,  
κινεῖσθαι', but it is the everlasting order of the universe, not just its everlasting move-  
ment, that is at issue and the ellipse, if any, is more likely to be of ἔχειν, as the follow-  
ing similar passage from *PT*, among others, confirms: λέγεται μὲν καὶ ὁ κόσμος οὗτος  
ὡσαύτως ἔχειν καθ' ὅσον ἄλυστον αἰὲ κρατουμένην ἔλαχε τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ τάξιν (I. 93.3–5).

<sup>416</sup> Reading αὐτοῖς for αὐτοῖς at 404.2 with Festugière. For the doctrine, cf. *ET* §23.

<sup>417</sup> Preferring αὐτοῦ (**MN**) to αὐτοῦ (**P**) at 404.8.

comes between intellect and the animated<sup>418</sup> body and joins intellect directly to the living body. And in addition to these errors, it seems to me that he makes another. Although he set intellects over the [celestial] spheres, he did not establish<sup>419</sup> the cosmos as a whole in an intellect. This is the height of absurdity. How can the cosmos be one unless a single intellect holds sway within it? And what coordination of the intellectual manifold can there be if it is not suspended from its own monad? And how can all things have been arranged for the best (*to eu*) unless there is a common intellect for all things in the cosmos (cf. 412.31–413.4)? For the [intellect] of the sphere of the fixed stars belongs [solely] to that sphere, as does that of the sphere of the sun and that of the sphere of the moon, and the same goes for the rest. But I have also directed a work specifically on these topics against Aristotle.<sup>420</sup>

How can one fail to admire Plato's [procedure in the *Timaeus*]? Taking the cosmos and dividing it into its components (*meros*) and attending to [the component] which moves in a discordant and disorderly fashion in isolation, he notionally (*logôî*) brings it to a standstill – just as in the *Laws* (895a6ff.), when he wished to reveal the self-moving cause of all movement, he brought the whole heaven to a standstill – and having brought it to a standstill,<sup>421</sup> he introduces soul into the universe, which, pouring forth life in abundance, has animated the cosmos, and, as well as soul, intellect, which, turned towards itself,<sup>422</sup> pilots the cosmos, [and] thanks to which the universe moves in a circle, thanks to which the whole is ordered, thanks to which the cosmos as a whole is unmoving.<sup>423</sup> And,

<sup>418</sup> Reading ἐμψυχουμένου (ἐμψυχωμένου codd., ἐψυχωμένου Diehl) with Festugière at 404.10.

<sup>419</sup> The verb *enidruen* ('establish in'), a favourite with Proclus (fourteen occurrences in *in Tim.*), is used of the presence of an effect in its causes, whether in procession or reversion, and this is, I think, tantamount to saying that Aristotle does not make Intellect one of the causes of the cosmos.

<sup>420</sup> Probably, as Festugière suggests, the work directed against Aristotle's criticisms of the *Timaeus* which Proclus refers to at II. 279.2ff., on which see Share (2005a) 99, n. 107.

<sup>421</sup> Like Festugière, I would punctuate with a full stop after οὐρανόν at 404.26.

<sup>422</sup> With this cf. ὥσπερ ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουργὸς εἰς ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν καὶ μένων αἰεὶ ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ἦθει παράγει τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ὀλικῶς καὶ ἀθροῶς καὶ αἰεὶ ὥσαύτως . . . τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐστραμμένος . . . (282.27–283.1).

<sup>423</sup> Retaining ἀκίνητός, the reading of the manuscripts, at 404.30. ἀκίνητος is, I think, shorthand for such phrases as ἀκίνητος κατὰ τὴν ὑπαρξιν in the passage πᾶν τὸ ἐξ ἀκινήτου γινόμενον αἰτίου κατὰ τὴν ὑπαρξιν ἀκίνητόν ἐστιν (Proclus at Philoponus, *Aet.* 55.25–6) or ἀκίνητος κατ' οὐσίαν in the passage δεῖ γὰρ ἕκαστον εἶδος ἀνέκλειπτον εἶναι τοῦ παντός, ἵνα τέλειον ᾖ τὸ πᾶν, καὶ ἵνα τὸ ἐξ ἀκινήτου γινόμενον αἰτίας ἀκίνητον ᾗ κατ' οὐσίαν (*in Tim.* I. 138.32–139.3), where ἀκίνητος clearly has the same meaning as (the more usual in such contexts) ἀμετάβλητος in passages such as πᾶν μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ ἀκινήτου αἰτίας ἀμετάβλητον ἔχει τὴν ὑπαρξιν (*ET* 72.5–6). The point, then, is that, thanks to its dependence on its 'unchanging cause', νοῦς, the cosmos 'as a whole' (ὁ

405

since all of these [components] constitute a single living thing and a single nature, it was also necessary that a cause to bring them together and unify them should have pre-existed, and that this should be intellective; for to embrace wholes all at once and simultaneously and to bring them together for the constitution of a single [entity] is the work of an intellective cause.

5

These then are the reasons why he has made unparticipated intellect exist ahead of participated intellect and placed the causes of all things in it and [only then] produced from this source (*ekeithen*) the intellects and souls and bodies out of which he has constituted the sensible cosmos.

***Does the world-soul become intellective? 405.7–406.10***

10

That it is necessary for the universe to participate intellective soul if it is to participate intellect is clear from what has been said, for this [soul] will [function as] a link between [two] extremes which are [diametrically] opposed. However, that the converse is also true, namely that if an intellective soul is already present in the universe there must also be an intellect of the universe, [still] requires demonstration. For given that we are claiming that this soul is intellective, it must also participate [*some*] intellect. So does it only participate universal intellect, or does it also participate a particular one within itself which derives from [universal intellect]?

15

Well, if the corporeal [element] also<sup>424</sup> benefited from the source of souls directly and not through the soul within it, it would have to do the same in the case of universal soul too.<sup>425</sup> But if there is on the one hand the source of souls in the Demiurge and on the other the [soul]<sup>426</sup> of the universe, and if the universe participates the former through the latter, then it is certainly also the case, one supposes, that the soul itself must

σύνπαῖς κόσμος), though not, of course, all of its parts, is unchanging in regard to its existence, or, as Proclus goes on to argue in *Aet.* at 56.10–15, ‘everlasting’. (ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως in the passage quoted in the note to line 29 above points, I think, in the same direction, and the same point is made, though the terminology differs, in the corollary to *ET* §34.)

<sup>424</sup> Sc. as intellective soul accesses universal intellect directly under the hypothesis that will be rejected.

<sup>425</sup> ἡ ὅλη ψυχὴ is, as often – for a particularly clear case, see II. 289.7 – the world-soul. The point is, I think, that if corporeal things in general participated the πηγὴ ψυχῶν directly rather than through particular soul, the body of the universe would participate it directly rather than through the world-soul.

<sup>426</sup> On the face of it, the ellipse should be of πηγὴ τῶν ψυχῶν. However, Proclus does not normally refer to universal soul or the like as a πηγὴ τῶν ψυχῶν (although he comes close to doing so at *in Tim.* III. 250.15–17), and Festugière is, I think, right to assume the ellipse of ψυχὴ, harsh though it is.

be attached to unparticipated intellect through participated intellects, because as the body of the universe stands in relation to soul, so does [its soul] in relation to intellect. And, besides, if [soul] becomes intellective *qua* soul, all soul would have to be [intellective]; but if by participation in intellect, it must participate the intellect which is commensurate with it. But this is not Intellect itself, but the intellect [lying] between Intellect itself and the soul which possesses intellection (*to noein*) as an acquired [capacity]. [This] is a *particular* intellect and, to the extent that it *is* intellect and does not *become* [intellect], as soul does, is superior to soul, but to the extent that it is *particular*, on a level with it. Intellect itself is above being ranked with soul *both* by being rather than becoming intellect *and* by being intellect pure and simple.

And, moreover, if you also bear in mind (1) that every monad produces a manifold resembling itself, the divine [monad] a divine one, the psychic a psychic one, and that the intellective [monad] therefore [produces] an intellective one, and (2) that the secondary classes always participate those prior to them,<sup>427</sup> then, on these premisses, it is necessarily the case that there is a *particular* intellect of the cosmos as a whole. [This is so] because the intellective soul must participate an intellect. Clearly, if one says that it participates<sup>428</sup> universal [intellect], that is absurd. In that case [universal intellect] will not be the creator of all things. But if [it participates] another, particular, [intellect], this is the intellect of the universe and the one which is participated in the true sense, in that, together with soul, it contributes to the constitution of the universe, whereas universal [intellect] is [only] participated [by soul] in the sense that it shines on it.<sup>429</sup>

Therefore (1) if intellect presides over wholes, the universe is ensouled, and (2) if [the universe] is ensouled it is also endowed with intellect.

### *The Demiurge places intellect in soul and soul in body*

**As a result of this reasoning, he fabricated the universe by constructing intellect within soul and soul within body.<sup>430</sup> (30b4–5)**

<sup>427</sup> For these relationships between monads and their manifolds, see *ET* §21, on the role of resemblance in them, §§29 and 32.

<sup>428</sup> Like Festugière, accepting Radermacher's conjecture μετέχειν for μετέχει and removing the comma before φησί at 406.4. However, I do not fully understand how the next clause (οὐκ ἔσται . . . δημιουργός) then relates to this and I would not rule out the need for further or different emendation.

<sup>429</sup> Sc. universal intellect on soul.

<sup>430</sup> No significant divergences from Burnet's OCT text.

*General explanation: 406.14–407.21*

15 We must first see what the intellect (*nous*) in question is and whether it is substantial, being set over the soul, or a kind of intellectual disposition (*hexis*) of [the soul itself].<sup>431</sup> [And we must] conclude that it is substantial, both on the basis of analogy – soul is related to body as intellect is to soul, and soul does not belong to body in the way that a disposition does, [so] nor does intellect to soul – and on the basis of final causality; for  
20 [Plato] says<sup>432</sup> that soul exists for the sake of intellect, not vice versa; and if soul [exists] for the sake of intellect, and if intellect is ‘that for the sake of which’ [it exists], intellect is not a disposition; for a substance nowhere exists for the sake of a disposition. And a third reason is that<sup>433</sup> the Demiurge gives existence to the intellect under discussion, whereas,  
25 as [Plato] himself will say (37c1–3), it is the soul [which produces understanding (*nous*)] *qua* disposition in accordance with the movement of the circle of the Same around the Intelligible; for it is in accordance with this movement, [he says], that ‘understanding and knowledge are necessarily produced’. [And], this being so, why would the Demiurge have produced what [the soul] produces ahead of [the soul]?<sup>434</sup>

30 Next, if this is correct, we must<sup>435</sup> grasp that, as Socrates says in the *Philebus*, ‘a royal soul and a royal intellect were present in the Demiurge in a causal role’<sup>436</sup> and that it is on the model of (*kata*) these sources of these two kinds [of being] that [the Demiurge] now **puts intellect in soul and soul in body**. [This is] not because better things reside in inferior, nor because intellect needs some seat, or because the soul of the universe resides in something – these [explanations] are unworthy of the universal and divine substances on account of which the cosmos is called a ‘blessed god’ (34b8) – but because we conceive of the nature of things  
407 from two viewpoints: that of their procession and that of their reversion.  
5 When we consider procession, we start from the primary entities and say

<sup>431</sup> Because νοῦς is ambiguous between ‘mind’ and ‘thought’, and ‘substantial’ νοῦς approximates the former, and ‘dispositional’ νοῦς, as becomes apparent, the latter, I translate νοῦς ‘understanding’ rather than ‘intellect’ later in the argument.

<sup>432</sup> He presumably has 30b1–3 in mind. <sup>433</sup> More literally, ‘and, thirdly, because . . .’

<sup>434</sup> Festugière points out that the trio divine (which includes the Demiurge), substantial (οὐσιώδης) and dispositional (καθ’ ἑξιν) νοῦς reappears at II. 313.1–3.

<sup>435</sup> I have, like Diehl and Festugière, assumed that δεῖ is to be understood from line 14 with λαβεῖν.

<sup>436</sup> Actually a paraphrase rather than a quotation of *Pbbl.* 30d1–3, which Proclus also paraphrases (rather more closely) at 315.15–17 and at 423.22–4. Interestingly, κατὰ τὸν τῆς αἰτίας λόγον replaces Plato’s διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας δύναμιν in all three passages. This phrase is clearly meant to be equivalent to κατ’ αἰτίαν (which Proclus actually uses at *PT V.* 86.18, in a passage (85.27–87.13) where he discusses the correct interpretation of the *Philebus* passage at some length), on which see *ET* §65 with Dodds’ comments.

that causes subsist in the [effects] which derive from them. And when [we consider] reversion it is the other way round: we say that the effects are present in the causes.<sup>437</sup>

Plato will in fact also provide [us with an example of] the second mode a little later (36d8–e5) when he puts body in soul – and [soul] in intellect on the same principle.<sup>438</sup> At present, however, since he is dealing with the [mode] of procession, he puts intellect in soul, because [soul] in its entirety has the form of intellect (*nooeidês esti*) and it is not possible to identify any part of it which is not controlled by the intellective nature, and soul in body, because [body] too participates soul with its whole being (*kath' holon heauto*) and it is not possible to identify any part of it that is inanimate<sup>439</sup> but even a thing that has been deprived of its own life is [still] animated as a part of the universe. For, just as we say that providence proceeds everywhere and exists everywhere because it is present to all things and leaves nothing bereft of its [presence], in just the same way we also say that intellect is in soul in that it illuminates it in its entirety, and soul in body in that it is present to the whole of it.

### *Agreement of Plato with Orpheus and the Chaldean Oracles:* *407.21–408.27*

Nor is it the case that Plato says this and Orpheus something different. In fact, if I must give my own opinion, the Theologian's meaning is also made clear by the above [comments on the text of Plato]. For Hipta,<sup>440</sup> who is the soul of the universe, and who is so named in the Theologian perhaps because her intellections are expressed (*ousiousthai*) in the most vigorous movements, or perhaps on account of the very rapid motion of the universe, of which she is the cause, having placed a winnowing basket<sup>441</sup> on her head and wound it round with a snake, takes into her

<sup>437</sup> With 407.5–8, cf. *ET* §35.

<sup>438</sup> As the phrase κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον (407.10) acknowledges, this is an extension of what Plato actually says.

<sup>439</sup> With 407.11–15 cf. 'Be that as it may, all things depend, as we said, on the One through the mediation of Intellect and Soul; Intellect has the form of the One (*henoeidês estin*), soul has the form of Intellect (*nooeidês*) and the body of the cosmos is endowed with life, and each thing is united with what precedes it' (*PT* I. 67.5–8).

<sup>440</sup> Here and at 408.7 and II. 106.1 the manuscripts are divided between Hippa (which Diehl prints) and Hipta, but Festugière's suggestion that the etymologizing which follows makes best sense if Proclus is assuming a connection between Hipta and the verb ἵπταμαι ('fly', 'dart', 'rush') seems convincing. Hipta was, it seems, the name of a pre-Greek Anatolian mother-goddess.

<sup>441</sup> The λίκνον was carried on the head at festivals of Dionysus. The word can also mean 'cradle'.

408 care Dionysus of the Heart;<sup>442</sup> for it is with the most divine [part] of her<sup>443</sup> that she becomes the recipient of intellective being and receives encosmic intellect. And [Dionysus], for his part, proceeds towards her out of the thigh of Zeus – he was united with [Zeus] at that point – and once he has [so] proceeded and has come to be participated by her,  
5 he leads her back up to the Intelligible and her own source; for she hastens to Ida, to the mother of the gods, from whom stems the whole series of souls.<sup>444</sup> Hence Hipta is said to assist<sup>445</sup> Zeus at the birth;<sup>446</sup> for, as was said earlier, ‘it is impossible for intellect without soul to be

<sup>442</sup> Like Festugière, I have translated the text of Diehl, which is that of **M** and **P**, and assumed that κραδιαῖος is the adjective of καρδίη, ‘heart’, meaning, as LSJ puts it, ‘of, or belonging to, the heart’. Dionysus could be described as κραδιαῖος either because he was reborn from his heart after his dismemberment by the Titans, or, as Festugière suggests, because Dionysus (here = the cosmic intellect) is at the centre, or heart, of the cosmos, just as the sun was often said to be at the heart of the physical world (for the sun, cf., in addition to the passages cited by Festugière, in *Remp.* II. 220.14–15, where Proclus cites *Or. Chald.* fr. 58 Majercik, and in *Tim.* II. 104.20–1), or (and this is perhaps the main point) because, according to the Neoplatonists, it was not simply Dionysus but his ‘undivided heart’ which was to be identified with ‘undivided’, or cosmic, intellect (for this see II. 145.4–146.22 and in *Crat.* 109.19–21). Quite apart from its interpretation, κραδιαῖος is not easy to translate. Although it does not seem to be attested as such, the word has the ring of a cult title and I have settled for ‘of the Heart’.

<sup>443</sup> Sc. her head; cf. II. 105.30–106.2, where Proclus quotes Syrianus for the doctrine that the World-soul has a transcendent part by which it is attached to intellect, ‘which Plato in the *Phaedrus* (cf. 248a3) and Orpheus in his writings (*logoi*) on Hipta called its head’, and II. 222.18–20. For the head as the most divine part, cf. *Tim.* 44d5–6 and, in Proclus, in *Tim.* I. 357.30–358.5, II. 222.19 (a reference to the present interpretation of Orpheus) and in *Remp.* II. 247.11–13.

<sup>444</sup> ἐπὶ τὸ νοητὸν αὐτὴν ἀνάγει καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ (ἐαυτῆς II.: em. Lobeck) πηγὴν· ἐπείγεται γὰρ πρὸς τὴν μητέρα τῶν θεῶν καὶ τὴν Ἰδην, ἃς ἦς πᾶσα τῶν ψυχῶν ἡ σειρά (408.4–6). I have retained ἐαυτῆς rather than accept Lobeck’s ἑαυτοῦ with Diehl and Festugière. ‘Her own source’, ‘the mother of the gods, from whom stems the whole series of souls’, must, I think, in the present Orphic context, be Rhea (in a Chaldean, it would presumably be Hecate, whom Proclus calls ‘mother of the gods’ at *Hymni* 6.1 and 6.13), for whom as the ‘mother of the gods’, cf. in *Remp.* I. 137.8 and 14, and as the source of all souls, of which Hipta is of course one, in *Remp.* I. 137.28 and *PT V.* 117.8–118.10 with Saffrey and Westerink’s notes. It is appropriate that Rhea, as ‘mother of the gods’, should be associated with a mountain, and at in *Remp.* I. 137.2–138.27 Proclus sees the coupling of Zeus and Hera on Ida as an analogue of that of Kronos and Rhea. αὐτὴν ἀνάγει (‘he leads her back up’) is appropriate both to the cosmic intellect’s causing the cosmic soul to revert upon its origin on the level of Intellect (ἐπὶ τὸ νοητὸν) and, on the mythological level, to Dionysus’ leading Hipta back up Ida to Rhea. The verb ἐπείγεται (‘she hastens’) is perhaps intended to recall the rapid motion associated with Hipta at 407.26–7.

<sup>445</sup> ‘Assist’ (LSJ VI.1) rather than ‘conceive’ (LSJ IV), I think, although it is difficult not to think of the latter in the present context. We can imagine Hipta as assisting with the delivery from Zeus’ thigh and then placing the baby in the basket or cradle.

<sup>446</sup> More literally, ‘Zeus giving birth’.

present in anything' (30b3). And this is similar<sup>447</sup> to the statement 'And the sweet offspring of Zeus was called forth' in Orpheus (fr. 199 Kern). And this [offspring] was cosmic intellect, the child of Zeus,<sup>448</sup> which has proceeded in the image of (*kata*) the [intellect] which has remained in Zeus.

And in the same way the god-given theology<sup>449</sup> says that the cosmos is constituted of these three [elements].<sup>450</sup> At any rate, Soul says on the subject of the 'Twice Beyond',<sup>451</sup> which has created the universe,

I, Soul, dwell next after the Thoughts of the Father,  
Giving life to all things with my warmth,<sup>452</sup>

for he has placed

intellect in soul, and in sluggish body  
has he placed us, he, the father of men and of gods,<sup>453</sup>

all but openly proclaiming that the Demiurge in her case too is Zeus; for of whom else than most great Zeus do we employ the much-used phrase<sup>454</sup> 'father of men and of gods'? And Plato confirms these statements when he calls [the Demiurge] 'father of gods' (41a7) and shows him generating souls and dispatching them to the generation of men for their very first lives (cf. 41d4–42a3).

But enough on these matters.

### *The words 'constructing' and 'fabricated': 408.27–409.4*

Since, as we have stated (406.7), both soul and intellect contribute to the constitution of a single living thing, it is, it seems to me, quite appropriate that Plato should have used both **constructing** (*sunistanai*) and **fabricated** (*suntektainein*). By means of the prefix ['*sun*'], which is common to both [verbs], he is indicating the unification of the universe; for he has made the cosmos one by at every stage (*aei*) making the more

<sup>447</sup> Sc. the statement that Hipta assisted Zeus at the birth refers to the same events as the statement that the offspring of Zeus was 'called forth'. (I am not sure exactly what 'called forth' is meant to cover; perhaps no more than 'was helped to emerge'.)

<sup>448</sup> νοῦς Διὸς ὦν (408.11) looks like a play on Διόνυσος. <sup>449</sup> Sc. the *Oracles*.

<sup>450</sup> Sc. of intellect, soul and body, which were mentioned in the lemma.

<sup>451</sup> On the Δις ἐπέκειναι (= Zeus) and the Ἀποξ ἐπέκειναι (= Kronos), see the note at 416.1.

<sup>452</sup> 408.16–17 = *Or. Chald.* fr. 53 Majercik. The same two lines are cited at II. 61.24–5.

<sup>453</sup> 408.19–20 = *Or. Chald.* fr. 94 Majercik. I have (as Festugière does), translated Diehl's text rather than that of Des Places and Majercik, who in line 19 reject Diehl's supplement <δ> and follow Kroll in supplying ψυχὴν δ' after ψυχῇ. The subject is the Demiurge and 'us' are, or at least include, particular souls. The same two lines were quoted earlier at 318.17–18.

<sup>454</sup> The phrase is Homeric.

divine [entities] more comprehensive than [their] inferiors. And by the kind [of verb] he uses in each instance he indicates in the one case [that the process is that of] composition, in the other [the employment of] demiurgic craft.

*The aim of the Demiurge is to produce the best world possible*

5 In order that he should have produced the most beautiful and best work possible in accordance with nature<sup>455</sup> (30b5–6)<sup>456</sup>

*The words ‘most beautiful’ and ‘best’: 409.7–30*

10 The account has returned to the starting-point<sup>457</sup> from which we have put together everything we have said. The cosmos has been ordered for the sake of soul; soul has been brought into existence for the sake of intellect; intellect has proceeded into the universe for the sake of intelligible beauty; the cosmos has participated this [beauty] so as to also participate the One itself;<sup>458</sup> and the end (*telos*) of its framing is this: for it to have been made the **most beautiful** and **best**. It becomes **most beautiful** thanks to the cause in the intelligible [realm] which produces beauty<sup>459</sup> and **best** thanks to the Source of goods – for the Good is the best of all things – and through this it of all things is most like the Demiurge;<sup>460</sup> for he too was called ‘the best’ (29a6). However, [the Demiurge] is ‘the best’ of the demiurgic causes – [only] the Good is the best without qualification, as being above and beyond all of the

<sup>455</sup> I have chosen this rendering of κατὰ φύσιν with an eye to the three glosses of the phrase that Proclus offers at 409.30–410.7.

<sup>456</sup> No divergences from Burnet’s OCT text.

<sup>457</sup> Sc. the final cause; cf. Proclus’ remarks at 355.28ff.

<sup>458</sup> With 409.8–11, cf. 401.21–31.

<sup>459</sup> (409.9–14). Since the cosmos participates it, one would expect the ‘intelligible beauty’ in line 10 to be that of the Paradigm and the phrase τὴν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καλλοποιὸν αἰτίαν (‘the cause in the intelligible realm which produces beauty’) to have the same reference. However, the καλλοποιὸς αἰτία (‘the cause which produces beauty’) is the ‘hidden’ and ‘ineffable’ cause of beauty in the first triad of the Intelligibles and the Paradigm participates it (cf. 433.30ff. and 334.14ff., which lines 12–14 here echo). Perhaps ‘intelligible beauty’ is actually a generic term which covers both the Paradigm, which is the immediate source of the beauty of the cosmos, and the ‘hidden’ cause of beauty, which, being in the first triad of the Intelligibles, is immediately below the One and therefore the final link in the chain through which the cosmos ‘participates’ the One.

<sup>460</sup> Festugière, perhaps correctly, translates ‘et, grâce à tout cela, il devient tout à fait semblable au Démoniurge’, but Proclus seems to be influenced by the phrase τοῦτῳ πάντων ὁμοίωτατον at *Tim.* 30c6–7, which favours the construction I have put on the Greek.

divine causes – whereas the cosmos is the **best work**, since it is a work of the Demiurge (*dēmiourgēma*). [And] here<sup>461</sup> the cosmos also participates Deity – for the Goodness beyond Intellect is Deity<sup>462</sup> – and is [also]<sup>463</sup> called ‘the best’ on that account. 20

And Plato commendably (*thaumastôs*) has not talked about divinity, as he has about intellect and soul, because it came [into the universe] along with<sup>464</sup> intellect. For the union of intellect with its own divinity is ineffably [close] and intellect itself, being divine, proceeds [immediately] from the Father,<sup>465</sup> which is a characteristic of the universal creation (*poiēsis*). For *qua* intellect it is also brought into existence by the particular creation, but *qua* divine intellect [only] by the universal.<sup>466</sup> So Plato has not divided it into ‘god’ and ‘intellect’ because he is deriving it [directly] from the Father. 30

### *The words ‘in accordance with nature’: 409.30–410.7*

And what does **in accordance with nature** (*kata phusin*) mean? Perhaps it is referring to the status (*taxis*) by virtue of which the universe has been able to participate even divine Beauty and would be equivalent to ‘in accordance with [its] status’. And perhaps it also indicates that the Demiurge creates by his very being and brings intellect and soul into being out of his own essence; and perhaps also that this work of the Demiurge is bound up with nature and that it is not the **most beautiful** in the same way as the transcendent (*to huperphues*), nor the **best** in the same way as that which is superior to nature, but in the sense that the supernatural is mixed in with nature and intellectual things with those of nature (*ta phusika*). 410 5

### *The cosmos created as a living thing endowed with intellect*

This, then, is how, according to the likely account, we must say that this cosmos came in truth to be a living thing endowed with soul and intellect through the providence of the god.<sup>467</sup> (30b6–c1) 10

<sup>461</sup> Either just ‘in this passage’ or, more probably, ‘here at the point where it participates the Source of goods’.

<sup>462</sup> Like Festugière, treating ἡ γὰρ ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἀγαθότης θεότης ἐστὶ (409.20–1) as parenthetical.

<sup>463</sup> I have supplied ‘also’ here because we have just been given one reason why the cosmos is called ‘the best’.

<sup>464</sup> In reality, I am unsure what relationship is implied by ἐπὶ here.

<sup>465</sup> Sc. the Demiurge.

<sup>466</sup> For the universal and particular creations, see the note at 356.15.

<sup>467</sup> No divergences from Burnet’s OCT text.

*The words ‘according to the likely account’ and ‘in truth’:*  
410.11–411.2

Just as the cosmos itself is mixed, being composed of both likenesses (*eikôn*) and divine essences, of things both natural and transcendent, so has Plato [first] called his account of it **likely** (*eikôs*) and then designated it the **truth**. In regard to [the element within it] which moves in a discordant and disorderly manner, [the cosmos] stands in need of likely discourse, in regard to the intellective essence within it and to the divine cause from which it proceeds, [it requires] the truth. Therefore, when he was about to mention the cosmos, [Plato] introduced the [word] **likely**, and when he was about to mention the providence of the god, the [word] **truth**.

Further, one could speculate that he also uses both, [that is] **likelihood** and **truth**, with reference to the same [topic],<sup>468</sup> not just using one or the other according to the nature of the subject matter (*pragmata*). For since in many places he has conceived of<sup>469</sup> the creation in stages (*meristôs*), making use of ‘reasonings’, ‘divisions’ and ‘compositions’, even though all things are simultaneous in the divine creation (*poiêsis*), but in many others come back to<sup>470</sup> the [single] complete (*holos*) intellection of the Father, as for example in the fundamental principles (*axiômata*) ‘he was good’ (29e1) and ‘it was not, nor is it [ever], right for the best to do anything other than what is most beautiful’ (30a6–7), he has called the former [passages] ‘likely discourse’, the latter ‘truth’, [thereby] referring to the simple apprehension as ‘truth’, and the fragmented<sup>471</sup> (*diêirêmenos*) as ‘likely discourse’. In fact he was using the various kinds of knowledge [to be found] in us<sup>472</sup> to demonstrate [the facts] of divine and demiurgic intellection.

<sup>468</sup> Reading κατὰ ταῦτὸν αὐτὸν λέγοντα θεωρήσεις ἂν (κατ’ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον θεωρήσεις ἂν **C**: κατὰ ταῦτὸν τὸν λέγοντα θεωρήσεις ἂν **M P**: κατ’ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον <αὐτὸν> θεωρήσεις ἂν Diehl). The ‘topic’ in question will be the creation. There is much to be said for Diehl’s text (which Festugière accepts), or something along the same lines, but (1) the first part of the sentence does seem to need a participle such as λέγοντα; I don’t think that one can really read διαιρούμενον forward, as Diehl presumably does, and (2) although none of the manuscripts provides a satisfactory text as it stands, it seems more likely that a text close to that of **M** and **P** should have been ‘emended’ to the text of **C** than vice versa.

<sup>469</sup> Or perhaps, ‘dealt with’.

<sup>470</sup> Or perhaps ‘ascended to’.

<sup>471</sup> Sc. understanding reached by a number of small steps; cf. the contrast between intuition and discursive thought.

<sup>472</sup> Cf. τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν γνώσεων τῶν συστοίχων τοῖς πράγμασι at 341.20–1.

*The words ‘living thing endowed with soul and intellect’:*

411.2–414.17

But how is it, they ask, that [Plato] defines the universe as a **living thing endowed with soul and intellect**? It seems, on the contrary, that ‘living thing’ is a species (*meros*) and ‘being endowed with soul’ the genus.

One must be mindful of the Platonic postulates (*hypotheses*) which state that ‘living thing’ extends down from the Intelligibles as far as the very plants and see<sup>473</sup> how on that basis everything that is endowed with soul is a living thing but not every living thing endowed with soul. For ‘*intelligible* living thing’ is above and beyond even the causes of soul; and, given that he calls the rational soul a living thing but also places ‘life’ after rational soul, he properly (*eikotôs*)<sup>474</sup> designates everything endowed with soul a living thing and not vice versa.<sup>475</sup> It was for this same reason that he also described<sup>476</sup> the paradigm of everything that is alive in any sense at all not as ‘endowed with soul’ but as ‘a living thing’, so that he would not, by describing it as ‘endowed with soul’, make it a paradigm for [only] some [living things] and not for all. And, if this is the way of things, after calling the cosmos a **living thing**, Plato, because there is<sup>477</sup> both an intelligible living thing and a sensible one which does not participate rational soul, properly added **endowed with soul**. And, [further,] because among souls there are some that are endowed with intellect and some that are without intellect, he defined the universe as endowed with intellect as well as **endowed with soul**. For<sup>478</sup> ‘living thing’, would seem,<sup>479</sup> since it is from the intelligible [living thing], the primal [one], to derive from the intelligible Father of the intellectual gods,<sup>480</sup> [being] ‘endowed with soul’ from the median

<sup>473</sup> Translating καὶ ὁρᾶν, the reading of **M** and **P**, at 411.7. (Cf. Festugière’s note ad loc.)

<sup>474</sup> εἰκότως, both here and in line 16, presumably echoes εἰκότα (‘likely’) in the lemma and so perhaps has the connotation ‘in accordance with the likely account’.

<sup>475</sup> Cf., with Festugière, 417.4–6.

<sup>476</sup> Cf. 30c3ff.

<sup>477</sup> Accenting νοητὸν ἔστι at 411.17.

<sup>478</sup> The sentence, I think, seeks to explain the different distributions of life, soul and intellect by their separate origins.

<sup>479</sup> ἔοικε (‘would seem’) looks like another echo of εἰκότα (‘likely’) in the lemma, which is a participle of the same verb.

<sup>480</sup> More literally, ‘For the “living thing”, as [being] from the intelligible [living thing], the primal [one], seems thus to derive also from the intelligible Father of the intellectual gods.’ Festugière makes τὸ νοητὸν τὸ πρῶτον (which he translates ‘Intelligible Premier’) the αὐτοζῶον and ὁ τῶν νοερῶν θεῶν νοητὸς πατήρ the Demiurge, but the former phrase so understood should refer to One Being and one would not expect Proclus to call the Demiurge a νοητὸς πατήρ. The reality is, I think, that both phrases refer to the αὐτοζῶον, as one would expect from the alternative explanation (lines 24–7) in terms of the Demiurge alone, where the παράδειγμα alone is responsible for the

cause,<sup>481</sup> which is both triadic and hebdomadic,<sup>482</sup> and [being] ‘endowed with intellect’ from the intellectual Father,<sup>483</sup> since, even if you consider the Demiurge alone, it is with reference to the paradigm in him that the universe is made a living thing, with reference to royal soul [that it is] ‘endowed with soul’, and [it is] ‘endowed with intellect’ with reference to royal intellect.<sup>484</sup>

And Plato has embraced<sup>485</sup> all these things in unity by means of the god’s **providence**; for it is from that source (*ekeithen*) that the universe is both a living thing and a ‘blessed god’ (34b8), perfected as it is by the providence of the god.<sup>486</sup>

And you [can] see how the account, [having progressed] from Goodness by way of Will, has ended at Providence.<sup>487</sup> For Will depends on Goodness, and Providence on Will, and the universe comes into being on account of the Providence, on account of the Will, on account of the Goodness of the Father, the last of these being essence prior to [all] essences, the second power, as it were, prior to [all] powers, the first activity prior to [all] activities. In fact [all three of] these belong to gods *qua* gods; for [Goodness] unifies essence and is its flower, [Will] is the measure of power, and [Providence] is activity ‘prior to intellect’ – its very name shows this, I believe.<sup>488</sup>

That, then, is how I distinguish between **living thing** and that which is **endowed with soul**. Iamblichus<sup>489</sup> for his part applies ‘living thing’ to everything that possesses life and ‘endowed with soul’ to individual

cosmos’s being a ζῶον. For the construction of lines 20–2, cf. the second example in Smyth (1966) §2990. For the (Orphic) description of the third triad of the Intelligibles (sc. the Paradigm, or Phanes) as the Father of the intellectual gods, cf. *PT* III. 90.22–7.

<sup>481</sup> Either Hecate, who is the world-soul in the Chaldean system and responsible for the existence of soul in the cosmos (cf. II. 129.25–130.1 with Festugière’s notes – where the two oracles referred to are nos. 50 and 53 in Majercik), or Rhea, the central figure, between Kronos and Zeus, in the ‘paternal intellectual triad’ (cf. *PT* V. 36.12ff. with Saffrey and Westerink’s note). Notice that in both cases the goddess is, as here, positioned between two Fathers.

<sup>482</sup> For the terms ‘triadic’ and ‘hebdomadic’, see Festugière’s note.

<sup>483</sup> Sc. the Demiurge *qua* intellect.

<sup>484</sup> On royal soul and royal intellect, which go back to *Philebus* 30d1–2, cf. the note at 406.30.

<sup>485</sup> Sc. in his account.

<sup>486</sup> ἐκεῖθεν γάρ ἐστι καὶ ζῶον καὶ θεὸς εὐδαίμων τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ προνοίᾳ τελεσθέν (411.28–412.1). Although I have translated the text of the manuscripts, the phrase τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ προνοίᾳ τελεσθέν looks like a (basically correct) gloss on ἐκεῖθεν, in which case I would translate: ‘for it is owing to this that the universe is both a living thing and a blessed god’.

<sup>487</sup> For this, and more on the triad, see 370.29–371.20.

<sup>488</sup> Sc. πρόνοια = πρὸ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια. The same equation is implied at *ET* 118.26 and at 415.23 below.

<sup>489</sup> 412.12–15 = fr. 41 Dillon.

participation in souls. And perhaps he too has included intelligible living things under 'that which possesses life' and only sensible ones under 'endowed with soul'.

15

It may be proved (1) that the cosmos is a 'living thing' on the basis of [the phenomenon of] sympathy,<sup>490</sup> (2) that it is 'endowed with soul' on the basis of its perpetual movement, and (3) that it is 'endowed with intellect' on the basis of its orderliness.

(1) If things here below are affected in sympathy (*sumpaschein*) with the heavenly bodies<sup>491</sup> and turn in conjunction with them in all kinds of ways, and if the heavenly bodies transmit effluences to mortals,<sup>492</sup> then the universe is a single living thing sustained by one life; for if this [life] were not common [to them all], there would not be community of affection between its parts, for community of affection is the result of sharing in the same nature.

20

(2) And if the cosmos is in perpetual motion, it is governed by a soul; for 'every body whose movement comes from within itself is endowed with soul, and [every one whose movement comes] from without is devoid of soul'.<sup>493</sup> So if [the cosmos] is in perpetual motion, what is it that moves it? It is [clearly] either motionless or self-moving. But it is contrary to divine law (*ou themis*) for that which is motionless to come into direct contact with things which are moved by others. It remains, then, that the agency which perpetually moves the cosmos is self-moving. And [such an agency] is a soul. Therefore the cosmos is endowed with soul.

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(3) And now the third point. If the universe is always in an orderly condition (*tattein*), and if all things are coordinated (*suntattein*) for the good (*to eu*), and if there is nothing that intrudes upon the governance<sup>494</sup> of the cosmos from without,<sup>495</sup> then intellect governs the cosmos.<sup>496</sup> [And] in fact the interconnection between things in [the cosmos], [its] order and [its] laws (*thesmos*) give clear indications of the oversight of intellect.<sup>497</sup>

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<sup>490</sup> The doctrine of 'cosmic sympathy' (which is characterized in what follows) was developed by the Stoics and accepted by all of the Neoplatonists and by most of their contemporaries.

<sup>491</sup> Or perhaps 'with those in the heavens'.

<sup>492</sup> Or perhaps 'and if heavenly things transmit effluences to mortal'.

<sup>493</sup> Cf. *Phdr.* 245e4–6, where, as Festugière points out, the two propositions occur the other way round.

<sup>494</sup> Or perhaps, 'polity' or 'commonwealth'.

<sup>495</sup> Proclus would presumably cite *Tim.* 32c5–33b1 in support of this proposition.

<sup>496</sup> For the argument, cf., with Festugière, 404.16–18.

<sup>497</sup> With 'give clear . . . intellect', cf. 403.12–13.

Aristotle<sup>498</sup> for his part made the [same] point in another way. He said that among things that are endowed with soul, animals (*zôion*)<sup>499</sup> have a left and a right, plants only a top and a bottom, and that the cosmos, which is endowed with soul, has a top and a bottom *and* a right and a left.<sup>500</sup> And so the cosmos is both endowed with soul and a living thing. And, moreover, it is also endowed with intellect; for the thing which moves it is intellect.

According to both philosophers, then, the cosmos is a living thing endowed with soul and intellect – except that according to the second of them it is endowed with soul [only] as possessing inseparable life, since he does not posit an intellective soul distinct from the intellect above soul<sup>501</sup> – and, what is more, is essentially dependent on another, intelligible, living thing; for what Plato has called a ‘Living Thing’ [Aristotle called] ‘an everlasting living thing’, as he himself<sup>502</sup> says in the *Metaphysics* (Λ 7, 1072b28–9), [where he writes] ‘we say that God is an everlasting living thing’.

And, [more] generally, since in the cosmos there are both things that are in motion and things that are motionless – and things that are always one or the other and those that are sometimes [one, sometimes the other]<sup>503</sup> – one must, I imagine, set the causes of both over the cosmos. Now, the cause of motion is soul. This is why in the *Laws* (895a6ff.), after supposing the universe immobile, [Plato] set it in motion by introducing soul, and why in the *Phaedrus* (245d7–e2) he brought everything to a halt by removing soul. Intellect, on the other hand, is clearly [the cause] of the things which are motionless, its<sup>504</sup> causes being either in balance

<sup>498</sup> For lines 5–9, cf. *Cael.* 2.2, especially 285a27–31, to which lines 7–8 show some verbal similarity. Lines 9–10 refer to Aristotle’s famous doctrine of the unmoved mover.

<sup>499</sup> Because anything from a plant to the cosmos as a whole can be called a ζῶον, I normally translate ‘living thing’. However, in contexts such as this, where ζῶα are being contrasted with plants, ‘animal’ is a better rendering.

<sup>500</sup> τὰ δὲ φυτὰ τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω, μόνος δὲ ὁ κόσμος (413.7). Clearly not *only* the cosmos has both top and bottom and right and left and this can hardly be what Proclus wrote. For purposes of translation, I have read τὰ δὲ φυτὰ τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω μόνον, ὁ δὲ κόσμος but this is not entirely satisfactory and, as the state of **M** also suggests, the corruption may go deeper.

<sup>501</sup> Following Festugière’s punctuation of the Greek. For Aristotle’s failure with regard to intellective soul, see 404.9–11.

<sup>502</sup> Translating φησιν αὐτός (**P** Festugière) rather than φησιν ὁ αὐτός (**C M** Diehl) at 413.16.

<sup>503</sup> καὶ ἄλλως . . . καὶ τῶν ποτέ (413.17–19). This analysis goes back to Aristotle; cf., for example, *Phys.* 8.1, 253a28–30. For other similar classifications in Proclus, see Dodds’ commentary on *ET* §14.

<sup>504</sup> Sc. those of Intellect.

with or even superior to the mobile [causes];<sup>505</sup> after all, the things that are always in motion move around the things which are motionless, and it is because the latter remain motionless that the former are always in motion. So it is certainly also the case that there is<sup>506</sup> a cosmic intellect above soul. 25

So the [cosmos] constructed by Chrysippus (*SVF* fr. 1042) is far from being comparable with the one we have been discussing (*toutôî*). That [philosopher] mixes up together unparticipated and participated causes, divine and intellective causes, and immaterial and material causes. In his system (*par' autôî*), one and the same god, [as well as] being the First God, pervades the cosmos and matter and is the soul and inseparable nature of the things it governs. Plato, by contrast, having posited the three causes Goodness, the intelligible Living Thing, [and] the demiurgic intellect as prior to the entire cosmos, gives to the cosmos, through the agency of these [causes], (1) a perfect intellect, always established in act, transcending matter, full of pure intellections; (2) a divine soul, intellective, unfolding the essence of the one Intellect, circling around it (cf. 403.4) and causing the universe to revolve; (3) the unity [which is a feature] of whole substances, a single divinity, and a goodness which embraces the entire manifold within the cosmos and makes it one; (4) a providence which extends to all things, is separate from the things for which it provides, belongs to itself, and keeps itself above all the things which are governed by it. 414 5 10 15

### *Procession and reversion: 414.18–416.5*

Since, as we stated earlier (407.4ff.), one must consider both the processions and the reversions of wholes, Plato has done both. He has taught their processions in [the words] ‘having put<sup>507</sup> intellect in soul and soul in body’ (30b4–5) and their reversions when, setting out from the cosmos, he calls it ‘a living thing endowed with soul and intellect’ (30b8) and [thereby] joins it to intellect by means of soul, which is of course the peculiar function of reversion, and [then] in culmination refers the fabrication of the cosmos to demiurgic providence (30b8–c1), through 20 25

<sup>505</sup> Accepting Radermacher’s conjecture of ἡτοι for ἡ ὅτι at 413.24. For immobile and mobile causes (the former of which include intellects, the latter souls), cf. *ET* §76 with Dodds’ commentary.

<sup>506</sup> Accenting ἔστι at 413.27 with Festugière. Alternatively, one could retain Diehl’s accentuation and translate: ‘So it is certainly also the case that cosmic intellect is above soul’, but it is the existence of such an intellect that is in question.

<sup>507</sup> Proclus substitutes θεῖς (or, if one follows P, τιθεῖς), for Plato’s συνιστάς.

whose agency it is that all things experience reversion. For [his] goodness unites the Demiurge to the One, [his] will furnishes the wholes with goods, and [his] providence causes all things to revert right back to the One itself.<sup>508</sup> And, indeed, as we have stated (412.2ff.), the first [of these three] is analogous to essence, the second to power, and the third to activity, for which reason the first establishes all things [in existence], the second stirs them to procession, the third calls them back in accordance with the reversion of all things upon that which is prior to Intellect. And if the Demiurge orders the universe on account of his goodness, and on account of ordering it causes (*poiein*) it to be endowed with intellect and soul, and in doing these things does them on account of providence – for it is on account of the god's providence that these things have come to pass (*gignesthai*) – then it is necessarily the case that to act on account of goodness and to act on account of providence are the same thing. And this makes sense (*eikotôs*),<sup>509</sup> because providence is the activity<sup>510</sup> of goodness. And in consequence according to Plato providence is nothing else but activity in accordance with the Good. And in fact in earthly affairs (*entautha*) too we say that that which is provident towards something is that which is the cause of some good for the object of the providence. Therefore providence should not only be defined by the fact that all things are made to revert upon the First, but also by the fact that [the First] is active in relation to all things, ordering all things in a single unity. And this is what providence truly is: the communication of good to all things and the reversion of all things towards the communicator and their participation [in it], [the communicator] giving what it gives to one and all according to the capacity of each for the gift.

And we must also bear in mind what [Plutarch] of Chaeronea said about the name 'Providence' on the basis that Plato so named the divine cause, and if the Demiurge is both intellect and, to the extent that he has [within him] something superior even to intellect, providence, he has quite properly (*eikotôs*) received the latter name<sup>511</sup> too on account of [his engaging in an] activity on a higher level than

<sup>508</sup> καὶ πρὸς αὐτόν at 414.29 is difficult. § omits καὶ and Kroll suggested adding <συνδεῖ> before αὐτόν, but, in view of κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ πρὸ νοῦ τῶν πάντων ἐπιστροφὴν at 415.3 and τὴν πρόνοιαν ὁριστείον τῶ πάντα ἐπεστράφθαι εἰς τὸ πρῶτον at 415.12–13, I suspect that Proclus actually wrote καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν (cf. εἰς αὐτὸ τάγαθον at 415.26, and, for the phrase, συνήπται πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ἡ γεννητικὴ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ θεότης at 364.9–10), or perhaps καὶ πρὸς αὐτό, and I have translated the former.

<sup>509</sup> Like Festugière, I would punctuate the Greek with a full stop rather than a comma before εἰκότως.

<sup>510</sup> Or perhaps 'actualization'. <sup>511</sup> Sc. the name 'Providence'.

intellect.<sup>512</sup> And indeed all things aspire to the good, but not all aspire to intellect; in fact not even those that are entirely without any share of intellect do,<sup>513</sup> lest their aspiration be a vain thing because it is shut out from its goal.<sup>514</sup> And because he is providence, [the Demiurge] is suspended from the Good itself, because he is intellect, from the very first Intellect. For it is not the [intellect] that both intelligizes and creates (*dēmiourgeîn*) that is the very first Intellect, but the one that only intelligizes and is therefore, as we have learned in the *Cratylus* (396c6–7), ‘pure intellect’. Hence according to Plato too [the very first Intellect] would be called ‘Once’ as having a single activity, the one directed towards itself, and the [Demiurge] ‘Twice’ as adding to this the activity responsible for the creation (*dēmiourgikos*) of the universe,<sup>515</sup> and [thereby] not only ‘ordaining’ (cf. 42d2) what comes after him, but also ‘remaining in his accustomed character’,<sup>516</sup> as [Plato] will say a little further on (42e5–6).

<sup>512</sup> Punctuating with a comma rather than a full stop in 415.20. Lines 18–20 (‘And we must . . . divine cause’) = Fr. 195 Sandbach. Festugière suggests that the reference is to the (almost certainly) pseudo-Plutarchean *De fato*, but although the highest level of providence is there (572a5–573d1) identified with the intellection or will of the first god (with *Tim.* 29d7–30a7 as the proof text) and this could at a pinch be construed as naming the divine cause ‘Providence’, there is no sign either in *De fato* or in any extant work of Plutarch of the etymology (for which cf. 412.9–10 and the note there) for which Plutarch is being cited.

<sup>513</sup> As one might have expected.

<sup>514</sup> καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἀγαθοῦ . . . ἄμοιρος οὖσα (415.23–6). Cf. *ET* 118.29–32.

<sup>515</sup> διὸ καὶ κατὰ Πλάτωνα ὁ μὲν ἅπαξ λέγοιτο ἅν . . . ὁ δὲ δις (415.30–416.1). It is tempting to translate, as Festugière does, along the lines ‘Hence too, according to Plato, [the very first Intellect] will be called by one name, . . . but [the Demiurge] by two’ and to see a reference either to 415.18–23 above, where the Demiurge is said to be rightly called both ‘intellect’ and ‘providence’, or to *Crat.* 395e5–396b3, where Plato explains why Zeus can be called either Ζῆνα or Δία, or to both. However, as Festugière indicates, ἅπαξ and δις clearly allude to ὁ ἅπαξ ἐπέκεινα and ὁ δις ἐπέκεινα, titles of Kronos and Zeus respectively in the *Oracles*, and I think that Proclus is arguing that, in view of the single name and single function of Kronos (= ὁ πρῶτιστος νοῦς) and the double name and double activity of Zeus (= the Demiurge), Plato ‘would have’ been aware of and accepted the names ὁ ἅπαξ ἐπέκεινα and ὁ δις ἐπέκεινα. As it stands, the argument need not involve any reference to the *Cratylus* beyond that in the previous sentence, but it is of course difficult to believe that Proclus did not also have the nearby discussion of the name(s) of Zeus in mind and he does in fact relate the title ὁ δις ἐπέκεινα to the apparently twofold activities and names of Zeus at *in Crat.* 52.1ff. (He also mentions, at 59.20, that Kronos is known as ὁ ἅπαξ ἐπέκεινα but does not relate this to his name or his activity.) For the probably Syriac origin of the titles ὁ ἅπαξ ἐπέκεινα and ὁ δις ἐπέκεινα, see *PT V*. xxi–xxii.

<sup>516</sup> διαθεσμοθετῶν τὰ μετ’ ἑαυτὸν expresses the Demiurge’s creative activity, or procession, and μένων ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ἦθει his activity *qua* νοῦς, or reversion. On the latter passage cf. *in Tim.* III. 315.7–16 and, for its significance to the Neoplatonists, the comments of Dodds (*ET* 214) and of Saffrey and Westerink (*PT V*. 64, n. 2).

***II The resemblance of the cosmos to the Living-Thing-itself:  
416.6–436.3***

***Which living thing is the Paradigm?***

This being so, we must go on to talk about what comes next. In the likeness of what living thing has he who constructs [the universe] constructed it? (30c2–3)<sup>517</sup>

***General explanation: 416.9–420.19***

- 10 By this Plato shows clearly the continuity between the problems [he poses] and the linking of the later ones to the earlier. The [phrases] **this being so** and **what comes next** show the continuity of what is going to be said with what has [already] been said, and that it is on account of the truth of the latter that what will follow is in turn furnished with the
- 15 starting-point of the inquiry. For, since it has been shown that it was through the providence of the god that the universe was produced as a living thing, it must have been made after the likeness of an *intelligible* living thing. After all, where else than to the intelligible [Living Thing] did the Demiurge look when he made the cosmos a living thing? And in fact one of the things demonstrated earlier (29a2–6) was that the cosmos, since it is ‘most beautiful’, is created (*gignesthai*) in relation to an everlasting paradigm. So if in creating an image of this [paradigm the Demiurge] brought a living thing into being, the paradigm itself must also have been a living thing – an intelligible one. For if [the paradigm] was not a living thing, how was this [living thing], which was created (*gignesthai*) as a copy of it, produced as a living thing? In fact, it is precisely because it resembles [the Paradigm] that it is created a living thing. It is not sensible or particular as a result of resembling it.
- 25 These [characteristics] both came to it as a consequence of its bodily nature. But it *is* a living thing because it resembles the Intelligible. And if it resembles it, it was from it (*ekeithen*) that it got the form of a living thing. And as a matter of fact copies, inasmuch as they are formed after their paradigms, get not only their form from them but their names as well. And so if [the cosmos’s] having life is due to the Paradigm, it is also
- 30 called ‘a living thing’ after it – and equally ‘endowed with soul’, because the cause of all animation also pre-exists in the Intelligibles, and, by the same argument, ‘endowed with intellect’. Only [Plato] has preferred to
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<sup>517</sup> No significant divergences from Burnet’s OCT text. I have translated ‘has he who constructs [the universe] constructed it’ rather than, say, ‘has the constructor [of the universe] constructed it’ with an eye to Proclus’ comments on ὁ συνιστάς and συνέστη-σεν at 420.24–421.3.

call the most sovereign cause<sup>518</sup> [simply] ‘a living thing’, because it is the cause of animation, of the dispensation of intellect and, in a word, of all life. For everything endowed with intellect is also endowed with soul, and everything endowed with soul is also a living thing, but the reverse is not the case. Not every living thing is endowed with soul; it is, we saw (411.10ff.), [only] one that participates *rational* soul that is endowed with soul. And not everything endowed with soul is endowed with intellect, since ‘of men, only a small proportion (*genos*) participate intellect’ (515–6). And so ‘living thing’ is more comprehensive than all [the other terms], and if the others apply to something, it is appropriate too, but when it is appropriate, the rest do not necessarily apply. And what is more comprehensive is closer to the very first Principle, and what is closer to this is more powerful in terms of causality, if it is indeed the cause of all things. Because Plato is not only acquainted with intelligible living thing, but has also revealed in the *Sophist* [the existence of an intelligible] ‘endowed with soul’.<sup>519</sup> For when he had placed life and soul and intellect in Being and [now] wished to give it movement too, he continued: ‘What? [Shall we believe] that something which possesses intellect and soul and life nevertheless remains totally immobile, even though it is endowed with soul?’ So there is both intelligible life and an intelligible living thing; both a cause of soul and an ‘endowed with soul’; both a cause of intellect and an ‘endowed with intellect’;<sup>520</sup> and the Living Thing is above and beyond all the [other] intelligible paradigms.

It was for these reasons, then, that Plato said that the discourse about the likeness of the cosmos to the intelligible Living Thing is continuous with the question (*problēma*) concerning its construction. For, since it was by being made ‘like’ [the intelligible Living Thing] in accordance with the very form of likeness that [the cosmos] was rendered a living thing by the Demiurge, [the paradigm] after which this living thing was created should [even] more properly be called a living thing [than it]. After all, [the cosmos] acquired [the property of] being a living thing thanks to the Intelligible, not thanks to that which moves in a discordant and disorderly fashion. Anything that belongs to anything<sup>521</sup> must belong to it either

<sup>518</sup> Proclus has previously reserved the designation κυριωτάτη αἴτια for the final cause. Here it serves to contrast the Paradigm as a whole with the less comprehensive causes contained within it. For the thought, cf. lines 18–21 below.

<sup>519</sup> 248e7–249a10, the direct quotation at 249a9–10.

<sup>520</sup> The last four entities are all, like intelligible Life and intelligible Living Thing, ‘intelligible’. ἐμψυχον and ἐννοον are difficult to render. Since they are coordinate with ζῶον, a case could be made for ‘thing endowed with soul’ (or ‘animated thing’) and ‘thing endowed with intellect’, but I have balked at that.

<sup>521</sup> Deleting τῷ at 417.29: τῷ παντί would have to mean ‘to the universe’, which scarcely seems appropriate, and the insertion of τῷ looks like a scribal ‘correction’.

30 by virtue of its matter or by virtue of its form. And so, if the cosmos is not a living thing by virtue of its substrate, it has [the property of] being a living thing by virtue of its form. And if it is because of its form, the primarily [existing] living thing is the cause of its form.

418 In regard to this problem, it remains to consider this: Which living thing has [the cosmos] been made to resemble? That it has been made to resemble [some living thing] is clear from what has already been said, and our next task is to consider which [of them] it has been made to resemble, because there exists a multiplicity of intelligible living things, as Plato himself was indicating when he asked: **in the likeness of which living thing has the Demiurge constructed the [cosmos]?** For, starting on high among the Intelligibles and advancing through all of the intermediate orders,<sup>522</sup> ‘living thing’ exists in the first instance in purely intelligible mode, in the second [still] in intelligible mode, but as that occurs in the Intelligibles and Intellectives, in the third in intellective mode, and [in this last case] now in intelligible mode as that occurs in the solely Intellectives,<sup>523</sup> now in vital mode (*zōtikōs*), now in intellective mode. And in this way ‘intelligible living thing’ occurs in each of the Intellects in the manner appropriate to each;<sup>524</sup> for every Intellect has an associated Intelligible. So it is with good reason that Plato asks what sort of living thing the paradigm of the universe is – whether it is hypercosmic,<sup>525</sup> or solely intellective, or intellective and intelligible, or solely intelligible – because the procession

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<sup>522</sup> Sc. those between the Intelligibles and the cosmos.

<sup>523</sup> It seems to me that sense, word-order and νοερόν μόνον in line 14 below all favour taking μόνον with ἐν νοεροῖς rather than with νοητῶς as Festugière does.

<sup>524</sup> Sc. νοητῶς in the case of the first intellective triad, or Kronos, ζωτικῶς in the case of the second, or Rhea, and νοεῶς in the case of the Demiurge, or Zeus.

<sup>525</sup> ὑπερκόσμιον ἢ νοερόν μόνον (418.13–14). ὑπερκόσμιον is unexpected. Although Proclus has stated that ‘living thing’ processes ‘through all the intermediate orders’ (418.6), he has so far spoken only of the orders of Intellect and in the next breath sums up by saying that ‘the procession of the kind “living thing” extends through all the orders of *Intellect*’. However, I am not convinced by Festugière’s suggestion that ἡ is not disjunctive and ὑπερκόσμιον is simply another way of naming the νοερόν μόνον. In Proclus, ὑπερκόσμιος is used (1) of everything outside the cosmos, when it is opposed to ἐγκόσμιος (for this usage cf. 13.8 and, I think, 419.21), or (2) more commonly, of the τάξις immediately below τὸ νοερόν and immediately above τὰ ἐγκόσμια, but never, as far as I can see, as a synonym for τὸ νοερόν. Here we must, I think, either take it in the second sense or remove it by emendation. I have opted for the former course. (Perhaps it is worth pointing out that Proclus refers to ‘intellective, hypercosmic and encosmic living things’ at 427.17–18 and that at 431.29–31 the αὐτοζῶον is said to be ‘prior to the Demiurge, in the Demiurge and posterior to the Demiurge – for it proceeds to the entire intellective order, both universal and particular’.)

of the kind (*physis*) ‘living thing’ extends through all the orders of Intellect.

And one must suppose that all of these different grades [of living thing] exist in unitary fashion in the very first living thing – [although] one must attribute to [all of] them procession in accordance with their own numbers, for, just as the first [living thing] is tetradic,<sup>526</sup> so is each of the other living things determined by some other number, and even in those in which the number is the same there is variation (*allôs esti kai allôs*) according to the particular properties of the things involved<sup>527</sup> – because, in the case of ‘living thing’ too, the monadic must precede the pluralized on account of its being more akin to the One, and without exception every divine multiplicity originates from a monad. So, just as the Demiurge is the monad of all of the efficient causes even though the property of efficiency exists in many [other] gods, so too is the Living-Thing-itself the monad of all living things, [and in it] are the most universal paradigms of encosmic [entities] and [in it] pre-exists the unique cause of the whole cosmos.

But why, one might ask, has [Plato] called the intelligible Paradigm a ‘living thing’? Because it is, as I said earlier (416.29ff.), the bestower of life, and because it generates the causes of the whole zoogonic series and the very sources of life, and because it is saturated with primal (*prôtistos*) and intelligible life. One Being is above and beyond life, but the middle order of the Intelligibles is primary, unique and infinite Life, and Living-Thing-itself, being full of intelligible life, is [thus] with good reason called a ‘living thing’, since just as it is ‘eternal’ because of its fulfilment by Eternity, so is it a ‘living thing’ because of its reception of life. [And] in fact it is an Intelligible [precisely] because it is ranked [immediately] after intelligible Life.<sup>528</sup> So it has been called a ‘living thing’ not *qua* being sentient or appetitive but *qua* having life, because, for Plato, everything that has life is a living thing; ‘for’, says Timaeus (77b2), ‘anything at all which has life may with justice be called a living thing’. This is why he calls plants and seeds living things, characterizing a living thing by the fact that it is alive. So, if the intelligible Paradigm is alive [it is] because

<sup>526</sup> With Festugière, reading τετραδικόν (M P) rather than μοναδικόν (C Diehl) at 418.19. (In fact, the otherwise inexplicable τέ before μοναδικόν in C (which Diehl brackets) suggests that its exemplar also contained τετραδικόν.) The best commentary on the tetradic nature of the αὐτοζῶον and the numbers which determine the other ζῶα is probably III. 105.14–107.26.

<sup>527</sup> I follow Festugière in regarding πρόοδον . . . ἰδιότητος (418.17–22) as in effect parenthetical.

<sup>528</sup> This seems to look back to the original question, ‘Why has Plato called the *intelligible* paradigm a *living* thing?’ (418.30–1).

15 it is eternal<sup>529</sup> – for, as Plotinus also says,<sup>530</sup> Eternity is all life, so the eternal is alive<sup>531</sup> – and if everything which has life is a living thing, then the intelligible Paradigm is a living thing.

And one may also conclude from the above that the [intelligible Paradigm] is in<sup>532</sup> the third triad of Intelligibles. It is neither in the first, because that is prior to Life, nor in the second, because that *is* Life. Therefore it is in the third. It is not *outside* the Intelligibles, since 20 Plato consistently calls the Paradigm intelligible and not anything else; although he similarly knows a hypercosmic<sup>533</sup> intellect, the demiurgic,<sup>534</sup> he does not call that ‘intelligible’ and the [Paradigm itself] is never ‘intellective’.

[Plato] it is true earlier (cf. 28c5–29a6) treated the always existent in 25 its entirety – which includes the Living Thing and the Demiurge, since both are everlasting Being, and Eternity, which is the always existent in its primal manifestation (*prôtôs*), and One Being itself, which is always existent as being its cause (*kat’ aitian*) – as the paradigm for generation as a whole.<sup>535</sup> Now, however, because a living cosmos is in question, he has called Living-Thing-itself the paradigm, since the always existent was also the paradigm for disorderly generation, if indeed it was from that source (*ekeithen*) that the confused forms<sup>536</sup> came to be present in 30 the disorderly [mass] prior to the generation of the heaven. However,

<sup>529</sup> I have taken εἰ οὖν ζῆ τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ νοητὸν ὡς αἰώνιον (419.12–13) as equivalent to εἰ οὖν ζῆ τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ νοητὸν ζῆ ὡς αἰώνιον: although the Paradigm is not alive *qua* sentient it is *qua* eternal.

<sup>530</sup> *Enn.* 3.7.3.36–8, γίνεται τοῖνυν ἡ περὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ εἶναι ζωῇ ὁμοῦ πᾶσα καὶ πλήρης ἀδιάστατος πανταχῇ τοῦτο, ὃ δὲ ζητοῦμεν, αἰών, seems closer than the passages (3.7.4.33–42 and 3.7.11.1–3) adduced by Festugière.

<sup>531</sup> For Proclus himself the second triad of the Intelligibles may equally well be described as Eternity or as intelligible Life (cf. *PT* III. §§13 and 16).

<sup>532</sup> Proclus more frequently says that it *is* the third triad and indeed concludes the present argument with the words: ‘Living-Thing-itself, then, is the third intelligible triad.’

<sup>533</sup> Sc. ‘outside the cosmos’, the first of the two senses of ὑπερκόσμιος described in the note at 418.13.

<sup>534</sup> Or, perhaps, ‘although he similarly knows that the demiurgic intellect is a hypercosmic one’. But I have a sneaking suspicion that Proclus actually wrote δημιουργόν rather than δημιουργικόν, in which case I would translate, ‘although he also knows that the Demiurge is a hypercosmic intellect, he does not call him “intelligible” . . .’

<sup>535</sup> This is slightly surprising. Proclus has, it is true, considered the possibility that Plato includes One Being and Eternity in the ‘always existent’ (cf. 231.29–232.11 and 234.13–17), but this has not been his favoured interpretation and he has not until now entertained the possibility that Plato would have included them in the paradigm for creation as a whole.

<sup>536</sup> The reference is to the ‘traces’ of *Tim.* 53b2. For other passages with a bearing on Proclus’ interpretation of this passage, see the note at 387.15.

even if we take Living-Thing-itself,<sup>537</sup> to the extent that it contains the forms of the elements, it too is a paradigm of the traces of the elements, but, to the extent that it is a living thing, [the paradigm] of this now<sup>538</sup> living universe. Consequently, Living-Thing-itself and the Intelligible are not simply the same thing, since Eternity too is always existent but is not a living thing, being<sup>539</sup> the intelligible paradigm of time, which is not a living thing. After all, not every intelligible paradigm is a living thing. And even though Living-Thing-itself is eternal, Eternity is prior to it, not being a living thing. For there is not any other living thing prior to Living-Thing-itself. Indeed, there is nothing of the same kind as it prior to any of the [entities] to which we append ‘itself’. So, just as Eternity is prior to Living-Thing-itself, not yet being a living thing, so is Being-itself prior to Eternity. For this reason [Being-itself] is not eternal and Eternity is a thing that has being.<sup>540</sup>

Living-Thing-itself, then, is the third intelligible triad. Of [this triad] the *Oracles*<sup>541</sup> too say that it is ‘a worker’, that it is ‘the bestower of life-bearing fire’, that it ‘fills the life-producing womb of Hecate’ and

pours into the Maintainers  
the life-giving might of most puissant fire.

[I say ‘too’] because all of this is no different from saying that it is an all-perfect intelligible living thing, the source of all intellective life and the cause of all paradigmatic existence.

But enough on this subject.

### *Points of detail: 420.20–421.3*

As far as the wording is concerned, **to construct in the likeness** shows that the universe has been made to the highest degree like the Paradigm. Not every image is **constructed in the likeness**, but [only] one that is perfectly like [its model]. Wherever dissimilarity has the upper hand, [the copy] is not **constructed in the likeness**. For that is not the outcome.<sup>542</sup>

**Has he who constructs [the universe] constructed [it]** shows us clearly that the Demiurge of the universe creates by his very being and that he possesses this activity essentially; for [Plato] has not referred

<sup>537</sup> Sc. as opposed to everlasting Being as a whole.

<sup>538</sup> Sc. at this point in Timaeus’ account.

<sup>539</sup> Reading ὦν (M Praechter, Festugière) rather than ὄν (C P Diehl) at 420.5.

<sup>540</sup> διὸ καὶ ὁ (ὁ om. M) αἰὼν ὄν καὶ (καὶ om. P) τὸ ὄν ὁ αἰὼν (420.11). Read διὸ καὶ οὐκ αἰώνιον καὶ τὸ ὄν ὁ αἰὼν. (Cf. 231.9–13 above and ET §87.)

<sup>541</sup> Or. *Chald.* fr. 32 Majercik.

<sup>542</sup> οὐ γὰρ γίνεται τοῦτο τέλος (420.24) is, as Festugière says, rather difficult, but I am not sure that changing τέλος to τέλειως, as Theiler suggests, really helps.

to [the Demiurge] in one way and to the creative activity (*poiêsis*) that issues (*proienai*) from him in another, but by one and the same word.<sup>543</sup> Moreover, [the wording], it seems to me, also indicates that he is always creating and is always creating completely, for **he who constructs** signifies an ever-present productivity, **has constructed**, one that is perfect and fully-completed. And from the combining of the two phrases it is quite clear that the creator of the universe, god,<sup>544</sup> is both begetting and has begotten all things through all eternity.<sup>545</sup>

*The Paradigm cannot be any incomplete living thing*

Let us not degrade it by supposing that it was to any of those that exist in the form of a part; nothing that resembles anything incomplete could ever be beautiful.<sup>546</sup> (30c4–5)

*General explanation: 421.7–422.5*

There are many intelligible living things (cf. 418.3ff.). Some of them are more universal, others more particular; some are unified, others divided; some are determined in relation to Limit, others in relation to the Unlimited. When he asks himself which [of these] is the all-complete paradigm of the universe and upon which intelligible living thing the cosmos is dependent, Plato does not think it right to assign any of the particular ones that status because each of them is **incomplete** as compared to the universal [one]. ['As compared to the universal one'] because a thing may be described as **incomplete** from two perspectives: either in comparison with its own [true] nature or in comparison with something that is superior and more of a cause. It is not permissible even to consider the first alternative in relation to divine [entities]. Each of these preserves its own measure<sup>547</sup> for all eternity and for ever keeps its own good well-protected. As Socrates says in the *Republic* (381c8), each of them is 'the best' in its own order. The second [kind of comparison], on

<sup>543</sup> Sc. the verb 'constructed' (συνίστημι).

<sup>544</sup> The phrase ὁ τοῦ παντός ποιητῆς θεός ('the creator of the universe, god'; 'le Dieu créateur de l'Univers' (Festugière)) is a little awkward and θεός may be a gloss on ὁ τοῦ παντός ποιητῆς.

<sup>545</sup> With 420.28–421.3, cf. the similar comments on 29e1 at 359.9–14.

<sup>546</sup> No divergences from Burnet's OCT text.

<sup>547</sup> I am not sure of the precise connotation of μέτρον here. 'Due measure, limit, proportion' (LSJ 4), 'degree, rank' (Lampe 4), and 'standard, level' (Lampe 5) are all suggestive, as is *ET* 126.21–3, where μέτρον is closely associated with τάξις.

the other hand, is, as was stated [earlier],<sup>548</sup> of common occurrence [in Plato] and it is in the same way that he describes something which is not primarily beautiful but [only] participates beauty as ‘wanting in beauty’ in the *Symposium* (201b6), for example, that he [here] terms ‘an **incomplete** living thing’ one that is not primarily a living thing, or living thing as such, but is one by participation and thanks to procession from up there (*ekeithen*).<sup>549</sup> If, then, every particular living thing is **incomplete** but the paradigm of the cosmos is all-complete, the paradigm of the cosmos will not be a particular living thing. After all, does the Demiurge think this all-complete and primary living thing or not? It is certainly impossible for him not to think things that we observe even soul thinking. But if he does think it, and if every thought of the Demiurge is a productive act, it must also be the case that he creates by the very act of thinking. So in that case what can be more divine than the universe?<sup>550</sup> He certainly will not create something second-rate if he is looking towards something that is superior.<sup>551</sup> It was with good reason, then, that [Plato], when seeking the paradigmatic cause (*archê*) of this cosmos of ours, had recourse to<sup>552</sup> the all-complete Living Thing.

### A puzzle: 422.5–423.7

‘Well then’, someone may ask, ‘are not the sun and the moon and each and every star beautiful? But how is this so? Each one of them has been made in the likeness of a *particular* living thing.’ The answer is that each of them is beautiful when considered along with the whole and subordinated to the whole, just as an eye is beautiful and a chin beautiful along with the whole face and in [the context of] the whole [face], but on its own does not exhibit the beauty that is proper to it. For, because it is a part and not in [its] essence a whole, by being detached from the whole it diminishes its own beauty. So perfection and beauty belong to [the heavenly bodies], although they are parts, thanks to the whole.

The reason [for this], says Porphyry,<sup>553</sup> is that in them the part is a whole. All that is present in the whole completely is, thanks to the unity of the intelligible Forms, present in a partial fashion<sup>554</sup> in each of them.

<sup>548</sup> At 363.23, where the *Symposium* passage is also cited.

<sup>549</sup> διχῶς . . . τοιοῦτον (421.13–24) is in effect parenthetical and Proclus resumes the argument with εἰ τοίνυν at 421.24.

<sup>550</sup> At 422.1 Festugière reads <δὲ> after δεῖ and punctuates with a comma rather than a full stop after νοεῖν, but it seems to me that Diehl’s text is satisfactory as it stands.

<sup>551</sup> Sc. the Living-Thing-itself. <sup>552</sup> Or perhaps ‘traced it back to’.

<sup>553</sup> 422.5–26 = fr. 52 Sodano. <sup>554</sup> Or perhaps ‘appropriately to a part’.

Now it is indeed true to say that each part<sup>555</sup> among them is also in a way a whole, being made a whole thanks to its communion with all things, so that, although it is one in essence, it is all things by participation. However, even its wholeness exists in a partial manner and is not like that of a whole in the strict sense. It is one thing to be a whole in the solar or lunar mode, [that is,] by each intellect containing all things in the manner appropriate to itself [but] with the single form which makes that intellect an intellect of a certain kind and an individual intellect dominating, quite another to be all things without [having] a particular character [of one's own], being all things through being<sup>556</sup> Intellect and not through being an intellect of a particular kind.<sup>557</sup>

‘What? Have not they too, this sun [of ours], this moon, each of these stars, been created (*gignesthai*) after intelligible paradigms? How, then, can they be other than beautiful?’ Yes, they too are beautiful, but not ‘most beautiful’; that which is in reality the ‘most beautiful’ [of things] is the cosmos. So, just as each of them is complete but not all-complete, so is each beautiful but not ‘most beautiful’ as the universe is. That each of them is indeed also complete [Plato] himself will indicate later when he states that the cosmos has been created (*gignesthai*) ‘complete, out of complete [parts]’ (32d1–2) and ‘a whole made up of wholes’ (33a7). So the completeness of the whole is one thing, that of the part another; and the wholeness of what is all-complete one thing, that of what is merely complete another; and beauty in the ‘most beautiful’ one thing, [the beauty] which has undergone a more partial participation in Beauty another.

So much for our solution to this puzzle.

### *Points of detail: 423.7–425.7*

The [phrase] **in the form of a part** is easier to understand if one takes it as meaning the same as ‘of the order of a part’, and that in turn as equivalent to begotten<sup>558</sup> (*gignesthai*) ‘as a part’.

The divine Iamblichus,<sup>559</sup> for his part, thinks that one should add ‘as’ to **in a form** and understand the whole to mean that every particular

<sup>555</sup> Sc. each individual star.

<sup>556</sup> Like Festugière, reading ὃν τὰ with C rather than ὧν τὰ with Schneider and Diehl at 422.25.

<sup>557</sup> With lines 21–6 cf. 426.18–25.

<sup>558</sup> γεγονός is, I think, inspired by πεφυκότων in the lemma and so does not belong inside the inverted commas. Such an origin also suggests renderings such as ‘begotten’, ‘born’ (‘est né’, Festugière) or ‘produced’, even though Proclus goes on to gloss πεφυκέναι by οὐσιώσθαι.

<sup>559</sup> 423.9–19 = fr. 42 Dillon.

living thing among the Intelligibles ‘is by nature a part as [they exist] in a Form’.<sup>560</sup> For, since a part is not the same kind of thing among [the Intelligibles] as it is among sensibles – there each [part] is all the things that the whole in its own order is – on that account the philosopher<sup>561</sup> has added [the qualification] **as in a Form**,<sup>562</sup> so that, regarding the appellation **part** in the manner appropriate to the Forms, you will not understand it in a sense which implies separation and division and is remote from<sup>563</sup> the unity of those unified and indivisible essences; for they are indeed indivisible and unified according to the philosopher himself.

In the present case let us take [the verb] *pepbukenai* to mean not ‘to be by nature’ but ‘to be essentially’.<sup>564</sup> People often also refer to essences of every kind as ‘natures’, as does Socrates in the *Philebus* [when he says]: ‘You will therefore say, in accordance with the principle of causality, that there is in the nature of Zeus a royal soul and a royal intellect.’<sup>565</sup>

As for the words **let us not degrade**<sup>566</sup> **it by supposing that it was to any**, Plato delivers them as though he were intoning them along with

<sup>560</sup> In the text of the *Timaeus* as Proclus had it, and as we have it, μέρους occurs between ἐν and εἶδει, so adding ὥς to ἐν εἶδει should give ὥς ἐν μέρους εἶδει rather than ἐν μέρους ὥς ἐν εἶδει (423.11), which, as far as I can see, makes no sense anyway. (Removing the second ἐν as, Kroll suggested, only goes part way towards remedying the situation.) If Iamblichus did indeed read ὥς ἐν μέρους εἶδει, he must, I think, have broken the nexus between ἐν εἶδει and μέρους and taken μέρους with πεφυκότων. (Plato would then be saying something like ‘to none of those which are by nature a part as [parts exist] in a Form’.) And in that case, since πεφυκότων has become πεφυκός in the paraphrase, we would expect either ὥς ἐν μέρος εἶδει πεφυκός or μέρος ὥς ἐν εἶδει πεφυκός at 423.11. The former has the advantage of remaining closer to the text of Plato, but the latter is easier Greek and ἐν μέρους for μέρος would be an easy enough ‘correction’ for a copyist, so that is what I have read. (Another possibility that occurs to me is that Iamblichus wanted to add ὥς ἐν εἶδει rather than just ὥς, in which case I would read τὸ ὥς τὸ [sc. μέρος] ἐν εἶδει in line 10 with **P** and ἐν μέρους <εἶδει> ὥς ἐν εἶδει in line 11. Admittedly the use of ἐν εἶδει in two different senses would be awkward, but it would make good sense of the whole passage and one could see how things might have gone wrong in the manuscripts.)

<sup>561</sup> The ‘philosopher’ should, as elsewhere (including just below in line 19), be Plato, which, as Dillon points out, seems to guarantee that Iamblichus wants to add ὥς (or ὥς ἐν εἶδει) to Plato’s text and not just to ‘understand’ it.

<sup>562</sup> Translating Diehl’s text at 423.15. (Festugière would add <τῷ> before ἐν εἶδει.)

<sup>563</sup> Translating ἀπολειφθεῖσαν (C Diehl) rather than ἀπολειφθῆς (M P Festugière).

<sup>564</sup> I have watered this down to ‘exist’ in my translation of the lemma.

<sup>565</sup> 30d1–3. (A paraphrase rather than a quotation.)

<sup>566</sup> Although I would opt for a more neutral rendering such as Cornford’s ‘suppose’ in translating the *Timaeus*, I have followed LSJ (s.v. IV) and Festugière in adopting this rendering here because it goes some way towards bringing out the play between κατα-ίωσωμεν and ἀξίωμα in the next line. Proclus seems to feel that Timaeus/Plato is not only uttering words appropriate to the Demiurge but employing a particularly elevated turn of phrase.

the Demiurge and as though he had actually assumed the very dignity of the divine cause itself. This is because one assumes the character of the divine when in mystic mode one expounds its transcendent and all-perfect intellections.

That **a thing which resembles something incomplete is not beautiful** is true but seems to involve a difficulty: if, in the whole, one part is better, another worse, how is it that the whole has not become inferior to its better part by the addition of its worse? However, the problem resolves itself because coordination of the worse with the better makes the whole one and complete; it is when they are not interwoven with one another that the admixture of the worse [element] does away with the potency of the better.

And if someone were, on the basis of this and earlier statements, to construct a syllogism with contradictory premisses, [as follows]: ‘everything created (*gignesthai*) after an eternal paradigm is beautiful (established [earlier]);<sup>567</sup> nothing created after an eternal *particular* paradigm is beautiful (as [Plato] says here); therefore that which is created after a particular eternal paradigm is not created after an eternal paradigm’, we refute the argument by finding fault with the middle term, which is not the same [in both cases]. In one case it designates that which is in any sense beautiful, whether in a restricted sense or absolutely, in the other that which is ‘most beautiful’, since, when that which is created after a particular paradigm is said not to be beautiful, it means that it is not ‘most beautiful’. For a part [only] has the beauty of a part and is not beautiful absolutely; the only thing that is is a whole to which the beauties of the individual parts also contribute, [beauties] which are themselves individual. For every part exists for the sake of something else, [namely,] the whole, and whatever beauty it may have has the status of matter in relation to the beauty of the whole. And for that reason it is not beautiful in the sense of being ‘most beautiful’.

On the same basis one must also reject those accounts which make the Good a particular intelligible Form and not something prior to all the Intelligibles.<sup>568</sup> If it *is* one of the Forms, it too is [merely] part of the

<sup>567</sup> Punctuating with a semicolon rather than a full stop after ὑπόκειται γάρ (424.8), which, like ὡς νῦν φησι in the next line, is a comment on the origin of the premiss rather than part of it. The reference is presumably to 28a6-b1.

<sup>568</sup> Proclus argues the position that the Good is prior to the Intelligibles at considerably greater length and from other perspectives in both *in Remp.* diss. XI and *PT* II. §4. In *in Remp.* (I. 269.14ff.) he argues that Plato distinguishes between the ‘good in us’, the Form of the good, and the transcendent Good, which is prior to the Intelligibles and their cause. He avoids complicating the issue here.

whole Intelligible Deep<sup>569</sup> in which it is [located]. And every part, as is stated in the present passage (*entautha*), is incomplete, and so the Good too is incomplete. How, then, is it any longer the most blessed thing in [the realm of] Being if it is incomplete?<sup>570</sup> And, in that case, a thing which resembles it is not beautiful;<sup>571</sup> [but] in fact<sup>572</sup> for all things there is nothing better or more beautiful than likeness to it.<sup>573</sup> So, if these are the consequences for the Good if it is a part, it will not be a part of the Intelligible.<sup>574</sup> But nor is it the whole of the Intelligible. What would there be left for it to rule over, if it were the whole of the Intelligible?<sup>575</sup> And, besides, the sun, which occupies a position analogous to that of the Good, is no more the whole of the visible.<sup>576</sup> Therefore the Good must be outside the Intelligible, being neither a part of the Intelligible nor the whole of the Intelligible. And nor, therefore, will either

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<sup>569</sup> τοῦ ὅλου νοητοῦ βάθους (424.24). This probably refers to the Intelligibles as a whole, in which case it is equivalent to the Chaldean expression ὁ πατρικός βυθός, for which see 312.7 with Runia's note. For the expression, cf. the references to a νοερόν and a δημιουργικόν βάθος in Theodore of Asine's system at II. 274.23–4 and to an unknown interpreter's suggestion that Ocean is τὸ νοητὸν αὐτὸ τῆς ζωῆς βάθος at III. 177.28 and Proclus' description in *PT* of the middle term of the middle triad of the Intelligible-Intellective level in his own system as τὸ βάθος τοῦ οὐρανοῦ at IV. 60.17, etc. As David Runia points out, the phrase is also reminiscent of τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ at *Symp.* 210d4.

<sup>570</sup> Both Living-Thing-itself and the Demiurge would be instances of more 'blessed' intelligible entities in that they are both in a sense 'wholes' (for this, cf. 425.5–7 below). However, perhaps one should understand τοῦ ὄντος less specifically and translate 'the most blessed thing in existence', which would make ἔτι ('still') easier.

<sup>571</sup> This would follow from the lemma.

<sup>572</sup> Assuming an ellipse along the lines, '[but that cannot be the case] because for all things . . .'

<sup>573</sup> πῶς οὖν ἔτι τοῦ ὄντος εὐδαιμονέστατον (εὐδαιμονέστερον ci Kroll), ἀτελὲς ὃν (ἀτελὲς ὃν Diehl: ἀτελὲς **M P**: om. **C**: ἔστιν ἀτελὲς ὃν ci **S**); οὕτως (οὕτως Kroll: ὄντως **C M**: ὄντος **P**: πῶς ci Schneider) δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκείνῳ εἰκὸς οὐκ ἔστι καλόν· οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστι τῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ὁμοιώσεως πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἢ μᾶλλον καλόν (424.26–9; I have only included the variants relevant to what follows). Although I have translated Diehl's text, I am not convinced by it. I would tentatively suggest accepting Schneider's πῶς, deleting οὐκ and punctuating with a question mark after καλόν (all in line 27), which would give, 'and how, moreover, is what resembles it beautiful? Because for all things . . .' Not only would this make the otherwise rather difficult γάρ clause (27–9) easier, but it is easy to see how ὃν (if one accepts it) followed by πῶς could be misread as ὄντως and ἀτελὲς then be omitted (in **C** only) and οὐκ be added (in all manuscripts) in an attempt to re-establish sense.

<sup>574</sup> Proclus also argues that the Good is not a part of the Intelligibles (or of anything else) at *in Remp.* I. 286.12–287.6, although the argument there is different.

<sup>575</sup> Socrates states that the Good 'rules over' the Intelligibles at *Rep.* 509d1–2.

<sup>576</sup> Taken by itself, this would seem to suggest that the Good is in fact 'part' of the Intelligibles.

Living-Thing-itself or the Demiurge<sup>577</sup> be identified with the Good, even though each of them is a whole in so far as it embraces all of the Forms.

*The Paradigm is that living thing which contains all others*

Rather, let us hold that of all [living things] it is most like the one of which other living things are, singly and in their families, parts.<sup>578</sup> (30c5–7)

*The words ‘singly and in their families’: 425.11–426.25*

10 Some, such as Atticus,<sup>579</sup> have stated that **singly** and **in their families** in this passage are opposing the indivisible species to the more universal ones.<sup>580</sup> (By ‘indivisible species’ they mean the immediate causes of individuals – for example Human-being-itself, Horse-itself [and] all other  
15 such species – and by ‘genera’ [those of] the paradigms which are more universal and comprehensive than these.)

Others say that the individuals themselves are also<sup>581</sup> being opposed to the more universal [groupings] because in fact some of the paradigms are those of particulars (*merê*), others of species, as Amelius states. And, what is more, Theodore, following [Amelius], says that there are two  
20 Intellects, one of which is divided into wholes, the other into parts, and this is the same as **singly** and **in their families**.<sup>582</sup>

Yet others, such as Xenarchus,<sup>583</sup> say that **in their families** refers to the pre-existing intelligible causes of living things [as grouped] according to their [respective] elements, that is, to the heavenly [genus], the aerial,  
25 the aquatic, the terrestrial, which [Plato] will refer to a little later (39e10–40a2),<sup>584</sup> and [that] **singly** [refers to] the specific causes (*eidopoioi archai*)

<sup>577</sup> Proclus has already argued that the Demiurge is not to be identified with the Good at 359.22–360.4.

<sup>578</sup> No significant divergences from Burnet’s OCT text.

<sup>579</sup> 425.11–16 = Atticus, fr. 33 Des Places.

<sup>580</sup> Sc. the *infimae species* to the subaltern species (which are at the same time species and genera) and the genera.

<sup>581</sup> Sc. as well as the ἄτομα εἶδη.

<sup>582</sup> 425.16–22 = Deuse Test. 11. As Festugière explains, Theodore holds that there are three Demiurges each having three phases, the third in each case being a (or the) αὐτοζῶον. As 309.14–20 shows, the two intellects referred to here are the second and third of Theodore’s three Demiurges, the first remaining undivided.

<sup>583</sup> For Xenarchus see the Introduction, p. 14.

<sup>584</sup> As Festugière points out, Cornford (p. 40) takes the same view.

of the many [individuals]<sup>585</sup> contained in each of these [genera], because among the heavenly bodies there is one paradigm for the sun, another for the moon, and among terrestrial creatures one for men, another for lions, and similarly for [the two spheres which fall] between these.

The divine Iamblichus,<sup>586</sup> for his part, took the opposite direction to all of these [commentators] in his interpretation. They make **singly** inferior to and more particular than **in their families**. He, on the contrary, makes it more elevated, just as, among the Intelligibles, it is fitting that the henad comes before the manifold. Accordingly, he says that all the other living things are **singly** or **in their families** parts of the Living-Thing-itself; and indeed, both with regard to the manifolds within them and with regard to their monads, they come under the Living-Thing-itself, and there is not one of them<sup>587</sup> which has not proceeded from the Intelligible. The intelligible Living Thing is inclusive of all things [that come] after it, not as being constituted by them – it is a whole prior to its parts, not [a whole formed] out of its parts<sup>588</sup> – nor as being predicated of them – indeed it is the cause of the many – but as the originating principle, and as filling all things with itself and embracing in a unitary fashion all things which the things which come after it [embrace] in a divided fashion. So [this principle] embraces what are [here] referred to as its **parts** and comprehends the many genera and species in a single form and pre-exists the secondary paradigms in every way (*pantelôs*). It was the All in intelligible mode, whereas, of the [paradigms which come] after it, one is all things in celestial mode, another in solar mode, another in terrestrial mode, others in other modes in accordance with the respective causes of the [remaining] encosmic [entities]. And so it embraces all things totally (*pantelôs*), while each of [the other paradigms embraces them only] partially as compared to [its] intelligible all-ness.<sup>589</sup>

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### *The words ‘most like’: 426.25–427.2*

Accordingly, while the cosmos is also ‘like’ these particular living things, since it also resembles the Demiurge himself, it is **most like** the Living-Thing-itself; indeed, it is precisely because it has mimicked the latter’s

<sup>585</sup> Festugière supplies ‘subdivisions’, but I think the examples that follow favour ‘individuals’.

<sup>586</sup> 426.3–427.2 = fr. 43 Dillon. <sup>587</sup> Or ‘no aspect of them’.

<sup>588</sup> For the distinction, see *ET* §§67–9.

<sup>589</sup> Cf. ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ τὸ πᾶν ἦν νοητῶς at 426.20. παντότης (‘all-ness’) is the quality of being all-embracing, almost of being a ‘universe’. The Living-Thing-itself has it in the first instance, the Demiurge (cf. 390.21; 432.18–25), the cosmos (448.25–6, etc.) and the soul (448.25–6), derivatively.

completeness and luminosity<sup>590</sup> that it is itself visible. Or, better,<sup>591</sup> each  
 30 living thing here below is also ‘like’ the all-complete Living Thing in so  
 far as it is [itself] a living thing, but that which is of all things **most like**  
 it is the universe, since [the universe] is the primal (*prôtôs*) visible living  
 thing just as [its model] was the primal intelligible living thing. So [the  
 427 universe] is **most like** [the Living-Thing-itself] in two senses: either in  
 that it is also like other [living things], or in that other [living things] are  
 also like the [Living-Thing-itself], but the universe is **most like** it.<sup>592</sup>

*The inclusiveness of the Living-Thing-itself is like that  
 of the cosmos*

For that [living thing] holds the intelligible living things in its embrace,  
 5 just as this cosmos [holds] us and all the other visible nurslings that exist  
 [within it].<sup>593</sup> (30c7–d1)<sup>594</sup>

*The identity of the Living-Thing-itself and the Orphic Phanes:  
 427.6–430.18*

Plotinus represents the Living-Thing-itself in two ways: sometimes as  
 superior to Intellect, as in the *Miscellaneous Inquiries* (*Enn.* 3.9.1), some-  
 times as inferior [to Intellect], as in *On Numbers* (*Enn.* 6.6.8), when  
 10 he says that Being is first, then Intellect, then the Living-Thing-itself.  
 Theodore, on the other hand, who claims that each of the Demiurges  
 has a threefold existence, thinks it right to call the third [element] in  
 each ‘Living-Thing-itself’. Clearly, we must take from both what is true,  
 from the admirable Theodore the fact that [Living-Thing-itself] holds  
 15 the third rank among the Intelligibles,<sup>595</sup> from the most divine Plot-  
 inus the fact that it is inferior to one intellect but above and beyond  
 another, and must say that, issuing (*ekphainein*)<sup>596</sup> from intelligible Life  
 at the limit of the Intelligibles, it produces the entire sum of intellective,

<sup>590</sup> On the ‘luminosity’ of the αὐτοζῶον, or Phanes, cf. the note at 430.18.

<sup>591</sup> It becomes apparent in the sequel that this second explanation of ὁμοιότατον does not entirely supersede the first.

<sup>592</sup> With Festugière, rejecting Diehl’s <κα> at 427.2 and punctuating with a comma rather than a full stop at the end of 427.1.

<sup>593</sup> Or, ‘that are produced in visible form [within it]’.

<sup>594</sup> Divergences from Burnet’s OCT text: Proclus omits πάντα after ζῶα at 30c8.

<sup>595</sup> 427.10–14 = Deuse Test. 13.

<sup>596</sup> Phanes means ‘he who reveals’ or ‘he who is revealed’, and plays on his name involv-  
 ing words formed from the same root are common; Proclus, for example, writes διὸ  
 δὴ καὶ Ὀρφεὺς Φάνητά τε τὸν θεὸν τοῦτον προσηγόρευσεν ὡς ἐκφαίνοντα τὰς νοητὰς  
 ἐνώδας at III. 101.10–11 below and the Orphic *Argonautica* already remarks Φάνητα  
 . . . πρῶτος γὰρ ἐφάνθη (verse 15). Although Phanes has not yet been mentioned, he is

hypercosmic and encosmic living things from the top [of the hierarchy] all the way [down] to the last of them, and that it is inclusive of all of them, transcending them and containing [their] causes in advance in a unitary form.

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And in fact Orpheus presents a similar picture of [the Living-Thing-itself] in his theological writings on Phanes. At any rate, in [Orpheus], this god first wears many animal heads,<sup>597</sup>

emitting the bellows of a bull and the roars of a fierce lion,

and proceeds out of the primordial egg. The Living Thing is seminally present in [this egg], and it was because he recognized this that Plato addressed this very great god as the 'Living-Thing-itself'. For what is the difference between calling the hidden cause an egg and [calling] that which has issued (*ekphainein*) from it a living thing? What else but a living thing would emerge from an egg? And this egg was the offspring of Ether and Chaos (cf. p. 128 Kern), the former of which is situated at the limit of the Intelligibles, the latter in the [region of the] Unlimited; for the former is the root of all things, while for the latter 'there was no limit' (fr. 66 Kern). So if the first thing [to issue] from Limit and the Unlimited is primal (*prôtôs*) Being, Plato's Being and the Orphic egg will be the same thing. And if Phanes, who corresponds to Living-Thing-itself, [issues] from this [egg], one must ask what it is in Orpheus that corresponds to Eternity,<sup>598</sup> which falls in Plato between Living-Thing-itself and Being. But we shall deal with that elsewhere. Now we must make the question of whether Phanes is the Living-Thing-itself clearer, and we must state that the Living-Thing-itself is nothing other than the Phanes of the Theologian. For, if [Phanes] first and [Phanes] alone proceeds from the

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the mythological alter ego of the αὐτοζῶον and ἐκφανέν (here translated 'issuing' but more literally 'having revealing himself' or 'having been revealed') is the first of many such plays in this section. Rather than try to bring out these puns in the translation, I shall add the words containing the puns in transliteration. (Most of them involve the verb ἐκφαίνω, which Proclus in fact uses freely in connection with all of the gods from the One down, but not normally as copiously as here.)

<sup>597</sup> And therefore is the first ζῶον.

<sup>598</sup> For a possible pointer to Proclus' solution, cf. the following passage in Damascius: εἰς δὲ τὴν δευτέραν [sc. τριάδα] τελεῖν ἦτοι τὸ κρούμενον καὶ τὸ κύον ὡν τὸν θεόν, ἢ τὸν ἀργῆτα χιτῶνα, ἢ τὴν νεφέλην, ὅτι ἐκ τούτων ἐκθρώσκει ὁ Φάνης. ἄλλοτε γὰρ ἄλλα περὶ τοῦ μέσου φιλοσοφοῦσι (*De princ.* I. 317.2–4 (Ruelle)). Either of the first two alternatives (sc. the fertilized egg containing the embryo god or the 'glistening membrane' of the egg) would accord with what Proclus says here. (Note, however, Brisson's comment that '[l]e caractère très artificiel de ces rapprochements incite à la plus grande prudence' at Brisson (1987b) 72.)

egg, which in [Orpheus] reveals<sup>599</sup> the very first intelligible Intellect, and [if] that which proceeds first and alone from an egg is of necessity nothing other than a living thing, it is clearly also the case that the very great Phanes is nothing other than the very first living thing, or, as Plato would say, the Living-Thing-itself. That much, then, is established. Let us [now] examine what comes next.

This [Phanes], then,<sup>600</sup> having made himself manifest (*ekphainein*) from among the Hidden Gods, **already contains** (*prolambanein*) **within himself** the causes of [all] the secondary orders<sup>601</sup> – the creative, the sustaining, the originating, the perfective, the inflexible – and **holds in his embrace**<sup>602</sup> in the form of a single cause all the **intelligible living things**, first (*men*) awakening himself to the most universal forms of all [things],<sup>603</sup> for which reason he has been said to be the first of the gods to have shape and form, then (*de*) producing all the intelligible and unified causes<sup>604</sup> and revealing (*ekphainein*) them to the intellective gods, as a result of which the Demiurge, filled with [these causes], brings this visible (*emphanês*) world into existence and includes within it all sensible living things, both the more divine and the mortal.

These [last] truly are nurslings because they certainly do participate the nutritive soul. But if they were *all*<sup>605</sup> to be called **nurslings** – though on the grounds that their bodies are the progeny of nature and that they possess continuous life and are sustained through its agency even

<sup>599</sup> This translation of δηλοῖ has the virtue of conforming to Proclan doctrine in making Phanes, or the αὐτοζῶν, νοητὸς νοῦς, rather than the Egg, as Festugière's 'désigne' seems to. However, as Diehl's apparatus shows, the text of lines 15–16 is far from certain, and it is not at all clear what Proclus actually wrote.

<sup>600</sup> What follows is closely paralleled by III. 101.3–9 below.

<sup>601</sup> Of gods, as the terms that follow – which Festugière gives reasons for believing are all 'Chaldean' – show. For the νοητοὶ θεοὶ as 'fathers of all of the classes (γενῶν) of gods', see *PT V*. 55.5–8.

<sup>602</sup> The choice of the perfect tense in προεἶληφε (428.23) and περιεἶληφε (428.25) has, I think, been inspired by the occurrence of the periphrastic form περιλαβὼν ἔχει in the lemma, which the two perfects in a sense gloss.

<sup>603</sup> ἐαυτὸν μὲν εἰς τὰς ὀλικωτάτας τῶν πάντων ἰδέας ἀνεγείρων (428.25–6). Cf. ἐγείρων μὲν ἐαυτὸν πρὸς ἰδέας καὶ δυνάμεις παντοίας at III. 101.7–8 with Festugière's note. Phanes' (or the αὐτοζῶν's) 'awakening himself' to ('into' has its attractions in the present passage, but a *TLG* search shows that Proclus uses πρὸς and εἰς interchangeably with both ἐγείρειν and ἀνεγείρειν) is paralleled by the Demiurge's 'looking to' (ὄραν) the αὐτοζῶν/παράδειγμα prior to creating. Proclus seems to explain the difference in terminology at III. 101.19–24: 'looking to' is proper to the intellectual gods, but the intelligible Intellect (sc. Phanes) is, according to Orpheus, 'eyeless'. Perhaps the verb ἀνεγείρειν (or ἐγείρειν) itself was used of Phanes in the Orphic poems.

<sup>604</sup> Sc. the [four 'species' of] Forms. For the third triad of the Intelligibles as the 'producer' of the Forms, cf. *PT V*. 55.14–24.

<sup>605</sup> Sc. the more divine as well as the mortal.

though they are everlasting, and not on the ground that they have need of nourishment supplied from outside – that would also be correct. Unless, indeed, one should also call all things in the cosmos **nurslings** on the ground that they are all nourished by the King of Visible Things<sup>606</sup> through the bestowal of light, which Socrates said in the *Republic* (509b3–4) is the cause of nourishment and generation for all it illumines. After all, once they are fully formed, each and every one of them is nourished by the light, since it is possible to be nourished from without and not only from within, as we have learned in the *Politicus* (288e8–289a3).

But be that as it may, the Demiurge has included all [these] in the cosmos,<sup>607</sup> in order that, in likeness to that [other], this sensible [one] too should be ‘a universe’<sup>608</sup> and complete because of the parts [contained] within it.<sup>609</sup> So this cosmos too is a composite living thing, emitting different sounds from different parts of itself and a single [sound] from all of its parts [together];<sup>610</sup> for it also is a manifold ‘one’. And much sooner is the intelligible cosmos both a single living thing and a multiplicity, having brought multiplicity together in unity, just as this [cosmos] for its part<sup>611</sup> manifests unity in multiplicity. And the one is a whole made up of parts, the other a whole prior to the parts, transcendentally embracing the intelligible living things both causally and in a single form; for from it have issued the sources of the divine [realities] and all the most universal genera. This is why the Theologian fashions a most universal living thing, placing on it the heads of a ram, a bull, a lion and a serpent, and why both maleness and femaleness are first of all in it as being the first living thing – ‘female and begetter is the mighty god Erikepaios’, says the Theologian (fr. 81 Kern) – and he was also the first to have wings.

But why beat about the bush? If he has emerged from the primordial egg, this story also shows that he is the very first living thing, if it is appropriate to maintain (*phulattein*) the analogy; for just as the egg has contained in advance the seminal cause of the living thing, so does the

<sup>606</sup> On the sun as ‘King’, or ‘King of Visible Things’ or the like, as here, cf. Saffrey and Westerink’s note at *PT* II. 32.7.

<sup>607</sup> Omitting τὰ at 429.16 with **C M P**; cf. 429.3. (πάντα δ’ οὖν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ συνείληφεν ὁ δημιουργός here simply repeats καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ περιλαμβάνει πάντα at 429.3 after the parenthetic discussion of ‘θρέμματα’.)

<sup>608</sup> Rejecting Diehl’s <τὸ> at 429.17.

<sup>609</sup> Or, ‘and a complete thing formed out of its own parts’. Cf. line 23 below and also *Tim.* 32c5–33a2.

<sup>610</sup> Same theme at II. 305.7–25. Here Proclus is probably preparing the way for the Orphic citation at lines 26ff.

<sup>611</sup> Or perhaps ‘conversely’.

hidden<sup>612</sup> order embrace in unitary fashion all the Intelligible, and just as the living thing at once contains in divided fashion everything that was in the egg seminally, so too does this god bring forth into the light (10 *eis to emphanes*) the ineffable and elusive [nature] of the first causes. But enough of these matters for the moment.

And 'just as this cosmos embraces all visible things, so does that other [embrace all] intelligible things'.<sup>613</sup> The manner of the embrace is, as we have stated,<sup>614</sup> different in each case, but nonetheless even their very visibility belongs to things here by analogy to things there.<sup>615</sup> For Phanes, (15 shedding intelligible light from above on those there, renders them all<sup>616</sup> visible and 'displays the formerly invisible in full visibility (*ex aphanôn phanerous*)' (fr. 109 Kern), just as here below (*entautha*) too all of the colours produced by light give to bodies the [property of] being visible.<sup>617</sup>

### *Unity and separateness of the Intelligibles: 430.18–431.9*

Another thing one can admire in Plato's teaching is the way in which, (20 while preserving the unity of the Intelligibles unshaken, he nevertheless also assigns an unmixed purity to [each of] them. For, if they were all united with one another in such a way that mixture occurred and the individual character of each did not remain unadulterated, it would not be possible to ask after what kind (*poios*) of paradigm the universe has been created (*gignesthai*); for there is no qualitative distinction (25 *to poion*) in things which are mixed together.<sup>618</sup> And if, on the other hand, they were separated from one another in such a way that there was no community between them, it would not be the case that some of the Intelligibles embrace and others are embraced; for embracing and being embraced presuppose an order, a community of powers and a cooperation of all of the secondary [entities] in the pursuit of one

<sup>612</sup> 'Hidden' (κρύφιος) is no. 198 in Majercik's list of 'Various Chaldean Expressions'. Many scholars have argued that 'hidden order' is more likely to be an Orphic expression and Majercik asterisks the word as dubiously Chaldean.

<sup>613</sup> A paraphrase of the lemma. <sup>614</sup> Cf. 429.15–26. <sup>615</sup> Same analogy at 426.27–9.

<sup>616</sup> πάντας (430.15). Sc. τοὺς θεούς. Proclus switches from the neuter of ἐκείνα (= τὰ νοητά) in line 14 to the masculine to adjust to φανερούς in the Orphic quotation which follows, where the reference is, primarily at least, to Ouranos and Gaia.

<sup>617</sup> Apart from the obvious play on Phanes' name (on such plays, cf. the note at 427.16), it should be remembered that Phanes' alter ego, the Paradigm, is, as part of the intelligible order, illuminated from above by 'divine light' (on which see the note at 400.10) and passes it down (as 'intelligible light') to the next level of reality.

<sup>618</sup> Or perhaps, given the form of Plato's question at 30c3 (τίνι τῶν ζώων αὐτὸν ὁ συνιστὰς συνέστησεν): 'to ask after which paradigm the universe has been created, for there is no "which" in things which are mixed together'.

[end].<sup>619</sup> And in fact it is a characteristic of incorporeal and immaterial [entities] that unity belongs to them essentially whereas [their] separateness [only] reveals itself through their outwards-proceeding activities and their products. If one considers them in themselves, one will find all of them [present] in one another because of their uniformity of colour as it were – especially if one chooses to consider their monads; it is from the secondary and participating [entities] that we infer their unmixed nature. After all, what is the origin of the separateness of these last unless it reflects the unmixed purity of [the Intelligibles] which produce them? Things that are mixed together produce other things of the same character.<sup>620</sup>

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### *The beauty and completeness of the cosmos derive from the Paradigm's*

For, wishing to make it like the most beautiful and in all respects most complete of intelligible [living things], he constructed it as a single visible living thing containing within itself all [other living things] that are naturally akin to it.<sup>623</sup> (30d1–31a1)

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### *Relation between the Living-Thing-itself and the Demiurge* 431.14–433.11

At this point Atticus<sup>624</sup> posed the question as to whether the Demiurge too is embraced by the intelligible Living Thing. On the one hand, if he is so embraced, he seems not to be complete, for [Plato] says (30c4–5) that particular living things are incomplete and that it is on that account that things which resemble them are not beautiful. On the other hand, if he is not so embraced, the Living-Thing-itself does not seem to be more comprehensive than all the [other] Intelligibles.<sup>625</sup> But having [once] posed the question, he [too] easily concluded (*tithenai*) that the Demiurge

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<sup>619</sup> Or perhaps 'in a striving for unity'.

<sup>620</sup> The whole of this last paragraph should be compared with *ET* §176.

<sup>621</sup> Taking μάλιστα with τελείω. Cases could be made for taking it with ὁμοιωσαι, as Cornford does (τούτω πάντων ὁμοιότατον αὐτὸν εἶναι τιθώμεν at 30c6–7 perhaps favours this), or, like Zeyl, with βουληθείς. It is not clear how Proclus would have taken it.

<sup>622</sup> Cf. 435.27 and 436.1 below for this supplement.

<sup>623</sup> Divergences from Burnet's OCT text: Proclus omits ζῶα after συγγενῇ at 31a1.

<sup>624</sup> 431.14–20 = Atticus, fr. 34 Des Places. With what is said here about the relative positions of the Paradigm and the Demiurge for Atticus, cf. 305.11–16.

<sup>625</sup> Proclus has argued that it is more comprehensive (sc. that it includes them) at 417.3–21. The implication here seems to be that if the Demiurge is not embraced by the Living-Thing-itself, he will embrace it, and therefore be 'more comprehensive'.

is above the Living-Thing-itself. In contrast to [Atticus], Porphyry<sup>626</sup> gives the Demiurge a lower rank than the Intelligible: having hypothesized a supercelestial soul as the creative agency (*poiêtikos*) for the cosmos, he puts the paradigm for created things (*ta genomena*) in Intellect.<sup>627</sup> The divine Iamblichus<sup>628</sup> falls between the two, joining and uniting the Paradigm with the Demiurge because of the union of Intellect with the Intelligible. Amelius identifies the Intelligible with one of [his] Demiurges, and with the others, which are thereby ranked after it, [he identifies] that which is determinate with regard to its being.<sup>629</sup>

Our own account maintains that the Living-Thing-itself is [at the same time] prior to the Demiurge, in the Demiurge<sup>630</sup> and posterior to the Demiurge – for it proceeds to the entire intellective order, both universal and particular – and that the Demiurge himself looks both to himself and to the entities which are prior to him – it would not be right for him to pay attention to the entities which are posterior to him – and, looking to these, brings all things into existence and makes the universe as a whole an image of the entire Intelligible,<sup>631</sup> yet he is himself embraced by the entire Intelligible in the cause of the intellective gods<sup>632</sup> [which resides] there, not as a part of [the Intelligible] and a single Form, but as a lower (*deuteros*) order in the one prior to it. For it is in one way that divine Intellect is said to embrace the Forms, in another [that it is said to embrace] particular intellects: each of the latter is all things in its own right (*autotelôs*), but each of the former, while it is united with the other Forms, is not all things, since each [Form] is [always] itself, keeping its own character pure and distinct. So, on the same principle, it is in one way that the Intelligibles which exist within it are contained in the intelligible Intellect,<sup>633</sup> in another that the intellective orders which have proceeded from it [are so contained]; for one could also say that each of these [orders], while independent, is contained in the all-complete Living Thing. So everything is as much in the Demiurge as it is in the

<sup>626</sup> 43 I.20–3 = fr. 53 Sodano. <sup>627</sup> Cf. above 307.1ff. <sup>628</sup> 43 I.23–6 = fr. 44 Dillon.

<sup>629</sup> I am not sure what κατὰ τὸ ὅν ἀφορισμένον (43 I.28) is meant to convey and the text of the whole sentence is by no means certain. Perhaps it is relevant that Theodore of Asine, who followed Amelius in hypothesizing three Demiurges, is said at 309.18–20 above to have described the first as ἀδιάρετος, the second as εἰς ὅλα διηρημένος and the third as καὶ εἰς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα διαίρεσιν πεποιημένος.

<sup>630</sup> Cf., for example, 323.2off.

<sup>631</sup> Or perhaps 'and makes the universe *qua* universe an image of the intelligible universe'.

<sup>632</sup> On the sense in which a thing exists, or pre-exists, in its cause, see *ET* §65 with Dodds' commentary. (The Demiurge is of course one of the intellective gods.)

<sup>633</sup> In effect, another name for the Paradigm or Living-Thing-itself, for which cf. *PT* III.49.15 (with Saffrey and Westerink's note) and 51.7.

Paradigm, and in creating the cosmos with an eye to (*pros*) it he is also creating it with an eye to himself.

And intelligible all-ness<sup>634</sup> is one thing, intellective [all-ness] another. Both the tetrad and the decad<sup>635</sup> contained all things in itself, but the former in a unified manner, the latter in a divided manner, and the decad contains all the things which the tetrad [contains], but, by containing them in a divided manner, is more imperfect than the tetrad. For that which is closer to the monad is more perfect and the smaller the quantity [of an entity] the greater [its] power. And so the Demiurge too, although it contains all the things which the intelligible Living Thing [contains], nevertheless possesses an all-ness inferior to the intelligible [all-ness].

Let us then say in summary that there are two kinds of inclusion, one as of parts in the whole, the other as of effects in the cause, [and] Plato has on the present occasion made use of the first kind when he says that in the whole which is the Living-Thing-itself there are included as parts the genera and species of living things, all of which he has called imperfect as compared to the whole. The Demiurge, on the other hand, has proceeded out of [the Living-Thing-itself] as from [his] cause but contains all things in the intellective mode in his own right as well. So the Demiurge is embraced by the intelligible Living Thing in the causal mode but is not embraced in the way a part is and thus incomplete. And for that reason Timaeus too says (30c7–8) in much the same vein: ‘This [Living Thing] holds embraced within itself all the intelligible living things’; for it is in truth these that are embraced in it as parts, since they have remained inseparable from their own totality and, because it is not the whole before the parts, but the whole formed from the parts, [in fact] constitute it.

That is enough on this problem.

### *Parallels between the Living-Thing-itself and the cosmos:*

#### *433.11–26*

However, it is in addition well worth observing how Plato, in admirable fashion, at one point moves, in the way familiar to us, from the copies to their paradigms and at another from the paradigms to their copies,

<sup>634</sup> For ‘all-ness’ see the note at 426.24.

<sup>635</sup> The tetrad is the Paradigm, the decad the Demiurge. Proclus claimed to find both of these identifications in Pythagorean sources (cf. 316.16–317.5; II. 53.2–9; III. 107.6–25; in the case of the decad, there are exegetic complications) and the former, though not the latter (it is not even mentioned in the *PT*) in the *Timaeus* itself (see 39e10–40a2 with Proclus’ commentary at III. 105.14–107.26). The difference between the contents of the tetrad/Paradigm and the decad/Demiurge has already been alluded to at 323.6–8; 324.11–14; 401.31–402.11; basically, the Paradigm contains four generic Forms (at 324.12 they are called ἰδεῶν μονάδες), while the Demiurge contains Forms for everything he causes to exist.

15 thereby simultaneously displaying the continuity of things and their processions and conversions; for when he said (30c7-a1) that ‘just as the cosmos has embraced us, so does the Living-Thing-itself hold the intelligible living things in its embrace’, he was ascending from things here below<sup>636</sup> to their causes, and when [he said] (30d1-31a1) that **since the god wished to make the cosmos like the most beautiful of intelligible beings**, he made it inclusive of all things, his purpose was to pass from the causes to the things which arise from them in imitation of the procession of the secondary [realities]. He was led to such a transition by the parallelism [between the two spheres]: the relation which the products have to one another also obtains between their paradigms, and the more universal and the more particular in both stand in the same relation [to one another].

*Points of detail: 433.26–436.3*

But why has [Plato] called the Living-Thing-itself **the most beautiful of intelligible [things]**, even though it is the last term of the Intelligibles? The reason is that, although there are intelligible orders above it, **the most beautiful [thing]** is lower in the scale (*huphiēnai*) than them. They do not *participate* beauty; rather, the cause which creates beauty, the very first beauty, Beauty [itself], resides in them. This is why, in Orpheus (fr. 74 Kern), Phanes appears in the intellective mode on this [inferior] level (*taxis*) – Beauty already pre-existing in the unified mode<sup>637</sup> in the first Intelligibles – and is immediately named ‘son of most beautiful Ether’ and ‘graceful Eros’, because this god is the first to have been filled with hidden and ineffable Beauty. For this reason he is called **most beautiful**, being<sup>638</sup> the very first of the participants, even though all of the Intelligibles are united with one another,<sup>639</sup> since one should not separate them from one another in the way one does the intellective orders but [should] consider their union one and indissoluble. But, although this is a good answer, the most essential [point] is that [Plato] has stated that the Living-Thing-itself is **the most beautiful** not of all intelligible beings without qualification, but of [those that are] living things, because it was [in the course of] comparing the all-complete [Living Thing] to more partial living things that he said that it is **the most beautiful** of all intelligible living things. And so if there is something superior to a living

<sup>636</sup> Like Festugière, retaining ἀπὸ τούτων, the reading of the manuscripts, at 433.18.

<sup>637</sup> Following Festugière in removing the comma after ἐκφαίνεται (434.1) and adding one after ἠνωμένως (434.2).

<sup>638</sup> Reading ὧν (C Praechter, Festugière) rather than ὅν (M P Diehl) at 434.6.

<sup>639</sup> And might therefore be thought to share equally in beauty.

thing,<sup>640</sup> it is not relevant to the present discussion. (That there is such a thing is a necessity, because Being is simpler even than Living Thing, and so is Beauty-itself, on account of which they are also [present] in entities which are not living things.) 15

Moving on, [the idea of]<sup>641</sup> **likeness** is, they say,<sup>642</sup> quite appropriately made use of by [Plato]. In many places Plato himself expresses doubt as to the nature (*tropos*) of participation, [asking] whether things up there (*ekeina*) are present in things down here (*tauta*) or whether they relate [to them] in some other way, but he expresses no doubt on this score at least, that it is **likeness** that has made the visible cosmos a copy of the intelligible. And, making distinctions, they say that the sensible participates physical Forms by receiving their imprint, but that it receives reflections of the psychical Forms and **likenesses** of the intelligible [Forms]. And so, since it is the intelligible paradigms which are at issue, Plato has, so they say, quite appropriately, made use of [the idea of] **likeness**. 20 25

Further, the cosmos is a **living thing** as being an image of this intelligible Living Thing and of the intelligible all-ness,<sup>643</sup> and a **visible** [entity] as being made like the luminosity of the Paradigm<sup>644</sup> – for what ‘countenance’ is up there (*ekei*), visibility (*to horaton*) is down here (*entautha*).<sup>645</sup> 435

They looked in amazement at an unexpected light in the ether:  
so brightly shone the countenance of immortal Phanes 5  
(*Orph. fr.* 86 Kern)

– and **contains all things akin [to it]** because it is inclusive of all sensible [things].<sup>646</sup>

As for **naturally** (*kata phusin*), its addition is altogether admirable, since it shows that the Intelligibles are paradigms of those things in the cosmos which are in accordance with nature (*kata phusin*) and not of

<sup>640</sup> Taking τῆς ζώου φύσεως here and in line 16 as periphrastic (cf. LSJ φύσις II.5).

<sup>641</sup> I have supplied ‘the idea of’ rather than, say, ‘the word’ because Plato actually uses the verb rather than the noun.

<sup>642</sup> Festugière supplies ‘certain’ and translates ‘disent certain’ in the belief that οἱ δὲ at 434.22 introduces the opinion of another group of commentators. It seems more likely to me that we are dealing with the same people throughout.

<sup>643</sup> On ‘all-ness’, see the note at 426.24. <sup>644</sup> Cf. 426.27–9.

<sup>645</sup> The αὐτοζῶον, or Paradigm, is, as we have already learned (see, for example, 428.18–20), to be identified with Phanes, and Proclus now applies elements of the description of Phanes in the Orphic fragment which follows to the Paradigm. Notice that τῶ φανῶ looks forward to φέγγος but also involves a play on the name Φάνης. (χρῶς is more literally I. skin, flesh; II. complexion, colour.) With the whole passage, cf. 430.12–18 with note ad loc.

<sup>646</sup> In other words, the things it includes are ‘akin’ to it in that they, like it, are ‘sensible’.

10 those which are contrary to nature, as some Platonists are in the habit of saying. To speak generally, if we divide<sup>647</sup> the contents of the cosmos into those which are in accordance with nature and those which are contrary to nature, into those which are universal and those which are particular, and into substances and accidents, we shall in every case agree upon [the existence of] formal causes of the superior [members of each pairing] but under no circumstances [accept their existence in the case] of the inferior. A thing born thence<sup>648</sup> comes forth (*proienai*) through the agency of nature, and, if so, it is in accordance with nature and not contrary to nature.<sup>649</sup> And a thing born thence is something that is whole and everlasting. Otherwise one of two things [will be true]. Either there will be no contingent entities, or some Forms will create necessarily [while] others will create or not create as a matter of contingency. And, thirdly, everything emerging (*proienai*) thence is a substance, for since [these causes] create just by being, each of them is productive of substances. After all, it would be ridiculous to claim that nature at the particular level creates substances<sup>650</sup> while claiming that intelligible Form is responsible for the existence of [even] one accident. But we have examined these questions at greater length elsewhere.<sup>651</sup>

25 The things in the cosmos are **akin** to it because they all exist because of the intelligible causes.

It seems, moreover, that [the words] **one visible living thing embracing all [other] living things within it**<sup>652</sup> in this passage (*entautha*) constitute a definition of the cosmos. The intelligible Living Thing is also **one**, but not a **visible** one, and the sun, and each monadic entity, is **one**

<sup>647</sup> Festugière has a note on the workings of the division which follows at 435.11.

<sup>648</sup> Sc. a thing whose origin can be traced back to the Intelligibles.

<sup>649</sup> Punctuating 435.14–16 with a full stop after οὐδαμῶς, a comma after πρόεισιν, and a full stop after παρὰ φύσιν.

<sup>650</sup> Sc. by reproduction or art.

<sup>651</sup> Although no extant passage quite fits, it is worth noting that Proclus prefaces his long discussion in the *in Parm.* (816.10–833.19) of which things have Ideas and which do not with the words, ‘Necessarily, then, there are Ideas of natural beings only, or Ideas of things contrary to these as well, and if of natural beings only, either of eternal beings only or also of things not eternal; and if of eternal beings only, either of substances only or of unsubstantial beings also; and if of substances, of wholes alone or also of their parts; and if of wholes, either of simple beings or also of compounds derived from them’ (815.39–816.8 in Morrow and Dillon’s translation) and adverts to these issues throughout it.

<sup>652</sup> The words πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ζῶα περιειληφός are in fact a (not unreasonable) interpretative paraphrase of πάντα ὅσα αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν συγγενῇ ἐντὸς ἔχον in the lemma. There is an initial temptation to translate them ‘embracing all the living things [it holds] within it’, but the lemma and the further paraphrase πάντα τὰ ἄλλα περιλαβόν at 436.1 fix their meaning.

**visible living thing** but does not embrace all the rest, and so the definition of the universe is indeed given here. But let us move the discussion on [and return] to the text of Plato.<sup>653</sup>

436

### *III The uniqueness of the cosmos: 436.4–458.11*

#### *Is the cosmos one or many?*

So, have we correctly called it one heaven, or would it have been more correct to speak of many, indeed an infinite number?<sup>654</sup> (31a2–3)<sup>655</sup>

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#### *General explanation: 436.6–437.25*

On the one hand, this problem, [coming as it does] after what has just been said, observes [an appropriate] compositional sequence. For, because [Plato] has defined the cosmos as ‘a single (*heis*) visible living thing containing within itself all living things which are naturally akin to it’ (30d3–31a1), he was bound to judge this very point – [I mean], whether the cosmos is a single entity (*hen ti*) or not – worthy of consideration and comment.<sup>656</sup> And, in fact, among the philosophers of nature some make it unique (*heis*), others many, [yet] others not only many but infinite in number.<sup>657</sup> And, secondly (*de*),<sup>658</sup> this [same] question also has a continuity with what has gone before that stems from the facts themselves. For, since the cosmos has been shown to be an image of the Living-Thing-itself (30c2–31a1), a ‘living thing endowed with soul and intellect’ (30b8), there was a need to put the finishing touch to the account of it by showing that it is also unique. In that way it would be

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<sup>653</sup> Sc. ‘let us move on to the next lemma’.

<sup>654</sup> πολλούς καὶ ἀπείρους (436.5). Despite διὰ ταῦτα οὔτε δύο οὔτ’ ἀπείρους ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιῶν κόσμους at 31b1–2, ‘many, indeed an infinite number’, or the like (cf. Jowett, Cornford and Zeyl), seems a better rendering of Plato’s words than, say, Lee’s ‘a plurality or infinity’ – unless he intends ‘infinity’ as a gloss on ‘plurality’. Proclus’ discussion at 437.25–438.17 below shows that the ancient commentators were divided on the issue, with Porphyry and Iamblichus in effect opting for ‘many *or* an infinite number’, but he does not come down firmly on either side.

<sup>655</sup> No divergences from Burnet’s OCT text.

<sup>656</sup> ὑπομνήσεως (436.10). Here and at 439.22 and 440.27 ὑπόμνησις seems to mean something like ‘explanation’ or ‘commentary’. (In his note on the occurrence at 439.22, Festugière comments ‘Ici = ὑπόμνημα’, but perhaps it would be better to relate this sense of the word to the verb ὑπομνηματίζομαι.) In their translation of the κεφάλαια to the *Platonic Theology*, where ὑπομνήσεις occurs quite frequently, Saffrey and Westerink normally translate ‘arguments’.

<sup>657</sup> The slight oddity of expression here goes back to the Greek.

<sup>658</sup> δὲ καὶ looks back to μὲν καὶ at 436.6, where Festugière cites other passages in *in Tim.* where a distinction is made between the order of exposition and the order of the material itself.

shown that it is also a god, since it would have participated the Henad above Intellect.<sup>659</sup> It was not possible just to call it a copy, because there are also other copies, some of them produced by nature, others by art; or a living thing, because there is also a multitude of particular living things; or 'endowed with soul', for a human being too is an image, and a living thing, and endowed with soul; or 'endowed with intellect', for both a demon and an angel are living things endowed with soul and intellect.<sup>660</sup> Rather, although, for the reason I stated,<sup>661</sup> he earlier left it unexpressed, he has now introduced [the property] which above all and primarily belongs to divine beings, [namely], oneness and uniqueness. For everything whatsoever in the universe that is monadic is divine, because it bears, if it is lawful to say it, an image of the One. ([On this basis] I call divine all that is angelic, all that is demonic, and everything numbered among particular souls; for each of these is divine in as far as it is attached to its own god and each of them is monadic.)<sup>662</sup> Things which are not monadic, on the other hand, experience generation and perishing and are relegated to mortal nature, the antithesis of everything divine. This present problem, then, is [as I said] closely bound up with what has gone before. For, since the paradigm of the universe is a god, is intelligible, is the bestower of life, and is an intellect, on account of (*kata*) the divinity in it [Plato]<sup>663</sup> makes the cosmos one, on account of what is one and intelligible in it, sensible, on account of what is one, intelligible and life in it, endowed with soul and a living thing, [and] on account of all of these along with intellect, endowed with intellect. For unification supervenes both before the rest and in addition to the rest, the living thing is active both before the rest and along with the rest, and it is both along with intellect and before intellect that the gift of life engenders and goes forth (*proienai*).<sup>664</sup>

<sup>659</sup> Sc. the One; cf. lines 26–7.

<sup>660</sup> Although it is far from clear, the terms of the references to human beings and to demons and angels suggest that the four rejected descriptions are: 1. copy, 2. copy and living thing, 3. copy and living thing endowed with soul, 4. copy, and living thing endowed with soul and intellect rather than simply: 1. copy, 2. living thing, 3. endowed with soul, 4. endowed with intellect.

<sup>661</sup> Sc. because both 'appropriate compositional sequence' (line 6) and the nature of reality (line 13) demanded it.

<sup>662</sup> For the subordination of groups of angels, demons, heroes and human souls to particular gods, see, for example, III. 165.30–166.18; for the monadic nature of all of the products of the first creation, including gods and particular souls, cf. 446.18–447.6.

<sup>663</sup> At first sight τὸ παράδειγμα should be the subject of ποιεῖ, but Proclus always carefully distinguishes the formal and efficient causes and I think Festugière must be right to think that the unstated subject is Plato.

<sup>664</sup> 437.2–11 exemplify (and are explained by) the principles that 'All that is produced by secondary beings is in a greater measure produced from those prior and more

You may gather from what is shown here and what has been shown earlier<sup>665</sup> that the paradigm of the universe is at the same time both unitary and the entire manifold of the Intelligibles, and that it is neither the case that its simplicity is devoid of multiplicity nor that its multiplicity is divided, but that it contains, coexisting together, diversity along with unity, the monadic with the all-complete, the uni-form with the multi-form. Because it proceeds from the Good, it is unified, but because it has established beforehand in itself the system (*diakosmos*) of intelligible Forms, it is all-complete. And inasmuch as it is unlimited, it exhibits the [whole] manifold of the Intelligibles, but inasmuch as it is confined by Limit it is one of a kind. And inasmuch as it has proceeded from the One Being it too wishes to have the status (*logos*) of a monad, but inasmuch as it [is] third after [One Being] it brings all of the intelligible gods into being within itself and on that account is shown to be all-complete. But we shall explicate these matters at greater length later on.

*Points of detail: 437.25–438.17*

The commentators disagree over [the interpretation of] the text. Some believe that [only] two [possibilities] are being distinguished here by Plato, singularity (*to hen*) and every [kind of] plurality,<sup>666</sup> and the [interrogative] *poteron*<sup>667</sup> seems to testify in their favour, since it was used by the ancients when [only] two things were involved. To others it seems clear that three [possibilities] are being distinguished: singularity, finite plurality and infinity. The foremost proponents of this last interpretation are Porphyry and Iamblichus,<sup>668</sup> and what they say accords well with the facts and with the teaching of Plato; for a little later he will reject two [terms] from the division and leave one standing, and the rejection of two terms and retention of one occurs when there were three

determinative principles from which the secondary were themselves derived' and that 'Every cause both operates prior to its consequent and gives rise to a greater number of posterior terms' (*ET* §56 and §57 in Dodds' translation).

<sup>665</sup> 'Here' presumably means at 437.2–7. 'Earlier' does not, as far as I can see, refer to any one passage, but 421.7–27, 427.12–20, 429.20–6 and 430.18–431.9 all seem relevant.

<sup>666</sup> Dillon (1973) 149 translates, 'the One and Multiplicity', and in lines 30–1, 'the One, Limited Multiplicity, and the Unlimited', seeing, perhaps correctly, a reference to the Neoplatonists' three highest principles.

<sup>667</sup> Because nothing in the translation of the lemma corresponds directly to πότερον, which can be rendered 'whether' in indirect alternative questions but has no obvious English equivalent in direct ones, I have fallen back on transliteration.

<sup>668</sup> 437.25–438.11 = fr. 54 Sodano and fr. 45 Dillon.

5 terms, not just two.<sup>669</sup> However, the [use of] *poteron* does seem to tell against them. So one must remedy this too and argue either that *poteron* means the same thing as *ar' oun*<sup>670</sup> ('is it then the case that?') – because *poteron* is often used in this sense too by the ancients<sup>671</sup> – or that the words *ê ou* ('or not') are missing from the sentence, and that the complete [sense] is: 'Have we been right to describe the heaven as unique or not? And if not, are there many or an infinite number [of heavens]?', and  
10 that Plato has left these [words] out for the sake of brevity. And perhaps one could even claim that the omission of that which is many but finite on Plato's part was not without a purpose. To say that there are this or that number [of heavens] is arbitrary, and, just as in all other cases in  
15 which a paradigm is not monadic in the sense of being the cause of a unique [individual]<sup>672</sup> the things produced are infinite, it is in the same way plausible that there should be an infinite number of worlds (*kosmos*) if [there is] not [just] one; for if the void is infinite, it will be receptive of an infinite number of worlds.<sup>673</sup>

### *Like the Paradigm, the cosmos is unique*

There is [only] one, if it is to have been fashioned by the Demiurge<sup>674</sup> after the Paradigm.<sup>675</sup> (31a3–4)

### *Method of Timaeus: 438.20–439.2*

20 Once more, consistently with his usual practice, [Timaeus] has stated the conclusion ahead of the arguments, answering the question before [providing] the proof, for [the answer] 'Only one', just like [the earlier

<sup>669</sup> As Festugière remarks, Proclus could well have brought *Tim.* 55c7–d6 into the discussion at this point.

<sup>670</sup> This οὐν seems unnecessary at best and C may be right to omit it.

<sup>671</sup> This is scarcely true. Perhaps he has in mind cases where the alternative is implied by the context rather than stated or the rare occasions when a second (or even a third) alternative (also introduced by ἢ) is added. The point at issue is really whether it can reasonably be argued that καί is here an 'or' rather than an 'and'.

<sup>672</sup> The second of three senses of 'one of a kind' or 'monadic' as applied to Forms or paradigms which are distinguished and discussed at 443.29–444.15. It turns out that the Paradigm is monadic in all three.

<sup>673</sup> A surprising statement given Proclus' frequent denial (see, for example, 453.19–20 and 456.29–31) of the possibility of an actual numeric infinity, but cf. the notes at 454.4 and 456.9.

<sup>674</sup> This rendering of δεδημιουργημένος is explained in the note at 447.14.

<sup>675</sup> No divergences from Burnet's OCT text.

answers] ‘It has come to be’ (28b7) and ‘He was good’ (29e1), has been stated in advance and the demonstration, as is his way, after it.<sup>676</sup> [This is possible because] it is he himself who poses the question, he himself who answers it, and he himself who provides the proof: by means of the question he turns towards (*epistrephein*) Intellect, by means of the concise response he acts in the manner of Intellect – for the expression which encompasses everything in one [word] is an image of intellectual intuition – by means of the proof he descends [again] from Intellect to discursive thought; for everyone who demonstrates gets his starting-points from intellect, and intellect is that by means of which we know definitions, says<sup>677</sup> Aristotle, since we grasp things by means of simple intuitions.

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Such then is the character of his arguments throughout [the treatise].

*How the uniqueness of the Paradigm implies the uniqueness of the cosmos: 439.2–28*

If it is agreeable, before looking at his actual words, let us set out his argument [in syllogistic form] and consider what truth there is in them.

The full argument, then, goes like this: If the cosmos has come into being after the Paradigm and the Paradigm is unique, [then] the cosmos is unique. The antecedent. Therefore the consequent.<sup>678</sup>

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Now, that the cosmos has come into being after the Paradigm was stated earlier and has been repeated both by [Timaeus] and by us.<sup>679</sup> And that the Paradigm is unique and monadic he himself will

<sup>676</sup> On ‘It has come to be’, see 283.4–11, on ‘He was good’, 360.6–14, and for another instance, see  $\delta\tau\iota$  πρὸς τὸ αἰδῖον (29a5) with Proclus’ comments at 330.12–19. In all three cases, as in lines 26–7 here, Proclus sees Plato’s immediate assumption of the conclusion as imaging the nature of intellectual intuition.

<sup>677</sup> Cf. with Diehl and Festugière *EN* 1142a25–26; 1143a36–b5.

<sup>678</sup> Or, spelling out the categorical premiss and the conclusion: if the cosmos has come into being after the Paradigm and the Paradigm is unique, [then] the cosmos is unique. The cosmos has come into being after the Paradigm and the Paradigm is unique. Therefore the cosmos is unique. The argument is a mixed hypothetical syllogism in the affirmative mood.

<sup>679</sup> Or perhaps, if ‘will explain’ is a reasonable rendering of ὑπομνήσει in the next line, ‘as was stated earlier and has been explained both by [Timaeus] and by us’, or even ‘as was stated earlier and commented on by [Timaeus] and us [respectively]’. The reference does not seem to be to any specific passage, but the Paradigm has been discussed at 27d5–29a6 and 30c2–31a1 and Proclus’ comments on these two passages are at 264.10–272.16 and 416.9–436.3 respectively.

10 explain<sup>680</sup> in what follows (31a4–b3). It remains then to see how it is that, if the antecedent<sup>681</sup> is true, the hypothetical proposition<sup>682</sup> is true. Accordingly, I declare that the cosmos, if it reproduces (*mimēisthai*) the Paradigm to the highest degree (cf. 30d1–3) and with exactitude, must reproduce all [aspects] of it, [including] its essence and its everlastingness and its uniqueness. For if it reproduces some aspects of  
15 it but not others, of what will the [Paradigm as a] whole<sup>683</sup> be the paradigm? Since it creates by its very being, it creates *some* copy of itself as a whole. And, this being so, that which has been created after the Paradigm as a whole is monadic, is everlasting, is a living thing. Just as someone who imitates (*mimēisthai*) the whole Socrates copies his entire  
20 way of life, in the same way too a cosmos modelled after the Living-Thing-itself will reproduce everything in it as far as its nature permits, containing in the sensible mode all that it contains in the intelligible mode.

Some, it is true, oppose this interpretation,<sup>684</sup> adducing the plurality  
25 of human beings and of horses. Human-being-itself and Horse-itself and all other such [entities] are, [they point out,] responsible for many individuals. And if one replies that these, because they are parts of other things, are therefore not monadic,<sup>685</sup> they will not leave off but bring up against us the sun and the moon and all the [other] things which, though parts of the cosmos, are monadic. Therefore one must get involved in more extended<sup>686</sup> argument with them.

<sup>680</sup> I have followed Festugière in translating ὑπομνήσει (439.9) ‘will explain’ (see my note at 436.10 on translating ὑπόμνησις ‘explanation’), but perhaps something like ‘mention’ or ‘point out’ would do.

<sup>681</sup> A πρόσληψις is normally the minor premiss of a categorical syllogism, but here it seems to refer to the antecedent of the hypothetical premiss (sc. εἰ ὁ κόσμος . . . ἔν ἐστιν), which was earlier (439.6) referred to as τὸ ἡγούμενον.

<sup>682</sup> Called τὸ συννημένον (roughly, ‘the conjunction’) as being the combination of the antecedent and the consequent.

<sup>683</sup> Reading τὸ ὅλον (the reading of **M**) and punctuating with a question mark after ὅλον at 439.15.

<sup>684</sup> ὑπόμνησιν (439.22). On this sense of the word, see the note at 436.10.

<sup>685</sup> Festugière assumes that ‘these’ are individual human beings and horses, etc., but it seems to me that ‘these’ are Human-being-itself, Horse-itself, etc., the ‘other things’ of which they are ‘parts’ being the four genera contained within the αὐτοζῶον, and indeed the αὐτοζῶον itself, and that the argument is that if Human-being-itself, etc., are (*qua* parts) not monadic, they will not produce unique copies.

<sup>686</sup> Or alternatively something like: ‘lay one’s hands on more profound arguments to use against them’. (Cf. Festugière’s translation and note.)

*Opinions of Porphyry and Iamblichus: 439.29–441.15*

Well then, the philosopher Porphyry,<sup>687</sup> who took a contrary position [to these people] on these issues, says that in the course of procession the Forms are always being borne down into multiplicity and division and [eventually] acquire extension and undergo fragmentation of every kind. For this reason, when the intelligible essence proceeds into the cosmos, it ends in divided, coarse and enmattered plurality, even though above it is unified, without parts and monadic. Now, in the case of the Intelligible as a whole, nothing else was providing it with matter. It produced it itself, [and] therefore produced just as much as it could occupy.<sup>688</sup> But in the case of Human-being-itself, it was this universe that was providing it with matter, [and] for this reason there was more matter than [was necessary] for one [human]. So, while the cosmos is unique from [a source that is also] unique and complete from [a source that is also] complete, human being is many from [a source that is] unique, because the cosmos provides [its] matter. So why, he asks, are there not also many suns and moons? Their matter also comes from the universe. Because, he replies, monadicity is proper to imperishable things as [it is] to the cosmos,<sup>689</sup> even when they are parts, while plurality [is proper] to perishable things. After all, if it were not the case that many [perishable things] participated the same reason-principle, and there was just one [of them], the species would cease to exist once that [individual] perished; and the cosmos must always be an aggregate of *all* the species.

So much for Porphyry.

The divine Iamblichus<sup>690</sup> castigates this interpretation as by no means free of difficulties.<sup>691</sup> For, granting that the sensible world as a whole contains the unpartitioned in partitioned mode, the undivided in divided mode, the monadic in pluralized mode, why then is it that some of the things in it nevertheless remain monadic and others do not? [And] this was the initial difficulty. [Iamblichus] himself proposes one solution to the problem which, while admirable, requires some supplementation.<sup>692</sup>

<sup>687</sup> 439.29–440.16 = fr. 55 Sodano.

<sup>688</sup> Sc. as much as was required for it to express itself in the form of the cosmos. (For ‘occupy’, cf. Lampe s.v. 2.)

<sup>689</sup> ὡς τῷ κόσμῳ is rather unexpected and could be a gloss on τοῖς ἀφθάρτοις that has found its way into the text.

<sup>690</sup> 440.16–26 = fr. 46 Dillon.

<sup>691</sup> Or perhaps ‘on the ground that it does not resolve any of the difficulties’, but the neuter μηδέν would then be odd.

<sup>692</sup> Festugière translates θαυμαστήν ‘étrange’ (and θαυμαστῶς in line 27 similarly), but I think the general tone is one of approval. My ‘supplementation’ (like Festugière’s ‘justification’) for παραμυθίας here and my ‘be supplemented’ for παραμυθεῖσθαι at 441.15 can claim the support of LSJ παραμυθεομαι 5. *support, justify* a thesis; *explain*.

He says that some Forms take pleasure in sameness and rest, others in movement and otherness, and that the former are the causes of things which are monadic and everlasting, the latter of things which are in motion and pluralized. This is very well said indeed, but it stands in need of some explanatory comment.<sup>693</sup> This is best provided by invoking the consideration that, after the One, there has been, as Socrates has stated in the *Philebus* (23c9–10; 26c5–6), the procession of two principles, Limit and the Unlimited, and, just as among numbers some are more monadic, others more dyadic, yet all of them have drawn their existence from the monad and the dyad together, in just the same way, even though all Forms are constituted in accordance with [both of] the two above-mentioned principles, some of them are nevertheless akin to Limit, others to the Unlimited. But why talk of Forms? Among the gods themselves, some belong to the column of Limit, others to that of the Unlimited, both as whole classes and as individuals – as whole classes because the entire paternal, maintaining and creative series is defined by Limit, the entire zoogonic and generative series by the Unlimited; as individuals because, within both the paternal and the zoogonic series, some [gods] are on the side of one of these principles, others on the side of the other. So if this is the situation even among the gods, is it any wonder if among the Forms too some are more akin to Limit than the rest, others more akin to the Unlimited, and that, in conformity with our analogy, some are productive of monadic entities, others of [entities] which proceed to multiplicity?

So much for the way in which this interpretation must be supplemented.

### *Opinion of Syrianus and Proclus: 441.15–447.32*

Our teacher [Syrianus] used to resolve this difficulty in many other ways too.<sup>694</sup> He would at all events say that all intelligible essence is

<sup>693</sup> ὑπομνήσεως (439.22). On this sense of the word, see the note at 436.10.

<sup>694</sup> καὶ ἄλλως τὴν ἀπορίαν ταύτην διέλυε πολλαχῶς (441.16). πολλαχῶς ('in many ways') suggests that we are about to hear a series of arguments derived from Syrianus and I have followed Festugière in assigning the suite of arguments extending from 441.15–447.32 to him. However, it is worth asking whether this is correct. (1) Although Proclus starts off with εἰλεγε ('he would say') there is no further trace of Syrianus in what follows and on more than one occasion he lapses into the first person: cf. ὡς εἵπομεν (442.16; still in the first argument); ἡμῖν (443.9); οἶμαι (443.22). In itself this does not mean a great deal since Proclus regularly adopts his master's arguments as his own, but it does leave open the possibility that some or all of the arguments subsequent to the first are Proclus' own or derived from another source. (2) πολλαχῶς, tacked on as it is to the end of the sentence (I would have expected καὶ ἄλλως πολλαχῶς or καὶ πολλαχῶς

uniform and eternal, but that some encosmic entities are more capable of taking on a resemblance to their own essences,<sup>695</sup> others less. (Those that are less material and purer are more [capable], those that are more material and coarser, less.) So, whereas all of the paradigms exist in monadic and everlasting substances,<sup>696</sup> the superior [entities] in the universe, which have reproduced their causes most [closely], have come into being very like their paradigms in all respects, in their monadicity, in their substantiality,<sup>697</sup> in their everlastingness, while the inferior ones, which have been allotted a secondary (*busteros*) kind of likeness, resemble their causes in some ways, but not in others. So, given that these three, [I mean] monadicity, substantiality, eternity, are present in the intelligible Forms, will [these inferior entities]<sup>698</sup> reproduce their monadicity and their everlastingness but in no wise [reproduce] their substantiality? That would be absurd. It has been shown (see 435.2off.) that, given that they create just by being, the [entities which derive] from them must be substances. So will they be images (*mimēmata*) of them with respect to their monadicity and substantiality but not their everlastingness? This too is impossible. Each [of them] will perish<sup>699</sup> if it is monadic but not everlasting: because it is not everlasting it will pass into non-being; because it is monadic, there will be nothing for it to be [re]-born from. And, without exception, everything which derives its existence from unmoving causes is unchanging in its essence,<sup>700</sup> and the Forms are unmoving; for they are intelligible. If,<sup>701</sup> then, [these inferior entities] can either reproduce all [of the properties of their paradigms]

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ἄλλως), could have originated as a marginal comment by someone who did assume that all the arguments which follow derive from Syrianus. (3) δ' οὖν ('at all events') would, I think make better sense if it were introducing a single argument rather than a whole series of them.

<sup>695</sup> Sc. their paradigms. (I suspect that Proclus may actually have written τὰς ἐαυτῶν αἰτίας, as he does below in line 23.)

<sup>696</sup> A rather unexpected formulation. Perhaps it amounts to something like 'take the form of monadic and everlasting substances'.

<sup>697</sup> 441.30–442.1 below show that this means 'in their being substances'.

<sup>698</sup> Although it is not always obvious, it seems to me that from here to 442.25 the argument relates solely to the 'inferior' encosmic entities of the previous sentence and I have supplemented the Greek in a number of places to make this clear.

<sup>699</sup> Translating ἀπολείται (S) rather than ἀπολείπεται (C M P Diehl). (ἀπολείπει, 'ceases', 'fails' might also be a possibility.) While ἀπολείπεται makes good enough sense in its own right ('each thing ends up being monadic but not everlasting'), the continuation διότι μὲν γὰρ . . . γενήσεται is then difficult. (Festugière tries to soften this by making it look all the way back to ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἄδύνατον, but that seems rather desperate.)

<sup>700</sup> And therefore everlasting. This is the gist of Proclus' fourth proof of the everlastingness of the cosmos in Philoponus, *Aet.*

<sup>701</sup> Translating εἰ τοίνυν (C M P) rather than ἢ τοίνυν (S, Diehl) at 442.8.

or [only] some of them but it is not possible [that they reproduce] all  
 [of them] – [this is] because things which are further from their origins  
 are less like them;<sup>702</sup> if, for example, Pythagoras is in possession of all  
 the sciences, someone who is closer to him, receives all of his knowledge  
 next [after him] (*deuterôs*),<sup>703</sup> while someone who is more remote from  
 him learns some of the sciences, but is not attuned<sup>704</sup> to others – if,  
 then, [as we were saying,] it is not possible [that they reproduce] all  
 [of the properties of their paradigms], it remains that [they can only  
 reproduce] some [of them], and if [only] some, since three [properties]  
 are present in [the paradigms], [properties] which are, as will become  
 clear, characteristics of the intelligible Forms – but, be that as it may, if  
 there are, as we have said, three [properties, these inferior entities] have  
 either reproduced the extremes and been left with no share in the mean,  
 or have received the first two and are clearly wanting in the third, or have  
 missed out on the first but participated in the [two] after it. But it has  
 been shown that neither of the first [two alternatives] is the case (*alêthês*).  
 Therefore it must be that they do not replicate the monadicity of the  
 Forms but only their substantiality and eternality. [And] for this reason  
 all the encosmic species are substances and remain always the same, but  
 not all of them are monadic, since not all of them are attuned to all of  
 the properties (*dunameis*) of their paradigms.

That every intelligible Form, in short everything which is primarily  
 a paradigmatic cause, is monadic, everlasting and substantial is evident.  
 If it is not substance, it will be accident, but every accident subsists in  
 association with matter and with entities [which are engaged] in matter,  
 and not among the causes which are separate [from matter]. And if it is  
 not everlasting, its image would not be everlasting either. But [its image]  
 must be, if it is true that the cosmos always consists of all of the species  
 (cf. 440.14f.). But once the source (*archê*) has been destroyed, there is

<sup>702</sup> Or perhaps, '[this is] because those which are further from their points of origin are less like them; similarly, if Pythagoras . . .' Proclus frequently makes use of the axiom that the closer a thing is to its origin, the more closely it resembles it, but, if the rendering in the text is the correct one, this seems to be his most explicit statement of it. (The axiom is implied by *ET* §§28, 36 and 37; for applications of it, cf. *ET* 58.24; 130.30; *PT* II. 49.1–3; III. 10.4–5.)

<sup>703</sup> Although I have translated it, *δευτέρως* looks rather like a gloss on *ἐγγυτέρω*.

<sup>704</sup> I am not sure how this example is meant to work. It is, I think, natural to assume that the closeness to or remoteness from Pythagoras that is envisioned is temporal (and *δευτέρως* – 'next after him' – rather favours this, if it is not a gloss), but 'is not attuned to others' would seem to suggest that closeness in temperament or ability is what is in question, in which case the distinction between *acusmatici* and *mathematici* (for which see Guthrie (1967) 191–2) could be relevant. Perhaps the truth is that ἀσύμμετρός ἐστιν is not very appropriate to the example of the Pythagoreans and is only present because it looks forward to *ἔχει σύμμετρός* in lines 24–5 below.

no means by which that which originates from it can be preserved. And if it is not monadic, it would no longer be primally a paradigm. It is impossible for two things [both] to be ‘primally’ something, as Socrates also says in the *Republic* (597c1–9). Where would the sameness of two such things come from unless from some [other] single Form common [to both]? So the three [properties] under discussion belong to [all of] the primary paradigms, and it would seem that monadicity accrues to them from Limit, everlastingness from the Unlimited, and substantiality from primary Substance.

We can also argue [this] in another way. Of the things present in the cosmos, some derive from the first creation alone, the rest also from the first creation, but through the agency of the second. Now, those that derive from the first creation remain [always] the same and are monadic, reproducing the uniqueness of their producer; for the hyper-cosmic creation is immobile, single and eternal. Those that derive from the second creation, on the other hand, are changing, borne along into multiplicity<sup>705</sup> and differently constituted at different times; for the second creation is multiform and it is through its own motion that it creates the things it creates, and time is what is akin to it, not eternity. This is why the [entities which derive] from it are highly changeable, are pluralized and display movement of every kind; things [resulting] from causes which are in motion are of the same nature [as those causes].<sup>706</sup> It is for this reason too, I think, that the Demiurge, once he has created all the monadic and everlasting [entities] in the cosmos, exhorts<sup>707</sup> the young gods to the creation of mortal [creatures], so that these too, to the extent that they possess anything of the everlasting, may exist through him, but to the extent that they are mortal through the young gods alone (*autos*), and so that, to the extent that they participate a single form, they may exist through him, but to the extent that this single [form] has been pluralized, they may exist through [the young gods]; for the change and

<sup>705</sup> Or perhaps just, ‘produced in large numbers’. For the phrase, cf. ἐν αἰσθήσει φερομένοις at *Tim.* 38a6 (which Zeyl renders ‘borne about in the realm of perception’) and εἰς πλῆθος ὑποφέρεσθαι (‘borne down into multiplicity’) at 439.31 above.

<sup>706</sup> On immobile and moving causes (or unmoving and mobile causes, as Dodds calls them – and one could also use ‘changing’ and ‘unchanging’), see *ET* §76 with Dodds’ commentary. The former are responsible for the first creation, the latter for the second, which is doubtless in part why the creations themselves were described as ‘immobile’ and ‘moving’ at 443.13 and 18 respectively. Ultimately, the unmoving causes are, as Dodds says, the One, the Forms and the Intellects, and the moving causes are natural processes within the cosmos. In the *Timaeus* the former are represented by the Living Thing and the Demiurge, the latter, for Proclus at least, as we are about to see, by the ‘young gods’.

<sup>707</sup> At 41a7–d3. For the νέοι θεοί, see 42d6. (νέος could connote ‘young’ (sc. young as compared with the Demiurge) or ‘new’ (sc. newly created).

pluralization [they display] derive from the circumstance that their causes are many and in movement.

Further, it also needs to be said that ‘one of a kind’ (cf. 31b3) has three senses. It either designates a monad [at the head] of its own series,<sup>708</sup> in which sense the Form of human being is monadic, and that of horse, and every form of that kind; or [it designates] a single [entity] which is participated by a single [entity], in which sense [the Forms of human being and the like] are no longer ‘one of a kind’, but the Form of sun or moon is; or it designates something which has nothing else coordinate with it, in which sense [the Forms of sun and of moon] are no longer ‘one of a kind’, since they are coordinate with one another, whereas the Living Thing as a whole is ‘one of a kind’, since it is not coordinate with any other living thing.

‘One of a kind’, then, is used in three senses, and if you would grasp [which of the above candidates] is truly ‘one of a kind’, it is the third, inasmuch as it is the cause of all living things, has the status of monad in relation to everything [else], is participated by a single [entity], and is coordinate with nothing else but is genuinely monadic.<sup>709</sup> And once this is grasped, the hypothetical proposition is at once a necessary one.<sup>710</sup> For, if the paradigm is ‘one of a kind’, that which has come into being in accordance with it is also ‘one of a kind’, having reproduced the [property of being] ‘one of a kind’ in the paradigm; and there is nothing such other than the cosmos, because it is also the case that there is nothing other than the Living-Thing-itself that is one of a kind in this [third] sense.

We must pursue our problem from yet another angle, [this time really] coming to grips with it.

Every Form is productive both of a unity and of a manifold; of a unity because, prior to the manifold, it brings into existence a monad which resembles itself, and of a manifold because every monad has associated with it a coordinate series (*arithmos*).<sup>711</sup> Accordingly, the

<sup>708</sup> Festugière sees a reference to the immanent monads which each Form is said to produce ahead of its manifold at 444.16ff., but the Forms themselves are also monads and the argument is that any monad at the head of a series can be described as *μονογενές* and that on that basis all Forms, including those of Man and Horse, can be so described.

<sup>709</sup> In other words, the *αὐτοζῶν* is ‘one of a kind’ in all three senses.

<sup>710</sup> Sc. the consequent necessarily follows upon the antecedent. The reference is of course to the syllogism at 439.4–6. (For ‘hypothetical proposition’ for *συνημμένον*, cf. the note at 439.11.)

<sup>711</sup> With this cf. 449.5–12 and 453.25–6. I have followed Dodds practice in *ET* in translating *ἀριθμός* ‘series’ in contexts such as this. (For an example, see §64, which incidentally states that every monad gives rise to two series.) On monads and their manifolds, see *ET* §§21–4 with Dodds’ comments. The ‘unity’ or ‘monad’ which a (transcendent) Form produces ahead of its manifold is the immanent, ‘participated’, universal that Dodds identifies in his commentary to §23.

Living-Thing-itself produces as its monad the cosmos as a whole, and in each order engenders, corresponding to that whole, that which is able to preserve a resemblance to the universe<sup>712</sup> in that series (*seira*); and the solar paradigm on the one hand gives birth to the visible sun itself and on the other brings into being a series (*arithmos*) of solar beings (*zôion*) which [all] have the same form inasmuch as they proceed from and are referable to a single [principle], although those later (*deuteros*) [in the series] bear an ever fainter resemblance to their own Form. And some of these beings are celestial, some sublunar, so that this series reaches all the way down to the earth. And no more is it the case that Human-being-itself at once brings this indefinite multitude<sup>713</sup> [here on earth] into existence. Procession is nowhere immediate but is [always] by way of the series (*arithmos*) appropriate and proper to [each] monad. Since, then, the intelligible Form is one, it must not at once create an indefinite [multitude],<sup>714</sup> but must first create a monad, then the series proper to it, and so on. For the mean between the single Intelligible and the pluralized sensible is that which is on the one hand sensible, on the other monadic, which by proceeding has become sensible, but by preserving its likeness to the paradigm has remained (*buphistanai*) monadic. And indeed one has to say that it would be truly strange if the divine, intelligible and unmoving causes were in the first instance (*prôtôs*)<sup>715</sup> the causes not of things which are unchanging in their essence but of things which are enmattered and subject to change. What account<sup>716</sup> will be able to link [such things] to [such causes]: things from the depths of the universe to the hypercosmic realities; things without intellect to intellective entities; things which are changing in every possible way to those that are eternal; things compounded of many elements to those that are simple; things which are dispersed by their very nature to those that are unified? It is, then, necessary that Human-being-itself and every other such Form should engender, prior to the dispersed multiplicity, stable monads, from which the procession of each of them into its own series [departs], and that these are the monads in the second creation, on which account they remain invariable (*bôsautôs*), as having been brought

<sup>712</sup> I have assumed that τὸ πᾶν here is synonymous with τὸν ὅλον κόσμον in line 20 above.

<sup>713</sup> τὸ πλῆθος τοῦτο τὸ ἄπειρον (444.30). ‘This infinite multitude’ is tempting, but since the number of souls is finite (cf. 446.25–447.4) and he does not in any case admit the possibility of a synchronous, or actual, numeric infinity (cf. 456.29–31 and *ET* §§86 and 94 with Dodds’ commentary), Proclus would have to be talking diachronically, and this does not seem to be the case.

<sup>714</sup> For this translation of τὸ ἄπειρον, see the previous note.

<sup>715</sup> They are of course ultimately the cause of everything.

<sup>716</sup> As often, various possibilities come to mind for λόγος, to name a few: ‘relation’, ‘proportion’, ‘principle’, ‘law’, ‘arrangement’.

into existence by the unmoving cause alone. So do not be surprised if someone should describe Man as immortal, Beast as rational, or Plant as endowed with intellect. Each of these is indeed in the first instance (*prôtôs*) such, but procession, which brings about a gradual decrease in every kind of resemblance to the paradigm, renders [plants] insensible, [animals] devoid of reason, and [men only] potentially intellective. Just as water when it first (*prôtôs*) emerges from its source is most like the water of that source and [still] preserves its purity undefiled, so do things when they have first (*prôtôs*) emerged (*ekphainein*) from the intelligible Forms preserve their likeness to their paradigms in an undiluted form; but, in the course of their procession, they lose this perfect resemblance and are infected with complexity and disfigurement from their material substrates.

It is possible to go about answering these questions in yet another way. The [first phase] of the creation is universal, single, undivided, the [second] is particular and pluralized and proceeds by means of partition, the [third] is not only divided, like the one that precedes it, but also deals with generated things and the species [which occur] in them.<sup>717</sup> You can even find the monads of these three creations in [Plato]. They are the Jovian, the Dionysiac and the Adonic, by means of which he also distinguished the three polities, as we have said elsewhere.<sup>718</sup> Now, the third [phase] is the cause of species which are both parts and non-monadic, the second of those which are monadic but not wholes, and the first of the whole and monadic; for this last is the nature of the universe, which is not part of anything [else] as are the sun and the moon and each of the everlasting parts [of the cosmos].<sup>719</sup> Now, if Plato were currently dealing with the creation as a whole, we would have to bring in the extension of the Forms into multiplicity and their divisions. But since the present statement<sup>720</sup> (*logos*) is only concerned with the universal creation,

<sup>717</sup> In this three-phase division of the creation, the first two phases together correspond to the 'first creation' and the third to the 'second creation' in the more common two-phase division. Of other occurrences of it, the most informative are 199.5–7 and II. 3.8–11 and 281.23–30. Proclus also at times employs a four-phase division, as at 310.16–18 and *PT V*. 42.6–9.

<sup>718</sup> Cf. *in Remp.* II. 8.15–23.

<sup>719</sup> Reading τὸ πᾶν with **M** and **P** rather than just πᾶν with **C** and Diehl at 446.11 and αἰδίων for ἰδίων at 446.12. For αἰδίων, cf. III. 242.9–12, τὴν πᾶσαν δημιουργίαν διεῖλεν εἰς τε τὴν τῶν θείων γέννησιν καὶ τὴν τῶν θνητῶν, καὶ τὴν μὲν τῶν θείων εἰς τε τὴν τοῦ ὅλου κόσμου τοῦ πρὸ τῶν μερῶν καὶ εἰς τε τὴν τῶν μεγάλων ἐν αὐτῷ αἰδίων μερῶν. As second best, I would again read τὸ πᾶν, take ἰδίων as equivalent to ἑαυτοῦ (cf. *LSJ* s.v. I. 6), and translate, 'for this last is the nature of the universe, which is not part of anything, as are the sun and the moon and each of its [other] parts'.

<sup>720</sup> Or perhaps 'account'.

why should we complicate matters<sup>721</sup> for ourselves by not keeping to the first demiurgic products, [I mean] those which came to be through the agency of the unmoving and universal cause?<sup>722</sup> For the universal (*holos*) Demiurge is a creator in a universal and monadic mode, since, even though he creates many gods, he creates them in a monadic mode. Each of the fixed stars, for example, has been produced after a single Form, given that there are different Forms even for earth, water and fire, whose parts undergo generation and perishing in time, so that much more is it the case that everlasting [entities] are such.<sup>723</sup> And particular souls [too] differ from one another in species; for everything *individual*<sup>724</sup> and particular is enmattered. And even if they each shape (*apotelein*) their own respective lives by projections of different reason-principles,<sup>725</sup> it is clear that they exist in universal mode in possession of the reason-principles of all things only in [their] Forms.<sup>726</sup> And so the procession of each of them takes place in relation to a different Form. And one must place this series of Forms in its unitary phase in the source of souls and in its divided phase in the origin of souls.<sup>727</sup> And how indeed, given that they

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<sup>721</sup> More literally 'make trouble'.

<sup>722</sup> Sc., as the continuation makes clear, to the products of the first two of the three demiurgic phases distinguished above, or to those of the first, or universal, creation.

<sup>723</sup> Sc. 'much more are everlasting entities like the stars produced after a single form'. (I would punctuate after τοιαῦτα at 446.24.)

<sup>724</sup> τὰ καθ' ἑκάστα (or τὰ ἄτομα) are individuals belonging to the same species, which differ from each other τῷ ἀριθμῷ or τῇ ὕλῃ. Souls are not 'enmattered' in the required sense and so can only differ in species. The same argument, in a rather more explicit form, appears at *in Parm.* 819.20–2: μοναδική δὲ πᾶσα (sc. ψυχὴ) καὶ καθ' ἓνα λόγον ἴδιον ὑφέστηκεν· οὐ γὰρ ὕλη διαφέρει ἄλλη ἄλλης. ἡ οὖν οὐδενὶ διοίσει τὸ παράπαν ἢ [[οὐ]] κατ' εἶδος. (*in Parm.* 817.4–819.29 is a careful and nuanced discussion of the relationship between souls and Forms.)

<sup>725</sup> For these 'projections' (or 'expressions', perhaps) of reason-principles, see *in Parm.* 896.1–12. They are, in effect, recollections of the Forms in the human soul. Proclus can say that souls 'make their lives different' through them because he believes that the choices of different lives on the part of souls in the myth of Er symbolize προβολαὶ λόγων, although there the phrase seems to convey something more like the expression of a paradigm. (Cf. *in Remp.* II. 95.)

<sup>726</sup> Although I am not sure that I have it right, this sentence is, I think, intended to preempt the suggestion that souls might differ as individuals in the same species rather than in species. On Proclus' view that the incarnate human soul does not have actual knowledge of all the Forms, cf. Dodds' note on *ET* §§194–5.

<sup>727</sup> At *PT V.* 115.4–117.6 Proclus explains that the πηγὴ ('source') and the ἀρχή ('origin') of souls are twin monads of soul. The former, which is the ultimate source of all souls, is the mixing-bowl of *Timaëus* 41d4, while the latter, which falls between the mixing-bowl and the souls themselves, is described as the αἰτία γόνιμος of the souls (117.4). In support of this doctrine he cites 'the theologians' (Saffrey and Westerink, 115, n.3, compare *Or. Chald.* fr. 49.3) and *Pbdr.* 245c7–9, where soul is said to be the πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως.

are finite [in number], could it be other than necessary that the [full] series should pre-exist in their causes, seeing that even Nature contains [in advance] the [full] series of the things it produces in series?<sup>728</sup>

Now, if both gods and souls are monadic, the classes falling between them are also monadic. And so it is certainly the case that everything the Demiurge creates is monadic. And [in fact] it seems that the cause of their everlastingness is precisely that each of them takes on the form of its paradigmatic cause in its entirety. So *everything* that proceeds from the universal Demiurge is of this nature.<sup>729</sup> If, then, he also creates the cosmos, the cosmos is single on account of the demiurgic monad as well as on account of the uniqueness of the Paradigm. It is because he is aware of this, I believe, that Plato says (31a3–4): **if it is to have been fashioned by the Demiurge<sup>730</sup> after the Paradigm**. For by not saying ‘if it has *come into being* after the Paradigm’ but **if it is to have been fashioned by the Demiurge after the Paradigm**, he has indicated both the paradigmatic and the demiurgic cause of its uniqueness (*monotês*): for the Demiurge is a monad and the Paradigm too is a monad, [and] therefore this universe, which has come to be through the agency of a monad in the image of a monad, is also monadic.

Why then, you may ask, was [Plato] content with the proof drawn from the Paradigm in what follows? Because, I shall reply, the Paradigm is more unified than the Demiurge. Not only is the Demiurge himself a monad [only] on account of his likeness to and correspondence with [the Paradigm] – this is clear, since he is also its analogue within the [series of] Kings<sup>731</sup> – but each of them<sup>732</sup> is an analogue of the

<sup>728</sup> καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν . . . περιέχει τοὺς ἀριθμούς (446.29–447.4). Although I persist with ‘series’ for ἀριθμός throughout, a case could be made for ‘number’, ‘sum’ or even ‘plurality’ at various points in the sentence.

<sup>729</sup> Sc. monadic.

<sup>730</sup> I have followed Festugière in translating δεδημιουργημένος ‘fashioned by the Demiurge’ to bring out the force of Proclus’ argument, which depends on the implicit reference to the Demiurge in the word.

<sup>731</sup> Sc. Zeus (= the Demiurge), the fifth of the Orphic Kings, is the analogue of Phanes (= the Paradigm), the first of them. Why is this so? Proclus returns to this relationship at 451.1–8, where he says that the creative activities of Zeus, though different in important respects, mimic those of Phanes (and uses this as evidence that the demiurgic cause is analogous to the paradigmatic), and the circumstance that Zeus swallows and incorporates Phanes prior to recreating the world is doubtless also relevant (for this, cf. Brisson (1987b) 67).

<sup>732</sup> I think that ἐκότερον αὐτῶν (447.25) must refer to the universe and the Demiurge rather than to the Demiurge and the Paradigm as Festugière argues. (Incidentally, I do not believe that the passages he adduces amount to evidence that, ‘Il y a pluralité de monades intelligibles . . . apparemment hiérarchisées et le Vivant-en-soi n’est monade qu’au second degré’. In the key passage at 310.27–311.1, which I would translate, ‘Just,

intelligible monad.<sup>733</sup> So, given that the monadicity of the Demiurge himself comes from that source (*ekeithen*),<sup>734</sup> what are we to think in the case of the universe? Clearly that it gets its uniqueness too in the first instance (*prôtôs*) from the Paradigm. [And] therefore the Paradigm is more effective for demonstrating the uniqueness of the cosmos. And you can see once again<sup>735</sup> that these three, [namely,] the Living-Thing-itself, the demiurgic cause, [and] the universe, are [all] monads, but that the first is an intelligible monad, the second an intellective monad, [and] the third a sensible monad.

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### *The inclusiveness of the Paradigm entails its uniqueness*

For something which embraces all the intelligible living things there are would never be on the second level along with another<sup>736</sup> [such].  
(31a4–5)<sup>737</sup>

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### *General explanation: 448.3–449.25*

The cogency of these proofs<sup>738</sup> is admirable, demonstrating that the all-complete Living Thing is one and unique. It resembles the modes of reasoning by which, in the *Sophist* (243d3–e6), he showed that the multitude of beings<sup>739</sup> goes back to one [form of being, namely,] real Being (*to ontôs on*).<sup>740</sup> For if [, he argues,] there are two sources of beings,

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then, as the one Paradigm precedes the many, so does the one Demiurge precede the many, in order that all [of these] may follow upon one another: the one intelligible Paradigm, the one intellective Demiurge, the one sensible cosmos, unique of its kind', it seems to me that τὸ ἐν παράδειγμα is the αὐτοζῶν and τὰ πολλὰ παραδείγματα the individual Forms, so that the whole sentence provides a close parallel to lines 30–2 below.)

<sup>733</sup> I.e. the Paradigm, which is referred to as an 'intelligible monad' in line 31.

<sup>734</sup> Sc. from the Paradigm.

<sup>735</sup> I am not sure why Proclus writes πάλιν here. Perhaps he is looking back to 447.4–19 where he, in effect, reached the same conclusion.

<sup>736</sup> μεθ' ἑτέρου δεύτερον (448.1–2). As the continuation shows, the phrase (literally 'second with another') is equivalent to 'one of two', or 'one of a pair', which is how both Cornford and Zeyl translate it. My rendering prepares the way for Proclus' comments at 449.15–450.9.

<sup>737</sup> No significant departures from Burnet's OCT text.

<sup>738</sup> As Festugière remarks, Proclus presumably has in mind 31a4–b1 and not just the present lemma.

<sup>739</sup> Or 'existents', or even 'things', but I think that using 'being' or 'Being' for ὄν throughout serves the argument better.

<sup>740</sup> Cf. too *ET* §22, 'All that exists primitively and originally in each order is one and not two or more than two, but unique' (Dodds' translation).

either each of the two is primarily Being, or [only] one of them. But if [only] one of them is, the other will [derive] from it. And if each of the two is, Being must be something else, from which these [two] beings [both derive]; for each of them is [in that case] a particular being and not Being without qualification. It is by this same method, then, that he now demonstrates that the all-complete Living Thing is one. And it follows that (*hôte*) in every order of realities that which is said to exist primarily is one of a kind; for we shall show<sup>741</sup> that both that which is primarily good and that which is primarily equal are monadic in just the same way as the Living-Thing-itself is proved to be here.

And how could [the Living-Thing-itself] not be one of a kind? If there is another alongside it, either each of them contains all things, or one of them contains all things and the other does not, or neither of them does. There is no other possibility.

[1] If, then, one were to say that neither of them is all things, each will be incomplete. But our concern is with the all-complete [Living Thing], and we shall [go on to] ask where the one which contains all things is. For it is not, I suppose, the case that the sensible [living thing] contains all things on its own level and that the soul contains all concepts<sup>742</sup> – it reveals that this is so by the fact that it apprehends all things by summoning up the concept of each – but that there will not be some one Intelligible which embraces all the Intelligibles at the level of being just as the soul does at the level of thought and the universe on the sensible level. Indeed, where does the all-ness<sup>743</sup> of these [last two spheres] come from if not from the Intelligibles? So, if there is some all-complete Intelligible, it will be the paradigm for the universe [i.e. the All], [being that] which is primarily ‘all’.

[2] If, on the other hand, one of them is all things but the other is not all things, they are not ranked or numbered together. Instead the one that does not embrace all things is inferior and the one that is all-complete has a greater capacity to embrace [things]. And as a result of this the one will be a part, the other a whole, and they will no longer both be all-complete living things, but only one of them will, [namely,] the more complete [of the two]; for the one that has an inferior completeness will not be all-complete.

<sup>741</sup> The phrasing suggests that he will do so soon, but nothing in the *in Tim.* or, I think, elsewhere looks as though it is intended to honour this promise, although there is, for example, an argument that equality is monadic in the intelligible world at *in Parm.* 937.23–938.19 and *ET* §21 proves that *any* series or order is headed by a monad.

<sup>742</sup> Or ‘reason-principles’, since there is clearly a reference to the doctrine that the soul contains all the Forms in the manner appropriate to its own mode of existence.

<sup>743</sup> For ‘all-ness’ see the note at 426.24.

[3] And if each of them [embraces] all things, from what source has each received all things? It must be from *some* source. For, just as things which participate a single Form exist through the agency of a single cause, so do things which have in similar fashion participated all things possess this all-ness by virtue of a single cause. There will, therefore, be something else prior to them, since, preceding the pair of them, there must also be a cause which brings them together.<sup>744</sup>

Now, this [entity] that is prior to them is, either indivisibly or in a divided manner, 'all'. If indivisibly, it will need some other intermediary; for between that which is indivisibly all things and the dyad that contains all things there is, as a mean, the monad that contains all things in a divided manner,<sup>745</sup> which is itself unified by virtue of its indivisible cause and [in its turn] gives unity to the all-ness in the dyad. Therefore this [entity] which primally embraces all things is the monad prior to the dyad; and it is within that which is [all things] indivisibly that the seed and unitary cause of all-ness resides.

It is with good reason, then, that the all-complete Living Thing has been stated to be monadic and unable to be **on the second level along with another [such]** not only in the sense that [Plato] appears to indicate by the phrase,<sup>746</sup> but also because it is not paired with another;<sup>747</sup> for that which has been ranked along with another is on the second level and no longer primally an 'all'. There are indeed also causes which are ranked on a level with others of the same kind *after* the all-complete Living Thing, but they do not contain all things primally, and that which does contain them primally is monadic. If it is to be comprehensive of all things, there will not be another intelligible living thing alongside it; for if there were another, it would no longer be all-complete but [only] a part, and only the whole of which it was a part would be all-complete;<sup>748</sup> for multiplicity must cease at the monad.

<sup>744</sup> Or, 'since, preceding a dyad, there must be a cause which brings [its members] together'.

<sup>745</sup> Cf. 444.15–19 and the note there. In the terms of Dodds' analysis (*ET*, p. 211), 'that which is indivisibly all things' is the transcendent, or unparticipated, universal, 'the monad that contains all things in a divided manner', the immanent, or participated, universal, 'the dyad that contains all things', the participants.

<sup>746</sup> Sc. δεύτερον ('on the second level').

<sup>747</sup> οὐχ ὡς τῷ ῥήματι . . . ἄλλῳ (449.17–18). If my rendering of the Greek is correct, Proclus seems to be suggesting that he has put forward a stronger interpretation of Plato's words than the obvious one, although it is not clear to me how this is so. Perhaps one should render ῥήμα 'adjective' (for ῥήμα used of an adjective functioning as a predicate, see LSJ s.v. II.), in which case Proclus would merely be stating (albeit rather obscurely) that Plato was right to add 'along with another' to 'on the second level', perhaps on the ground that the monad of the previous paragraph could be described as δεύτερος but not as μεθ' ἑτέρου.

<sup>748</sup> Festugière construes this clause rather differently.

*The words ‘on the second level along with another [such]’:*

449.25–451.22

But why did Plato say **on the second level along with another [such]**? It would have been enough to say either just **along with another** or just **on the second level**, but he has combined the two. So as to show that which is ranked on a level with another and is not monadic cannot be first, as we said earlier (449.15–19).<sup>749</sup>

But perhaps he is also pointing to an aspect of reality.<sup>750</sup> The form in perishable things is in every case **along with another**. For example, the human form in this [individual] is also in that, since [it has] many participants, and for this reason each [of the two instances] is **along with another**. The [form] which is everlasting, on the other hand, but not a whole,<sup>751</sup> even though it is monadic and therefore not **along with another**, is nevertheless **on the second level**, being less complete than some whole. And [the form] which is neither in many [individuals] nor a part is not **on the second level along with another**, since it is [the form] of a single [thing] and of a whole not a part.<sup>752</sup>

It is with good reason, then, that the Theologian too (*Orph. fr.* 85.2 Kern) produces Phanes, ‘the bearer of the illustrious seed of the gods’, alone<sup>753</sup> from the god who is in a hidden manner all things,<sup>754</sup> and [then] from him brings into existence all of the secondary classes of gods. Ouranos comes forth (*proienai*) along with Gê –

<sup>749</sup> ἀλλὰ πῶς . . . εἴπομεν (449.25–450.1). With ἐνδεκνύμενος begins, it seems to me, Proclus’ answer to his own question and I would punctuate with a comma rather than a colon after δεύτερον and with a full stop after συνέπλεξεν.

<sup>750</sup> In what follows Proclus (perhaps surprisingly) focuses on the immanent phase of Forms (or form), distinguishing three possible modes of instantiation. The first is, as Proclus tells us himself, that of Forms such as Man, the second will be that of, for example, the Forms of the heavenly bodies, and the third is that of the αὐτοζῶον.

<sup>751</sup> Festugière comments: ‘Ici τὸ δὲ . . . αἰδίων μὲν, οὐχ ὅλον δὲ ne peut signifier que τὸ δὲ ἐν αἰδίῳ μὲν, οὐχ ὅλον δὲ’, but Proclus can express himself as he does because the immanent form of a star, informing as it does an everlasting body, is, unlike that of a human being, itself everlasting.

<sup>752</sup> From the indications present in the text it is possible to derive the following ‘scheme of instantiation’. (Elements not actually present in the text in square brackets.) 1. Forms such as Man: (a) multiply instantiated, (b) instantiated in perishable bodies, (c) [themselves perishable in their immanent phase], (d) not ‘in wholes’, (e) not themselves ‘wholes’. 2. Forms such as those of the heavenly bodies: (a) singly instantiated, (b) [instantiated in everlasting bodies], (c) themselves everlasting in their immanent phase, (d) [not ‘in wholes’], (e) not themselves ‘wholes’. 3. The αὐτοζῶον: (a) singly instantiated, (b) [instantiated in an everlasting body], (c) [itself everlasting in its immanent phase], (d) ‘in a whole’, (e) itself a ‘whole’.

<sup>753</sup> Sc. as an only child, so to speak.

<sup>754</sup> Sc. from the egg. Proclus often describes Being, or the first triad of the Intelligibles, its equivalent in his own system, in similar terms; cf., for example, 239.8–12 above.

She<sup>755</sup> in turn gave birth to Gaia and broad Ouranos  
(*Orph. fr.* 109 Kern)

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– and [then] Kronos along with Rhea; for it was in the third generation that Gê produced:

seven comely girls, lively-eyed, chaste,  
and she bore seven boys, lords, with downy hair;<sup>756</sup>  
(*Orph. fr.* 114.1–2 Kern)

and the Demiurge himself, the very great Zeus, is the yoke-mate of Hera – which is why she is said to ‘bear an equal burden’ with him – and they are sprung (*proerchesthai*) from the same parents (*Orph. fr.* 163 Kern); but Phanes, in contrast, comes forth alone and, one and the same person, is celebrated in song as [both] ‘female and begetter’ (*Orph. fr.* 81 Kern) and brings forth (*paragein*) the Nights and, as a father, has intercourse with the middle one:<sup>757</sup>

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for he himself plucked the virginal flower of his own child.  
(*Orph. fr.* 98 Kern)

So, according to this theologian too, the All-complete Living Thing is not **on the second level along with another [such]** but fills both the nocturnal and the heavenly orders<sup>758</sup> with its own all-ness.<sup>759</sup> And, in imitation of him,<sup>760</sup> Zeus too produces two orders [of gods], the hyper-cosmic and the encosmic. But while Phanes produces two triads Zeus [produces] two dodecads. (This, in fact, is why his sceptre is said to be ‘four and twenty measures long’ (*Orph. fr.* 157 Kern).) So, while the demiurgic cause always bears a likeness to the paradigmatic cause, it

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<sup>755</sup> Sc. Night. Festugière refers the reader to III. 171ff. for these genealogies.

<sup>756</sup> This sounds like the hair of a newborn baby, but perhaps we should think of long hair and beards.

<sup>757</sup> Presumably the idea is that it is Phanes’ female aspect that produces the Nights and his male that has intercourse with one of them. It is difficult to see how this can be squared with Brisson’s suggestion that the first of the three Nights can be viewed as Phanes’ mother, the second as his sister and the third as his daughter (Brisson (1987b) 58).

<sup>758</sup> Sc. the offspring of Night and Ouranos respectively.

<sup>759</sup> Just as the all-complete Living Thing passes on its ‘all-ness’ to soul and to the cosmos at 448.26–7 and the hypothetical monad its to the hypothetical dyad at 449.9–12.

<sup>760</sup> Festugière, following Schneider and Praechter, corrects ὄν to ὅ. However, although Proclus wrote τὸ παντελὲς ζῶον rather than Φάνης at 450.7, we have been firmly back on the mythological plane since then and it is easy to see how he may have lost sight of that, or even, given his identification of the two, have knowingly employed a kind of *constructio ad sensum*. (For this parallelism between Zeus and Phanes, cf. 447.24–5 above and the note ad loc.)

proceeds from intelligible unity into multiplicity.<sup>761</sup> But these matters have been dealt with in other writings.

10 And that the Living-Thing-itself rejoices in solitude has also been revealed through the *Orphic Theologies*; for the god in the egg,<sup>762</sup> that is to say, the Living Thing,<sup>763</sup> conceives by itself.<sup>764</sup> But<sup>765</sup> [the Theologian] nevertheless<sup>766</sup> calls him:

August daemon,  
Wisdom, bearer of the illustrious seed of the gods,<sup>767</sup>

by analogy with whom Zeus too is called ‘Wisdom’ and likewise ‘daemon’:

15 He was born the one Power, the one Daemon, the  
great Ruler of all things.<sup>768</sup>

In similar fashion, the *Oracles* too name this very great god ‘Source of sources’<sup>769</sup> and say that he alone has begotten all things:

Thence<sup>770</sup> unceasingly springs<sup>771</sup> the generation of manifold matter,  
Sweeping thence, the storm expends the flower of its fire,  
Hurling itself into the hollows of the worlds; for thence all things  
begin to extend their marvellous rays downwards.<sup>772</sup>

### *The Living-Thing-itself must be all-embracing and unique to be the Paradigm*

For there would have to be yet another living thing embracing (*peri*) the two of them, of which they would be parts, and this [living thing]<sup>773</sup>

<sup>761</sup> The philosophical counterpart of the greater fruitfulness of Zeus in lines 2–4.

<sup>762</sup> Or perhaps ‘the oviform god’. <sup>763</sup> Adding a comma after ζῶον at 451.10.

<sup>764</sup> Sc. is both father and mother.

<sup>765</sup> Punctuating with a full stop rather than a comma after ἐαυτοῦ at 451.10.

<sup>766</sup> ‘Nevertheless’ points to the contrast between his love of solitude and his production of all of the gods.

<sup>767</sup> *Orph. fr.* 85.1–2 Kern. <sup>768</sup> *Orph. fr.* 168.6 Kern.

<sup>769</sup> The phrase πηγῇ τῶν πηγῶν appears in *Or. Chald.* fr. 30 Majercik.

<sup>770</sup> Sc. from the ‘Source of sources’. At 388.21, where Proclus also quotes this line, Festugière argues that the ‘Source of sources’ is the Chaldean supreme god and that Proclus is not here deriving matter from the Paradigm as he does there, but whatever the status of the ‘Source of sources’ within the Chaldean system, in the present passage Proclus is clearly identifying it with the Living-Thing-itself and Phanes.

<sup>771</sup> Translating ἄδην (scr. Diehl: ἄδην C P: ἄρδην 388.21) θρώσκει with Festugière rather than ἀποθρώσκει (N: Damascius, *De princ.* I. 251.17 (Ruelle)), the preferred reading of Des Places and Majercik.

<sup>772</sup> 451.17–22 = *Or. Chald.* fr. 34 Majercik. <sup>773</sup> I.e. our universe.

would [then] be more correctly described as being made in the likeness no longer of them but of the one which embraced them.<sup>774</sup> (31a6–8)<sup>775</sup>

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### General explanation: 452.3–27

What Plato is stating here is easily<sup>776</sup> shown to be the case [by starting] from demiurgic goodness. If the Demiurge is good, he produces the universe after [the likeness of] the all-complete Living Thing. But he certainly is good and the best of causes. Therefore he does make the cosmos just like the all-complete Living Thing. After all, the very first Demiurge must have intellection (*einai noêtikos*) of the very first paradigm, and if he has intellection of it, he must also be the creator of complete (*pantôs*) resemblance to it. For either there will be nothing [created] after [the paradigm], and [then] it would no longer have the status of a paradigm, or there will be that which has been produced by the very first of [all] demiurges.

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And if you say that there must also be other, secondary, causes which create after more particular paradigms, you make a valid point, but you are still retaining a single universe, since their creations (*dêmiourgêmata*) will be part of the universe. [This is so] because as creations are to [their] creators,<sup>777</sup> so are the creating [agencies] to [their] paradigms, and vice versa. So, just as the paradigms [in question] are parts of [other] paradigms and the creative causes [parts] of [other] creative causes, so are the creations [parts] of [other] creations.<sup>778</sup>

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<sup>774</sup> ἐκείνω at 452.1 is something of a puzzle. Burnet prints ἐκείνω without recording any variants and Diehl himself does not record it as a departure from the transmitted text of Plato. Fortunately, it makes little difference which of the two one translates.

<sup>775</sup> Divergences from Burnet's OCT text: Proclus omits ὃν after γάρ at 31a6.

<sup>776</sup> ῥᾶδιον (452.3) is a little difficult. Kroll suggested emending to ῥᾶον, but I would prefer ῥᾶδιως or, better, changing ἀποδείκνυται to ἀποδεικνύναι.

<sup>777</sup> As the argument unfolds, these 'creators' (δημιουργοί) become first 'creating [agencies]' (δημιουργοῦντα) and then 'creative causes' (δημιουργικά αἰτία). This variation is not, as far as I can see, really necessary to the argument and only tends to confuse it. Proclus would have done better to keep to, say, δημιουργικά αἰτία throughout.

<sup>778</sup> I have assumed that the first part of the argument (ὥς γὰρ τὰ δημιουργήματα . . . ἐναλλάξ) is intended to state a general truth and the second (ὥς οὖν μέρη . . . δημιουργημάτων) to apply it to the matter in hand, and I cannot see any other way of making sense of the argument. However, if this is right, the second part of the argument is rather poorly put and one would have expected something along the lines, ὥς οὖν μέρη τὰ παραδείγματα τοῦ παραδείγματος καὶ τὰ δημιουργικά αἰτία τοῦ δημιουργικοῦ αἰτίου, οὕτως καὶ τὰ δημιουργήματα τοῦ δημιουργήματος ('So, just as the paradigms [in question] are parts of the Paradigm and the creative causes [parts] of the Creative Cause, so are the creations [parts] of [this] creation'), if more elegantly phrased. Perhaps something has gone wrong with the text.

25 The wholeness, then, of the universe is necessarily an image of the all-complete Living Thing and the all-complete Living Thing the paradigm of the universe. But it has been shown that the Living-Thing-itself alone is truly monadic.<sup>779</sup> Therefore, so as to have imitated the Paradigm perfectly, the cosmos [too] is one and monadic. And indeed, as soon as it takes on the same form as [the Paradigm],<sup>780</sup> how could it fail to image its whole nature by being born intelligent, everlasting and monadic?

*The cosmos is unique because the Paradigm is unique*

453 Therefore, so that this [living thing] would be like the all-complete Living Thing in respect of uniqueness (*monôsis*), its maker did not make an infinite number of worlds (*kosmos*) or [even] two.<sup>781</sup> (31a8-b2)

*The word 'all-complete': 453.3-14*

5 [Plato] once again directs our attention to the demiurgic cause, so that, [starting] from it too,<sup>782</sup> we may grasp that all that comes into being through the agency of the universal creation is monadic, everlasting, intellectual, and that it is by bringing their monads into existence that the Demiurge is the cause of all things and he hands over pluralized and particular creation to the young gods.

10 Further, Plato has implicitly<sup>783</sup> (*lelêthotôs*) taught us which in his view is – [to use] a phrase which is always on the lips of more recent [commentators] – ‘the **all-complete** Intellect’. [He indicates] that it is certainly the intelligible [Intellect], in which the universe in the first instance (*prôtôs*) exists. Earlier (30d3), where he was celebrating its

<sup>779</sup> This was the thrust of 448.3–451.22.

<sup>780</sup> A more natural rendering of the Greek would be ‘and indeed, if [or ‘since’] it was the first to take the same form as [the Paradigm]’, and Festugière translates along these lines, but the cosmos is the *only* copy of the Paradigm.

<sup>781</sup> Divergences from Burnet’s OCT text: Proclus reads οὔτε ἀπείρους οὔτε δύο for οὔτε δύο οὔτ’ ἀπείρους at 30b2.

<sup>782</sup> This looks back to ἀπὸ τῆς δημιουργικῆς ἀγαθότητος at 452.3.

<sup>783</sup> Or perhaps ‘unwittingly’, although, as David Runia points out, commentators usually assume that their all-knowing authors do everything purposefully. In any case, the point seems to be that this passage settles a later debate. It is not quite clear whether the question at issue was which intellect was best described as ‘all-complete’ or just what Plato’s opinion was (notice that at *PT* III. 62. 1–2 Proclus again states that it was Plato’s *opinion* that it was the Paradigm), although for the Neoplatonists this probably came to the same thing. As Festugière points out, the two candidates will have been the Paradigm and the Demiurge.

all-ness,<sup>784</sup> he called it, in a divided manner, ‘that which is in all respects complete’, but now, where the issue is that it is ‘one of a kind’, he has, bringing it all together, called it **all-complete**.<sup>785</sup>

*The hypothesis of an infinity of worlds: 453.14–454.10*

But in what sense does infinity exist, in what sense not? [The word] ‘infinity’ is clearly used in three [connections]: in relation to power, in relation to number or in relation to size. Infinity in relation to power is found among divine beings and in the cosmos; for to be inexhaustible and ever-flowing is the property of infinity in relation to power. [Infinity] in relation to number (*plêthos*) exists in one sense but does not in another: it does not exist all at once but does bit by bit.<sup>786</sup> [Infinity] in relation to size does not exist at all.

Now, if there is infinity with regard to number in the case of worlds, [1] it will in the first place lack any internal order; for what ordering of prior and posterior entities is there in an infinity, where nothing comes first? [2] Secondly (*epeita*), [such an infinity] will not have a single efficient cause. If it did have one, it would create a unity (*hen*) before multiplicity and a whole before the parts.<sup>787</sup> Being single [itself], it would also in the first instance (*prôton*) make its effects (*ta met’ autên*) like itself, because every natural efficient cause wishes to bring into existence things like itself.<sup>788</sup> But among things where there is a ‘first instance’ infinity is not present. [3]<sup>789</sup> And if they are going to hypothesize worlds which are [produced] from one another, the causes [of these worlds] will be either uncoordinated or coordinated. If they are coordinated, the worlds too must exhibit a single coordinated arrangement (*suntaxis*). But there is no order in the infinite. And, besides, the void, coming between them, would

<sup>784</sup> For ‘all-ness’ see the note at 426.24.

<sup>785</sup> In other words, although ‘that which is in all respects complete’, and ‘all-complete’ mean much the same thing, Plato chose the multi-word description to image its all-inclusiveness (or the fact that it contains many different things) when he was talking about that and the single-word description to image its unity when that was the issue.

<sup>786</sup> Sc. it is not possible for an infinite number of things to exist simultaneously but they can successively over time. This is standard Neoplatonic doctrine (cf. the note at 444.30), although Proclus does toy with the possibility of an infinite number of *concurrent* worlds at 438.11–17.

<sup>787</sup> On this, cf. the note at 444.19.

<sup>788</sup> Cf. *ET* §28, which states that, ‘Every producing cause brings into existence things like to itself before the unlike’ (Dodds’ translation).

<sup>789</sup> This third argument has some interesting similarities to *PT* II. 15.10–16.21, where Proclus is arguing that there is a single ‘first principle’, namely the One.

5 keep them apart.<sup>790</sup> If, on the other hand, [their causes] are uncoordinated, we shall be assuming a divided and unsympathetic<sup>791</sup> multiplicity among the first principles, and this utterly destroys everything – both the causes themselves and their effects (*ta met' auta*). For [the causes] will be mutually destructive, because, being totally incompatible (*allotriōs*), they will be unable to coexist, and the things which result from them  
10 will come to a standstill and not have anything from which to be reborn, since the first principles will have been destroyed.<sup>792</sup>

### *The hypothesis of a finite plurality of worlds: 454.10–457.11*

If, on the other hand, one were to say that there is neither one cosmos  
nor an infinite number but a finite plurality – in fact I recently<sup>793</sup> read<sup>794</sup>  
a certain barbarian speculation (*doxa*) which Plutarch of Chaeronea  
recorded<sup>795</sup> [to the effect that] in a single equilateral triangle, the Intel-  
15 ligible is situated in the middle and around it on each of the sides are

<sup>790</sup> Or perhaps, 'would prevent it'. The other arguments in this paragraph are, or at least could be, directed, as one would expect in view of the initial denial of the very possibility of an *actual* numeric infinity at 453.19–20, against the possibility of an infinity of *successive* worlds, and the words ἄλλους ἐξ ἄλλων . . . κόσμους ('worlds which are [produced] from one another') at 453.30f. suggest that this one should be too, but the reference to 'void' (τὸ κενόν) suggests that the target has suddenly become an infinity of *concurrent* worlds.

<sup>791</sup> Sc. one whose members lack affinity. <sup>792</sup> A reminiscence of *Phdr.* 245d7–e2.

<sup>793</sup> Or perhaps just 'I once read', since in Plato, who uses the phrase ἤδη ἤκουσα half a dozen times (the only other passage in which Proclus himself uses the phrase, in *Remp.* I. 224.22, does not help here), it usually means something like 'I once heard'.

<sup>794</sup> More literally 'heard', but ἀκούειν can be used of reading, in later Greek even, as Schenkeveld (1992) has shown, of silent reading, and it seems to me that both the phrasing here and the amount of detail that Proclus goes on to supply suggest a written source rather than, say, a private conversation or a lecture, though not, I think (for reasons I give in the note at 454.24) Plutarch himself.

<sup>795</sup> For the cosmology, see *De defectu oraculorum* 422b–c. Cleombrotus, who recounts it, says (421a–b) that he got it from a mysterious, Doric-speaking but non-Greek, wise-man and prophet in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf, but Plutarch's brother Lamprias, another character in the dialogue and its narrator, later (422d–e) claims that it was actually promulgated long ago by Petron, a Dorian Greek from Himera in Sicily. (On Petron, for whom the *De defectu* is, unless one counts Proclus, our only source, see Guthrie (1962) 322–3.) Festugière points out that Proclus' account of the cosmology (454.13–18) 'gives both more and less' than Plutarch's and suggests that he may have read Petron himself. Whether this was so or not (and Lamprias' remarks at 23e suggest that Plutarch himself had not sighted Petron's book), the words 'a certain barbarian speculation' (454.12), which echo Cleombrotus' sourcing of the cosmology, betray an awareness of the *De defectu*. Actually, I think that the differences between the two accounts of the cosmology are best explained on the assumption that Plutarch's has been massaged to prepare the way for the reading of it that follows at 454.20–455.2.

sixty worlds, and at each angle one, [all of them] being like the one that contains us, so that there are three Rulers and thrice sixty others under them, since the ones at the corners are more sovereign than those on the sides – these hypotheses (*logoi*) at least then<sup>796</sup> produce a finite plurality of worlds while making the Intelligible one – unless perhaps they position the Intelligible in the centre as being the root of all things and the three worlds at the corners as being conjoiners (*sunektikoi*) and unifiers after the fashion of the one cosmic intellect, the one cosmic soul and the one cosmic nature, or after the fashion of the empyrean, the ethereal and the material worlds<sup>797</sup> (and the angle is indeed the juncture (*sunochê*) of the sides) and by the three groups of sixty mean the manifolds which proceed<sup>798</sup> from these in (*kata*) each sphere; for there are twelve spheres,<sup>799</sup> and the manifold corresponding to each is spherical, the symbol of which is the pentad, which is the first spherical number; so there are three groups of sixty because in each sphere, the symbol for which is the pentad, there is an intellective, a psychic and a physical series, or because there is an empyrean manifold of gods, an ethereal and a material – but, be that as it may,<sup>800</sup> if anyone talking of a finite [plurality of worlds]

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<sup>796</sup> Sc. ‘these if no others that are current’, although Proclus goes on to undermine the idea that even these do.

<sup>797</sup> This division of the universe into empyrean, ethereal and material regions, or κόσμοι, which, in Proclus, also appears at *in Tim.* II. 57.9–58.11 (see especially 57.9–14 and 58.3–11) and *PT* IV. §39 (see especially 111.12–16), derives from the Oracles and gives this Neoplatonic interpretation of Petron’s cosmology a ‘Chaldean’ slant, which suggests that Proclus’ source for it, and perhaps for the cosmology itself, complete with reference to Plutarch, may have been a commentary on the *Oracles*. (Festugière and Saffrey and Westerink mention other references to the three κόσμοι in their notes to the passages cited above and they are discussed at Lewy (1978) 137–57; note that (i) Saffrey and Westerink point out (111, n. 1) that the material in *PT* seems to come from a commentary on the *Oracles*, and (ii) that at *in Tim.* II. 57.10–11 the three κόσμοι are said to originate in ‘foreign theosophy’ (ὑπερόριος θεοσοφία), a phrase which Lewy (p. 444) lists among those that point to the *Oracles*, and which is also reminiscent of βαρβαρική δόξα at 454.12 above; perhaps it was no accident that Proclus, or his source, failed to mention the fact that Lamprias attributes the *De defectu* cosmology to Petron.)

<sup>798</sup> With Festugière, accepting Kroll’s conjecture <προελθόντα> before ἀπὸ at 454.26.

<sup>799</sup> Proclus also mentions these twelve spheres at *in Remp.* II. 46.11–17 and at *in Tim.* II. 276.5 (in the course of summarizing Theodore of Asine’s exegesis of the Psychogony). In the former passage he lists them as those of the fixed stars and the seven planets together with the sublunary sphere and the spheres of the three elements that make it up (sc. air, water and earth), and associates them with the twelve gods of *Phaedrus* 246e4–247a4. There are also references to twelve spheres in Hermias (*in Phdr.* 135.26–8), Philoponus (*Aet.* 537.4–7 and Psellus (*Opusc.* 12.14–15), all of whom omit the sublunary sphere but include spheres for all four of the elements, and Proclus (or his source) may well have tailored the tradition to suit the development of the argument in *in Remp.*

<sup>800</sup> At this point Proclus finally resumes the argument after being side-tracked not just once, but twice (at 454.12 and 454.20).

5 is not intimating [something like] this, but [means] that they really are numerically distinct, we shall ask him whether it is better to create a single cosmos which embraces everything or many separated from one another. The former alternative has the manifold held together by the monad and the parts by the whole; the latter extends creation (*poiësis*) [all the way] to an uncoordinated manifold, even though Nature and every 10 similar [agency] has a monad hold together its manifold<sup>801</sup> and a whole its parts. And if these worlds are in contact with one another, they will, since they are spherical, be in contact at a point and are separated<sup>802</sup> from one another by their whole [bulk] and will [therefore] be more unsympathetic than sympathetic. But things [derived] from a single cause must be in 15 sympathy with one another and live one life. And if they do not even<sup>803</sup> touch, they will be entirely separate from one another.

And if this last is the case what is up will be down, says Aristotle,<sup>804</sup> and what is down up, since there will be space outside [the worlds], and worlds will be placed here and there [in it]; for ‘up’ for us will be ‘down’ 20 for others. So how can the earth there and everything heavy there fail to be carried towards this cosmos as well, if it is true that downwards movement is [characteristic] of heavy things? And at the same time the same thing will, as being in that cosmos, be travelling upwards and, as moving towards this [cosmos], travelling downwards,<sup>805</sup> and there will be no order among movements or forces or oppositions (*sustoichia*)<sup>806</sup> in 25 the universe. Unless indeed one were to say in response to this notion<sup>807</sup> that the centre is different in each [cosmos], since the [relevant] centre is not that of the void but that of the cosmos [in question], [and] so a part of a particular (*hekastos*) cosmos travels towards its own (*to en autôî*)

<sup>801</sup> Pace Praechter and Festugière, I have followed Diehl in excluding *πρό* at 455.9.

<sup>802</sup> The present tense *διείργονται* is rather unexpected. Did Proclus perhaps write *διειργόμενοι* or even *τῷ δὲ ὅλῳ διείργεσθαι*?

<sup>803</sup> Reading *μηδὲ* (Diehl in app., Praechter, Festugière) for *μητὲ* (codd., Diehl) at 455.14.

<sup>804</sup> Contrary to appearances, Proclus is not quoting Aristotle directly. Festugière suggests that he has in mind *Phys.* 4.1, 208b14ff., but *Cael.* 1.8, 276a22–276b21 (cf. especially 276b11–18 with lines 19–24) seems more likely.

<sup>805</sup> Omitting *χωρῶν ἐπὶ* (perhaps an anticipation of the same phrase two lines further on) at 455.21 with *M* and *P*, and reading *τοῦτον* with *C* at 455.23.

<sup>806</sup> These *συστοιχίαι* are actually columns or series of coordinate pairs such as ‘light and heavy’ and ‘up and down’, and the thought is presumably that ‘up’ will no longer be consistently ‘up’ or (perhaps) ‘heavy’ consistently ‘heavy’, and so on.

<sup>807</sup> I am not really sure how best to translate *ἐπιβολή* either here or at 456.2. Other possibilities here are ‘interpretation’ (cf. Lampe s.v. 3), or ‘criticism’, which is not really supported by Proclus’ usage elsewhere or by the dictionaries, although the latter do have ‘attack’ and ‘assault’.

centre or periphery, not towards an alien one, and all those<sup>808</sup> [located] in different worlds (*kosmoi*) are mutually alien.

And should one agree to accept these [arguments]<sup>809</sup> too as sufficient, [by all means] let them too be among the [possible] modes of refutation,<sup>810</sup> but Plato for his part has chosen the most effective [refutation] of all – the one that sets out from the Paradigm – and has left these and similar [refutations] aside because they [only] take in subsidiary causes. And such a proof is definitive. It does not separately refute first those who claim that there is a plurality of worlds (*kosmoi*) and then those who introduce an infinity [of worlds] scattered all over the place and surrounded by void,<sup>811</sup> but has shown at one and the same time that both the former and the latter are in error by establishing that the cosmos is one directly from the uniqueness of the Paradigm.

And, besides, [Plato] rejected modes of argument based on material considerations. He did not, like Aristotle, base his demonstrations on the [claim] that matter is one or that natural places are limited in number, or, like the Stoics, on the [claim] that substance – to wit matter, since [for them] substance is corporeal – is unified.<sup>812</sup> For Plato, either uniquely or more than anyone else, made use of causation stemming from a provident [deity], says Theophrastus,<sup>813</sup> giving him his due on this point at least.

As we said, then, [Plato] has credited the Paradigm with being the cause of the uniqueness of the cosmos. For, if the Paradigm is one and the Demiurge one, the cosmos too is necessarily one. And, putting it at its simplest, not even this [is all necessary], but if the Paradigm is one and the cosmos images the uniqueness of the Paradigm, the cosmos is one. But the antecedent is true. The Paradigm *is* one, as [Plato] has shown earlier, and it *has* brought the cosmos into existence on the model of (*kata*) its own uniqueness; for, just as the Intelligible<sup>814</sup> [which derives]

<sup>808</sup> Sc. centres and peripheries.

<sup>809</sup> Taking both ταῦτά (455.29) and οὔτοι (456.2) (the latter being masculine by attraction to τρόποι) as referring to the arguments set out at 455.2–29, but Festugière may be right to refer ταῦτά to the possible response to the argument from Aristotle outlined at 455.24–9, in which case I would translate: ‘but even if one were to accept this [response] as warranted, let these [arguments of ours stand as] among the [possible] modes of refutation, although Plato for his part . . .’

<sup>810</sup> On my difficulties with ἐπιβολή, see the note at 455.25. Here I have followed Festugière in settling on ‘refutation’, although this has even less support in the dictionaries than the renderings considered there.

<sup>811</sup> Given that Proclus’ arguments at 453ff. seem, in the main at least, to be directed at the possibility of an infinite number of *successive* worlds it is rather surprising that he seems to assume that Plato’s argument is directed only at the possibility of an infinite number of *concurrent* worlds.

<sup>812</sup> Cited at *SVF* II. 533. <sup>813</sup> Fr. 242 Fortenbaugh *et al.*

<sup>814</sup> Sc. the Paradigm. One might have expected νοητὸν ζῶον, as at 457.2.

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from a unique [entity], the Good, was produced as a unique [entity], so likewise has it brought into existence, [modelled] after itself, which is one in [its] uniqueness, the cosmos, single in its kind.

Therefore the cosmos is one and neither more than one – nor is there more than one primary paradigm<sup>815</sup> – nor infinite in number; after all, a numeric (*kata plêthos*) infinity does not exist even among mortal beings let alone among everlasting beings.

Porphyrus<sup>816</sup> says that it is possible to use Plato's proof in relation to all the other first principles as well. For by it not only is it shown that the intelligible Living Thing is one but also that the very first Demiurge is one and, at the general level, that the first principles of [all of] the Intelligibles are not multiple but single. [Otherwise] there would have to be yet another first principle of these multiple [principles] thanks to which they too were principles and were ungenerated; for everything which is naturally present in multiple [subjects] must of necessity have originated from a single cause. So should anyone<sup>817</sup> claim that God and matter [are both principles] he would be compelled to posit another prior to them. For matter is not self-sufficient and God does not embrace all things, so the cause which embraces all things, the one which is truly self-sufficient and has need of nothing else, must be prior to them.

*The cosmos always has been and always will be unique*

**But this heaven, alone of its kind, came into being one, is one, and will remain one.**<sup>818</sup> (31b2–3)

*Points of detail: 457.14–458.11*

[The heaven's being] **alone of its kind** (*monogenês*)<sup>819</sup> images the monadic cause and points to the Being which embraces all secondary [beings] and which has dominion over wholes. And indeed the Theologian (*Orph. fr.*

<sup>815</sup> The words 'nor is there more than one primary paradigm' (οὔτε πλεῖω τὰ πρῶτα παραδείγματα) are a little odd as they stand and I am tempted to either add γάρ after οὔτε or omit them as a marginal comment which has found its way into the text.

<sup>816</sup> 456.31–457.11 = fr. 56 Sodano.

<sup>817</sup> Comparison with 381.26–396.26 above, which is in large part devoted to showing that matter is not, *pace* Plutarch and Atticus, an independent principle, suggests that Proclus (or Porphyry) has Plutarch and/or Atticus in mind here too.

<sup>818</sup> Divergences from Burnet's OCT text: Proclus reads τε καὶ ἔσται rather than καὶ ἔτ' ἔσται at 31b3.

<sup>819</sup> Perhaps μονογενής has been 'corrected' to μονογενές, but cf. τὸ ἓν in line 22.

190 Kern) in the same way habitually calls Kore<sup>820</sup> **Alone of Her Kind** (*mounogeneia*) because she presides over all encosmic beings like a leader and is the cause of living things which are **alone of their kind**; for it is the goddess who comes next after her<sup>821</sup> who gives existence to [the orders of beings which are],<sup>822</sup> being irrational, not **alone of their kind**. But, be that as it may, the Theologian, for the stated reasons (*dia tauta*), similarly calls Kore **alone of her kind** even though he has produced another divinity from the same causes as Kore.<sup>823</sup>

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[Being] **one**<sup>824</sup> comes to the universe from the one Henad of henads;<sup>825</sup> just as the being [that is dispersed] everywhere [issues] from Being, so does the one that is in all things [issue] from the One.<sup>826</sup>

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**Came into being, is** and **will be** indicate the universe's everlastingness in time, an everlastingness which extends throughout the infinity of time; for **came into being** [relates to] the past, **is** to the present and **will be** to the future.

Again,<sup>827</sup> you have **one** as an image of One Being, **came into being, is** and **will be** as an image of Eternity – for the infinity of time imitates infinite Eternity – and all of these [together] as an image of the Living-Thing-itself; for [the Living-Thing-itself] was primally monadic and really one and eternal, and this [living thing is only so] on account of its resemblance to it.<sup>828</sup>

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Also, **to have come into being** is indicative of completeness, **to be** of participation in Being, **to be going to be** of the perpetual generation

<sup>820</sup> Kore is the second god in both the second triad of the intellectual gods and the second triad of the hypercosmic gods (when she is also known as Persephone), in the latter case also giving her name to the whole triad. (Cf. the table in Brisson (1987b) 103.) The circumstance that this Kore is said to preside over τὰ ἐγκόσμια ('encosmic beings') and to do so ἡγεμονικῶς ('like a leader'), suggests that she is the 'hegemonic' or hypercosmic one.

<sup>821</sup> Kern, Diehl and Festugière agree that this is Demeter, presumably as being the goddess for whom the corresponding (sc. zoogonic) triad of hypercosmic-encosmic gods is named. (Cf. Brisson (1987b) 103.)

<sup>822</sup> Following Festugière in supposing the ellipse of τάξεις after τὰς γὰρ μὴ μονογενεῖς at 457.19.

<sup>823</sup> Kern and Diehl suggest Zeus and Plouton (= Hades), Festugière just Plouton, the two latter citing *Orph. fr.* 195, 198 Kern. Perhaps it is relevant that Demeter bore just Kore and Ploutos (= Wealth).

<sup>824</sup> Or, 'Oneness'.

<sup>825</sup> Sc. the One. The phrase also occurs at *PT* II. 65.12 and in *Parm.* 1045.1.

<sup>826</sup> Following Festugière in punctuating with a semicolon rather than a comma and adding γὰρ after καθάπερ at 457.23.

<sup>827</sup> The exact force of οὖν πάλιν eludes me.

<sup>828</sup> In other words, all three members of the intelligible triad can be extracted from the lemma.

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on account of which the cosmos is never-failing. And so it is also the case that the first of these [three] derives from the One – for it is thence that completeness has come to all things – the second from One Being, and the third from Eternity; for it is [from Eternity] that unceasing existence (*to anekleipton*) accrues to wholes.

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# English–Greek glossary

This list of terms is designed to help the reader identify the Greek original of a particular translation. For best effect it should be used in conjunction with the Greek–English index.

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absolute	<i>haplous</i>	ἅπλοῦς
absolutely complete	<i>holotelês</i>	όλοτελής
accessory (cause)	<i>sunaition</i>	συναίτιον
accident	<i>sumbebêkos</i>	συμβεβηκός
accomplish	<i>epiteleîn</i>	ἐπιτελεῖν
account	<i>logos</i>	λόγος
acted upon, be	<i>paschein</i>	πάσχειν
activity, actuality	<i>energeia</i>	ἐνέργεια
affection	<i>pathos</i>	πάθος
affinity	<i>sungeneia</i>	συγγένεια
affirmation	<i>kataphasis</i>	κατάφασις
akin to	<i>sungenês</i>	συγγενής
all at once	<i>homou</i>	ὁμοῦ
all together	<i>athroûs (pan)</i>	ἅθρως (πᾶν)
all-ness	<i>pantotês</i>	παντότης
all-perfect	<i>panteleios</i>	παντέλειος
alone in its kind	<i>monogenês</i>	μονογενής
aloneness	<i>monôsis</i>	μόνωσις
always	<i>aei</i>	ἀεί
always-existent, the	<i>to aei on</i>	τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν
ambiguous	<i>amphibolos</i>	ἄμφιβολος
analogy	<i>analogia</i>	ἀναλογία
ancient	<i>palaios</i>	παλαιός
angels	<i>angeloi</i>	ἄγγελοι
animate, to	<i>psychoun</i>	ψυχοῦν
antecedent	<i>hêgoumenon</i>	ἡγούμενον
appearance	<i>emphasis</i>	ἐμφασις
apportion	<i>aponemein</i>	ἀπονέμειν
apprehension	<i>epibolê</i>	ἐπιβολή
appropriate	<i>oikeios</i>	οἰκεῖος
appropriate, to	<i>oikeioun</i>	οἰκιοῦν
arrangement	<i>harmonia, suntaxis</i>	ἁρμονία, σύνταξις
ascend	<i>anatrechein</i>	ἀνατρέχειν
ascent	<i>anodos</i>	ἄνοδος

# English–Greek glossary

associate	<i>suzugein</i>	συζυγεῖν
august	<i>semnos</i>	σεμνός
autonomous	<i>autarkês</i>	αὐτάρκης
axiom	<i>axiôma</i>	ἄξιωμα
basic principle	<i>bupothesis</i>	ὑπόθεσις
bastard	<i>nothos</i>	νόθος
beautiful	<i>kalos</i>	καλός
beautify	<i>kosmein</i>	κοσμεῖν
beauty	<i>kallos, to kalon</i>	κάλλος, τὸ καλόν
become	<i>gignesthai</i>	γίγνεσθαι
becoming	<i>genesis</i>	γένεσις
beginning	<i>archê</i>	ἀρχή
behaviour	<i>pathos</i>	πάθος
being	<i>eimai, ousia, to on</i>	εἶναι, οὐσία, τὸ ὄν
beingness	<i>ousia</i>	οὐσία
beings	<i>ta onta</i>	τὰ ὄντα
beneficent	<i>agathourgos</i>	ἀγαθουργός
bestower	<i>chorêgos</i>	χορηγός
bodily	<i>sômatikos, sômatoeidês</i>	σωματικός, σωματοειδής
body	<i>sôma, onkos</i>	σῶμα, ὄγκος
bond	<i>desmos, sunochê</i>	δεσμός, συνοχή
boniform	<i>agathoeidês</i>	ἀγαθοειδής
bounty	<i>chorêgia</i>	χορηγία
bring forth	<i>paragein</i>	παράγειν
builder	<i>tektôn</i>	τέκτων
bulk	<i>onkos</i>	ὄγκος
capacity	<i>dunamis</i>	δύναμις
causation	<i>aitia</i>	αἰτία
cause	<i>aitia, aition</i>	αἰτία, αἴτιον
celebrate	<i>anumnein</i>	ἀνυμνεῖν
chance	<i>automaton</i>	αὐτόματον
change	<i>metabolê</i>	μεταβολή
change, to	<i>metaballein</i>	μεταβάλλειν
chaos	<i>chaos</i>	χάος
character	<i>idiôma</i>	ἰδίωμα
choice	<i>bairesis</i>	αἵρεσις
circle, to	<i>choreuein</i>	χορεύειν
clearly	<i>saphôs</i>	σαφῶς
cognition	<i>gnôsis</i>	γνώσις
cognitive	<i>gnôstikos</i>	γνωστικός
come into being, come to be	<i>gignesthai</i>	γίγνεσθαι
coming into being	<i>genesis</i>	γένεσις
common	<i>koinos</i>	κοινός

# English–Greek glossary

communion	<i>koinônia</i>	κοινωνία
complete (adjective)	<i>teleios</i>	τέλειος
complete, to	<i>apotelein, perainein</i>	ἀποτελεῖν, περαίνειν
completion	<i>telos, sumplērôsis</i>	τέλος, συμπλήρωσις
composite	<i>sustêma</i>	σύστημα
composition	<i>sunthesis</i>	σύνθεσις
concatenation	<i>heirmos</i>	εἶρμός
conception	<i>ennoia</i>	ἐννοία
conclusion	<i>sumperasma</i>	συμπέρασμα
confuse	<i>sunchein</i>	συγχεῖν
conjectural	<i>eikastikos</i>	εἰκαστικός
conjecture, to	<i>eikazein</i>	εἰκάζειν
connatural, of a	<i>sumphuês</i>	συμφυής
cognate nature		
connection	<i>sunaphê</i>	συναφή
consequent	<i>hepomenon</i>	ἐπόμενον
construct	<i>sunistanai, apergazesthai</i>	συνιστάναι, ἀπεργάζεσθαι
contemplate	<i>theôrein</i>	θεωρεῖν
contemplation	<i>thea, theôria</i>	θέα, θεωρία
continuity	<i>sunecheia</i>	συνέχεια
continuously	<i>aei</i>	ἀεί
convert (logical use)	<i>antistrephein</i>	ἀντιστρέφειν
convincingness	<i>pistis</i>	πίστις
cooperation	<i>sumpnoia</i>	σύμπνοια
copy	<i>eidôlon, eikôn</i>	εἰδωλον, εἰκών
corporeal	<i>sômatikos, sômatoeidês</i>	σωματικός, σωματοειδής
cosmos	<i>kosmos</i>	κόσμος
cosmos-making	<i>kosmopoios</i>	κοσμοποιός
coupled series	<i>sustoichia</i>	συστοιχία
coupled with	<i>suzugos</i>	σύζυγος
craft	<i>technê</i>	τέχνη
craftsman	<i>demiourgos</i>	δημιουργός
create	<i>demiourgein</i>	δημιουργεῖν
creation	<i>poësis</i>	ποίησις
creation, the	<i>kosmopoia</i>	κοσμοποιία
creative task, creativity	<i>demiourgia</i>	δημιουργία
creator	<i>poiêtês</i>	ποιητής
cult (holy)	<i>thrêskeia</i>	θρησκεία
dark	<i>skoteinos</i>	σκοτεινός
decad	<i>dekas</i>	δεκάς
decide	<i>boulesthai</i>	βούλεσθαι
decision (rational)	<i>boulêsis</i>	βούλησις
deed, action	<i>praxis</i>	πρᾶξις
defining, definitory	<i>horikos</i>	ὀρικός
defining feature	<i>idiôma</i>	ιδίωμα

# English–Greek glossary

definition	<i>boros, diorismos</i>	ὅρος, διορισμός
Demiurge	<i>dēmiourgos</i>	δημιουργός
demiurgy	<i>dēmiourgia</i>	δημιουργία
demon	<i>daimôn</i>	δαίμων
demonic	<i>daimonios</i>	δαιμόνιος
demonstrate	<i>deiknusthai, apodeiknusthai</i>	δείκνυσθαι, ἀποδείκνυσθαι
demonstration	<i>apodeixis</i>	ἀπόδειξις
depend on	<i>artasthai</i>	ἀρτᾶσθαι
desire	<i>epheis, orexis</i>	ἐφεις, ὄρεξις
destructible	<i>phthartos</i>	φθαρτός
destruction	<i>phthora</i>	φθορά
destructive	<i>phthartikos</i>	φθαρτικός
determine	<i>boulesthai</i>	βούλεσθαι
differentiation	<i>diakrisis</i>	διάκρισις
difficulty	<i>aporia</i>	ἀπορία
discordant	<i>plēmmelês</i>	πλημμελής
discursive	<i>dianoêtos, dianoêtikos</i>	διανοητός, διανοητικός
discursive reason	<i>dianoia</i>	διάνοια
disjunctive	<i>diairetikos</i>	διαιρητικός
disordered	<i>ataktos</i>	ἄτακτος
disposition	<i>bexis</i>	ἔξις
dissimilar	<i>anomoios</i>	ἀνόμοιος
distinguish	<i>aphorizein</i>	ἀφορίζειν
divide	<i>diairein</i>	διαίρειν
divided	<i>meristos</i>	μεριστός
divine	<i>theios</i>	θεῖος
divinity, divine nature	<i>theotês</i>	θεότης
division	<i>diairesis, merismos</i>	διαίρεσις, μερισμός
doctrine	<i>theôria</i>	θεωρία
double	<i>dittos</i>	διττός
dyad	<i>duas</i>	δυάς
dyadic	<i>duadikos</i>	δυαδικός
element	<i>stoicheion</i>	στοιχείον
elevate	<i>exairein</i>	ἐξαιρεῖν
embracing	<i>perilēptikos</i>	περιληπτικός
encosmic	<i>enkosmios</i>	ἐγκόσμιος
end, end-point	<i>telos</i>	τέλος
engender	<i>gennan</i>	γεννᾶν
enmattered	<i>enulos</i>	ἐνυλος
enquiry	<i>zêtêsis</i>	ζήτησησις
ensouled	<i>empsuchos</i>	ἐμψυχος
envy	<i>phthonos</i>	φθόνος
equivalent, be	<i>isodunamein</i>	ἰσοδυναμεῖν
essence, essential nature	<i>ousia</i>	οὐσία

# English–Greek glossary

essential	<i>ousiôdês</i>	οὐσιωδής
establish	<i>idruein, enidruein</i>	ἰδρύειν, ἐνιδρύειν
eternal	<i>aîônios, diaiônios</i>	αἰώνιος, διαιώνιος
eternity	<i>aîôn</i>	αἰών
ethereal	<i>aithērios</i>	αιθέριος
everlasting	<i>aîdios</i>	ἄϊδιος
everlastingness	<i>aîdiotês</i>	ἄϊδιότης
evil	<i>to kakon</i>	τὸ κακόν
existence	<i>huparxis, hupostasis</i>	ὑπαρξις, ὑπόστασις
existence, incidental	<i>parupostasis</i>	παρὑπόστασις
existent	<i>on</i>	ὄν
existent, always, the	<i>to aei on</i>	τὸ αἰεὶ ὄν
experience	<i>pathos</i>	πάθος
extension	<i>paratasis</i>	παράτασις
familiarization	<i>oikeiôsis</i>	οἰκείωσις
fashion, to	<i>dêmiourgein, anaplattein</i>	δημιουργεῖν, ἀναπλάττειν
fate	<i>heimarmenê</i>	εἰμαρμένη
father	<i>patêr</i>	πατήρ
final, relating to the end	<i>telikos</i>	τελικός
fire	<i>pur</i>	πῦρ
first	<i>prôtos</i>	πρῶτος
first, the	<i>to prôton</i>	τὸ πρῶτον
fixed (stars)	<i>aplanês</i>	ἀπλάνης
form	<i>idea, eidos</i>	ἰδέα, εἶδος
form, maker of	<i>eidopoios</i>	εἰδοποιός
form, without	<i>aneideos</i>	ἀνείδεος
formal	<i>eidêtikos</i>	εἰδητικός
formula	<i>logos</i>	λόγος
founder, creator	<i>hupostatês</i>	ὑποστάτης
freedom from	<i>agenesia</i>	ἀγενεσία
generation		
fundamental	<i>axiôma</i>	ἀξίωμα
proposition		
generated	<i>genêtos</i>	γενητός
generation	<i>genesis</i>	γένεσις
generative	<i>gonimos</i>	γόνιμος
generic	<i>genikos</i>	γενικός
geometric	<i>geômetrikos</i>	γεωμετρικός
geometry	<i>geômetria</i>	γεωμετρία
goal	<i>skopos</i>	σκοπός
God, gods	<i>theos, theoi</i>	θεός, θεοί
godless	<i>atheos</i>	ἄθεος
good	<i>agathos</i>	ἀγαθός
Good, the	<i>to agathon</i>	τὸ ἀγαθόν

# English–Greek glossary

good, the	<i>to eu</i>	τὸ εὖ
goodness	<i>agatbotês</i>	ἀγαθότης
govern	<i>epitropeuein, kubernan</i>	ἐπιτροπεύειν, κυβερνᾶν
grasp, to	<i>perilambanein</i>	περιλάμβανειν
harmonize	<i>epharμοzein</i>	ἐφαρμόζειν
harmony	<i>harmonia</i>	ἁρμονία
heading	<i>kephalaion</i>	κεφαλαῖον
heaven	<i>ouranos</i>	οὐρανός
heavenly	<i>ouranios</i>	οὐράνιος
henad	<i>benas</i>	ἐνάς
human	<i>anthrôpinos</i>	ἀνθρώπινος
hypercosmic	<i>hyperkosmios</i>	ὑπερκόσμιος
hypothesis	<i>hupothesis</i>	ὑπόθεσις
hypothesized, be	<i>hupokeisthai</i>	ὑποκεῖσθαι
idea	<i>idea</i>	ἰδέα
ignorance	<i>agnoia</i>	ἄγνοια
illuminate, irradiate	<i>ellampein</i>	ἐλλάμπειν
image	<i>agalma, indalma</i>	ἄγαλμα, ἰνδαλμα
image	<i>eidolon, eikôn, mimêma</i>	εἰδωλον, εἰκών, μίμημα
imagination	<i>phantasia</i>	φαντασία
imaginative	<i>phantastikos</i>	φανταστικός
imitate	<i>mimêisthai</i>	μιμεῖσθαι
imitation	<i>mimêma, mimêsis</i>	μίμημα, μίμησις
immaculate	<i>acbrantos</i>	ἄχραντος
immaterial	<i>aûlos</i>	αὐλος
immortal	<i>athanatos</i>	ἀθάνατος
imparticipable	<i>amethektos</i>	ἀμέθεκτος
incommensurability	<i>asummetria</i>	ἄσυμμετρία
incomplete	<i>atelês</i>	ἀτέλης
incorporeal	<i>asômatos</i>	ἄσώματος
indestructible	<i>aphthartos</i>	ἄφθαρτος
indeterminate	<i>aoristos</i>	ἀόριστος
indicate	<i>dêloun, epideiknusthai</i>	δηλοῦν, ἐπιδείκνυσθαι
indicative	<i>sêmantikos</i>	σημαντικός
individual	<i>atomos</i>	ἄτομος
indivisible	<i>adiairetos, amerês, ameristos</i>	ἀδιαίρετος, ἀμερής, ἀμέριστος
ineffable	<i>arrhêtos, aporrhêtos</i>	ἄρρητος, ἀπόρρητος
inexhaustible	<i>anekleiptos</i>	ἀνέκλειπτος
inform (matter)	<i>eidopoiein</i>	εἰδοποιεῖν
inseparable	<i>achôristos</i>	ἄχώριστος
insight	<i>epibolê, gnôsis</i>	ἐπιβολή, γνώσις
inspired	<i>entheos</i>	ἐνθεος
instrument	<i>organon</i>	ὄργανον

# English-Greek glossary

intellect	<i>nous</i>	νοῦς
intellect, endowed with	<i>ennous</i>	ἐννοους
intellect, without	<i>anoêtos</i>	ἄνοητος
intellective	<i>noeros</i>	νοερός
intelligible	<i>noêtos</i>	νοητός
intermediate	<i>to meson</i>	τὸ μέσον
interpret	<i>hermêneuein</i>	ἐρμηνεύειν
interpretation	<i>exêgêsis</i>	ἐξήγησις
intrinsic	<i>katb' heauto</i>	καθ' ἑαυτό
intuition	<i>epibolê</i>	ἐπιβολή
intuitive thought	<i>noêsis</i>	νόησις
investigate	<i>zêtein</i>	ζητεῖν
investigation	<i>theôria</i>	θεωρία
invisible	<i>aphanês</i>	ἄφανής
invocation	<i>paraklêsis</i>	παράκλησις
irrational	<i>alogos</i>	ἄλογος
irrefutable	<i>anelenkto</i>	ἀνέλεγκτος
is, that which	<i>to on</i>	τὸ ὄν
issue from	<i>ekphainein</i>	ἐκφαίνειν
joiner	<i>tektôn</i>	τέκτων
judgement, faculty of	<i>kritêrion</i>	κριτήριον
just	<i>dikaios</i>	δίκαιος
kinship	<i>sungeneia</i>	συγγένεια
knowledge	<i>gnôsis</i>	γνώσις
lack	<i>endeia</i>	ἐνδεια
last, lowest	<i>teleutaios</i>	τελευταῖος
level	<i>platos</i>	πλάτος
light	<i>phôs</i>	φῶς
likely	<i>eikos</i>	εἰκός
likely discourse	<i>eikotologia</i>	εἰκοτολογία
liken	<i>apeikazein</i>	ἀπεικάζειν
likeness	<i>homoiôsis</i>	ὁμοίωσις
limit	<i>peirar, peras</i>	πεῖραρ, πέρας
living thing	<i>zôion</i>	ζῷον
Living-Thing-itself	<i>autozôion</i>	αὐτοζῷον
love	<i>erôs</i>	ἔρως
maker	<i>poiêtês</i>	ποιητής
maleficent	<i>kakergetis, kakopoios</i>	κακεργέτις, κακοποιός
manufacture	<i>kosmourgein</i>	κοσμουργεῖν
manufacturer	<i>technitês</i>	τεχνίτης
mark	<i>tupos</i>	τύπος
mass	<i>onkos</i>	ὄγκος

# English–Greek glossary

material	<i>bulikos, bulaios</i>	ὕλικός, ὑλαῖος
matter	<i>bulê</i>	ῦλη
mean	<i>mesotês</i>	μεσότης
measure	<i>metron</i>	μέτρον
measure, to	<i>metrein</i>	μετρεῖν
mixture	<i>mixis</i>	μίξις
monad	<i>monas</i>	μονάς
moon	<i>selênê</i>	σελήνη
mortal	<i>thnêtos</i>	θνητός
mother	<i>mêtêr</i>	μήτηρ
multiple meanings, with	<i>pollachôs</i>	πολλαχῶς
multiplicity	<i>plêthos</i>	πλήθος
name	<i>onoma</i>	ὄνομα
native	<i>oikeios</i>	οἰκεῖος
natural	<i>phusikos</i>	φυσικός
nature	<i>phusis</i>	φύσις
necessity	<i>anankê</i>	ἀνάγκη
non-being	<i>to mê on</i>	τὸ μὴ ὄν
non-being, absolute	<i>to mêdamôs on</i>	τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν
notion	<i>ennoia</i>	ἐννοία
number	<i>arithmos</i>	ἀριθμός
observe	<i>theôrein</i>	θεωρεῖν
offspring	<i>engonos</i>	ἐγγονος
One, the	<i>to hen</i>	τὸ ἓν
opinable	<i>doxastos</i>	δοξαστός
opinative	<i>doxastikos</i>	δοξαστικός
opinion	<i>doxa</i>	δόξα
opposition	<i>sustoichia</i>	συστοιχία
order	<i>diakosmos, taxis</i>	διάκοσμος, τάξις
order, absence of	<i>akosmia</i>	ἀκοσμία
order, to	<i>diatattein</i>	διατάττειν
ordering	<i>diakosmêsis</i>	διακόσμησις
ordinance	<i>thesmos</i>	θεσμός
organism	<i>zôion</i>	ζῷον
organization	<i>diataxis</i>	διάταξις
otherness	<i>beterotês</i>	ἐτερότης
paradigm	<i>paradeigma</i>	παραδείγμα
paradigmatic	<i>paradeigmatikos</i>	παραδειγματικός
part	<i>meros, morion</i>	μέρος, μόνιον
participate	<i>metechein</i>	μετέχειν
participated	<i>methektos</i>	μεθεκτός
participation	<i>metochê, methexis, metousia</i>	μετοχή, μέθεξις, μετουσία

# English-Greek glossary

particular	<i>hekastos, merikos</i>	ἕκαστος, μερικός
partition	<i>merismos</i>	μερισμός
pass away	<i>apollusthai</i>	ἀπόλλυσθαι
passive	<i>patbêtikos</i>	παθητικός
paternal	<i>patrikos</i>	πατρικός
perfect (adjective)	<i>teleios</i>	τέλειος
perfective	<i>telesiourgos, teleôtikos</i>	τελεσιουργός, τελεωτικός
perishing	<i>apollumenos</i>	ἀπολλύμενος
permissible	<i>themis, themitos</i>	θέμις, θεμιτός
perpetual being	<i>aei on</i>	ἀεὶ ὄν
persuasion	<i>pistis</i>	πίστις
philosopher of nature	<i>phusiologos</i>	φυσιολόγος
philosopher,	<i>philosophos</i>	φιλόσοφος
philosophical		
philosophize	<i>philosophhein</i>	φιλοσοφεῖν
philosophy	<i>philosophia</i>	φιλοσοφία
philosophy of nature	<i>physiologia</i>	φυσιολογία
place	<i>topos, chôra</i>	τόπος, χώρα
plainly	<i>enargôs</i>	ἐναργῶς
plan	<i>logos</i>	λόγος
plant	<i>phuton</i>	φύτον
plenitude	<i>sumplêrôsis</i>	συμπλήρωση
pluriform	<i>polueidês</i>	πολυειδής
point (geometrical)	<i>sêmeion</i>	σημεῖον
portion	<i>moira</i>	μοῖρα
power	<i>dunamis</i>	δύναμις
predicate	<i>katêgorein</i>	κατηγορεῖν
pre-eminence	<i>hyperochê</i>	ὑπεροχή
pre-exist	<i>proiûparchein,</i> <i>proiûphistanai</i>	προϋπάρχειν, προϋφιστάναι
preliminaries	<i>prooimia</i>	προοίμια
presentation	<i>apodosis</i>	ἀπόδοσις
presentation, visual	<i>phantasia</i>	φαντασία
preserve	<i>sôizein</i>	σώζειν
primal	<i>prôtos</i>	πρώτος
primarily, primitively	<i>prôtôs</i>	πρώτως
primordial	<i>prôtogenês</i>	πρωτογενής
principle	<i>archê</i>	ἀρχή
prior, that which is	<i>to proteron</i>	τὸ πρότερον
procedure	<i>diexodos, ephodos</i>	διέξοδος, ἐφοδος
proceed	<i>proienai</i>	προίεναι
procession	<i>proodos</i>	πρόοδος
proclaim	<i>anumnein</i>	ἀνυμνεῖν
producer	<i>poiêtês</i>	ποιητής
product	<i>ergon, poiêma, apotelesma</i>	ἔργον, ποίημα, ἀποτέλεσμα

# English–Greek glossary

productive	<i>paraktikos, poiêtikos</i>	παρακτικός, ποιητικός
proof of the argument	<i>kataskeuê</i>	κατασκευή
properly	<i>eikotôs</i>	εϊκότως
property	<i>idiotês</i>	ιδιότης
proportion	<i>logos</i>	λόγος
proportionality	<i>analogia</i>	ἀναλογία
proposition	<i>lêmma</i>	λήμμα
proximate	<i>prosechês</i>	προσεχής
psychic	<i>psuchikos</i>	ψυχικός
punishment	<i>dikê</i>	δίκη
pure	<i>achrantos</i>	ἄχραντος
purification	<i>katharsis</i>	κάθαρσις
puzzle	<i>aporia</i>	ἀπορία
qualitative nature	<i>poiôtês</i>	ποιότης
question	<i>problêma, zêtêsis</i>	πρόβλημα, ζήτησις
radiation	<i>prolampsis</i>	πρόλαμψις
random	<i>matên</i>	μάτην
rank	<i>moira, taxis</i>	μοῖρα, τάξις
rational	<i>logikos</i>	λογικός
realities	<i>pragmata</i>	πράγματα
really	<i>ontôs</i>	ὄντως
realm	<i>topos, platos</i>	τόπος, πλάτος
reason, contrary to	<i>paralogos</i>	παράλογος
reason, rationale	<i>logos</i>	λόγος
receptacle	<i>hupodochê</i>	ὑποδοχή
regular	<i>bomalos</i>	ὁμαλός
rejection	<i>anairesis</i>	ἀναίρεσις
relation	<i>schesis</i>	σχέσις
remove	<i>aphairein</i>	ἀφαιρεῖν
reproduce	<i>mimeîsthai</i>	μιμεῖσθαι
resemble	<i>eoikenai, homoioun</i>	εἰοικέναι, ὁμοιοῦν
rest	<i>stasis, monê</i>	στάσις, μονή
reversion	<i>epistrophê</i>	ἐπιστροφή
revert	<i>epistrephein</i>	ἐπιστρέφειν
revolution	<i>periphora</i>	περιφορά
revolve	<i>anakukleîn</i>	ἀνακυκλεῖν
right opinion	<i>orthê doxa</i>	ὀρθή δόξα
room	<i>topos, chōra</i>	τόπος, χώρα
rule	<i>kanôn</i>	κάνων
rule, to	<i>basileuein</i>	βασιλεύειν
science, scientific	<i>epistêmê</i>	ἐπιστήμη
knowledge		
scientific	<i>epistêmonikos</i>	ἐπιστημονικός

# English–Greek glossary

second, secondary	<i>deuteros</i>	δεύτερος
seed	<i>sperma</i>	σπέρμα
self-complete	<i>autotelês</i>	αὐτοτέλης
self-constituted, self-subsistent	<i>authupostatos</i>	αὐθυπόστατος
self-moved	<i>autokinêtos</i>	αὐτοκίνητος
self-sufficient	<i>autarkês</i>	αὐτάρκης
sempiternity	<i>aidiotês</i>	αἰδιότης
sense organ	<i>aisthêtêrion</i>	αἰσθητήριον
sense-perceptible	<i>aisthêtos</i>	αἰσθητός
sense-perception	<i>aisthêsis</i>	αἴσθησις
senses	<i>aisthêseis</i>	αἰσθήσεις
sentient	<i>aisthêtikos</i>	αἰσθητικός
separate	<i>chôristos</i>	χωριστός
series	<i>seira</i>	σειρά
set	<i>arithmos</i>	ἀριθμός
shape	<i>schêma</i>	σχῆμα
sharing	<i>metadosis</i>	μετάδοσις
sharing in	<i>metousia</i>	μετουσία
show	<i>deiknusthai</i>	δείκνυσθαι
sight	<i>horasis</i>	ὄρασις
signature	<i>sunthêma</i>	σύνθημα
signify	<i>sêmainein</i>	σημαίνειν
similar	<i>homoios</i>	ὅμοιος
similarity	<i>homoiotês</i>	ὁμοιότης
simplicity	<i>haplotês</i>	ἀπλότης
single in its kind	<i>monoeidês, monogenês</i>	μονοειδής, μονογενής
skill	<i>technê</i>	τέχνη
solid	<i>nastos</i>	ναστός
soul	<i>psychê</i>	ψυχή
soul, endow with	<i>psychoun</i>	ψυχοῦν
source	<i>pêgê</i>	πηγή
spontaneity	<i>automaton</i>	αὐτόματον
stability, reliability	<i>to bebaion</i>	τὸ βέβαιον
stable	<i>monimos</i>	μόνιμος
starting-point	<i>archê</i>	ἀρχή
state of being	<i>hexis</i>	ἕξις
statement	<i>logos, apodosis</i>	λόγος, ἀπόδοσις
status	<i>taxis</i>	τάξις
sterile	<i>agonos</i>	ἄγονος
story, tale	<i>muthos</i>	μῦθος
structure	<i>logos</i>	λόγος
student of nature	<i>phusikos</i>	φυσικός
study of nature	<i>phusiologia</i>	φυσιολογία
subject	<i>hupothesis</i>	ὑπόθεσις
subject matter	<i>pragmateia</i>	πραγματεία

# English–Greek glossary

subordinate	<i>bupheimenos</i>	ὑφειμένος
subordinate, to	<i>katatassein</i>	κατατάσσειν
subsist, exist	<i>buphistanai</i>	ὑφιστάναι
subsistence	<i>bupostasis</i>	ὑπόστασις
substantial	<i>ousiôdês</i>	οὐσιώδης
substantial entity	<i>bupostasis</i>	ὑπόστασις
substrate	<i>bupokeimenon</i>	ὑποκείμενον
suitably	<i>eikotôs</i>	εἰκότως
summit	<i>akros</i>	ἄκρος
sun	<i>bêlios</i>	ἥλιος
superfluous	<i>perittos</i>	περιττός
symbol	<i>sumbolon</i>	σύμβολον
sympathy	<i>sumpatheia</i>	συμπάθεια
system	<i>diakosmos</i>	διάκοσμος
take over	<i>paralambanein</i>	παραλαμβάνειν
temporal	<i>enchronos, cbronikos</i>	ἔγχρονος, χρονικός
text, term (lexical)	<i>lexis</i>	λέξις
theology	<i>theologia</i>	θεολογία
thing	<i>pragma</i>	πρᾶγμα
thought	<i>noêma</i>	νόημα
thought (intuitive)	<i>noêsis</i>	νόησις
token	<i>gnôrisma</i>	γνώρισμα
totality	<i>bolotês</i>	ὀλότης
trace	<i>ichnos</i>	ἵχνος
trait	<i>idiôma</i>	ἰδίωμα
transcendence	<i>huperochê</i>	ὑπεροχή
transcendent	<i>exêirêmenos, huperphuês</i>	ἐξηρημένος, ὑπερφυής
travail	<i>ôdis</i>	ὠδὶς
triad	<i>trias</i>	τριάς
trust	<i>pistis</i>	πίστις
truth	<i>alêtheia</i>	ἀλήθεια
two phases, in	<i>dittos</i>	διττός
ugly, not beautiful	<i>aischros</i>	αἰσχρὸς
ultimately	<i>prôtos</i>	πρώτως
unchanging	<i>ametablêtos, atreptos</i>	ἀμετάβλητος, ἄτρεπτος
understanding	<i>epibolê, perilêpsis</i>	ἐπιβολή, περίληψις
undivided	<i>adiairetos, ameristos</i>	ἀδιαίρετος, ἀμέριστος
ungenerated	<i>agenêtos</i>	ἀγένητος
unification	<i>benôsis</i>	ἐνωσις
unified manner, in a	<i>bênômenôs</i>	ἡνωμένως
unique, unitary	<i>benoeidês</i>	ἐνοειδής
uniqueness	<i>monôsis</i>	μόνωσις
unitary manner, in a	<i>benoeidôs</i>	ἐνοειδῶς
unite	<i>henizein</i>	ἐνίζειν

# English–Greek glossary

unities	<i>henades</i>	ἐνάδες
universal	<i>katholikos, kath'olou, holikos</i>	καθολικός, καθ' ὅλου, ὀλικός
universe, the	<i>to pan</i>	τὸ πᾶν
unlimited	<i>apeiros</i>	ἄπειρος
unmixed	<i>amigês</i>	ἀμιγής
unmoved	<i>akinêtos</i>	ἀκίνητος
unnatural	<i>para phusin</i>	παρά φύσιν
unordered, unorganized	<i>akosmos</i>	ἄκοσμος
unparticipated	<i>amethektos</i>	ἀμέθεκτος
unwind	<i>anelittein</i>	ἀνελίττειν
variety	<i>poikilia</i>	ποικιλία
verisimilitude	<i>eikotologia</i>	εἰκοτολογία
vice	<i>kakia</i>	κακία
virtue	<i>aretê</i>	ἀρετή
visible	<i>horatos, emphanês</i>	ὁρατός, ἐμφανής
void	<i>kenos</i>	κενός
want	<i>endeia</i>	ἐνδεια
weakness	<i>astheneia</i>	ἀσθένεια
whole	<i>holos, holikos</i>	ὅλος, ὀλικός
will	<i>boulêsis</i>	βούλησις
will, to	<i>boulesthai</i>	βούλεσθαι
wisdom	<i>phronêsis</i>	φρόνησις
wise	<i>emphrôn, phronimos</i>	ἐμφρων, φρόνιμος
wording	<i>lexis</i>	λέξις

## Greek word index

This index has been compiled as an instrument allowing readers to identify the philosophical and other technical terminology used by Proclus, as well as proper names. For the more common terms the listings are in some cases not exhaustive. Very common terms found throughout do not have page references listed, or in some cases just a few references are given. Translations listed are meant to be a guide to how the term is translated, but it has not proved possible to standardize translations beyond a certain point. In order to obtain an exhaustive concordance of Proclus' use of Greek terms in this work, the reader is encouraged to use electronic searching methods.

### A

- ἀγαθοειδής, boniform, good in form,  
308.26; 363.15; 376.13; 378.6,18  
ἀγαθόν, τό, The Good, 213,13; 228.6;  
237.15; 260.22; 269.20; 274.28; 286.1;  
304.5; 305.7  
ἀγαθὰ, τά, good things, advantages,  
191.31; 212.22; 334.15; 290.2; 362.32;  
363.4,10,11; 364.4, 28,29; 366.19;  
372.26; 375.21,26; 378.19; 382.24  
τὸ αἰὲν ἀγαθόν, that which is always  
good, 367.24  
τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, the absolute Good,  
369.15  
τὸ πρῶτως ἀγαθόν, the primal good,  
363.12; 365.12,16; 375.27; 448.13  
ἀγαθός, good, *frequent*  
ἀγαθότης, goodness, 210.9; 215.15; 330.1;  
331.10; 355.11; 357.11; 362.7;  
363.7,20; 364.27; 367.15; 368.3,20;  
369.3,25; 375.4,19; 387.7; 389.23;  
397.18; 401.22; 409.20; 412.1,3,5;  
414.8; 452.3  
ἀγαθοῦργός, beneficent, 309.2  
ἀγαθύνειν, to make good, 361.3;  
365.23,29; 366.7,24; 373.29; 374.30;  
375.2; 376.12; 381.21  
ἄγαλμα, image, sacred image, 273.11,14;  
330.31; 334.25  
ἀγαπητός, should be content, 353.6,23  
ἀγγελικός, angelic (opp. δαιμόνιος) 436.28  
ἀγγελικαὶ ψυχαί, angelic souls, 245.19  
ἀγγελικὴ τάξις, the messenger class,  
341.16  
ἄγγελοι, angels, 251.19; 256.16, 270.3;  
369.26,29  
(opp. δαίμονες), 436.23  
ὁ τοῦ Διὸς ἄγγελος, the messenger of  
Zeus, 341.11  
ἀγενεσία, freedom from generation,  
239.17  
ἀγενής, ungenerated, 218.6  
ἀγένητος, ungenerated, 218.5;  
219.16,19,24; 239.21; 252.27,29;  
253.1,7,15; 275.7.18,25; 283.29;  
284.24,25; 287.18ff.; 292.11; 292.2,6;  
326.2; 327.4; 328.4,27; 367.1;  
384.3ff.; 391.13ff.; 391.9; 392.5; 457.5  
ἀγένητος κόσμος, the ungenerated  
cosmos, 219.3,11,24,30; 238.2; 277.2;  
291.30; 293.17ff.; 328.9;  
360.8  
ἀγένητος οὐρανός, the ungenerated  
heaven, 252.14; 253.7; 287.8  
ἀγένητος φύσις, ungenerated nature,  
257.11  
ἀγένητος χρόνος, ungenerated time,  
287.8,19  
ἀγένητος ψυχή, ungenerated soul,  
227.26; 235.14,16; 391.11  
ἀγιώτατος, most sacred, 334.26  
Ἀγλαΐα, Aglaia, 333.4  
ἀγνεία, chastity, 211.15

- ἄγνοια, ignorance, 250.12; 288.21  
 ἄγονος, sterile, 340.3; 372.31; 373.1  
 ἄδεκτος, unreceptive, not admitting of, 240.7; 279.10  
 ἀδιάιρετος, undivided, indivisible, 246.18; 308.26; 309.18; 343.9; 440.19  
 ἀδιαίρετως, indivisibly, 239.11;  
 449.7,8,9,14  
 ἀδιάκοπος, unwearying, untiring, 267.17; 301.26  
 ἀδιάρθρωτος, disjointed, not articulated, confused, 387.15; 395.8; 419.29  
 ἀδιάστροφος, undistorted, 328.11  
 ἄδρανής, impotent, feeble, inert, 260.18; 340.4; 394.6  
 ἄδυναμία, lack of power, 351.27; 367.6  
 Ἀδωναϊκός, Adonic, 446.7  
 ἀεί, always, at every stage, continuously, *frequent*  
 ἀειγενεσία, perpetual generation, 458.7  
 ἀειδής, unseen, 230.23  
 ἀεικινήσια, perpetual movement, 412.17  
 ἀεικίνητος, in perpetual motion, 404.30; 412.23,26; 413.25  
 ἀένσας, ever flowing, 453.18  
 ἀέριος, aerial, 425.24  
 ἄήρ, air, 233.28; 317.27; 377.1; 403.22  
 ἄθάνατος, immortal, 207.6; 292.3; 313.14; 435.4; 445.20  
 ἄθεος, godless, without God, 209.3; 368.6; 384.12; 392.4  
 ἄθεότης, atheism, 207.26  
 Ἀθηναϊκός, of Athena, 355.6  
 Ἀθηναῖος, Athenian, 212.18; 235.18; 338.16; 392.14; 394.4  
 Ἀθηναῖοι, the Athenians, 205.6; 213.24; 216.4  
 Ἀθήνη, Athena, 327.27  
 ἄλλος, contest, 302.17  
 ἅπλως, all at the one time, all at once, immediate, 245.6; 247.17; 360.14; 453.20  
 ἁπλῶς, all together, all at the one time, all at once, 244.30; 282.29; 283.7; 388.13; 395.21; 399.12,14; 405.1; 453.13  
 ἁπλῶς πᾶν, all together, 239.3  
 Αἰγύπτιοι, Egyptians, 386.9  
 αἰῖδιος, everlasting, 229.24; 253.15; 254.6,14; 264.15; 265.31; 266.1ff.; 267.19ff.; 270.17; 272.5; 278.1ff.; 279.20; 286.24ff.; 294.9ff.; 301.13; 323.8; 326.31ff.; 328.13ff.; 330.7ff.; 332.1ff.; 342.15; 368.1ff.; 369.30; 380.27; 384.8ff.; 400.15; 403.5; 413.15; 416.19; 419.25; 429.8; 435.17; 439.19; 441.22ff.; 446.23; 450.5; 452.27ff.; 456.31  
 αἰδιότης, everlastingness, eternity, 239.13; 254.14; 266.5; 278.8ff.; 286.20; 291.24; 294.27; 296.11; 337.30; 366.22; 367.18; 368.4; 439.14; 447.7; 457.26  
 αἰθέριος, ethereal, 454.24; 455.2  
 αἰθήρ, Ether, 385.20f.; 428.4ff.  
 αἰνιγμα, riddle, 289.14  
 αἰνίσσασθαι, intimate, 455.3  
 αἰρεῖσθαι, choose, 216.5ff.  
 αἶρεσις, choice, 216.1,12; 376.21; 377.10ff.; 378.2ff.; 379.9  
 αἰσθησις, sense-perception, senses (pl.), 249.3,12; 242.29; 245.12; 248.15ff.; 249.19,23,28; 250.2ff.; 251.8ff.; 257.26ff.; 293.1; 329.17,34; 343.7,25; 346.7,9ff.; 348.25; 349.12; 351.29; 352.1,31; 353.4  
 (opp. νόησις) 244.24; 323.19  
 αἰσθητήριον, sense organ, 248.23; 250.3  
 αἰσθητικός, sentient, 419.8  
 αἰσθητός, perceptible, sense-perceptible, 207.17; 228.5; 233.3; 242.29; 248.11,15ff.; 249.3,14ff.; 251.28; 252.2ff.; 254.27; 255.14,16; 256.11; 257.13; 266.14; 270.13; 277.17,30; 279.14,16; 283.14; 284.2,17,18; 286.16; 291.10; 292.28; 293.2,5; 300.25; 311.1; 319.27; 325.6,8; 327.2; 334.10; 335.13ff.; 337.20; 339.32; 344.3; 347.1; 348.7; 349.6ff.; 350.6; 358.10ff.; 385.3; 390.9; 391.11; 396.6; 402.31; 405.6; 411.17; 416.24; 423.13; 429.17; 434.24; 435.6; 437.5; 439.21; 440.18; 445.4ff.; 448.21,26  
 αἰσθητός, in the sense-perceptible/sensible, mode, on the sensible level, 325.8; 390.9; 439.21; 448.26  
 αἰσχος, ugliness, 269.11; 375.16  
 αἰσχρός, shameful, ugly, 266.16,19; 326.20; 380.13; 395.25; 398.2

αἰτία, cause, causation, *frequent*

ἀπ' αἰτίας, from/by a cause, 235.24;

236.23; 239.25; 257.31; 258.1;

267.7,19; 277.9,13; 280.2,8; 290.19;

297.18; 298.8,31; 384.4,9; 391.13;

433.2

κατ' αἰτίαν, as a cause, causally 231.32;

234.25; 286.8; 398.29; 401.17; 419.26;

429.25

ἀκίνητος, unmoved/motionless cause,

294.12; 442.6; 445.8; 446.18

ἀμέθεκτοι, unparticipated causes,

414.3

ἄρρητος, ineffable cause, 385.2

γεννητική, generative cause, 226.10

δεύτεραι, second/secondary causes,

387.20; 401.19; 452.13

εἰδητική, formal cause, 205.16; 213.14;

299.24; 435.14

ἐνοειδής, unifying cause, 224.3; 449.14

θεία, divine cause, 299.16; 341.1; 370.2,1;

380.26; 394.31; 397.13; 398.19;

409.18; 410.17; 414.4; 415.20; 423.26;

445.7

κινούμεναι, moved/moving cause,

443.21,28

νοερά, intellective cause, 386.15;

400.22,30; 405.1; 414.4

νοητή, intelligible cause, 314.24; 385.4;

386.15; 425.24; 435.25

πρώτη/πρωτίστη, first/very first cause,

224.3; 290.20; 298.24; 385.2; 386.18;

430.9

αἰτιατόν, τό, that which is caused, 281.9;

329.6,9; 400.29; 407.8; 432.27

αἴτιον, cause, 209.16; 213.15; 298.11;

369.12; 404.25; 413.24; 421.15;

425.14; 442.29

αἰτιώδης, causal, 330.18

αἰών, eternity, 231.10ff.; 234.10ff.;

239.12,13,21; 254.2,9; 256.19;

278.10ff.; 285.19; 295.2,11; 299,3;

419.6ff.; 428.10; 443.19; 458.2,10

αἰώνιος, eternal, 230.21; 231.15; 232.1;

233.1; 234.8; 235.16; 239.2; 325.26;

331.19; 360.19

ἀκάκωτος, untouched by evil, 380.25,27

ἀκαρής, for a moment, 346.21

ἀκατάληκτος, unceasing, 239.5

ἀκατονόμαστος, unnamed, 312.28

ἀκηλίδωτος, undefiled, 445.26

ἀκίνητος, unmoved, motionless, 293.20;

294.12,15; 310.12; 355.15; 373.13;

412.27,28; 413.18ff.; 417.17; 442.6,7;

443.15; 445.8,19; 446.18

ἀκολουθία, sequence, 436.6

ἀκολουθῶς, consistent with, 295.14; 315.18

ἀκόσμητος, unordered, unorganized,

233.12; 297.29; 298.3; 382.1

ἀκοσμία, absence/lack of order, 358.24;

394.22

ἄκοσμος, disordered, unorganized, 317.1;

390.32; 395.2,5

ἄκροατής, listener, reader, 275.3; 339.20;

348,17; 355.4

ἄκρος, summit, topmost peak, 217.13;

230.7; 269.26; 272.22; 316.5

ἄκρότης, summit, that which is highest,

257.8; 311.28; 385.10

ἀλαζονεία, effrontery, 217.9; 353,15

Ἀλβίνος, Albinus, 219.2; 340.24

ἀλήθεια, truth, 212.2,1; 215.2; 223.9; 269.7;

290.7; 302.6; 339.1; 345.1; 346.1,29;

348.25; 349.2; 351.9; 410.9ff.; 416.14;

439.3

ἄληπτος, elusive, which cannot be

grasped, 331.29; 430.9

ἄλογία, irrationality, 250.13; 251.11;

353.28; 391.12

ἄλόγιστος, lacking reason, 400.29

ἄλογος, irrational, 236.23; 240.15,21;

241.1ff.; 245.4; 246.25; 248.9ff.;

249.3ff.; 250.9ff.; 251.4; 268.2,1;

284.16; 302.10; 320.15; 346.6,9;

348.5; 352.5; 381.2; 389.8; 391.9;

392.2,16; 394.10; 457.20

ἄμαθής, uninformed, 248.17

ἀμέθεκτος, unparticipated, imparticipable,

298.30; 307.14; 320.1; 322.3; 359.26;

361.23; 365.9,15; 372.13; 404.1,7;

405.4,10; 414.3

Ἀμέλιος, Amelius, 306.1,32; 309.14,21;

336.20; 361.26; 398.16; 425.19;

431.26

ἄμέρεια, indivisibility, partlessness, 247.12;

342.18; 343.2

ἄμερής, indivisible, without parts, 225.3;

253.5; 267.25; 278.12; 293.28;

294.1,3

ἄμέριστος, indivisible, undivided, 225.2;

263.16; 278.13; 349.4; 351.23,26;

402.15,19ff.; 423.17; 440.19; 446.2

- ἀμερίστως, indivisibly, undividedly, in an undivided fashion, 248.4; 352.7; 426.18
- ἀμέσως, without intermediation, direct, 209.14; 402.29; 412.28
- ἀμεταβλησία, immutability, 238.31; 239.1
- ἀμετάβλητος, immutable, unchangeable, unchanging, 238.16; 288.16; 392.6; 442.7; 445.8
- ἀμετάπλωτος, unalterable, unaltering, 338.29; 341.26; 342.10, 15, 21
- ἀμιγής, unmixed, unshaken, 232.21, 24; 239.16; 430.20; 431.8; 432.11
- ἄμοιρος, without share, not to participate, 215.10; 253.26; 415.25; 442.17
- ἄμορφον, τό, shapelessness, 368.6
- ἄμυδρός, not clear, feeble, dim, indistinct, faint, 249.6; 306.9; 330.32; 343.24; 385.15; 444.26
- ἀμφιβάλλειν, express doubt, 434.19, 21
- ἀμφίβολος, ambiguous, ambivalent, going either way, indecisive, 223.27; 302.9; 378.9; 390.11
- ἀνάγειν, elevate, refer, lead back, attribute, 220.12; 254.13; 295.2; 347.17; 378.13; 393.15
- ἀνάγκη, necessity, *frequent*; the goddess Anankê, 397.10
- ἀναγωγός, causing to ascend, leading upwards, 212.20; 255.8
- ἀναδεῖν, attach, bind, 220.8; 310.19
- ἀναζωπυρεῖν, kindle, 301.27
- ἀναιρεῖν, destroy, do away with, eliminate, 208.2; 266.30; 286.20; 367.4, 19; 373.25; 375.7; 378.28; 382.18; 392.1, 27, 28
- ἀναίρεσις, rejection, 327.6; 438.3
- ἀναισθητός, imperceptible, insensible, 257.26, 28; 445.23
- ἀναίτιος, non-causal, 262.7, 9; 392.2
- ἀνακαθαίρειν, purify, 223.8
- ἀνακαλεῖν, summon, call back, 213.10; 415.3
- ἀνακηρύττειν, call on, proclaim, 221.10; 283.6
- ἀνακυκλεῖν, revolve, 289.12; 397.12; 414.13
- ἀνακύκλησις, revolution, 289.9ff.
- ἀναλάμπειν, light up, 302.19
- ἀναλογία, analogy, proportionality, proportional balance, 252.18; 332.22; 354.19; 373.18; 406.16; 430.4, 14; 433.23; 441.13; 447.23
- ἀναλυτικῶς, using the analytic method, 276.13
- ἀναμάττειν, copy, 439.19
- ἀναμιγνύναι, mix in, 410.6
- ἀνάμνησις, recollection, 213.18; 300.32
- ἀναμφίλεκός, having the character of indisputability, 337.6
- ἀναπιμπλάναι, infect, fill, (pass.) be replete, 238.15; 353.26, 29; 375.16
- ἀναπλαστικός, creative (capacity) to invent, 320.7
- ἀναπλάττειν, devise, fashion, 320.10; 429.27
- ἀναρτᾶν, (pass.) be dependent on, be referable to, be attached to, be suspended from, 239.31; 252.22; 322.12; 357.10; 368.28; 401.20; 405.20; 415.26; 421.11
- ἀνατείνειν/ἀνατείνεσθαι, reach, reach out towards, stretch out towards, 206.17; 207.18; 213.29; 265.20; 323.27; 331.7; 369.15
- ἀνατρέχειν, return, ascend, proceed, advance, have recourse to, 215.26; 221.2; 234.4; 246.27; 247.12, 13; 276.14; 283.2; 285.7; 299, 21; 306.16; 362.22; 382.19; 392.18; 409.7; 410.26; 422.5; 433.18
- ἀναφαίνειν, reveal, (pass.) appear, 205.20; 263.23; 302.16; 304.13
- ἀναφής, having no tactility, 347.27
- ἀναφθέγγεσθαι, proclaim, state, 352.14; 438.20
- ἀναφῶς, intangibly, 396.7
- ἀνείδεος, without form, formless, devoid of form, 218.10; 270.16; 368.6; 385.16; 386.3; 388.1; 395.6
- ἀνελιγμένως, in an articulated mode, in detail, 341.7; 370.18
- ἀνέκλειπτος, inexhaustible, unfailing, uninterrupted, 281.3, 26; 294.12; 371.24; 385.25; 453.18; 458.8, 11
- ἀνεκφοίτητος, inseparable, not departing, 231.26; 273.23; 364.7; 433.8
- ἀνελάττωτος, free of diminution, 390.17
- ἀνελέγκτος, irrefutable, 342.1, 11, 21, 25; 343.4; 347.6; 348.27; 349.14; 351.25

ἀνελίττειν, proceed, unfold, unwind,  
232.32; 248.5; 342.16; 343.6; 370.27;  
414.12  
ἀνεξάλλακτος, not subject to change,  
238.16  
ἀνεπιτήδειος, unready, 367.7,10,11  
ἀνεπιτηδείότης, unreadiness, 394.21;  
395.18  
ἀνθρώπινος, human, 215.6,20; 221.4;  
222.5; 351.4,17; 352.3; 353.29; 370.2;  
396.3  
ἀνιέναι, ascend, proceed, 235.8; 268.22;  
298.21; 299.15; 350.14  
ἀνοδος, ascent, 212.2,4; 357.12; 391.28  
ἀνόητος, without intellect, unintelligent,  
370.2,3; 382.15; 400.24,30; 401.7,16;  
445.11  
ἀνόμοιος, dissimilar, non-resemblance,  
219.8; 232.19; 265.23; 271.27; 280.4;  
281.1; 286.17; 297.19; 335.11; 359.4;  
420.23  
ἀνομοιότης, dissimilarity, 265.16; 342.23  
ἀνομοίως, without resemblance,  
dissimilarly, 265.11,12; 373.11;  
385.29  
ἀνορθοῦν, set aright, 208.6  
ἄνους, devoid of intellect, without  
intellect, 402.31; 403.1; 411.19  
ἄνουν, τό, lack of intellect, 400.29  
ἀντιδιαρεῖν, distinguish in opposition,  
oppose, 291.14,19; 358.11; 384.20;  
392.5; 425.12  
ἀντιδιαστέλλειν, oppose, 425.17  
ἀντικείμενον, τό, contradictory, 328.22;  
329.28; 424.6  
ἀντικεῖσθαι, be set in opposition, be  
opposed, 291.17,20  
ἀντιπαθεῖα, antipathy, 301.9  
ἀντιστρέφειν, reverse, convert (*log.*),  
292.21; 328.20,23; 329.3,12  
ἀντίστροφον, τό, the converse, a logical  
conversion, 292.23; 405.10  
ἄντρον, cave, 333.28; 334.5  
ἀνυμνεῖν, celebrate, praise, 279.2; 303.28;  
308.19; 316.10,15; 317.19; 336.7;  
359.24; 370.18; 450.23  
ἀνυπόστατος, non-constituted, 232.17  
ἀνωθεν, from (the higher realms/the gods,  
etc.), *frequent*  
ἀνώλεθρος, indestructible, 235.18; 243.24;  
252.14ff.

ἀνωμαλία, irregularity, 289.27  
ἀνώματος, irregular, 287.1,3  
ἀνωμόλως, irregularly, 286.30  
ἀξίωμα, fundamental principle, axiom,  
236.1ff.; 242.17; 258.13,23; 262.2,29;  
263.24ff.; 266.20; 272.10; 281.14;  
296.4; 328.18ff.; 337.26; 340.19ff.;  
365.6; 410.26; 423.26  
ἀόριστος, indeterminate, without limit,  
218.9; 245.2; 247.11; 321.3;  
356.26; 366.5; 374.26; 375.26,28;  
386.2  
ἀπαγγέλλειν, report, recount, 241.16;  
249.28; 250.2,25; 341.12  
ἀπαθεία, dispassionate state, 362.22  
ἀπάντησις, response, reply, argument,  
285.11; 289.13; 439.29  
ἄπαξ, Once (name of the First Intellect),  
415.30  
ἀπεικάζειν, make to resemble, liken; pass.:  
resemble, be formed as an image,  
224.1; 326.18; 343.16; 344.21,22;  
394.6; 422.7  
ἀπεικονίζειν, imitate, form an image of,  
222.22; 342.10; 370.17; 452.26;  
457.14  
ἀπειρία, inexperience 240.28  
ἀπειρία, unlimitedness (cf. note at 384.26),  
278.2,10; 281.3; 288.4ff.; 290.29;  
295.2; 384.28,29; 385.1ff.; 393.24;  
441.2,12; 443.8; 453.19; 456.7;  
457.26; 458.2  
ἄπειρος, (the) unlimited (cf. note at  
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254.10; 263.9ff.; 266.4; 267.13ff.;  
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391.28; 419.4; 421.9; 428.6,8;  
436.5,12; 437.19,31; 438.10ff.;  
440.30; 441.4; 444.30; 445.2; 453.1ff.;  
454.3,11; 456.29,30; 458.2  
ἀπεργάζεσθαι, make, construct, produce,  
practice, 222.17; 229.21; 366.8;  
374.29; 386.27; 392.12; 395.23; 396.1;  
397.27; 401.23; 409.6; 433.20; 436.20;  
452.5,12  
ἀπερείδειν, fix in, 210.9  
ἀπλανής, fixed (esp. stars and heavens)  
317.25; 404.9,18; 446.21

- ἀπλήθυντος, non-multiple, devoid of multiplicity, 267.1; 295.21; 322.28; 437.14
- ἀπλότης, simplicity, 221.8, 238.10, 25; 239.7; 246.7; 398.6; 437.14
- ἀπλοῦς, absolute, simple, 225.3; 237.28; *frequent*
- ἀποβλέπειν, look (to, at, towards), pay attention to, 265.19; 277.18; 322.13; 331.8ff.; 432.2
- ἀπογεννᾶν, generate, beget, 217.27; 273.10; 277.13; 368.17; 399.14; 418.32; 427.17; 444.21; 445.16
- ἀπογέννησις, generation, birth, 214.26; 271.1; 299.27; 373.21; 397.24; 451.18
- ἀπογίγνεσθαι, pass out of being, 233.26
- ἀπόγονος, grandchild, offspring, 304.5; 305.6; 368.10
- ἀποδεικνύναι, demonstrate, prove, 228.19; 253.9; 293.7; 296.22; 321.18; 403.20; 438.24; 452.3
- ἀπόδειξις, demonstration, proof, 228.8; 229.3ff.; 236.15ff.; 242.18, 23; 263.22; 276.7; 283.6, 10; 292.20ff.; 296.19; 320.30; 329.13; 330.13; 337.6; 338.27; 339.30; 346.32; 360.9; 438.23ff.; 447.21, 27; 448.3; 456.6, 31
- ἀπόδοσις, presentation, definition, proposition, statement, rendering, interpretation, 242.18; 243.27; 253.28; 261.9; 303.10; 309.10; 330.18; 350.11; 440.17; 441.15
- ἀποκαλεῖν, call, name, declare, refer to, 229.29; 230.28; 279.32; 287.21; 291.23; 292.3; 304.26; 305.22; 307.1, 7, 18; 309.17; 311.5; 321.30; 333.22; 338.17; 358.6; 407.3; 409.16; 410.14; 411.10; 419.5; 420.28
- ἀποκάμνειν, grow weary, 280.15
- ἀποκρύπτειν, hide away, 273.12
- ἀπολαύειν, enjoy, benefit from, 215.16; 331.1; 405.15
- ἀπόλλυσθαι, pass away, 228.11; 233.29; 240.15ff.; 243.7ff.; 252.13ff.; 253.18; 293.6ff.; 334.23; 372.29; 376.6; 377.1; 440.14; 442.31
- ἀπολογισμός, reasoning, 338.2; 343.11; 350.12
- ἀπόλυσις, liberation, 222.2
- ἀπόλυτος, detached, 220.26; 269.29
- ἀπομερισμός, fragmentation, 390.12, 14
- ἀπονέμειν, apportion, assign, reserve, 254.3, 26; 292.11; 308.22; 316.13
- ἀπονεύειν, incline, 221.14
- ἀποπληροῦν, fulfil, fill, 222.5; 401.24
- ἀποπληρωτικός, enabling fulfilment, completive, 213.7; 308.30
- ἀποπληρωτικόν, τό, that which brings to fulfilment, 371.30
- ἀπορία, difficulty, 206.31; 216.22; 227.18; 238.8; 243.2; 280.23; 308.8; 325.22, 30; 327.10; 347.19; 350.21; 373.24; 374.3; 399.24; 423.7, 30; 438.21, 25; 441.16; 444.16
- ἀπόρρητος, ineffable, secret, 302.27; 365.25
- ἀπόρροια, effluence, 220.19; 412.20
- ἀποσπᾶν, separate, cut off, wrench away, detach, 208.13; 209.29, 30; 330.1; 392.11; 422.12
- ἀποτελεῖν, complete, *frequent*
- ἀποτέλεσμα, effect, product, 222.20; 228.20; 265.26; 268.17; 281.13; 297.30; 369.9; 388.2; 390.4, 22; 431.2; 433.24
- ἀποτυποῦν, model after, replicate, 439.20; 442.21
- ἀπόφασις, negation, negative aspect, 243.12; 266.10
- ἀποφατικῶς, negatively, 232.29; 243.4; 256.26
- ἀπρονόητος, outside of providence, 366.5
- ἀπταιστον, τό, infallibility, 346.16; 348.27
- ἄπτός, tangible, 276.3; 282.23; 283.13; 284.1ff.; 286.5ff.; 358.10; 396.7
- ἀργία, state of idleness, 288.24
- ἀρετή, virtue, excellence, 208.10, 21, 25ff.; 212.2, 5, 19; 222.1; 288.6; 351.12
- ἀριθμός, number, series, 306.21; 440.30; 454.29
- Ἀριστοτέλης, Aristotle, 237.17, 25; 252.11; 253.9ff.; 261.3, 14; 262.25; 267.5; 268.18, 23; 279.8; 280.1, 21; 290.28; 294.14, 31; 295.20ff.; 305.20; 320.25; 339.20; 384.5; 390.3; 395.1; 404.7, 20; 413.5; 438.30; 455.16; 456.13
- Ἀριστοτελικός, Aristotelian, 262.5; 286.21; 357.3
- ἁρμόζειν, harmonize, construct, 205.18; 285.1; 353.14
- ἁρμονία, harmony, arrangement, 205.18; 332.21; 358.26; 366.16

## Greek word index

- ἀρμοστικός, to do with arranging, 358.15  
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     371.12, 20; 372.17; 385.2; 409.24;  
     430.9; 434.5  
 ἀρτᾶν, suspend; pass.: be dependent on,  
     depend on, be derived from, 216.9;  
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     412.2  
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 ἀρχή, principle, starting-point, source,  
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     295.26; 350.14; 384.9; 422.4; 425.27;  
     426.16  
     δημιουργική, demiurgic principle,  
         260.20; 347.19  
     δύο, two principles, 385.22; 386.14;  
         440.29; 441.1, 9; 448.7  
     μία, single principle, 228.18; 298.19  
     πρωτίστη, very first principle, 334.14;  
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     ἀρχηγικῶς, in a principal manner, 335.17  
     ἀρχικός, of Ruler, (cosmic) ruler,  
         originating, 317.21, 23; 318.1, 11;  
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     ἀσάλευτος, unshaken, 212.19; 397.12;  
         430.20  
     ἀσεβεῖν, involve impiety, 382.17  
     ἀσθενεία, weakness, paltriness, 349.10;  
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     ἀστάθμητος, instability, 353.3  
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     ἀσύγχυτος, distinct, unmixed, 431.6;  
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     ἀσυλλόγιστος, invalid, 284.5  
     ἀσυμμετρία, incommensurability, 381.3, 5  
     ἀσύμμετρος, not attuned, 442.13  
     ἀσυμπαθής, unsympathetic, 454.5; 455.13  
     ἀσύντακτος, lacking order, uncoordinated,  
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     ἀσχημάτιστος, without shape, 245.4;  
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         431.3  
     ἄτακτος, disordered, unordered,  
         disorderly, without order, 270.12, 18;  
         277.3, 7; 286.27, 28; 298.3; 316.28;  
         366.4, 19, 29; 368.7; 377.3; 382.4ff.;  
         388.1; 390.3ff.; 392.26; 394.11ff.;  
         403.29; 419.28, 29  
     ἀτάκτως, in a disorderly fashion, 256.20;  
         283.28; 284.4ff.; 296.8; 326.9, 19;  
         328.1; 381.24; 382.6; 383.6, 23;  
         387.14; 391.10; 394.28; 400.12;  
         401.28; 404.24; 410.15; 417.28  
     ἀτέλης, incomplete, 225.20; 239.31;  
         260.19; 281.19; 288.32; 294.17;  
         297.2ff.; 301.21; 367.28; 381.19;  
         382.15; 421.5ff.; 423.19; 424.26;  
         431.16; 432.21; 433.1, 5; 448.20; 450.7  
     ἄτομος, individualized, individual, 351.24;  
         377.17; 400.32, 33; 425.12, 13  
     ἀτρέπτος, unchanging, immutable,  
         inflexible, 212.22; 316.27; 317.10;  
         392.6; 397.12; 428.24  
     ἀτρέπτως, immutably, 308.5  
     ἀτροπος, undeviating, 316.24, 27  
     Ἀττικός, Atticus, 272.1; 276.31; 283.27;  
         284.6; 285.6; 305.6; 326.1; 366.9;  
         381.27; 384.4; 391.7; 425.13; 431.14  
     αὐθυπόστατος, self-subsistent,  
         self-constituted, 232.1ff.; 239.27;  
         277.10; 279.15, 29; 280.18; 281.7;  
         285.10; 299.5  
     αὔλος, immaterial, 301.11; 349.15; 350.1;  
         351.22, 26; 352.10, 22; 359.1; 384.12;  
         414.4; 431.3  
     αὐλως, in a matter that is immaterial,  
         immaterially, 352.23, 24; 396.6  
     αὐξητικός, of growth, 393.4  
     αὐτάρκεια, self-sufficiency, 362.23  
     αὐτάρκης, autonomous, self-sufficient,  
         278.22; 289.17; 290.12; 362.23; 392.6;  
         457.9, 11  
     αὐτεξούσιος, that possesses its own  
         autonomy, 223.2  
     αὐτοαγαθόν, Good-itself, 363.16, 18;  
         374.15  
     αὐτοαεί, always-in-itself, 234.21  
     αὐτοάνθρωπος, human-being-in-itself,  
         271.8; 425.14; 439.24; 440.5  
     αὐτοαρετή, Virtue-itself, 231.4

## Greek word index

αὐτογόνος, self-generated, 277.10  
 αὐτογόνον, τό, self-production,  
 372.8  
 αὐτοζῶον, the Living-Thing-itself, 231.5;  
 307.3; 308.14; 326.15; 402.2ff.;  
 418.4,27; 425.5; 426.10; 431.19,29;  
 439.20; 444.14,19; 447.30; 448.15;  
 451.8; 453.23; 458.3  
 αὐτοῖππος, Horse-itself, 425.14;  
 439.25  
 αὐτόκακον, Evil-itself, 374.16,19  
 αὐτόκαλον, the Beautiful-itself,  
 Beauty-itself, 363.17; 434.17  
 αὐτοκίνητος, self-moved, self-moving,  
 235.14; 297.26; 367.12; 379.1,3;  
 412.27,29  
 αὐτοματίζειν, (perf. pass. part.) the result  
 of spontaneity, 297.22  
 αὐτόματον, τό, chance, spontaneity, 262.8;  
 299.17; 356.30  
 αὐτονόησις, intuitive knowledge in itself,  
 244.9  
 αὐτόνους, Mind-itself, 363.16  
 αὐτόον, Being-itself, 231.6; 232.7  
 αὐτοουσία, essence in itself, 244.1  
 αὐτοπτικός, of concentrated vision, 302.13  
 αὐτοπτικῶς, with its own direct vision,  
 247.7  
 αὐτοτελής, self-complete, 359.10; 371.23;  
 432.15; 438.8  
 αὐτοφάνεια, self-manifestation, 302.3  
 ἀφαίρειν, set aside, subtract, remove,  
 pluck, 257.16; 281.18; 304.11; 305.3;

320.14; 346.3; 367.6; 413.23;  
 450.26  
 ἀφανής, invisible, non-apparent, 207.18;  
 273.16; 274.18.23; 301.7; 332.24;  
 339.23; 430.16  
 ἀφανίζειν, cause to vanish, destroy,  
 suppress, do away with, 221.31;  
 377.6; 397.29; 424.5  
 ἄφθαρτος, indestructible, 227.26;  
 287.23,29; 293.15ff.; 294.8; 296.2,6;  
 328.5; 366.23; 440.11  
 ἄφθονος, unstinting, 211.6; 300.1  
 ἀφομοιοῦν, make resemble, make after the  
 likeness of, 207.17; 340.11; 416.17;  
 452.2  
 ἀφορίζειν, distinguish, 213.19; 225.25,30;  
 226.24; 242.16; 251.17; 256.23;  
 257.4; 272.26; 275.18; 310.8; 320.18;  
 350.13; 382.28; 398.29; 411.3;  
 441.7  
 Ἀφροδίτη, Aphrodite, 333.3  
 ἀχάνεια, gaping void, 209.31  
 ἄχραντος, immaculate, pure, 232.4;  
 238.30; 302.21,24; 352.23,24,27;  
 369.30; 371.20,21; 390.26; 414.11;  
 430.22  
 ἀχραντῶς, immaculately, in a manner that  
 is undefiled, 302.21; 352.24,27;  
 369.30  
 ἀχρόνως, instantaneously, 395.18  
 ἀχρώματος, having no colour, 347.26  
 ἀχώριστος, inseparable, 233.24; 266.28;  
 404.1; 413.12; 414.6

## B

βάθος τοῦ νοητοῦ, Intelligible Deep,  
 424.24  
 βασιλεία, kingdom, 305.26  
 βασιλεύειν, rule, 228.6; 310.13; 359.28,30;  
 360.1; 425.1  
 βασιλεύς, King, 304.29; 306.2,12; 308.10;  
 316.15; 362.1; 429.10  
 βασιλικός, royal, 224.1; 311.29; 315.16;  
 387.3; 406.29; 411.26,27;  
 423.23  
 βέβαιος, reliable, 341.25; 342.5,19  
 βέβαιον, τό, stability, reliability, 260.13;  
 342.11  
 βλέπειν, look, contemplate, 229.24; 264.5;  
 266.23; 269.6ff.; 270.11,19;

271.12,30ff.; 306.29; 322.16; 324.16;  
 325.5; 326.25,26; 328.13; 331.12;  
 332.1,10,12; 335.6,22; 400.31;  
 416.17  
 Βουλαῖος Ζεὺς, Zeus the Counsellor, 216.4  
 βούλεσθαι, to will, wish, decide, *frequent*  
 βούλησις, will, decision, 211.5; 221.12ff.;  
 289.22; 298.27; 341.13; 361.29; 362.7;  
 364.12,13; 366.19; 371.2ff.; 377.29;  
 381.9,16; 382.18; 389.19,20; 394.23;  
 398.24; 412.2,5; 414.28  
 βροτός, mortal, 211.22; 212.18;  
 338.15  
 βυθὸς πατρικός, paternal abyss,  
 312.7

Γ

Γάιος, Gaius, 340.24  
γένεσις, becoming, coming into being, generation, *frequent*  
γενητός, generated, 229.7ff.; 235.4.9;  
236.29; 237.10; 239.20,31; 256.10;  
257.8,12; 260.26; 263.12,19;  
264.15,22; 269.2; 271.25;  
275.18; 276.5; 278.4; 279.20; 280.2ff.  
γενικός, generic, 242.8  
γεννᾶν, engender, 293.23  
γεννητικός, generative, engendering, etc.,  
productive of, 226.10; 252.20; 293.23;  
294.23; 309.1,24; 363.29; 364.9;  
371.18; 441.8; 444.17  
γεννητικῶς, in the manner of begetting,  
269.27  
γένος, kind, 206.11; 213.20; 224.19;  
226.5ff.; 230.6; 241.32; 242.5ff.;  
317.4; 429.26; 432.29  
ἐγκόσμια γένη, encosmic kinds, 205.13  
θεῖα γένη, genera of divinities, 220.15  
νοερὸν γένος, class of intellectives,  
380.26  
δαιμόνιος, demonic, 301.12; 436.28;  
245.19,23  
δαίμων, demon, Daimon, 256.16; 332.14;  
369.4,25,29; 376.18; 436.22  
δεικνύναι, show, demonstrate, 217.17;  
229.1; 238.3; 251.4; *frequent*  
δεῖξις, demonstration, 283.18  
δεκάς, decad, 316.18,26; 432.19ff.  
δελεάζειν, ensnare, 333.9  
δεσμός, bond, chain, shackle, 207.12;  
222.3; 307.13; 314.13,14,15  
δεσμοτήριον, jail, 208.11  
δεύτερα, τά, second/secondary things,  
213.1; 216.16; 225.21; 231.2; 238.13;  
255.22; 280.21; 295.22; 296.18;  
300.31ff.; 319.3ff.; 330.32; 331.25;  
335.27; 341.13; 343.5; 354.9; 390.6;  
397.23ff.; 401.19; 406.2; 426.20;  
428.2; 430.29; 431.5; 433.22; 449.26;  
450.13; 452.13; 457.15  
δηλοῦν, indicate, 216.4, 230.27; *frequent*  
δημιούργημα, a created thing, product,  
work of craftsmanship, 273.4; 304.20;

νοητὸν γένος, intelligible genus, 256.13  
γεωμέτρης, geometer, 228.27;  
236.15,30,33; 272.11; 283.17  
γεωμετρία, geometry, 395.4  
γεωμετρικός, geometric, 226.26; 258.12;  
346.31  
Γῆ, Gē (Earth), 450.14,17  
γίγνεσθαι, become, come to be, come into  
being, *frequent*  
γνώρισμα, token, 273.16; 308.27  
γῶσις, cognition, insight, knowledge,  
228.21; 242.1ff.; 244.20; 249.3,4;  
250.12,13; 339.10ff.; 342.15ff.;  
350.17; 351.28; 389.22  
γνωστικός, cognitive, obtaining cognition,  
able to know, 248.27,30; 249.5,9;  
252.6; 255.9; 361.14; 389.26  
γνωστικόν, τό, cognitive realm,  
242.27  
γόνιμος, generative, fructifying,  
productive, 220.9; 226.14; 308.29;  
340.5; 375.8; 382.19  
γωνία, angle, 454.25  
γωνιακοί, at the corners,  
454.18, 21

Δ

314.11; 321.15; 330.24; 334.9; 335.19;  
359.8; 399.10; 409.19; 410.4; 446.17;  
452.15,19  
δημιουργεῖν, create, fashion, 269.24;  
270.19; 273.4; 288.15,16; 304.20;  
314.11,21; 317.24; 320.5; 321.15;  
322.14; 325.5,17; 330.25; 332.2;  
334.9; 335.19,28; 356.19; 359.8,18;  
367.2,25; 372.25; 382.20; 392.30;  
393.2,11; 399.7,10; 408.15;  
409.19; 410.4; 446.17;  
452.15ff.  
δημιουργία, creativity, creative task,  
demiurgy, 205.15; 206.28;  
294.15; 304.16; 310.18,22;  
321.3; 336.10; 359.16; 370.13;  
409.27; 443.14; 446.1ff.;  
453.7  
δημιουργικός, demiurgic, *frequent*  
δημιουργός, craftsman, Demiurge, 230.3;  
270.10; 288.20ff.; 305.19; 321.10;  
322.11; 356.29; 362.2ff.; 372.14;  
415.20

## Greek word index

- δημιουργός, craftsman, Demiurge, (*cont.*)  
 ὁ ὅλος, the Demiurge in his entirety, the  
 universal Demiurge, the whole  
 Demiurge, 269.25; 314.27; 329.24;  
 446.19  
 πρώτιστος, the very first Demiurge,  
 452.8,12  
 τρεῖς, three demiurges, the triple  
 Demiurge, 306.1ff.; 309.15,23;  
 361.27; 362.5; 427.10; 431.26; 452.16  
 διαίρειν, divide, make (carry out) a division,  
 make a distinction, distinguish,  
 separate, 224.19,28,30; 225.18; 228.5;  
 240.28; 246.5; 254.25; 263.3; 270.31;  
 281.8; 304.14; 309.19; 310.21,25;  
 318.2,24; 322.8; 341.22; 344.7,18;  
 346.7; 371.21; 376.15; 382.31; 399.19;  
 402.8; 404.22; 409.28; 410.22; 412.11;  
 421.8; 425.21; 430.25; 435.11;  
 437.15,26,30; 440.2; 454.5; 455.6,15  
 διηρημένος, point by point, fragmented,  
 distinct, 370.25; 410.30; 455.4  
 διηρημένως, separately, that implies  
 division, in (a) divided fashion,  
 manner, mode, in (the) divided phase,  
 399.12; 423.17; 426.17; 430.7;  
 432.20,21; 440.19; 447.1; 449.8,11;  
 453.12  
 διαίρεσις, division, distinction, 214.9;  
 220.5,12,14; 223.25; *frequent*  
 διαίρετικός, disjunctive, of division, 258.18;  
 330.4; 399.26  
 δίατα, treatment, 322.19  
 διαιώνιος, eternal, of eternity, 359.11;  
 367.17; 392.3; 441.29  
 διακληροῦν, distribute, 270.1  
 διακορής, (completely) saturated, 332.29;  
 419.2  
 διακοσμεῖν, order, regulate, 262.24; 269.14;  
 310.24; 368.8; 388.8; 389.5  
 διακόσμησις, ordering, 205.10; 315.26;  
 358.22; 370.19; 382.27; 387.8; 389.2  
 διάκοσμος, cosmos, order, 220.4; 308.13;  
 365.18; 385.23; 430.6; 437.18; 450.29;  
 451.1  
 διακρισις, distinction, division,  
 differentiation, 220.9; 224.10,13;  
 225.25; 227.8; 247.16; 343.8; 355.23;  
 391.18; 431.1,7  
 διακριτικός, relating to distinctions, 357.23  
 διαλάμπειν, illuminate, 346.2  
 διαλεκτική, dialectic, 240.28  
 διαλεκτικοὶ μέθοδοι, procedures of  
 dialectic. 276.10  
 διαλεκτικῶς, in a dialectical fashion,  
 223.9  
 διαμονή, permanence, duration, 239.2;  
 254.7  
 διανοητικός, discursive, 223.23; 254.26;  
 350.17  
 διανοητός, of discursive reasoning,  
 discursive, 228.5; 273.26  
 διανοητόν, τό, discursive reasoning,  
 object of discursive thought,  
 242.29,30; 349.25,27  
 διανοητῶς, at the level of thought, 448.25  
 διάνοια, discursive reason, discursive  
 thought, 209.11; 223.17,25,29; 224.2;  
 242.29; 246.21,26,29; 248.14; 249.4;  
 254.26; 255.10; 283.2; 310.7; 346.28;  
 384.15; 407.23; 438.28  
 διαπορθεῖν, transmit, 341.18  
 διαρθεροῦν, thoroughly examine, 245.21  
 διάστατος, with extension, extended,  
 277.17; 349.19; 352.6; 396.8  
 διασπτάως, in an extended manner, 255.19  
 διάταξις, disposition, organization, 330.20;  
 369.11  
 διατάττειν, order, arrange, command,  
 determine, 210.5; 214.28; 233.5;  
 269.11; 304.24; 336.19; 355.13;  
 398.20; 399.29  
 διατείνειν, extend; pass.: contend, 205.20;  
 216.15; 277.20; 385.11; 387.4; 398.16;  
 414.16  
 διατελεῖν, do something consistently,  
 419.20  
 διαφαίνειν, reveal, 431.2  
 διαφορά, difference, differentia, 218.27;  
 225.18ff.; *frequent*  
 διαφορότης, difference, differentiation,  
 214.3; 339.17  
 διαφυλάττειν, preserve, retain, 217.8;  
 286.18  
 διδασκαλία, teaching, 218.20; 219.28;  
 242.21; 272.16; 338.29; 339.29;  
 354.18; 430.19; 438.1  
 διδασκαλικός, of instruction, didactic,  
 290.9; 338.5  
 διδασκαλικῶς, didactically, 218.27  
 διδάσκαλος, teacher, 218.14; 241.4; 305.7;  
 358.13; 374.4; 441.16

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διεξοδικῶς, discursively, 370.18  
 διέξοδος, traversal, procedure, passage,  
 246.13; 283.10; 302.16; 303.15;  
 399.19  
 διήκειν, penetrate, pervade, extend, 206.4;  
 215.8; 216.14; 222.23; 226.19; 332.22;  
 386.24  
 διηρημένως, separately, that implies  
 division, in (a) divided fashion,  
 manner, mode, in (the) divided phase,  
 399.12; 423.17; 426.17; 430.7;  
 432.20, 21; 440.19; 447.1; 449.8, 11;  
 453.12  
 Δίος, Jovian, of Zeus, 206.15; 305.26;  
 316.1; 408.11; 446.7  
 δίκαιος, just, 238.17ff.  
 δίκη, punishment, 315.14; 376.14;  
 377.10ff.; 419.11  
 διοικεῖν, administer, 403.15  
 διοικούμενον, τό, what is administered,  
 under governance, 382.7; 391.4;  
 403.16; 414.6, 17  
 Διόνυσος, Dionysus, 336.15, 30; 407.29  
 διορισμός, definition, determination,  
 distinction, 236.1; 239.18; 242.15;  
 246.10; 253.28; 255.27; 320.28;  
 338.28; 339.8  
 δῖς, Twice (title of the Demiurge), 416, 1  
 Δὶς ἐπέκεινα, Twice Beyond, 408.14  
 διττός, double, 206.10; *frequent*  
 διωρισμένως, taken separately,  
 344.23

δογματίζειν, present doctrine,  
 340.25  
 δόξα, opinative part (of the soul), opinion,  
 223.17; 246.21, 27; 247.11; 248.25;  
 249.20; 254.21ff.; 255.12ff.;  
 257.18, 30; 292.26; 293.3; 339.15;  
 343.9; 370.6  
 ὀρθή δόξα, 248.20  
 δοξαστικός, opinative, 223.24; 246.20;  
 248.12, 28; 251.24; 302.9  
 δοξαστός, opinable, 228.3; 236.23;  
 240.15, 21; 241.2ff.; 247.2; 249.27;  
 251.26ff.; 252.13, 15; 254.26; 255.11;  
 273.26, 27; 283.14, 15; 284.17; 286.17;  
 292.22; 293.1ff.  
 δόσις, giving, gift, 222.16; 332.26;  
 437.11  
 δουλεύειν, serve, be subservient to, 298.26;  
 369.8  
 δραστήριος, efficacious, active, 213.6.9;  
 361.15; 395.30  
 δραστήριον, τό, efficacy, efficaciousness,  
 371.19; 372.11  
 δυαδικός, dyadic, 274.24; 440.31  
 δυάς, dyad, 226.13; 245.12; 440.32;  
 449.6ff.  
 δυσείδης, double, 247.16  
 δύναμις, capacity, power, *frequent*  
 δυσεύρετος, hard to find, 347.18  
 δυσέφικτος, hard to attain, 302.15  
 δυσφημία, negative language, 329.29  
 δύσφημος, blasphemous, 330.3

## E

ἐβδομαδικός, hebdomadic, 411.23  
 ἔγγονος, child, progeny, offspring, 304.4;  
 305.5; 334.25; 341.20; 384.19; 386.23;  
 388.7; 393.18; 428.4  
 ἐγκαλεῖν, make an accusation, 241.31  
 ἐγκόσμιος, encosmic, 205.13; 206.7ff.;  
 234.30; 269.30; 300.18ff.; 319.8;  
 340.17; 360.24ff.; 408.2; 418.28;  
 426.23; 427.18; 441.18; 442.22; 451.2;  
 457.18  
 ἐγκράτεια, self-control, 215.21  
 ἔγχρονος, in time, temporal, 256.3; 279.8;  
 299.4; 349.5; 352.7; 402.22  
 ἔδρα, location, seat, 351.23; 386.1;  
 407.1  
 ἐδράζειν, establish, 371.23; 415.2  
 ἐδραῖον, τό, stability, 359.8

εἰδητικός, formal, 205.16; 218.10; 263.21;  
 299.24; 324.12; 435.14  
 εἰδοποιεῖν, inform (matter), 270.23;  
 388.5, 17; 395.7; 416.28  
 εἰδοποιός, maker of form, 300.9;  
 425.27  
 εἶδος, form, kind, nature, 205.23; 213.20;  
 224.19; 225.6, 11; 242.13; 249.24;  
 264.19; 269.22; 270.25; 274.22;  
 275.17; 276.4, 20; 283.12; 320.21;  
 379.4; 385.16; 395.6; 425.12ff.;  
 426.19; 432.29  
 εἶδωλον, copy, image, phantom, 232.25;  
 280.29; 285.17; 323.18; 336.29;  
 340.12  
 εἰκαζειν, conjecture, 344.8  
 εἰκαστικός, conjectural, 343.23, 27

εἰκαστός, of guesswork, imagistic, 228.5;  
343.22, 27.28; 344.3  
εἰκονικῶς, in the manner of an image, 227.7  
εἰκός, likely, probable, 205.15; 215.1;  
341.4; 386.12; 410.21  
εἰκοτολογία, a likely discourse,  
verisimilitude, 339.1; 345.1; 348.26;  
350.20; 355.27; 410.15, 29  
εἰκοτολογικῶς, as a likely discourse, 340.26  
εἰκότως, suitably, reasonably, *frequent*  
εἰκών, copy, image, *frequent*  
εἰλικρινῶς, purely, in an undiluted form,  
240.10; 445.28  
εἰμαρμένη, fate, 262.11; 305.21; 315.19, 28;  
389.12  
εἰρμός, concatenation, 262.18  
εἰρωνεία, irony, false modesty, 217.8;  
353.15  
ἕκαστος, each (person), particular, *frequent*  
Ἑκῆτη, Hecate, 420.14  
ἕκβασις, process, 283.8  
ἐκεῖ, there (i.e. the ideal realm), 263.11;  
385.9; 400.27; 401.12ff.; 432.5; 435.2;  
455.19  
ἐκθεοῦν, give divinity to, make a god,  
divinize, 361.2; 363.21; 365.14, 16  
ἐκκαλεῖν, summon, call forth, 301.27;  
408.10  
ἔκστασις, ecstasy, 212.23  
ἐκτένεια, expansiveness, reach, 366.2;  
367.16; 388.4  
ἐκτενές, τό, expansiveness, 365.21; 371.18  
ἐκφράσινειν, appear, issue from, disclose,  
246.3; 247.9; 274.8; 315.20; 341.8ff.;  
403.11; 428.27; 434.1; 437.20  
ἐκφανσις, manifestation, 210.4; 385.16  
ἐλάττωσις, diminution, 390.12  
ἐλλάμπειν, illuminate, irradiate, 317.1;  
387.17; 403.17  
ἐλλαμψις, irradiation, 361.1; 385.11  
ἐλλειψις, lack, 386.8  
Ἑλληνες, the Greeks, 208.19  
ἐλπίς, expectation, hope, 209.9;  
212.22  
ἐμμέθοδος, fully systematic, 261.18  
ἐμμεθόδως, systematic, 261.3  
ἐμμελής, harmonious, 286.29  
ἐμμελῶς, decorously, 217.8  
ἐμπαθής, full of passion, 269.9  
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, Empedocles, 351.8  
ἐμπύριος, empyrean, 454.24; 455.1

ἐμφανής, visible, observable, manifest,  
273.12; 274.23; 276.30; 301.6; 339.24;  
355.10; 368.10; 385.23; 429.2; 430.9;  
444.24  
ἐμφασις, appearance, reflection, 233.18;  
243.25; 387.14  
ἐμφορεῖν, fully fill, 312.12  
ἐμφρων, wise, knowledgeable, 223.11;  
369.14, 31; 370.8; 382.6, 10; 383.12;  
403.3  
ἐμψυχος, ensouled, 292.6; 314.16; 319.17;  
360.29; 401.26; 403.20, 31; 404.5;  
406.9, 10; 411.3ff.; 412.13ff.;  
414.23; 415.5; 416.30ff.;  
436.15ff.  
ἐν, τό, the One, unity, *frequent*  
τό ἐν ὄν, the One Being, the  
One-existent, 230.9; 234.15, 25;  
239.9, 12; 385.13ff.; 393.31; 419.2, 26;  
437.21; 457.29; 458.10  
τό ἐν τῆς ψυχῆς, the unity of the soul,  
211.25  
τό ἐν τῶν θεῶν, the unity of the gods,  
211.25  
ἐναντίωσις, opposition, 205.12; 206.8  
ἐναργῶς, plainly, 229.19; 287.20  
ἐναρμόζειν, harmonize, arrange in, 223.20;  
358.17  
ἐναρμόνιος, harmonious, 332.27; 355.11  
ἐνάς, henad, 210.6; 226.16, 19; 298.19;  
306.16, 19; 332.28; 361.19; 362.13;  
372.18; 386.19; 426.7, 10; 431.5;  
436.18; 457.23  
ἐνδεής, lacking, wanting, in, 363.26, 27;  
364.26, 28, 29; 399.22; 421.20  
ἐνδεια, lack, 363.4, 10, 24; 364.3ff.; 386.7  
ἐνδεικνύναι, indicate, display, 218.27;  
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327.12; 331.16; 337.11; 344.20;  
345.13; 353.28; 354.6ff.; 359.4, 11;  
362.12; 366.2; 369.7; 389.18; 398.18;  
409.1; 416.11; 418.4; 427.21; 433.16;  
435.8; 449.28; 457.16  
ἐνδιδόναι, instil, place in, accord to,  
207.23; 213.17; 215.27; 220.18;  
222.15; 260.15; 404.3  
ἐνέργεια, activity, actuality, 221.29;  
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415.1; 420.26; 431.1  
ἐκτὸς ἐνέργειαι, activities external (to us),  
216.2  
κατ' ἐνέργειαν, active, actualized, in act,  
246.25; 297.4; 336.5; 398.30; 414.10  
ἐνέργημα, activity, 302.19  
ἐνεργητικῶς, in an active manner, 335.30  
ἐνθεος, divine, inspired, 215.21; 322.18;  
374.6; 398.9  
ἐνθουσιᾶν, be divinely inspired, 283.7  
ἐνιαῖος, unitary, 437.12  
ἐνιαίως, in a unified way, manner, in (its)  
unitary phase, 234.17; 360.21; 446.30  
ἐνιδρύειν, establish, 211.8,25,31; 213.11;  
215.14; 244.5; 246.30; 248.28; 302.20;  
404.13  
ἐνίζειν, unite, 431.24; 437.17  
ἐννοια, conception, notion, 211.12; 212.14;  
214.29; 223.8; 228.12; 247.32; 258.14;  
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411.3,19ff.; 412.18; 413.10; 414.23;  
415.5; 417.1ff.; 436.15ff.; 445.21  
ἐνοειδής, unifying, unique, unitary, 224.3;  
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402.15; 449.15  
ἐνοειδῶς, in a unitary manner, 221.3;  
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434.7; 440.2; 445.13; 447.21; 449.11;  
456.14  
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ἐνστηρίζειν, set fast in, 403.17  
ἐνταῦθα, here, down here, 263.10; 344.12;  
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ἐνυλος, enmattered, 238.22; 357.27;  
372.24; 403.8; 440.2; 445.9; 446.25  
ἐνωσις, unification, unity, 211.24; 213.5;  
302.14; 347.23; 369.1; 371.11; 386.28;  
398.12; 409.1; 414.13; 423.18; 430.30;  
437.8  
ἐνωτικός, that which unifies, to unify,  
364.15; 404.32  
ἐξοίρειν, exalt, elevate, raise above; pass.:  
transcend, be transcendent, 217.12;  
226.17; 232.12,25; 239.10; 245.8;  
246.18; 267.3; 304.9; 305.23; 311.14;  
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371.11; 376.11; 388.30; 390.16,25;  
395.17.20; 414.10; 423.28; 427.19  
ἐξοίρετος, special to, peculiar, what sets  
apart, that distinguishes, 248.10;  
311.16,20; 414.25  
ἐξαιρέτως, especially, 387.18  
ἐξαρτᾶσθαι, depend on, be dependent on,  
be attached to, be suspended from, be  
suspended, 210.20; 215.17; 222.12;  
296.17; 310.20; 334.17; 371.6; 376.26;  
397.18; 404.16; 413.14  
ἐξήγησις, interpretation, 218.12; 275.26;  
289.13; 290.2,16; 362.10; 398.27;  
426.4; 437.31  
ἐξηγητής, commentator, exegete,  
interpreter, 218.3,29; 227.8; 310.3;  
326.20; 437.25  
ἐξις, disposition, relation, state, 215.30;  
289.18; 364.13; 369.13; 399.22;  
406.15,18,21  
ἐξομοιοῦν, establish a resemblance,  
assimilate to, make just like, 271.19;  
366.11; 452.7  
ἐπάνοδος, return, 208.14  
ἐπαφή, contact, 302.13; 349.30  
ἐπεισοδῖος, that intrudes upon, 413.2  
ἐπεισοδιῶδης, disjointedly, 262.16  
ἐπέκεινα, above, 209.26; 231.10,14; 241.27;  
305.10; 318.11; 321.28; 361.22;  
374.14; 409.18; 411.9; 417.20; 419.3;  
427.15  
ἐπιβάλλειν, go about, apprehend, 446.1;  
448.23  
ἐπιβολή, apprehension, concentration,  
intuition, 249.7; 301.26; 302.12;  
400.20; 410.29; 438.27,30; 455.25;  
456.2  
ἐπιδείκνυσθαι, indicate, reveal, 206.1;  
*frequent*  
ἐπικαλεῖν, invoke, 217.11  
ἐπίκηρος, perishable, 403.9  
ἐπίκλησις, invocation, 215.1  
Ἐπικούρειος, Epicurean, 262.2, 266.26  
Ἐπίκουρος, Epicurus, 267.16  
ἐπικρατεία, domination, predominance,  
233.29; 271.11

- ἐπίκρισις, adjudication, 255.9  
 ἐπικτήτος, additional, acquired, by  
 acquisition, 352.21; 363.11,13;  
 393.12; 405.26  
 ἐπιλάμπειν, radiate, shed light, 365.29;  
 430.15  
 ἐπινοία (κατ' ἐπινοίαν), conceptually, in a  
 conceptual manner, 256.20; 281.8;  
 290.4.6  
 ἐπιπλοκαί, (astronomical) connections,  
 214.10  
 ἐπισκευαστός, reconditioned, 260.15;  
 278.21; 281.2  
 ἐπιστάσια, superintendence, governance,  
 403.13; 413.4  
 ἐπιστατεῖν, preside over, 206.25  
 ἐπιστήμη, science, scientific knowledge,  
 215.3; 218.18; 221.5; 223.1,13,18;  
 229.2; 237.6; 247.5; 248.21; 250.18;  
 269.8; 300.31; 302.18,22; 303.10,24;  
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 346.17,23; 347.10,13,30; 350.8ff.;  
 357.23; 371.28; 372.2,4,8; 399.21;  
 442.11-13  
 ἐπιστημονικός, knowable, scientific,  
 218.22; 223.25; 246.20; 302.5,10;  
 342.25; 343.14; 348.19; 351.24;  
 354.18; 371.29  
 ἐπιστημονικῶς, scientifically, in a scientific  
 manner, 218.26; 292.20; 303.19;  
 340.26; 342.12  
 ἐπιστρεπτικῶς, in the manner of reversion,  
 269.28  
 ἐπιστρέφειν, revert, *frequent*  
 ἐπιστροφή, reversion, 208.24; 210.9;  
 211.30; 221.21; 340.10; 407.5ff.;  
 414.19ff.; 415.3ff.  
 ἐπισυνάπτειν, link together, 211.29  
 ἐπιτελεῖν, achieve, accomplish, carry  
 through, practice, complete, bring to  
 completion, 209.15; 212.5; 214.8;  
 222.2,4; 359.12; 395.12  
 ἐπιτήδειος, receptive, suitable, ready,  
 222.14; 294.6; 367.8; 392.8,12;  
 394.17,20  
 ἐπιτηδείότης, readiness, 392.9; 394.19  
 ἐπιτροπεύειν, supervise, govern, preside  
 over, 220.22; 310.20; 336.30  
 ἐπόμενον, τό, consequent, what follows,  
 229.1; 293.10; 328.23; 329.10;  
 439.6  
 ἔργον, product, work, 212.19; 405.3;  
*frequent*  
 ἔρημος, devoid of, bereft of, 374.14; 381.9;  
 387.9; 407.19  
 Ἑρμαρχος, Hermarchus, 216.19  
 ἑρμηνεύειν, interpret, give an  
 interpretation, 243.8; 341.17; 343.27  
 Ἑρμῆς, Hermes (Trismegistus), 386.10  
 ἔρως, love, 212.21; 354.13  
 Ἔρως, Eros, 336.13; 363.25; 434.4  
 ἐρώτησις, question, inquiry, 285.10;  
 325.19; 366.32; 379.27  
 ἔσχατα, τά, lowest, final, last, ultimate  
 (parts, levels, entities, etc.), 206.5;  
 209.20; 222.23; 226.19; 228.24;  
 232.16; 375.9; 385.12; 388.3; 402.28  
 ἑτεροκίνητος, moved by another, 293.21;  
 328.2,5; 373.14; 376.19,25; 379.2  
 ἑτεροποιοῖς, that makes things other,  
 385.26  
 ἑτερότης, otherness, 280.21; 440.25  
 εὖ, τό, the good, 262.26; 390.5; 404.17  
 εὐδαίμων, blessed, 212.9; 292.9,19; 329.30;  
 334.4; 401.31; 407.3; 411.29; 424.26  
 Εὐδάνεμοι, Eudanemoi, 213.23  
 εὐεργός, (having) the right pliability, ready  
 for use, 329.26; 395.16  
 Εὐθénéια, Eutheneia, 333.4  
 Εὐκλεία, Eukleia, 333.4  
 εὐτακτος, well-ordered, orderly, 299.19;  
 373.20  
 εὐτάκτως, orderly, 403.3  
 εὐταξία, orderliness, 412.18  
 Εὐφήμη, Eupheme, 333.5  
 εὐφημία, high praise, 334.12; 354.14  
 εὐχή, prayer, 206.27-223.20; 228.8; 275.3  
 εὐχομαι, pray, 207.12; 208.13,16; 211.3ff.;  
 212.6; 213.2; 214.2; 216.20,23,29;  
 220.2; 221.9ff.  
 ἐφάπτειν, have contact with, touch on,  
 attain, grasp, fasten on to, adhere to,  
 249.2; 274.9,30; 302.11; 346.28;  
 347.29; 374.3; 446.5  
 ἐφαρμόζειν, connect, fit, harmonize,  
 205.10; 281.4; 304.12; 337.26; 347.7;  
 349.24; 351.26  
 ἔφεις, desire, aspiration, 221.21,22;  
 267.6,8; 415.25  
 ἐφετός, an object of desire, 390.6  
 ἐφετόν, τό, object of desire, desirability,  
 274.30; 295.21; 371.17

## Greek word index

ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τό, what is in our power,  
216.12, 15  
ἐφισθαί, be desirous, desire, aspire to,  
221.22; 289.17; 365.23; 415.23  
ἐφιστάναί, ἐφιστάνεin, carefully observe,  
take note, call attention to, consider,

deal with, establish, (be) set over,  
preside over, 243.3; 278.2; 299.13;  
309.25; 311.24; 402.12; 403.13; 406.9;  
413.20  
ἐφοδος, mode, procedure, route, 325.29;  
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## Z

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336.11, 22; 341.11; 408.23; 450.20;  
451.17  
Zeus (sculpted by Phidias), 265.18  
ζῆν, live, be alive, have life, 235.6; 259.10;  
356.16; 371.27; 404.11; 411.13;  
416.29; 419.12ff.; 420.2  
ζῆν, τό, life, 309.29; 315.7;  
336.3  
ζητεῖν, seek, investigate, examine, pose a  
question, 208.28; 226.3; 234.6;  
237.10; 240.23; 261.20; 264.11;  
268.14, 21; 276.20; 278.27; 279.25;  
280.12; 288.5; *frequent*  
ζητούμενον, τό, object of enquiry,  
subject under investigation, question,  
255.20; 275.18; 320.29; 326.31; 355.2;  
360.15; 446.1

ζήτησις, enquiry, question, 254.17; 276.30;  
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416.14  
ζωή, life, 220.24; 221.15; 232.32; 244.4;  
372.16; *frequent*  
ζωογονικός, having life, productive of life,  
zoogonic, 226.13; 360.2; 361.9; 419.9  
ζωογόνος, life-giving, zoogonic, 420.14;  
441.7  
ζῶον, living thing, *frequent*  
νοητόν, a living thing endowed with  
intellect, 411.3ff.; 416.17, 21; 420.2ff.;  
426.12, 32; 428.25; 429.24; 431.12ff.;  
449.23; 457.2  
ζωοποιεῖν, give life, vivify, 235.16; 257.9;  
393.6  
ζωοποιός, vivificatory, 213.21, 27  
ζωτικός, life-giving, 300.16  
ζωτικῶς, in (a) vital mode, 418.10

## H

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(pl.) behaviour, 282.28; 311.16; 355.7;  
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ἡλιακός, solar, of the sun, 210.23; 214.10;  
404.19; 444.23ff.  
ἥλιος, the sun, 228.7; 249.30; 250.28;  
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426.1; 435.29; 439.26; 440.9;  
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ἡνωμένως, in a unified manner, as a unity,  
335.17; 352.17, 24; 361.25; 411.27;  
426.17; 432.20; 434.2  
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θεά, goddess, 220.1, 30; 221.9; 224.11;  
275.11  
θεατής, student, 353.18  
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ἀριθμοί, divine multiplicity, divine sets,  
the set of gods, 300.21; 306.20;  
418.24  
γένη, genera of divinities, 220.15

τάξις, divine rank, ranks of gods, 211.9;  
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θεολόγος, the Theologian, 207.2; 313.8,18;  
315.15; 317.11; 324.18; 325.8; 327.23;  
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οἱ θεολόγοι, the theologians, 333.2;  
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θεός, god, *frequent*  
δημιουργικοί, the demiurgic gods,  
269.31; 299.15  
ἐγκόσμιοι, the encosmic gods, 269.28ff.;  
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κρύφιοι, the Hidden Gods, 428.22  
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432.5  
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θεουργός, theurgist, 274.16; 317.23  
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θεσμός, law, ordinance, 396.30; 413.4  
θεωρεῖν, observe, examine, investigate,  
contemplate, 210.16; 217.20; 218.18;  
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394.26; 401.18; 404.23; 407.6; 410.20;  
411.25; 414.19; 422.8; 428.21; 431.3;  
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332.15ff.; 376.9; 412.20; 429.4;  
436.32; 443.24ff.; 456.30  
θρέμμα, nursling, 427.4; 429.5,6,9  
θρεπτικός, nutritive, 393.4; 429.5  
θηρησκεία, cult, 208.22; 211.13; 212.16  
θύρα, gate, 301.28

## I

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Ἰδη, Ida, 408.6  
ιδιότης, property, characteristic,  
particularity, particular function, own  
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270.7; 308.6; 312.22; 365.19;  
418.22,26; 422.25; 430.23; 432.11  
ιδίωμα, character, trait, 336.21; 384.21;  
388.12,16; 398.7  
ιδρύειν, establish, place, 210.29; 230.7;  
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ἰνδαλμα, image, 241.18; 360.29;  
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Ἰππα, Hipta, 407.24; 408.7  
ἰσοδυναμεῖν, be equivalent, 241.12  
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 καθαρεύειν, purify; pass.: free of, 343.9;  
 362.24  
 καθαρότης, purity, 211.15; 238.14,29;  
 286.18; 347.22; 445.26  
 κάθαρσις, cleansing, purification, 302.18;  
 380.14  
 καθαρτικός, purifying, purificatory, 212.20;  
 213.21,24.; 222.1  
 καθέλκειν, drag down, 378.13  
 καθηγεμών (Syrianus), teacher, 315.1;  
 322.18; 324.20  
 καθήκειν, descend, 220.28; 228.30; 270.6;  
 321.9; 327.22  
 καθολικός, universal, 346.32; 351.24  
 καθ' ὅλον ἑαυτόν, with his whole being,  
 390.19; 407.15  
 καθ' ὅλου, wholly, universal, 234.14;  
 337.26; 340.20; 349.13; 350.3; 351.25  
 καθορᾶν, observe, contemplate, see, look,  
 215.8; 224.8; 323.25; 326.17; 400.6;  
 433.11; 435.3  
 κακεργέτις, maleficent, 382.2,6,10; 391.10  
 κακία, evil, vice, 288.6; 373.23; 375.2,28;  
 376.1,21  
 κακόν, τό, evil, 373.25,28; 374–381 *passim*;  
 392.3  
 κακοποιός, maleficent, 378.23  
 κακύνειν, produce evil, 375.25  
 καλλονή, beauty, 331.6; 333.9  
 καλλοποιός, beauty-producing, that makes  
 (produces, creates) beauty, 269.17;  
 334.15; 409.13; 433.30  
 κάλλος, the beautiful, beauty, 238.18,22;  
 265.17; 266.7,12; 269.11ff.;  
 332.20,29; 333.1; 334.14; 361.4;  
 366.5; 368.8; 397.15; 401.10,22;  
 409.31; 421.22; 422.11,13; 423.6;  
 424.18; 433.29; 434.1  
 καλόν, τό, the beautiful, good, the good,  
 215.5; 265.23; 266.11; 268.25ff.;  
 269.2,9; 329.19; 330.26; 363.14,25;  
 366.17; 398.1  
 κἄνων, rule, 241.33  
 καταβάλλειν, establish, lay down, put in  
 place, condemn, 206.20; 307.16;  
 354.15; 355.21  
 καταδέεστος, inferior, 224.16; 264.18;  
 359.31; 400.27; 424.1; 426.5;  
 441.27

καταλάμπειν, illuminate, 270.21; 347.25;  
 367.22; 400.10  
 καταπίνειν, swallow up, 312.11; 314.23;  
 324.15,19; 336.24  
 κατάποσις, swallowing, 313.7  
 κατασκευή, proof of the argument, 227.24;  
 293.5  
 κατατάσσειν, give a posting, subordinate,  
 225.14; 353.24  
 κατατεταγμένος, subordinate, 225.14  
 κατατομή, division, 346.5  
 κατάφασις, affirmative statement, 243.13  
 καταφατικός, affirmative, 232.29; 243.5;  
 256.28  
 κατηγορεῖν, predicate, 426.14  
 κατηγορικός, categorical, 258.29  
 κατιέναι, descend, 235.9; 283.9; 438.28  
 κενός, empty, void, 373.7; 438.16; 454.5;  
 455.26; 456.8  
 κεφαλαῖον, heading, subject, 205.4; 212.5;  
 275.6; 393.14; 395.11  
 κεφαλή, head, 313.21; 358.1,2,3; 407.28;  
 427.23; 429.28  
 κηλῖς, stain, 221.31  
 κιθαρωδικός, of lyre-playing, 355.5  
 κίνησις, movement, motion, *frequent*  
 κινητικός, moving, relating to motion,  
 263.26; 267.8; 368.19; 385.25; 413.10  
 κοῖλος, hollow, 364.1; 396.12  
 κοινός, common, *frequent*; universal,  
 425.12,17  
 κοινωνία, communion, intercourse,  
 community, 211.23; 217.3; 218.20;  
 422.19; 430.26,28  
 κολάζειν, punish, 378.7  
 Κόρη, Kore, 457.17,21  
 κοροπλαθικός τύπος, example made by the  
 image maker, waxwork, 335.25; 394.7  
 κορυφή, peak, top, finishing touch, 231.6;  
 255.17; 310.12; 316.5; 317.14; 436.15  
 κοσμεῖν, organize, beautify, 285.3; 317.16;  
 349.28; 392.8ff.; 399.14; 415.4,5  
 κόσμησις, beautification, 317.1  
 κοσμητής, imposer of order, 383.16  
 κοσμητικός, intended to instil good  
 (behaviour), producing the ordered  
 cosmos, 355.7; 383.3  
 κοσμικός, cosmic, 205.22; 264.21; 274.14;  
 318.1; 319.26; 327.25; 397.9; 403.22;  
 408.11; 413.27; 454.23

## Greek word index

κόσμος, ordered, 332.30  
 κοσμοποιία, the cosmos' creation, the  
     creation, 207.11; 228.28; 256.21;  
     277.3,7; 284.9; 321.6; 357.9; 358.14;  
     375.7; 382.8; 388.26; 390.28  
 κοσμοποιός, cosmos-making, that which  
     produces organization, 233.17;  
     390.32  
 κόσμος, cosmos, order, 272.27ff. (defined);  
     277.2ff.; 304.1; 333.27ff.; 429.19;  
     order, organization, the (ordered)  
     cosmos, 297.30; 299.23; 358.25;  
     395.2; cosmos, world, *frequent*  
 ἀγένητος, ungenerated cosmos, 219.3ff.;  
 αἰδίδιος, everlasting cosmos, 267.19;  
     366.21  
 αἰσθητός, sense-perceptible cosmos,  
     sensible cosmos 277.30; 311.1; 325.6;  
     405.7; 434.22; 437.5ff.; 440.18  
 αἰώνιος, eternal cosmos, 230.21,30  
 γενητός, generated cosmos, 219.3; 429.3  
 νοερός, intellectual cosmos, 301.23  
 νοητός, intelligible cosmos, 229.12;  
     230.4; 244.15; 301.24; 307.18,28;  
     324.28; 429.21; 434.22  
 οὐράνιος, the celestial world, 310.13  
 ὑπερουράνιος, the supra-celestial world,  
     310.13  
 κοσμουργεῖν, manufacture the cosmos,  
     334.1  
 κοσμουργός, cosmos-creating, 362.9  
 κραδιαῖος Διόνυσος, Dionysus of the  
     Heart, 407.29

κράμα, mixture, 383.29  
 Κράντωρ, Crantor, 277.8  
 κρατήρ, mixing bowl, 311.18,23  
 κρείττων, better, superior, 208.16; 212.14;  
     216.16; 230.25; 299.5; 372.25; 373.3;  
     421.15; 422.3; 435.13; 441.23  
 κρίσις, judgement, separation, 214.1;  
     255.22; 354.7; 369.14; 370.6  
 κριτήριον, faculty of judgement, 254.19ff.;  
     255.24  
 κριτικός, critical, judgemental, 254.30,31;  
     255.1  
 Κρονίδης, Kronides, 313.5; 314.26; 315.9  
 Κρόνος, Kronos, 207.12; 305.1,26; 306.13;  
     450.16  
 κρύφιος, hidden, 231.26; 234.17; 428.2,22;  
     430.6; 434.4  
 κρυφίως, hidden, secretly, in a hidden  
     manner, 234.17; 239.11; 450.12  
 κυβερνᾶν, govern, 378.5; 412.24; 413.2  
 κύνειν, conceive, 451.10  
 κύκλος, circle, 209.27; 210.10; 248.5;  
     349.8ff.; 353.9; 404.29  
 κύκλῳ ἢ γένεσις, generation in a circle,  
     228.16,18  
 ὁ ὄντως, the true circle, 350.3ff.  
 ταύτου, the circle of the Same, 406.24  
 τῆς ψυχῆς, circle of the soul, 206.10  
 κυκλοφορία, circular movement, 295.26  
 κυριώτατος, most sovereign, 281.29;  
     285.30; 286.2; 356.14; 358.1,32;  
     368.18ff.; 417.2; 456.3  
 κῶλον, clause, phrase, 240.17,19; 337.14

## Λ

λεληθότως, implicitly, secretly, 331.17;  
     453.8  
 λέξις, wording, text, 227.10; 241.4; 243.26;  
     299.20; 337.11; 387.6; 390.27; 420.20;  
     436.2; 437.25  
 λῆμμα, proposition, 348.14; 355.24  
 λῆξις, 'to be allotted', 206.16  
 λίκνον, winnowing basket, 407.28  
 Λογγίνος, Longinus, 322.24  
 λογικός, logical, rational, 248.8; 250.12;  
     251.16; 283.10; 301.15; 328.16;  
     330.20; 346.8; 348.6; 445.21  
 λόγιον, oracle, 211.11,20; 224.7; 286.10;  
     340.11; 348.23  
 λόγια, the (Chaldean) oracles,  
     318.13,21,26; 388.19; 420.12; 451.17

λογογραφικός, compositional, 339.18;  
     436.6  
 λογοειδής, *logos*-like, 248.29,  
 λόγος, *frequent*  
     plan, 223.30; 394.18  
     basis, hypothesis, rationale, 219.7;  
     245.9ff.; 299.1; 326.24; 352.17;  
     362.26; 371.26; 386.4; 391.12; 404.24;  
     407.11; 417.1; 432.12; 433.26;  
     454.19  
     conformation, formula, 320.22; 395.18  
     account, definition, statement, 236.22;  
     245.9; 305.4; 446.16  
     *logos*, 246.23ff.; 247.3ff.; 248.2ff.;  
     249.1ff.; 250.9ff.; 251.8; 255.6; 350.4  
     proportion, structure, 300.1; 388.8

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relation, 387.27  
 status, 437.22  
 θεῶν, a logical basis for the gods, 280.24

Μάγοι, Magi, 208.18  
 μάταιος, of no purpose, pointless, (in) vain,  
 262.28; 366.31; 381.16; 415.25  
 μάτην, at random, randomness, 262.16,27  
 μεθεκτός, participated, 226.18; 364.17;  
 365.9; 404.1; 405.20; 406.7; 408.4;  
 414.3  
 μέθεξις, participation, 363.23; 364.6; 434.20  
 κατὰ μέθεξιν, by participation, 232.1;  
 234.24ff.; 363.10,12,27; 364.23;  
 405.24  
 μέθοδος, method, procedure, 255.29;  
 276.10  
 μέλος, melody, song, 355.5,14  
 μερικός, particular, partial, 217.21; 231.22;  
 234.29; 358.31; *frequent*  
 δημιουργία, particular creation, 409.27;  
 453.7  
 ζῶον, particular living thing, 403.29ff.;  
 421.25ff.; 422.7; 423.11; 426.26;  
 431.16; 436.20  
 νοῦς, particular intellect, 231.22; 232.7;  
 244.11; 245.10ff.; 246.30; 247.13,25;  
 256.15; 364.24; 376.17; 432.8  
 παράδειγμα, particular paradigm,  
 424.9ff.; 452.14  
 φύσις, particular nature, 379.12,24;  
 435.22; 446.2  
 ψυχή, individual/partial/particular soul,  
 245.19ff.; 256.16; 268.9; 270.5; 274.7;  
 322.18; 334.8; 363.9; 375.17; 380.29;  
 400.3; 436.29; 446.24  
 μερίς, region, 301.7,18  
 μερισμός, division, partition, 439.32;  
 446.3  
 μεριστός, divided, divisible, in stages,  
 225.4; 257.10; 263.16; 267.25; 278.13;  
 293.30; 310.22; 352.4ff.; 410.24  
 μέρος, part, *frequent*  
 μέσον, τό, the intermediate, the middle  
 term, 247.2; 258.26; 259.4; 260.17  
 μεσότης, a mean, 402.18; 403.2; 449.9  
 μεταβάλλειν, change, shift ground, 232.26;  
 233.9; 266.9; 284.28; 289.16; 304.28;  
 352.25; 367.11; 377.2; 379.13,15;  
 393.1,10; 443.16

νόθος, bastard reason, 257.25  
 (opp. νοῦς, νόησις), 246.5ff.; 251.2,13  
 λοιμικός, pestilential, 213.25

### M

μεταβατικός, discursive, 244.18; 246.5;  
 277.31  
 μεταβολή, change, 224.17; 232.31; 235.5;  
 252.19; 253.26; 268.8; 288.8; 289.17;  
 376.29,30; 379.22; 443.29  
 μετάγειν, transfer, translate, 209.10;  
 289.14; 391.4  
 μετάδοσις, bestowal, communication (of),  
 sharing, 211.7; 237.16; 300.1; 366.19;  
 401.10; 415.15  
 μεταπηδᾶν, leap, 398.18  
 μετάστασις, emigration, 208.12  
 μετέχειν, participate, share in, *frequent*  
 μετουσία, participation, sharing in, 211.24;  
 212.15; 222.16; 238.14,18; 332.27;  
 340.10; 354.12; 364.4; 366.3; 382.12;  
 389.17; 412.13; 421.23; 422.20; 423.5  
 μετοχή, participation, sharing, 234.21;  
 238.18; 273.17; 363.22; 364.26;  
 365.13; 412.22; 458.7  
 μετρέειν, measure, 256.18; 278.12; 279.13  
 μετρητικός, providing measure, 372.9;  
 385.24  
 μέτρον, measure, fixed limit, capacity,  
 degree, 220.9; 221.26; 320.11,18;  
 332.21; 364.12; 366.1; 374.27; 375.3;  
 387.27; 403.12; 412.9; 421.17; 451.5  
 μηδαμῶς ὄν, τό, absolute non-being, that  
 which is in no way existent, 209.26;  
 228.3; 374.15,18; 376.10  
 μήτηρ, mother, 316.22; 384.19; 389.25;  
 408.5  
 Μητιέτης, Metietēs (All-wise), 312.10  
 Μητις, Mêtis, Wisdom, 312.10; 336.11,24;  
 451.14  
 μητρικός, maternal, 226.11; 384.21  
 μιμεῖσθαι, imitate, reproduce, 222.18;  
 265.11; 320.6; 403.3; 439.21; 441.29;  
 442.8,  
 μίμημα, imitation, copy, 266.8; 286.12;  
 442.2;  
 μίμησις, imitation, resemblance, 330.27;  
 445.23; 458.5  
 Μίνως, the *Minos*, 316.2  
 μῖξις, admixture, mixture, 239.28; 248.24;  
 383.29; 424.5

μοῖρα, portion, rank, 206.25; 229.27;  
230.4; 231.12; 256.7; 257.2; 276.20;  
312.28; 314.2; 332.25; 338.10,19;  
381.18  
μοναδικός, monadic, 274.24; 306.24;  
324.26; 418.19,23; 452.24  
μονάς, monad, 226.13; 230.32; 231.23;  
262.19,21; 271.11; 298.28; 300.22;  
306.19; 340.17; 372.17; 392.19; 397.9;  
399.4; 404.16; 405.32; 418.24,26;  
432.22; 437.21; 440.32; 444.8,18;  
445.2ff.; 447.12ff.; 449.10,13ff.;  
455.6,9  
μονή, permanence, rest, 211.30; 274.26  
μόνιμος, stable, 220.6; 226.10; 309.3;  
339.15; 341.25,26; 342.4,8ff.; 346.3;  
347.5; 350.10; 351.3; 385.24; 445.15  
μονίμως, in a stable manner, enduringly,  
299.27; 352.26; 371.23  
μονογενής, single (unique, alone) in (of) its  
kind, one of a kind, 306.25,30; 311.1;  
437.20; 443.30; 444.3ff.; 448.13,16;  
453.14; 456.27; 457.12ff.  
μονοειδής, single, uniform, unique, 221.6;  
255.1; 260.29; 262.23; 285.20; 437.16;  
441.17

ναστός, solid, 396.12  
νεύειν, incline, stoop, 251.12; 354.11;  
399.31; 400.2  
νεώτεροι, οἱ, more recent (writers,  
commentators), 339.21; 453.10  
νοερός, *intellective, frequent*  
ἀριθμός, intellective set, 300.21  
δημιουργία, intellective universe, 335.13  
διάκοσμος, διακόσμησις, intellective  
order, 347.25; 365.18  
εἶδος, intellective form, 300.26  
κόσμος, intellective cosmos, 301.23;  
399.6  
μονάς, intellective monad, 406.1; 447.32  
πλῆθος, intellective manifold, 404.15  
φῶς, φέγγος, intellective light,  
intellective light-beam, 245.21; 346.2;  
348.24  
ψύχη, intellective soul, 360.30; 364.26;  
383.9; 403.14; 404.6,9; 405.7,10;  
406.4; 413.13; 414.11  
νοεῶς, in the intellective mode,  
intellectively, intuitively, 218.26;  
245.31; 271.13; 303.13,20; 314.1;

μονότης, solitude, unicity, uniqueness,  
298.29; 447.17; 451.8  
μόνωσις, aloneness, uniqueness, 238.29;  
436.26; 439.14; 443.14; 447.12;  
452.28; 456.11ff.  
μόριον, part, contribution, alternative,  
212.1; 230.15; 250.19; 258.23; 281.24;  
283.22; 298.1; 324.2; 390.16; 401.2;  
407.15; 425.9; 426.9,18; 429.20;  
432.6; 439.27  
μορφοῦν, configure, 388.1  
μόρφωμα, configuration, 320.8  
μορφωτικῶς, figuratively, 255.19;  
352.18  
μουνογενεῖα, alone of her kind (of Korê),  
457.17  
Μοῦσαι, the Muses, 287.26  
μοχλεία, levering, pulling, 297.28;  
395.28  
μύειν, initiate, 302.8; 303.6  
μυθικός, mythical, 289.14  
μῦθος, myth, story, tale, 324.19; 345.19;  
351.18; 353.26; 430.3  
μυστήρια, mysteries, 206.20; 208.20  
μυστικῶς, in mystic mode,  
423.28

## N

323.21; 325.7; 335.31; 362.8; 369.29;  
390.9; 418.9; 433.3; 434.1  
νόημα, thought, 339.6,11; 354.28; 362.30;  
391.5  
νόησις, intuitive thought, thought, 222.26;  
240.13; 243.28; 244.18; 398.8;  
*frequent*  
νοητός, intelligible, noetic, 228.7; 229.12;  
232.6; 233.1; 244.15; 247.10; 301.24;  
305.24; 307.17,28; 308.13,21; 322.26;  
323.3,5; 324.28; 335.11; 365.18;  
371.21; 411.22; 420.12; 424.24;  
426.25; 429.21; 430.15; 432.4,18,25;  
433.28; 434.28; 435.28; 440.3; 445.3;  
455.19  
εἶδος, intelligible form, 286.18;  
422.17,22; 435.23; 441.28;  
445.1,27  
θεός, intelligible god, 309.16; 311.7;  
324.15; 340.13; 360.27; 437.23  
κάλλος, intelligible beauty, 336.28;  
397.18; 401.9; 409.10  
μονάς, intelligible monad, 310.9;  
447.26,31

νοῦς, intelligible intellect, 242.28;  
428.17; 432.12; 453.11  
πλάτος, intelligible world, noetic realm  
(cf. n.154), 229.15; 230.32; 233.2  
νοητῶς, intelligibly, 244.2; 323.21; 324.11;  
325.7; 335.31; 418.7; 426.21; 439.22  
νόθος, bastard, 257.25ff.  
νοοειδής, intellect-like, having the form of  
intellect, 247.25; 407.12  
νοοποιός, of creating intellect, creator of  
intellect, 311.20,24  
Νουμήνιος, Numenius, 303.27  
νοῦς, intellect, 210.29; 220.20; 221.5,8;  
222.5,30; 223.17,19; 224.1; 242.28;  
244.3ff.; 246.21; 251.2,10,16; 254.24;  
257.17,30; 263.5; 269.17; 291.28;  
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311.19ff.; 314.14; 317.1; 318.14;  
320.18; 325.25; 355.13; 356.16; 357.1;

361.9,25; 370.3; 371.4ff.; 372.14;  
383.11; 389.25; 403.32; 414.24;  
415.27; 419.21; 427.7; 428.17; 431.25;  
438.25,26ff.  
δημιουργικός, demiurgic intellect,  
295.22; 302.14; 309.25; 325.13;  
356.6,29ff.; 360.23; 361.9; 362.2;  
364.22; 398.1; 403.32; 414.9; 419.21  
κόσμος, ἐγκόσμιος, cosmic intellect,  
encosmic intellect, 305.19; 306.2;  
408.2,11; 413.27; 425.20; 454.23  
ὅλος, intellect as a whole, universal  
intellect, 323.15; 361.1; 369.15;  
399.16; 403.25; 405.13; 406.4  
παθητικός, passive intellect, 244.21  
Νύξ, Night, 206.29; 207.2; 314.1,3,25;  
315.13; 324.27; 333.23;  
397.3  
νύχιος, nocturnal, 450.28

## Ξ

Ξενάρχος, Xenarchus, 425.22

## Ο

ὄγκος, body, bulk, mass, matter, 300.14;  
358.5; 370.16; 369.10,19; 399.17;  
402.25; 439.32  
ὀδεύειν, pass, proceed, 237.3; 300.32  
οἰκεῖος, appropriate, proper, native, 224.14;  
236.33; *frequent*  
οἰκεῖον, appropriate, correspond to,  
210.19; 215.29; 301.25  
οἰκείως, properly, appropriately, 206.14;  
211.10,14; 254.24; 301.28; 335.18;  
408.29; 418.11; 422.23; 423.16;  
434.18  
οἰκείωσις, familiarization, appropriation,  
211.14; 301.28  
ὀλικός, universal, whole, holistic, 234.29;  
317.2; 320.1  
ὅλος, whole, (pl.) all things, the universe,  
the Whole, *frequent*  
ὀλοτελής, absolutely complete, 359.13;  
362.11  
ὀλότης, totality, a whole, wholeness, whole  
species, 318.8,10; 358.19; 378.30;  
379.13,17; 422.20; 423.4; 432.27;  
433.9; 452.20  
Ὀλυμπος, Olympus, 310.12; 316.5; 317.4  
ὁμαλός, regular, 286.30; 287.1,3

ὁμαλῶς, regularly, 286.30  
Ὅμηρος, Homer, 265.19; 316.4; 333.21  
ὅμοιος, similar, like, resembling, 208.8,9;  
246.17; *frequent*  
ὁμοιότης, similarity, likeness, resemblance,  
271.15; 323.29; 336.28; 342.9,22;  
356.22; 359.15; 397.25; 416.7;  
420.20ff.; 429.17; 444.22,27;  
445.6,28; 447.23  
ὁμοιοῦν, resemble, make like; pass.:  
assimilate self, imitate, become  
similar, resemble, be like, 301.23;  
326.12,14,16; 330.29; 332.30; 335.10;  
339.2; 340.18; 385.29; 417.24;  
418.2,3; 420.21; 431.11; 433.19;  
435.1; 441.19,26; 442.10;  
451.6  
ὁμοίωμα, copy, resemblance, 266.14;  
327.4; 452.10  
ὁμοίωσις, becoming like, resemblance,  
similarity, likeness, 211.14; 265.13;  
331.7; 334.21; 337.5; 417.22,25;  
424.28; 434.18ff.; 441.26;  
445.29  
ὁμοῦ, together with, all at once, 241.23;  
*frequent*

- ὄν, τό, being, that which is, 301.2  
(defined), *frequent*  
δημιουργικόν, demiurgic being, 317.14;  
362.8; 386.21  
πρώτως, primal being, 230.17; 234.20;  
238.12; 239.10; 428.8; 442.26;  
448.7  
τὸ μὴ ὄν, non-being, 210.1; 212.27;  
226.20; 228.2; 239.10; 242.11; 259.24;  
281.6ff.; 300.10; 374.17; 442.5  
τὸ ὄντως ὄν, true being, 219.4; 228.9,23;  
235.21; 237.7; 238.10; 245.2; 247.26;  
252.29; 350.16; 400.24; 448.6  
τὸ ἀεί ὄν, the always-existent, 225.5;  
227.18ff.; 228.9,17,27; *frequent*  
τὰ ἀεί ὄντα, always existent, 269.15;  
287.15; 288.14; 308.17  
τὰ ὄντως ὄντα, beings that really exist,  
real being, 252.26; 273.8; 363.19  
ὄνομα, name, 237.15; 262.5; 272.7ff.;  
*frequent*  
ὀνόματα (θεῖα), divine names, 273.22;  
316.11  
ὀπαδός, follower, helper, 270.4;  
315.14  
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425.3; 426.31; 429.9; 430.11ff.;  
434.22; 435.2  
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357.14  
ὄργανον, instrument, organ, 250.7;  
255.4,23; 352.31; 353.4; 393.6;  
395.14  
ὀρεκτικόν, τό, desiring subject, 267.9,10,12  
ὀρεκτόν, τό, object of desire, 267.9,20  
ὄρεξις, desire, 269.8  
ὀρικός, defining, definitory, 227.13;  
309.10  
ὀρισμός, definition, 227.14; 240.18,23,29;  
241.19,28; 242.7; 243.13; 254.16;  
258.12  
ὀριστικός, defining, 303.10  
ὀριστικῶς, by means of a definition,  
276.12  
ὀρμᾶν, venture upon, have an impulse,  
make the attempt; pass. take one's  
starting-point, receive one's impulse,  
issue forth, set out, 214.23; 216.8ff.;  
219.29; 223.2; 301.20; 318.22; 338.1;  
348.26; 377.14; 380.22;  
456.3  
ὀρμή, venture, enterprise, impulse,  
214.15,27; 215.13; 216.10ff.; 377.10;  
378.4  
ὀρμητήριον, beginning, encouragement,  
212.15; 356.1  
ὀρμητικός, appetitive, 419.8  
ὄρμος, ὁ πατρικός, the paternal harbour  
(cf. n.606), 302.24  
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324.14,20; 336.29; 385.17; 390.7;  
407.22; 408.9; 427.21; 428.11  
ὁσιότης, piety, 209.6; 212.6; 351.13  
οὐδενεία, nothingness, 374.16  
οὐράνιος, heavenly, 278.9,18; 295.23;  
310.14; 315.22; 346.21; 353.4; 412.19  
οὐρανός, heaven, *frequent*  
Οὐρανός, Heaven, Ouranos, 304.27; 305.2;  
306.13; 315.2; 450.13  
οὐσία, beingness, being; essence, essential  
nature, 207.21; 211.18; 219.25; 361.7;  
*frequent*  
κατ' οὐσίαν, in essence, essential, 210.13;  
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352.20; 367.22; 373.29; 379.8ff.;  
393.9; 413.14; 422.12; 442.7; 445.8  
νοερά, intellectual realm, 256.31;  
302.12; 309.17; 332.25; 348.22; 394.9;  
402.15; 403.28; 408.1; 410.16  
νοητή, intelligible realm, 230.7; 242.6;  
256.31; 361.2; 440.1; 441.17  
οὐσιοποιός, productive of substances,  
435.22  
οὐσιοῦν, express, give existence,  
substantiate, 335.30; 363.7;  
364.16,19; 407.26; 423.21  
οὐσιωδής, essential, substantial, 243.31;  
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443.8  
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ὄφελος, benefit, 208.3  
ὄχετός, channel, conduit, 220.24; 310.2

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- παθαίνεσθαι, become passionate, 362.22  
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 322.17; 343.8; 362.25,32; 363.9;  
 367.26  
 παιδεία, education, admonition, 211.15;  
 250.22  
 παιδευτικός, educational, 268.31  
 παιδιά, playfulness, 334.9  
 παίζω, play, 334.2  
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 322.20  
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 266.25; 272.19; 310.3; 321.26; 322.20;  
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 πανάγαθος, the All-Good, entirely good,  
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 449.5,12,15; 451.1; 453.13  
 παραβάλλειν, compare, 266.13; 414.1;  
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 παράγειν, bring forth, 228.22; *frequent*  
 παραγίγνεσθαι, be present, stem from,  
 come about, supervene (upon), 217.1;  
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 παραδειγματικῶς, in the manner of a  
 paradigm, in a paradigmatic mode,  
 227.6; 335.28; 400.23  
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 παρακαλεῖν, encourage, invoke, 207.1;  
 275.11  
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 reason, wrong, 375.18; 376.4;  
 380.22  
 παραμυθεῖν, encourage, supplement,  
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 πάροδος, admission, path, 239.32;  
 373.6  
 παρορᾶν, view wrongly, 338.8  
 παρυπόστασις, by-product, incidental  
 existence, 375.15,18; 381.7  
 παρυφιστάναι, arise as a by-product,  
 381.11  
 πάσχειν, be acted upon, suffer, undergo,  
 226.21; 260.3,5; 282.20; 293.2;  
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 πατήρ, father, 207.1,15; 211.1; 260.16;  
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- περαίνειν, bring to completion, complete;  
pass.: be limited, be finite, 253.10,11;  
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- πέρας, limit, 211.28; 248.8; 251.1; 310.8;  
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- περιέχειν, embrace, contain, enfold,  
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429.25; 430.6ff.; 435.6; 436.9; 447.4;  
448.1; 449.13; 454.16; 457.10
- περικλᾶν, to bend, 317.25
- περιλαμβάνειν, embrace, enclose, include,  
grasp, encompass, provide a  
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391.6; 411.28; 412.15; 427.3; 428.25;  
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- περιλάμπειν, illuminate, 407.20
- περιληπτικός, embracing, comprehending,  
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427.19; 431.19; 433.20; 435.7; 448.31;  
445.5
- περιληπτός, grasped, 240.13,19,31;  
241.7,30; 247.22,25; 251.25,27;  
253.30; 256.10; 282.25; 321.27,30;  
330.10; 342.4,7,12
- περίληψις, embrace, grasp, understanding,  
206.22; 234.5; 235.27; 246.16; 360.14
- περιουσία, superabundance, 381.20; 386.8
- περιοχή, comprehension, embrace,  
inclusion, 247.28; 354.28; 430.12;  
432.26
- Περιπατητικοί, Peripatetics, 266.29
- περιττός, superfluous, 352.28
- περιφορά, revolution, 206.8; 214.11;  
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- περιχορεύειν, dance around, 248.4; 310.25
- πηγαῖος, of the source, 317.20; 318.12,21;  
445.25
- πηγή, source, 234.20; 290.30; 309.18ff.;  
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405.15,17; 406.31; 409.14; 419.1;  
420.18; 429.25; 445.25; 446.30;  
451.17
- πίστις, convincingness, persuasion, trust,  
212.21; 339.2; 345.1; 346.3; 348.4,24;  
438.21
- πλανᾶσθαι, go astray, be a planet, 317.26;  
320.12
- πλάνη, distraction, 302.17
- πλάτος, entire expanse, level, full extent,  
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308.7  
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- Πλάτων, Plato, 209.3,12; 214.17; 218.1,6;  
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- πληθος, manifold, multiplicity, 212.28;  
225.21; 232.12; 262.21; 393.30;  
*frequent*
- πληθύνειν, pluralize, 370.15; 402.16;  
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446.3; 453.7
- πλημμελής, disharmonious, discordant,  
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394.25
- πλημμελές, τό, what is disharmonious,  
disharmonious realm, the discordant,  
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391.10; 394.28; 400.12; 401.27;  
404.23; 410.15; 417.28
- πληροῦν, fill; pass.: be replete, 207.17,19;  
222.12; 223.29; 238.13; 244.5; 273.7;  
310.9,26; 316.3; 324.27; 348.2;  
365.23; 374.29; 401.10; 403.16;  
420.14; 426.16; 429.2; 434.5;  
450.28,29
- πλήρωμα, content, region, plenitude,  
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- πλήρωσις, process of filling, fulfilment,  
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307.4,16,19; 322.21; 369.23; 419.14;  
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- ποίησις, creation, creative activity, 215.14,  
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- ποιητής, creator, maker, producer, 206.28;  
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365.27; 383.16; 394.1; 421.3; 452.10
- οἱ ποιηταί, the poets, 338.12
- ποιητικός, creative, productive, *frequent*  
ποιητική δύναμις, creative power,  
226.14 (plural); 294.10; 312.1
- ποικιλία, variety, variegated nature,  
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- ποικίλος, variegated, a variety of,  
composite, 220.27; 233.21; 247.6,11;  
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- ποικίλα, τά, diversity, 262.22
- ποινή, requital, penalty, 377.26; 378.4,20
- ποιότης, qualitative nature, 341.23; 386.22
- πόλεμος, war, 205.11; 206.4,14; 390.30
- πολιτεία, constitution, statehood, 205.5ff.;  
288.5
- πολιτεύειν, administer, 262.17
- πολιτική, political order, 317.8
- πολλαπλασιάζειν, multiply many times,  
338.8
- πολλαχῶς, in many ways, with multiple  
meanings, 217.20; 218.14; 279.30;  
280.6; 282.9; 285.25; 441.16
- πολυδύναμος, multi-powered, 399.6
- πολυειδής, of various kinds, plural,  
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- πολυμετάβολος, highly changeable,  
443.19
- πολυμυγής, mixed out of many substances,  
328.2
- πολυσύνθετος, compounded of many  
elements, 445.12
- πολυτίμητος, most precious, 404.6
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- Ποσειδών, Poseidon, 206.15
- πρᾶγμα, thing, matter, 214.15,27;  
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- πράγματα, things, entities, realities,  
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- πραγματεία, subject matter, dissertation  
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- πρᾶξις, deed, action, procedure, 215.12;  
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380.11,15
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venerable, senior, 219.10; 305.13;  
321.8; 322.4; 333.24; 356.14; 364.21
- πρεσβύτατος, the most ancient, 333.24;  
356.14; 364.21
- πρεσβύτεροι, the ancient (interpreters),  
303.27
- προαρπάζειν, presuppose, 326.30
- προβάλλειν, set before, project, lay down;  
(middle) protect, 212.20; 222.29;  
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421.17
- πρόβλημα, question, problem, 236.3ff.;  
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- προβολή, projection, 446.26
- προδιορίζειν, determine in advance,  
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- πρόδρομος, precursor, 383.20; 388.23,
- προετινοεῖν, presuppose, 358.20
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- προηγείσθαι, lead the way, precede, stand  
at the head of, 224.1; 225.7; 280.25;  
289.30; 298.27; 371.15; 375.26;  
398.29; 426.7
- προηγούμενος, primarily, 231.20
- προϊέναι, proceed, *frequent*
- προκαλεῖν, challenge, 380.12
- προκαταβάλλειν, establish in advance,  
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*frequent*  
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447.3  
προφορικός, expressive of, 246.13  
Πρωταγόρειος, Protagorean, 254.21  
πρωτογενής, primordial, 427.25  
Πρωτόγονος, Protogonos, 324.20  
πρώτον, τό, that which is first, the First,  
267.7; 304.10,12; 305.2,14,21; 306.8;  
361.3; 368.16; 415.13; 418.19  
πρωτουργός, primary, originating, 213.12;  
270.31; 387.24; 426.16  
πρώτως, primarily, primitively, *frequent*  
Πυθαγόρας, Pythagoras, 442.10  
Πυθαγόρειος, Pythagorean, 262.10; 267.2;  
276.16; 302.26; 308.24  
πυθμήν, the bottom, the depths, the  
ultimate parts, 206.6; 353.7; 386.1;  
445.11  
πῦρ, fire, 233.27; 313.29; 320.19; 367.22;  
375.23; 390.13; 403.21; 420.13,16;  
446.22; 451.20  
πυριθαλής, fire-heated, 211.12

## P

ρίζα, root, 338.1; 454.21  
ρίζοῦν, root, 210.8; 273.18  
ῥοπή, tendency, 379.10; 390.11

## Σ

ὑπὸ σελήνην, extending to the moon,  
sub-lunary, 272.20; 353.2; 357.24;  
444.28  
σεμνός, sublime, reverent, august, 303.4;  
334.24; 400.32; 401.5; 426.6;  
451.12  
Σεῦηρος, Severus, 227.15; 255.5; 289.7  
σημαίνειν, signify, indicate, 225.28; 227.16;  
229.12; 241.15; 243.14; 248.1; 259.16;  
274.16; 291.24; 299.28; 300.14ff.;  
307.26; 337.14; 365.28; 381.19;  
420.29; 423.8; 438.6; 443.30;  
450.1

## Greek word index

- σημαινόμενον, τό, meaning,  
interpretation, term, 224.20,26;  
246.15; 277.20; 443.31; 444.14
- σημαντικός, indicative, referring to,  
273.20; 274.25; 298.29; 300.25; 319.4;  
359.7; 362.13,21; 409.31; 458.6
- σημείον, (geometrical) point, 228.28;  
236.31; 349.18,21; 455.11
- σιωπᾶν, keep silent, 303.8,22
- σιωπή, silence, 303.8
- σκεδαστός, subject to dissolution, 253.8
- σκέμμα, subject examined, question,  
327.13; 436.13
- σκόπος, goal, aim, 278.24; 292.5; 317.28;  
320.11; 334.31; 438.12
- σκοτεινός, dark, 352.26; 400.9
- σκότος, darkness, 363.29; 386.2,6
- σπέρμα, seed, 300.13; 419.11
- σπερματικός, seminal, 430.5
- σπερματικῶς, seminally, 427.26; 430.8
- σπηλαῖον, grotto, 333.28; 334.6
- σπουδαῖος, virtuous, good, 208.7,9;  
356.19; 367.27; 376.4
- στάσις, rest, 206.11; 289.29; 440.24
- στερεῖν, deprive, rob, 377.4; 378.30
- Στοά, οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς, Stoics, 266.27; 351.12;  
456.15
- στοιχεῖον, element, 246.13; 274.19; 328.3;  
332.22; 383.24; 420.1,2; 425.23
- στροφή, reversion, 210.4
- Στωϊκός, Stoic, 224.29
- συγγένεια, affinity, kinship, 227.27; 246.31
- συγγενής, akin to, 340.22; 341.19; 369.30;  
418.23; 435.6,24; 436.8; 441.2,12
- συγκείσθαι, be composed of, 224.31;  
291.3; 298.6; 358.20; 410.12
- συγκεφαλαίωσις, summary, 205.5
- σύγκρισις, inclusion, 343.8
- συγχέειν, confuse, merge, mix up together,  
226.1; 254.1; 346.12; 375.8; 414.3;  
430.25; 431.8
- σύγχυσις, mixture, 430.22
- συζευγνύναι, bring together, yoke  
together, couple with, associate,  
244.13; 246.25; 279.19; 285.21;  
300.21; 304.6; 306.7; 333.3; 418.12;  
449.17; 450.20
- συζυγεῖν, couple with, associate, 244.13;  
279.19; 285.21; 300.21; 306.7; 418.12;  
450.20
- σύνζυγία, pairing, 251.13
- σύζυγος, coupled with, 242.32; 244.6;  
281.3; 295.11
- σύλληψις, task, 207.2; 216.5
- συλλογίζεσθαι, give an account, conclude,  
calculate, infer, 243.29; 278.3; 283.9;  
290.6; 317.6; 406.16; 431.6
- συλλογισμός, syllogism, reasoning,  
argument, 258.29; 259.4; 264.28;  
288.2; 400.20; 424.7; 439.3
- συλλογιστική, syllogistic, 302.10
- συμβεβηκός, accidental category,  
composite 224.21ff.; accident,  
435.13,23; 442.27,28
- κατὰ συμβεβηκός, incidental, 261.4,9;  
accidentally, 380.4,6
- σύμβολον, symbol, 205.11; 211.1; 215.27;  
273.12,23; 355.20,22; 454.28
- συμμερίζειν, divide together with,  
349.20
- συμμιγῆς, mixed (with, together), 238.21;  
239.16; 328.6; 362.32
- σύμμικτος, mixed, 363.13; 410.11
- συμπάθεια, sympathy, 210.16; 301.8;  
412.17,22
- συμπαρατείνειν, be coextensive with,  
254.14; 278.8; 281.4; 294.30
- συμπαρεκτείνειν, be coextensive with,  
278.26
- συμπάσχειν, be (affected) in sympathy,  
412.18; 455.14
- συμπέρασμα, conclusion, 258.26,28; 259.4;  
260.12; 283.6; 330.12,16; 338.4;  
360.11; 438.21
- συμπληροῦν, complete, accomplish,  
constitute, 220.30; 237.10; 251.10;  
274.20; 318.8; 373.16; 404.31; 405.6;  
408.13; 426.13; 433.9
- συμπλήρωσις, completion, constitution,  
plenitude, 308.28; 358.16,22; 405.2;  
408.28
- σύμπνοια, cooperation, 359.7; 430.29
- συμφύης, connatural, of a cognate nature,  
235.7; 238.8; 244.19; 246.11
- σύμφυτος, connatural, as part of (its)  
nature, inborn, 389.12; 393.11;  
404.4
- συνάγειν, concur with, guide, draw (reach)  
a conclusion, infer, 214.21; 221.22;  
259.2; 279.4; 280.4; 308.29; 327.15;  
329.32; 338.3; 346.32; 348.14; 353.9;  
402.19; 405.2

- συναγωγός, that which connects, collects, gathers (brings) together, 212.30; 244.4; 262.15; 263.3; 308.30; 399.26; 404.32; 449.6
- συναίτιον, accessory, subsidiary, cause, 261.15,18; 298.20,26; 369.5,8; 456.4
- συνάπτειν, connect, link, bring together, join, (pass.) have contact with, 247.24; 248.9; 260.11; 265.27; 301.19,22; 302.21; 337.13; 354.13; 391.8; 392.10; 402.30; 404.10; 414.24; 431.24; 445.10
- συνημμένον, τό, premiss, hypothetical proposition, 329.28; 330.4; 439.11; 444.10
- συναριθμῆναι, count with, number together, 244.20; 304.6; 448.30
- συναρμόζειν, bring into harmony with, adapt, 215.9; 296.12
- συναρτᾶν, bind up with, join to, 367.15; 368.2; 403.1; 437.1
- συναφή, connection, touching, 208.7; 211.18; 222.22
- σύνδεσμος, conjunction, link, 330.19; 379.7; 405.9
- συνδιαίρειν, distinguish, make a division, 340.29; 341.22; 345.12; 446.8
- συνεισφέρειν, bring with, 352.3
- συντεκταίνεσθαι, participate in the fabrication, fabricate, 398.26; 406.13; 408.30
- συνεκτείνειν, be coextensive with, extend, stretch forth, 239.4; 241.24; 279.21
- συνεκτικός, that holds (connects) together, maintains, connective, 208.29; 244.3; 249.26; 253.6; 260.30; 293.23ff.; 372.17; 385.25; 434.10; 454.22; 455.10
- συνεκτικόν, τό, cohesiveness, 372.7
- συνεκτικῶς, as sustainer, 361.9
- συνέργειν, work with, 298.25
- συνέχεια, continuity, 209.15; 239.3; 299.6; 371.8; 373.12; 378.30; 398.18; 413.3; 416.9,12; 433.14; 436.13
- συνεχής, continuous, continual, connected with, 287.6,8; 296.18; 301.26; 327.13; 370.28; 373.17; 378.25; 379.20; 397.16
- συνεχῶς, continually, smoothly, in direct connection with, immediately, 307.6; 327.30; 336.15; 341.17; 398.18; 434.2
- συνηνωμένος, unified with, united with, 231.24; 308.27; 364.7; 398.2; 408.3
- σύνθεσις, combination, composition, complexity, 219.8; 246.15; 285.13; 286.4; 291.3; 297.21; 298.1,5,7; 343.6; 409.4; 410.24; 445.29
- σύνθημα, signature, symbol, 210.13,22,28; 213.16; 215.25; 273.16,22; 274.13; 301.19; 365.25
- συνιστάναι, construct, 323.29; 324.3; 359.11; 406.12; 408.29; 416.8; 420.20ff.; 443.17
- συννεύειν, incline towards, 211.19
- συνοχή, bond, juncture, maintenance, 309.4; 364.15; 454.24
- συνοχικός, sustaining, maintaining, 428.23; 441.6
- συνοχικῶς, 'maintainingly', 308.5
- σύνταξις, arrangement, 262.22,26; 334.13; 350.22; 404.15; 405.31; 424.4; 454.2
- συντάττειν, align (up) with, rank (together) with, arrange, coordinate, subordinate, 218.7,12; 245.9; 251.9; 292.5; 298.19; 304.9; 315.9; 404.3,17; 413.1; 422.8; 448.29; 449.20,29; 454.1,2
- συντεκταίνεσθαι, participate in the fabrication, fabricate, 398.26; 406.13; 408.30
- συντέλεια, contribution, 205.9; 211.1; 219.24
- συνυφιστάναι, coexist with, come into existence with, 279.17; 285.9,12; 287.9,16,17; 288.27; 348.22; 368.10; 382.32; 395.9; 402.17; 437.15
- σύστημα, composite, 319.26
- συστοιχία, coupled series, double series, column (of Pythagorean opposites) 220.23; 316.8; 441.4; 455.24
- σύστοιχος, coupled with, ranked with, 245.7; 274.15; 286.29; 300.22; 315.2; 341.21; 351.28; 405.29; 444.4,5,9,19
- σφαῖρα, sphere, 300.15; 305.27; 394.5; 404.13,19; 454.27
- σφαιρικός, spherical, 454.28,29
- σχέσις, relation, 242.2; 255.18; 304.9,11; 305.3; 374.5; 379.5
- σχῆμα, (external) form, shape, 244.22; 245.2; 252.19; 255.16; 358.17; 401.5; 403.11

## Greek word index

σώζειν, save, preserve, keep, 209.6,7;  
223.5; 259.20,22; 294.6; 336.29;  
353.11; 376.18; 379.1ff.; 390.26;  
397.25; 432.11; 443.1; 445.6,26,27  
Σωκράτης, Socrates, 205.4,22; 214.13ff.;  
218.24; 223.6; 227.25; 230.25; 235.15;  
249.7,12; 260.22; 275.16; 287.19;  
292.2; 325.18; 335.26; 344.10; 346.13;  
348.8; 350.23; 354.5ff.; 359.23; 363.2;  
392.17; 397.10,28; 403.19; 406.30;  
421.18; 423.22; 429.12; 439.18;  
440.29; 443.4  
σῶμα, body, *frequent*  
σωματικός, corporeal, bodily, somatic,  
208.28; 253.17; 286.14; 295.5; 300.14;

358.32; 383.5,15,24; 386.22; 387.10;  
405.15; 416.25  
σωματοειδής, bodily, 217.21; 233.11;  
240.1; 253.4,8; 287.13; 292.4,17;  
293.21; 300.22  
σωματοургικός, to do with creating  
bodies, producing body, 358.15;  
383.3,14  
σωματοургός, of making the body, 311.21  
σωστικός, preservative, 391.19ff.  
σωτηρία, salvation, 208.25; 214.7  
σωφρονεῖν, be prudent, be persons of good  
sense, 209.4; 215.1; 216.11  
σωφροσύνη, good sense, 214.14,27;  
215.19; 217.10,14,15

## T

τάξις, order, orderly condition, rank,  
status, *frequent*  
ταυτοποιός, that which makes the same,  
385.24  
ταυτότης, sameness, 220.6; 247.16;  
271.11; 324.9; 342.9; 359.15; 440.24;  
443.4  
τεκταίνεσθαι, fabricate, 383.24  
τέκτων, builder, 344.5; 366.9  
τελεῖν, consecrate, 273.15; be  
subordinate/under the sway of, come  
under, 278.29; 393.27; 408.28; 426.11  
τέλειος, complete, perfect, final, 281.22;  
282.7; 288.33; 289.17; 292.15; 297.5;  
326.29; 358.26,27; 368.30; 382.15;  
389.2; 393.13; 414.10; 422.30;  
423.1ff.; 424.4; 429.18; 431.11,16;  
445.29; 448.33; 453.12  
τέλειον, τό, perfection, completion,  
completeness, 208.30; 281.21,23;  
354.17; 371.17; 422.13; 458.9  
τελειότης, perfection, completion, 207.22;  
213.3; 221.19; 294.21; 357.11;  
*frequent*  
τελειοῦν, perfect, make perfect, complete,  
(pass.) achieve completion, 245.15;  
268.21; 282.6,8; 297.3ff.; 368.29  
τελείως, in a perfect way, with perfection,  
211.5; 274.29  
τελειωτικός, able to complete, perfective,  
297.10,12; 361.16; 372.7  
τελειουργός, accomplishing, bringing to  
completion, perfective, 210.4;

213.15,29; 255.7; 331.4; 360.2;  
371.19; 428.24  
τελεστική, art of the mysteries, practice of  
initiation, 273.11; 330.31  
τελετή, rite, 208.19  
τελευταία, τό, ranked last, the last (things),  
the lowest levels, 372.30; 373.6,19;  
427.19  
τελικός, final, pertaining to the end,  
213.10; 263.20,21; 266.30; 274.28;  
281.29; 285.24,30; 337.21; 338.27;  
356.2ff.; 360.12,16; 368.15ff.; 401.19;  
416.19  
τέλος, accomplishment, completion, end,  
end-point, goal, 221.12,19; 283.8;  
356.21; 368.29; 415.25  
τετράς, tetrad, 316.17,22,26; 432.19,21,22  
τέχνη, art, craft, skill, 263.6; 266.11,18;  
268.18; 320.18; 327.22; 343.22ff.;  
344.8,16; 392.16; 395.19; 399.21;  
401.6; 409.4; 436.20  
τεχνητός, artistic, 266.18; 343.22; 344.16  
τεχνίτης, producer, craftsman, artificer,  
artisan, 332.16; 344.9; 361.30; 383.17;  
393.13; 395.13; 399.22  
τῇδε, down here, here below, 278.7;  
282.22; 385.6; 401.15; 412.18; 426.29  
Τίμαιος, Timaeus, *frequent*  
τιμωρία, retribution, 380.8,20  
Τιτάνες, Titans, 390.30,  
τόπος, place, realm, region, 228.7; 251.24;  
334.5; 346.24; 357.25; 385.30;  
453.14

## Greek word index

τρανέστερος, clearer, more transparent,  
211.23; 249.6; 251.30; 428.13  
τρεπτῶς, mutably, 308.5  
τριαδικός, triadic, 411.23  
τριαδικῶς, in the manner of a triad,  
322.8  
τριάς, triad, 210.5; 212.22; 230.28; 269.26;  
306.20ff.; 308.21; 310.2; 322.8;  
361.27; 371.15; 389.27; 397.5; 419.17;  
420.12; 451.3

τρίγωνον, triangle, 454.13  
τρίτος ἀπό, at a third remove (from), third  
after, 218.18; 344.2; 437.22  
τύπος, characteristic manner, mark,  
(waxwork) image, 223.5; 244.22;  
335.25; 340.12; 343.9;  
394.6  
τυχαῖος, the result of chance,  
297.21  
τυχαῖον, τό, chance, 392.1,16

## Υ

ὕδωρ, water, 446.22  
ὕλαῖος, material, of matter, physical, 222.3;  
454.24; 455.2  
ὕλη, matter, material, 206.1; 209.19;  
218.9; 356.7; 357.15; *frequent*  
ὕλικός, material, 205.16; 213.16;  
263.21,23; 285.24; 297.31; 326.12;  
456.11  
ὕπαρξις, being, existence, 217.27;  
234.24ff.; 238.11; 295.11; 361.6;  
362.11; 365.8; 371.21; 386.18; 420.19;  
427.11  
καθ' ὕπαρξιν, existentially, 232.1  
ὑπεραιώνιος, beyond eternity,  
supereternal, above eternity, 234.18;  
362.11,13; 398.8  
ὑπερβολή, transcendence, excessive force,  
redundancy, 231.29; 248.25;  
362.27,29  
ὑπερέχειν, be above, 364.5; 365.1  
ὑπεριδρύειν, establish above, 245.14;  
311.9  
ὑπερκαθῆσθαι, be set over, 406.15  
ὑπερκόσμιος, hypercosmic, 226.12; 234.29;  
256.14; 307.1; 311.10; 312.24ff.;  
360.24; 418.13; 419.21; 427.18;  
443.14; 445.10  
ὑπερουράνιος, hypercosmic, supercelestial,  
supra-celestial, 310.13; 360.27;  
386.15; 431.22; 451.2  
ὑπερούσιος, superessential, 371.11  
ὑπερουσιῶν, super-substantiate,  
364.20  
ὑπεροχή, pre-eminence, transcendence,  
269.26; 308.28; 319.4; 331.29  
ὑπερπλήρες, τό, superabundance,  
surplentitude, 362.10; 365.21;  
371.18

ὑπέρτερος, higher, superior  
(being etc.), 331.24; 387.20; 388.4;  
400.26  
ὑπερφυής, extraordinary, transcendent,  
209.8; 410.5  
ὑποδοχή, receptacle, receptivity,  
recipient, 212.22; 402.24; 408.1;  
419.7  
ὑπόθεσις, subject, subject matter, basic  
principle, hypothesis, 214.17,20;  
219.26; 226.26; *frequent*  
ὑποθετικός συλλογισμός, hypothetical  
syllogism, 259.3  
ὑποκειμένον, τό, substrate, the underlying  
(material etc), 238.23; 292.2; 329.24;  
366.28; 367.7; 387.12  
ὑποκεῖσθαι, to be hypothesized, to be laid  
down, 275.15; 326.14; 356.30;  
424.8  
ὑπόληψις, assumption, conception,  
223.28; 328.11  
ὑπόστασις, existence, subsistence,  
substantial entity, 219.9; 224.17;  
*frequent*  
ὑποστάτης, creator, founder, 267.3;  
332.16; 361.26; 369.25; 397.22; 399.9;  
446.19  
ὑποστατικός, foundational,  
making/causing to exist, productive of  
being, 260.21; 299.8,18; 356.7; 396.9;  
431.9; 435.23; 441.13  
ὑποστρωννύναι, lie outstretched,  
303.7  
ὑφείμενος, subordinate, lower, 216.18;  
322.3; 341.8; 360.26; 404.3; 431.21;  
432.25; 449.1  
ὑφesis, inferiority, gradual decrease, 365.2;  
445.23

Φ

Φάνης, Phanes, 306.13; 313.7; 314.23;  
315.3; 336.6,15,23; 427.21; 428.9,19;  
430.15; 434.2; 450.10,22; 451.3  
φαντασία, imagination, 244.21; 247.10;  
255.12,18; 269.8; 343.7,9; 352.18,31;  
378.3; 380.23; 395.22,30; 396.4  
φανταστικός, imaginative, 244.20; 245.1;  
320.10  
φανταστόν, τό, object of imagination,  
245.3; 255.12  
Φειδίας, Phidias, 265.18  
φθαρτικός, destructive, 391.19,21,30; 454.7  
φθαρτός, destructible, 256; 21; 293.18;  
294.7; 296.1; 328.4; 379.10;  
440.12,14; 450.2  
φθόνος, envy, 362.28,31; 363.2,28;  
364.2,24ff.  
φθορά, destruction, perishing, 294.6;  
375.15; 376.29; 436.31; 446.23  
φιλοθεάμων, devoted to contemplation,  
357.12  
φιλοσοφείν, philosophize, 228.1; 306.1  
φιλοσοφία, philosophy, 245.15; 404.8  
φιλόσοφος, philosophical, 214.3; 351.11;  
413.11  
Φιλοφροσύνη, Philophrosunê, 333.5  
φοιτᾶν, pass through, penetrate, pervade,  
226.8; 307.8; 369.2  
φρόνησις, wisdom, 369.24; 370.2,6  
φρόνιμος, wise, 368.13; 369.18; 370.5  
φρουρά, prison, 208.10; 333.28  
φρουρεῖν, protect, 376.17,24  
φρουρός, guardian, 397.22  
φυλάττειν, preserve, keep (within), retain,  
212.19; 237.8; 345.9; 389.9; 390.17;  
430.4,20; 452.14  
φυσικός, natural, of nature, physical, 227.3;  
237.1,21; 269.4; 290.2; 295.27;  
298.21; 301.7,10; 337.25; 347.17;  
348.19,21,22; 349.21ff.; 410.6,12;  
434.23  
οἱ φυσικοί, the philosophers of nature,  
205.17; 436.11

φυσικῶς, physically, 349.20; 380.2  
φυσιολογία, natural philosophy, the science  
of nature, 217.25; 219.23; 228.30;  
236.17,20; 237.3,9; 289.15; 348.13;  
350.18; 355.19  
φυσιολόγος, natural philosopher,  
philosopher of nature, 237.4;  
347.12,16  
φύσις, nature, *frequent*  
αἰώνιος, eternal nature, 240.6; 299.4  
ἄλογος, irrational nature, 389.8  
γενητή, generated nature, 280.5ff.;  
299.4; 328.3  
ἐνοσιδής, μία, single nature, unified  
nature, 303.16; 404.32; 454.23  
θνητή, θνητοειδής, mortal nature,  
301.17; 436.32  
μερική, nature at the particular level,  
particular nature, 379.12,24;  
435.22  
νοερά, intellective nature, 407.13  
νοητή, intelligible nature, intelligible  
realm, 232.6; 233.1; 247.10  
παρά φύσιν, contrary to nature,  
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ἐκ τἀγαθοῦ, light (that proceeds) from  
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τῆς ἐπιστήμης, illumination/light of  
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τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν, light in us, 211.31  
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χάσμα, gulf, 385.29

χείρωνα, τά, inferior things, what is  
inferior, something second-rate,  
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ψιλοῦν, to give a smooth breathing,  
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ὠδῖς, travail, 380.12,19  
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The primary vehicles for finding material within the translation are the word index and the glossary. The main function of this index is to help readers locate names, words and phrases, passages, and topics discussed in the introductory material and the notes; in the translation we have indexed only (1) parenthetical references to works other than the *Timaeus* and the commentary itself, (2) parenthetical indications of the inclusion of a passage in a collection of fragments.

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