Günther Zuntz
Griechischer Lehrgang

I. Lektionen
II. Exercitii, Vokabular
III. Appendix Grammatica, Summa Grammatica

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Der Lehrgang basiert auf griechischen Texten von Homer bis Mark Aurel. Die Lektionen enthalten reiches Material zur Ableitung oder Illustration der grammatischen Phänomene; Exercitii und Vokabular dienen der Befestigung des jeweils Erarbeiteten; die Appendix Grammatica erläutert den grammatischen Inhalt jeder Lektion; eine Summa Grammatica systematisiert ihr. Der Lehrgang, in Kursen an der Universität Tübingen erprobt, ist nicht auf einen bestimmten Lehrplan, ein Curriculum oder eine spezielle Methode festgelegt. Er kann an Scholen und Universitäten ebenso wie zum Selbstunterricht verwendet werden.

"Der Lehrgang bietet alle Voraussetzungen zum sicheren Erwerb des Griechischen, es bildet eine konsequent aufgebauten, in sich abgeschlosseinen Einheit mit interessanten Texten."
- Mitteilungsblatt des Deutschen Alphab logosverbandes

"Der Grundgedanke des Werkes ist einfach und durchschlagend gleich. Nicht ein neuer Programmhumanismus, nicht pädagogische Fesseln oder programmierte Unterricht, vielmehr die Überzeugung, Worauf es ankommt, ist gutes Griechisch. Die sprachliche Tradition hat die Lebendigkeit und die Kraft, für sich selbst einzustellen..."
- Neue Zürcher Zeitung
Human vocabulary and naturalist vocabulary in the Presocratics

By Francisco R. Ardavos, Madrid

I. General Remarks

The creation of a philosophic system or an ensemble of philosophic systems in a certain country and age implies the creation in turn of a particular philosophical language. In later cultures, from Rene on, that philosophic language is indebted to an earlier tradition, to be precise, to Greek philosophic language. In our own languages not only philosophic language, but intellectual language overall constitute in fact a sort of quasi Greek. They include a large number of terms originated in Greek which have been either adapted to or translated into the new language.

The question posed by the philosophic Greek language is, therefore, somewhat different. It does not borrow anything and comes to be instead as an evolution from common Greek speech. Philosophers spoke first the common language of Ionia enhanced by the literary tradition of Homer, Hesiod, and certain lyric poets, all of which were their predecessors too in regard to doctrine and ideas. However, the Ionic vocabulary was inadequate at times to express concepts newly worked out. In these cases, two options were available: one solution was to bestow a new meaning (or new meanings depending on the philosophers and the time) upon the old word; the other was to create new words.

Of course, this issue did not remain unnoticed to scholars interested in the semantic evolution of previously existing terms, like 

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1) E. Leow, "Die Ausdrücke 


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Of course, this issue did not remain unnoticed to scholars interested in the semantic evolution of previously existent terms, like μάρτυς, μάρτυς, or μάρτυς, and in the study of new terms, like πεποιθή and πεποιθή when used by the Presocratics. It has been said, for instance, that when Heraclitus elaborated the problem of movement, he lacked precise philosophical expressions. That is the question of the Presocratic vocabulary has seldom been approached from a linguistic perspective. And yet it must be situated within the more general issue of the philosophic and scientific vocabulary to which I have dedicated...


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dents to undertake works on this topic.⁵ The truth is that the isolation of linguists and historians of the Philosophy from one another turns out to be very damaging for the production and appreciation of this kind of works.

Let us address ourselves to the Presocratics now. It is obvious that we find in their texts the Greek philosophic vocabulary in an embryonic stage. For this reason it is not strange if we find traces of the general use as opposed to the philosophical one, as well as hesitations, contradictions, synonymy, quasi synonymy and so forth. It is therefore necessary a systematic study from a linguistic point of view keeping in mind each term’s place within the system (opposition) and in the context (distribution). This is what I sought to do in respect of Heraclitus ages ago.⁶ And it is evident that very valuable interpretations and materials suitable for the kind of general study which I propose may be found in the most important comprehensive work about the Presocratics as well as in many works related to more specific questions. But a systematic and structural approach to the issue is still lacking.⁷ Here I simply intend to make some general statements and outline a convenient design for future research in this direction. And also to introduce a general theme, namely, the universal philosophic value attained among the Presocratics by two distinct sets of vocabulary, one related originally to the human world, the other, related to the natural world. In this way we clearly place ourselves in the sphere of common languages with philosophical specialization.

Let us summarize again the main features of the problem we are facing now. Philosophical vocabulary is created:

a) through the specialization of words belonging to poetic speech, ionic dialect, or common speech.

b) through the creation of new terms by means of derivation and word composition in accordance to the normal procedures of the Greek language.

c) by building up systematic lexical frameworks to organize the world: negative adjectives (with prothetic δ as δινός, δάκος) or nouns denoting identity (formed with α as) opposed to abstract nouns denoting actions; numerous and diverse opposing pairs among which the best known are the ones coined by Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans (but there are others more general like ἔλεγχος/γνῶσις, ὁδός/ἀφθονος; adjectives and nouns running parallel to verbs (I am referring to sets like ἀφθονος/γνῶσις, ἀκοή/ακοή, etc.; ἀγων/ἀγων, ἀθάνατος/μιαστός, etc.). A variable material is also common words are used in their common sense, while others are endowed with more evolved meanings, or new ones are created having from the outset philosophical meaning.

These are partly old systems given a new purpose, partly new ones. The procedures of word derivation are the normal ones at first, but some formations increase their frequency. That is the case with abstract nouns in -αι and -ος, adjectives with δ, or neoter adjectives substantivized like δακός.

It is also noteworthy that the meaning of some words may change from one philosopher to another and that the systems of opposition change accordingly. Anaxagoras’ opposition between ἀγων and ἀθάνατος is just at the same as Xenophanes’ ἀγων and ἀθάνατος (something which philosopher approaches ἀφθονος to ἀγων (B 25). But Parmenides rejects ἀφθονος so important for Heraclitus and identifies αἰών with ἀθάνατος. Empedocles, however, places on the same level ἀφθονος and ἀθάνατος (B 110.10). Of course, if we turn to socratic and platonist ἀφθονος, we will see that it is now integrated in the system of the moral concepts. This is just in example among many other possible.

We insist, nevertheless, that we are facing a sonimal vocabulary anchored in myth and religion and quite different from the philosophical vocabulary of later times. We must, therefore, dwell briefly on these singularities of the Presocratic vocabulary.

II. Some features of the Presocratic vocabulary

1. Relations with the vocabulary of Cosmogonies and Theogonies, orphic ones in particular

It is well known the relationship between the principles of Pre-socratic philosophy and the cosmogonic traditions included in Homer, Hesiod, and the orphics. In some cases the roots of these traditions go back to poems and cosmogonic speculations of the Near East.
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(b) adjectival denoting identity (formed with αυτο-) opposed to abstract nouns denoting action; numerous and diverse opposing pairs among which the best known are the ones coined by Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans (but there are others more general like ολος / ονειρος, γενος / ανευρος; adjectives and nouns running parallel to verbs (I am referring to sets like ανθρωπος, ανθρωπος, ιδιος, etc.; οιος, οικος, οινος, υδρας, etc.). A variable material is used; common words are used in their common sense, while others are endowed with more evolved meanings, or new ones are created away from the outset philosophical meaning. These are partly old systems given a new purpose, partly new ones. The procedures of word derivation are the normal ones at first, but some formations increase their frequency. That is the case with abstract nouns in -ανω and -ων, adjectives with ὁ, or neuter adjectives substantivized like τὸ ἀναστήσης.

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Suffice here to mention the books by W. Jager and Seligman\(^1\) to do not know of any in depth study about this topic, but I will make here some observations.

It is evident the presence of the elements ἄξον, ἱδία, ἀλης, μία in the Cosmogonies. Scholars have often noted their active and divine connotations as they unfold and reveal themselves in the creation of beings. But there is more to say. The terms πέπλος, ἄτομος, ἀπόκρυτος among others meaning limitation (in origin spatial limitation) or absence of limits are foreshadowed in the Homeric expression κατά πόλη [πάτρα] (II. 14.226, and 301) and in other passages by Homer and Hesiod in which ἄξον is an attribute of ἀνέξοι. No doubt this is the source for Empedocles ἄτομον γῆς βοῦς (B 39) and the attribution of this characteristic to the sphere (B 28). Αἰάνης and ἁύτη are also said by several authors of the cosmos, the beings, the atoms, and the other, all of them primordial entities. The substantial use by Anaximander and the Pythagoreans (πέπλος καὶ ἀπόκρυτος Ρυθμικ, B 3) represents a further step in the progressive abstraction of these terms.

Πέπλος comes too from the same Homeric passage (II. 14.226). ἄξον [τὸ ἄξον] γένεσις: cf. II. 14.246. From this sense comes Parmenides' use of the term rather than from more common meanings like 'race'. It appears likewise in cosmogonic passages by Aristophanes (Aces 691), Plato, and other authors related to the birth of the gods (see Hdt. 2.146 and DGE s. v.). The verb γίνεσθαι appears too in these and other similar passages, from which it has developed the meaning 'become'.

The latter were just two examples, but we could bring in some other ones like ἀρνετής (Hex. Thg. 811); cf. Critias, Ph. Thg. 4.1), ἄτομον (Pherecyd. Syr. 35), or even ἄξον.

2. Relationship with the poetic vocabulary in general

In addition to the cosmogonies part of the philosophic vocabulary managed by the Presocratics proceeds from Homeric poetry in its wider sense (Homer, Hesiod, Hymns). Sometimes, in our documentation, there are not any intermediary steps, sometimes there are this is not surprising, as Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Empedocles write in hexameters and, in general, poetic speculation precedes the philosophical one.

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This is what happens with certain negative terms, like ὑπόστας found in H. Memp. 80 and then in Parm. B 8. 16; or ὧς ὑπόστας found first in Odd. 8. 552 and later in Parm. B 8. 17. Obviously we can see the model for terms like τὸν ὑπόστας ὄρος, found in Anaximand. B 3, and Parm. B 8. 3. Later on, we have ὧς ὑπόστας, found first in the Homeric poems and hymns and then in Gorgias and Melissus. Likewise, the terms meaning Love and Hatred, namely, Φιλός and Νέιος, the two opposing forces that create and destroy the worlds in Empedocles, come from Homer. From the Homeric sense of ὧς ὑπόστας, that is, joint, gathering (Odd. 7. 492 regarding the Trojan horse), comes the meaning world' for this word in Pythagoras and Heraclitus according to Jula Korschenstein.2) Similar interpretations have been advanced for other terms.

The lyric poets play a leading role in this process too. Asíos meaning 'sacred', 'time' with no limits derives no doubt from the posthomerhic use of the word (meaning III in DGE), where it is said in reference to gods and divine personifications; our earliest notices go back to Simm. 79; 4, 1. 554 and then appear in Emp. B 16. 2, and Heracl. 130, etc.3)
As I mentioned before, we find in the Presocratics entities which are hypostasis of divine or semidivine entities. They are at once hallowed and not; they underlie reality and yet permeate reality; they are not mere abstractions. When talking about lyric poetry E. Frinket called them "Weisenheiten", namely, essences, hypostasis, like Hesiod, Thetis, etc. They were the forerunners of ideas and concepts.

It is difficult to express in our vocabulary active principles like fire, which sometimes is identified with the One, and sometimes is more or less a synonym of Sun and Lightning. Equally problematic are structural, not substantial elements like Logos or Love.

4. The unity of Nature, Man and God

Greek philosophy, by virtue of its rationalist slant, drove forward the differentiation between Nature, Man, and God. This process can already be detected in the Presocratics. However, we find in them the same essential units we found before in Hesiod. I mentioned above the divine nature of principles, the combination of hypostatic proceeding from human life (Memory, Youth, Love) with strictly natural elements like Water or Fire.

All this is inevitably reflected in the vocabulary, which turns out to be neutral in regard to these oppositions. For instance, Heraclitus (B 67) said that god is night and day, summer and winter, hunger and satisy. Now, the student of the origins of Greek philosophical vocabulary finds that terms regarding human life have come down to the realm of Nature and vice versa. Anthropos, Justice, has become for Anaximander (B 94) a term meaning natural law. Likewise, in other philosophers their terms logos, nous, vnoos, etc. permeate everything and suppress the two worlds we are dealing with; there is even a tendency for them to acquire the meaning of God. The same happened in Hesiod with eros and some other concepts. The opposite happens with oinos, which is bound in origin to the use of oinos to designate the birth of plants and animals, as well as with the elements belonging to the natural order.

There may be doubtful cases. There are conflicting theories about the origin of noos. It is not clear if its meaning derives from a


Synchrony and diachrony

The philosophical vocabulary of the Presocratics is archaic. The principles, logos, existed in the primal time, which explains their generic name. But they continue to be a hidden, basic reality. To be sure, they ancede not only sensory realities, but also wjous,กล่อง, vnoos, etc. And yet they are inside of these posterior entities, which in turn are themselves implicit in them. According to Heraclitus (B 123), Nature likes to hide itself away, but it always underlies apparent reality, not just at the beginning. Thus, Aristotle, in accordance with the principle of entelechy, investigates the evolution of tragedy till the point of reaching its own nature (Poet. 1449 a 15).

It is, therefore, useless to delineate temporal limits. Heraclitus' ajous is both a structural law and a rule of evolution. The same happens with chance and necessity in Democritus, and Anaxagoras' vnoos. Empedocles' Love and Hatred are active from the beginning of Time and will remain active. The descriptions of birth, becoming, and death, or the descriptions of different creations and destructions of the world have a general value. This is the case too for the natural law referred to by terms like vnoos, dsovos, oinos.

It is true that things which existed in the beginning, like Pherecydes' Chaos and Chthonia, do not exist any more, but, as I am showing, there are others which are panarchic.

4. Adherences and traditions

However elaborate this set of vocabulary may be, it is only natural that traditional lexical remnants have been carried over with it owing to its strong traditional origins. This is what happens, for instance, with the so laboriously arrived to concept of natural law. I have outlined above some lexical origins of this concept; I will look now at its relationship with the idea of necessity, fate.
As I mentioned before, we find in the Presocratics entities which are hypostasis of divine or semidivine entities. They are at once isolated and not; they underlie reality and yet permeate reality; they are not mere abstractions. When talking about lyric poetry E. Fraenkel called them "Weisenheiten", namely, essences, hypostases, like Hesiod, Thesiger, etc. They were the forerunners of ideas and concepts.

It is difficult to express in our vocabulary active principles like daimon, which sometimes is identified with the One, and sometimes is more or less a synonym of Sun and Lightning. Equally problematic are structural, not substantial elements like logos or Love.29

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'Andros' comes from Homer and the lyric poets, but it means natural law already in Hdt. 2.22, in Lecipp. B 2 and in some other Presocratic fragments. 'Andros' is also the physical and logical necessity which makes the world to be what it is in Parm. B 6.30, 10.5, Emp.115.1, etc. The same with 'nym', derived from άνήρ which appears in poetry and in Parmenides and Democritus as well. In those cases the words still preserve signs of their old religious meaning.

Somewhat different is the case of νόμος. Here, side by side with the ρήμα νόμος or divine law (Heraclit. B 114, etc.), the meaning of law of the city for νόμος is present in the same text. And the traditional use of the words is as frequent as the philosophical use. Sometimes it is not easy to distinguish one from the other.

7. Gaps in the system. The problem of fragments A and B

The Presocratic lexical systems are never complete. At times they take shape gradually from author to author. To try to present a total system including all of them is, to some extent, a fallacy. Only Plato and Aristotle display often times systems completely worked out. This can be seen very clearly in Petes’ book mentioned above. But we must not forget that our knowledge of the Presocratics is very fragmentary and we can not, therefore, establish exhaustively their lexical systems. The problem grows bigger if we keep in mind that not always it is possible to assign beyond doubt to the Presocratic (fragments B) the vocabulary transmitted by later witnesses and commentators (fragments A). There is a tendency to contemplate this vocabulary as belonging to these later witnesses and commentators and as being independent from the Presocratic texts under consideration.

For instance, if we look at διακότης both in LSJ and DGE, we see that the philosophical use (DGE 31 acción de distinguir, distinción, diferenciación) starts with Plato and Aristotle. The same for διακότης. But if we go to Deleuze-Krause’s lexicon, the situation changes. Both words appear in the Presocratics (Lecippus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Archytas, etc.), but in the A fragments. The problem is to know if the authors which transmit these terms are using their own vocabulary or are quoting the Presocratics.

Many times this issue has not even been raised. Attention is directed to the contents while the words themselves are neglected, even though these words and the systems built with them are important. And when the problem has been addressed the solutions advanced have been contradictory. Thus, in her long study about νόμος J. Kerschensteiner maintains that the use of the word νόμος meaning 'world' does not appear until Pythagoras and Heraclitus. Its presence in the A fragments of Thales, Anaximander and others should be attributed to the authors who are making the quotes. But Diller, 14 and based on Kranz and Fleischer’s authority, says that the term was no doubt used by Anaximander.

The situation is at times inconclusive. We saw that νόμος meaning 'eternity' is found in Heraclitus and Empedocles (fragments B); and in Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Democritus but only in the A fragments. Should we attribute the term to these thinkers? And, what to think of the use of ρήμα as a synonym in other A fragments? Its presence in cosmogenie speculations as being one of the primordial elements of the world points to an affirmative answer (cf. Pheroeyd. Syr. B 1).

In general I am inclined to think that this terminology must be attributed to the Presocratics or at least to some of them. Of course, every case should be studied on its own.

III. Some conclusions about the vocabulary of the Presocratics

It is evident that the working methodology must be inductive: to gather up the vocabulary of each Presocratic philosopher, to decide to what extent authoritaties attributions are safe ones, to study the terms' meaning or meanings, to establish their position as part of a system (oppositions) and within the text (classification of their distributions).

It is useless to establish general parameters. This is what I tried to do for Heraclitus about whom our documentation is relatively important. The procedure followed there is similar to the one I applied to the study of the semantic field of love in Sappho. 15) On my opinion, the whole system is organized on one side around νόμος and its synonyms and quasi synonyms, on the other, around λόγος and its semantically close terms. In a concluding table I give the parameters according to which the terms are organized:

'Άνδρος comes from Homer and the lyric poets, but it means natural law already in Hdt. 2.22, in Lecipp. B.2 and in some other Presocratic fragments. 'Άνδρος is also the physical and logical notion which makes the world to be what it is in Parm. B 8.30; 10.6, Emp. 115.1, etc. The same with ἄνδρος derived from άνδρος which appears in poetry and in Parmenides and Democritus as well. In these cases the words still preserve signs of their old religious meaning.

Somewhat different is the case of νόμος. Here, side by side with the Ἀνδρος νόμος or divine law (Herodot. B.114, etc.), the meaning of law of the city for νόμος is present in the same text. And the usual traditional use of the words is as frequent as the philosophical use. Sometimes it is not easy to distinguish one from the other.

7. Cays in the system. The problem of fragments A and B

The Presocratic lexical systems are never complete. At times they take shape gradually from author to author. To try to present a total system including all of them is, to some extent, a fallacy. Only Plato and Aristotle display often times systems completely worked out. This can be seen very clearly in Peter's book mentioned above. But we must not forget that our knowledge of the Presocratics is very fragmentary and we can not, therefore, establish exhaustively their lexical systems.

The problem grows bigger if we keep in mind that not always it is possible to assign beyond doubt to the Presocratics (fragments B) the vocabulary transmitted by later witnesses and commentators (fragments A). There is a tendency to contemplate this vocabulary as belonging to these later witnesses and commentators and as being independent from the Presocratic texts under consideration.

For instance, if we look at άνδρος both in LSJ and DGE, we see that the philosophical use (DGE III 1 acción de distinguir, distinción, diferenciación) starts with Plato and Aristotle. The same for νόμος. But if we go to Diers-Scame's lexicon, the situation changes. Both words appear in the Presocratics (Lecippus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Archytas, etc.), but in the A fragments. The problem is to know if the authors which transmit these terms are using their own vocabulary or are quoting the Presocratics.

Many times this issue has not even been raised. Attention is directed to the contents while the words themselves are neglected, even though these words and the systems built with them are important. And when the problem has been addressed the solutions advanced have been contradictory. Thus, in her long study about νόμος J. Kerschensteiner maintains that the use of the word νόμος meaning 'world' does not appear until Pythagoras and Heraclitus. Its presence in the A fragments of Thales, Anaximander and others should be attributed to the authors that are making the quotes. But Diller,10 based on Kranz and Schleier's authority, says that the term was no doubt used by Anaximander.

The situation is at times inconclusive. We saw that ἄνδρος meaning 'constancy' is found in Heraclitus and Empedocles (fragments B); and in Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Democritus but only in the A fragments. Should we attribute the term to these thinkers? And, what to think of the use of νόμος as a synonym in other A fragments? Its presence in cosmogonic speculations as being one of the primum elements of the world points to an affirmative answer (cf. Pherecyd. Syr. B.1).

In general I am inclined to think that this terminology must be attributed to the Presocratics or at least to some of them. Of course, every case should be studied on its own.

III. Some conclusions about the vocabulary of the Presocratics

It is evident that the working methodology must be inductive: gather up the vocabulary of each Presocratic philosopher, to decide to what extent authorial attributions are safe ones, to study the terms' meaning or meanings, to establish their position as part of a system (oppositions) and within the text (classification of their distributions).

It is useless to establish general parameters. This is what I tried to do for Heraclitus about whom our documentation is relatively important. The procedure followed there is similar to the one I applied to the study of the semantic field of love in Sappho.11 On my opinion, the whole system is organized on one side around νόμος and its synonyms and quasi synonyms, on the other, around λόγος and its semantically close terms. In a concluding table I give the parameters according to which the terms are organized:

whether they are related to being, to becoming, whether they denote agents, whether they are divinized, whether wisdom, secrecy, comnuons, unity are attributed to them or not. All this is not based on a priori criteria, but on grammatical distributions and oppositions. Here I can not go that far. I will make just a few remarks about the terms and the system in which they are integrated.

1. Terms whose meaning has been modified

I indicated above the different origins for some specific terms in cosmogenies, epic, and the earlier religious vocabulary. Of course words should be studied one by one with the available bibliography about their evolution and their new meaning or meanings in philosophy.

It is impossible to give here a complete bibliographical list which must include general works like the ones by Guthrie and Zeller-Mondello as well as particular studies, some of which I have already mentioned. I will limit myself to give a few brief references about the complex nous, noēs, and noēz, noēt, noēm, noēm, noēm. 16

I also give a brief list of words, some of which have been studied above.

For example, as I have said, the nouns of most of the elements come from an earlier tradition: dēmos, dēmos, dēmos, dēma, dēma, having a sense which goes beyond naturalism not only in the Presocratics but also in the cosmogonic tradition. Their origin is, nevertheless, rooted in natural elements. From the physical world proceeds, as it appears, the new use of noēz. Noēz was applied to physical, spatial entities before its meaning being extended. It is spatial and also denotes hostility the use of noētēs by Pherecydes Syr. 3 and by almost all the Presocratics. These spatial meanings are made more abstract by them. Then we have the temporal terms. Also from an earlier tradition come dox, dox, which have acquired new and more specialized meanings, 17 and dox. The concept itself of dox implies an important evolution. From Homer on we know the strictly temporal meaning beginning, and from it has to be derived the meaning principle in Anaximander B 1 (the spatial and hierarchical meanings come from an independent evolution in the 7th century.


17 See A. Bemal, quoted in note 10.

It must be added too yovan, which as I said before, has enlarged its sense. On the contrary quos has evolved from the meaning birth, origin to the meaning nature. Likewise, yovan has evolved from the sense to be born to the meaning becoming in opposition to being. There are always more abstract senses which go beyond the more temporal meanings.

There is one more semantic domain in the earlier literary tradition that has been refined for the benefit of rational conceptualization. I am referring to the semantic field of necessity. A religious conception has turned into the idea of natural law. In the same way from the commonplace uses of dēma, dēma in Homer to signify that which exists and is true derives the 'Being' in Xenophon, Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus.

Within the realm of Man Yplostos and Nélos acquire a cosmic value and the same happens to dēma, noēs, noēs, dēma, and even noēs. All this represents a great progress towards the unification of the human and the natural, which is in turn connected to the divine.

Not so original is the fact that the intellectual and sensory operations expressed in various ways by αἰθινός, νόης, φρονή, δοξ, and their corresponding nouns αἰθιά, νόης, φρονή, δοξ: these are related to interior knowledge as much as to exterior knowledge. The same happens with the adjectives applied to men having that knowledge. But there are new senses and new series of oppositions are created now bringing out an advance in the Greek language.

We make some remarks about them, but a more thorough study is needed. For example, αἰθιά referred to sensory perception appears only starting with Alcmeon (B 1a), Democritus (B 11) and it is opposed to φιλοσ, φιλοσ, etc. Other times a new word is given a philosophical meaning. That is the case with δοξο and δοξο, if it is true that only in the Presocratics is found for the first time the new sense.

I have also indicated the presence in the Presocratic texts of a series of adjectives with the prefixes δοξ and νόη preceding from the old poetry. These adjectives produced, by analogy, growing series of new adjectives connected with verbs, nouns and adverbs.

2. New terms

New terms are normally derivations from existing ones but incorporating a philosophical meaning. They are nouns derived from adjectives, and verbs or adjectives derived from other words. A good
whether they are related to being, to becoming, whether they designate agents, whether they are divinized, whether wisdom, secrecy, commonness, unity are attributed to them or not. All this is not based on a priori criteria, but on grammatical distributions and oppositions. Here I can not go that far. I will make just a few remarks about the terms and the system in which they are integrated.

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For example, as I have said, the nouns of most of the elements come from an earlier tradition: ἄθεος, ἄθῆς, ἄθέος, ἄθέοντας, having a sense which goes beyond naturalism not only in the Presocratics but also in the cosmogenic tradition. Their origin is, nevertheless, rooted in natural elements. From the physical world proceeds, as it appears, the new use of νοείν; ἀφθάνοντας was applied to physis, spatial entities before its meaning being extended. It is spatial and also denotes capacity the use of ἀφθάνοντας by Pherecydes, 3 and by almost all the Presocratics. These spatial meanings are made more abstract by them. Then we have the temporal terms. Also from an earlier tradition come ἀφθάνον, ἀφθάνοντας, which have acquired new and more specialized meanings,17 and ἄθεος. The concept itself of ἀφθάνον implies an important evolution. From Homer we know the strictly temporal meaning "beginning," and from it has to be derived the meaning "principle" in Anaximander B 1 (the spatial and hierarchical meanings come from an independent evolution in the 7th century).

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It must be added too ὁ πάντα, which as I said before, has enlarged its sense. On the contrary ὁ πάντα has evolved from the meaning 'birth', origin to the meaning 'natures'. Likewise, ὁ ἰδίως has evolved from the sense 'to be born' to the meaning 'becoming in opposition to being'. There are always more abstract senses which go beyond the more temporal meanings.

There is one more semantic domain in the earlier literary tradition that has been refined for the benefit of rational conceptualization. I am referring to the semantic field of necessity. A religious conception has turned into the idea of natural law. In the same way from the commonplace uses of ἀπό, ἀποθανόν in Homer to signify 'that which exists and is true' derives the 'Being' in Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus. Within the realm of Man ἀνθρώπος and ἄνθηος acquire a cosmic value and the same happens to ἔθνος, νόμος, νοικία, λόγος, and even μνημή. All this represents a great progress towards the unification of the human and the natural, which is in turn connected to the divine.

Not so original is the fact that the intellectual and sensory operations expressed in various ways by ἀνθρώπως, νόμος, νοικία, διάκονος and their corresponding nouns ἀνθρώπης, νόμης, νοικία, φωνής, ἄλλοι are related to interior knowledge as much as to exterior knowledge. The same happens with the adjectives applied to men having that knowledge. But there are new terms and new series of oppositions are created new bringing out an advance in the Greek language.

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example is τὸ ἄπαξ, Anaximander’s principle. As I was saying, the adjective ἄπαξ is used in a spatial sense or meaning ‘countless’ from Homer on. But it is only found in the philosophical language of Empedocles, who uses a great number of poetic words. Philosophers have opted for the substantivized use of ἄπαξ, which is used in a spatial sense by Herodotus and Euripides and later by the Presocratics in spatial and numeric contexts. See, for instance, Anaxagoras B 1 ἄπαξ καὶ πάλαιος καὶ εὐπάλαιος (there are similar examples in the A fragments of Anaximander, Zeno, Leucippus and Democritus with ἀπεκτάσεα).

Two operations have taken place: a) to opt for the adjective ending -ός; b) to transfer old uses of adjectives in -ος to the adjectives in -ός. This is explained by the easiness with which a noun like ἄπαξ was created merging both values. This is a systematic phenomenon. The Presocratics begin to develop substantivized uses like ἁπάξ and ἄγετον (Pythag. B 4, Anaxag. B 12, etc.). There will be extremely productive later on in Physics, Philosophy, and Medicine. The principle ἄπαξ is known from Anaximander (B 1), Pythagoras (B 5), etc. It is a new creation.

This is only an example of the Presocratics’ innovations. Among other nouns which appear now for the first time, there are ἄριστος (Anaxag. B 2, Democ. B 9, etc.), ἄπαξ (see above), Ἀμφίδρομος (Parm. 1.33, 4.2), νόμιμος (several B quotes from Diog. Apoll., and some A quotes from Leucippus, etc.), νόμος (Xenoph. B 23.2, Parm. B 46.4, Emp. B 105.3, etc.).

In some other cases both the adjective and the noun appear for the first time in the Presocratics: ἂντικός τὸ ἄπαξ (ὁ ἄντικος is a later term). It is always the sense ‘indivisible’, ‘the indivisible’. The adjective appears in Empedocles (A 43 a) and the noun in the atomist philosophers. It is obviously a creation based on an easy derivation from πάνω (worked out by Empedocles). It is noteworthy that ἂντικός ‘not cut’ is also possible. It appears at the same time in Sophocles (75.1203).

They are no doubt parallel creations. There are also adjectival creations already mentioned, like ἀνίκαθεσθαι and ἀνιγκόπτερος.

3. Lexical systems in the Presocratics

In the archaic period the archaic lexical systems achieve gradually completeness. Sometimes the completion affects the whole language, some other times it affects only a particular genre and author. This has been demonstrated by Elvira Gianguta for the vocabulary regarding life and death and by myself for the semantic field of love in Sappho.

Here there are some examples of how old incomplete lexical paradigms were filled in, even though their perfection would be attained only in later ages. We have, thus, the series ἁθέτωμαι / ἁθέσθαι / ἁθεσθαι (and later ἁθετήσω, ἁθετήσω, ἁθετήσω) in connection with the opposing systems based on wrongly and φωτίζω. I said something above about these systems and their fluctuations in the philosophers’ hands. Also about negative adjectives like ἄθετος, ἀνικάθεσθαι in the A fragments.

The task to accomplish is the study of verbs, nouns, adjectives, and adverbs, or even several words from each class, in order to establish the system of morphological derivations, synonyms, and antonyms. The position of these groups within broader semantic fields must be also accounted for, as the systems may be comprehensive or simply limited.

These systems and subsystems should be outlined by means of establishing distribution and oppositions, as I did for Heraclitus. Note that diverse words with the same stem face within a semantic field words with a different stem. Let us keep in mind here the list of opposing terms worked out by the Pythagoreans (two series related with πάνω and τὸ ἄπαξ respectively) and the well known Heraclitus’ oppositions. The system of oppositions is inherent to Greek thought and continues developing in Plato and Aristotle.

Finally, this is the research project which I propose. This work would pave the way for the study of the later evolution of the Greek philosophical vocabulary, in Socrates, Plato, Aristotle as well as in the Hellenistic philosophies and their heirs of later ages.
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